JUDGMENT : Dr. B.R. Sarangi, J. 1. The petitioner, by way of this writ application, seeks to challenge order dated 05.12.2002 passed by the appellate authority, viz., the Joint Director (Schools), Sambalpur in Annexure-6 in rejecting the appeal, which was preferred by the petitioner against the order passed by the Secretary of the Managing Committee, Jayakrishna High School, Dangaghat, Bolangir preventing him from discharging the duty, which amounts to termination of service, pursuant to order dated 24.03.2002 passed by this Court in OJC No. 8191 of 1997 directing the petitioner to prefer an appeal in accordance with resolution dated 27.03.1983 issued by the State Government. 2. The fact of the case, in a nutshell, is that Jayakrishna High School, Dangaghat was established in the year 1991. It is a recognized private unaided educational institution within the meaning of Section 3(p) of the Orissa Education Act. 2.1. The petitioner was appointed as a science teacher by opposite party No. 4, vide order dated 28.11.1991, in pursuance of which he joined the post on the very same day, i.e. on 28.11.1991, and as such, his appointment was against the approved post of the aforesaid school. On account of X-Mas holidays, the school remained closed and the same was reopened on 03.01.1994. When the petitioner wanted to perform his duty in the school, he was prevented from putting his signature in the attendance register by the Secretary of the Managing Committee, with the help of some of its members, and was also not allowed to perform his duty. Though the petitioner brought this fact to the notice of the authority, with a view to ascertaining the reasons thereof, the same was not acceded to. He then brought the fact to the notice of the Inspector of Schools and subsequently to the Director with a prayer to interfere with the matter, but was of no effect. Though the petitioner brought this fact to the notice of the authority, with a view to ascertaining the reasons thereof, the same was not acceded to. He then brought the fact to the notice of the Inspector of Schools and subsequently to the Director with a prayer to interfere with the matter, but was of no effect. In spite of several requests made to the authorities, when no action was taken, the petitioner filed OJC No. 8191 of 1997 seeking direction to opposite party No. 4-Managing Committee of the school to allow him to perform his duty, as before, and the said writ petition was disposed of by this Court, vide order dated 25.03.2002, permitting the petitioner to prefer an appeal-in view of Government Resolution dated 27.03.1983, which provided the provision of appeal for the employees of the unaided, private recognized schools, in the event the employees of such institutions are prevented from discharging their duty arbitrarily, whimsically and without following the principles of natural justice. 2.2. In compliance of order dated. 25.03.2002 passed by this Court, the petitioner preferred an appeal. Pursuant to the notice issued by the appellate authority, opposite party No. 4 appeared and filed counter affidavit stating that the petitioner, along with three others, remained absent from duty unauthorisedly w.e.f. 29.11.1993 to 30.11.1993 and thereafter from 18.12.1993 to 02.01.1994 They neither came to the school nor took classes nor intimated their absence. But they met the Secretary, Managing Committee on 01.01.1994 and demanded salary for the month of December, 1993. When the Secretary, Managing Committee questioned about their unauthorized absence and issued show-cause notice for the said period, instead of replying the same, the petitioner remained silent, for which another show-cause was served on him on 16.02.1994. When no reply was received thereto, vide resolution No. 20 dated 20.04.1994, the petitioner was terminated from service with effect from 21.04.1994. 2.3. The petitioner gave reply to the counter affidavit filed by opposite party No. 4 stating, inter alia, that the petitioner had never remained unauthorized absence from 29.11.1993 to 30.11.1993 and, thereafter, from 18.12.1993 to 02.01.1994. The school remained closed, on account of X-Mas holidays from 18.12.1993 to 02.01.1994, therefore, the question of unauthorized absence is misconceived and uncalled for. When the petitioner joined on the reopening day, i.e., 03.01.1994, he was prevented from discharging his duty. The school remained closed, on account of X-Mas holidays from 18.12.1993 to 02.01.1994, therefore, the question of unauthorized absence is misconceived and uncalled for. When the petitioner joined on the reopening day, i.e., 03.01.1994, he was prevented from discharging his duty. It is further contended that if the petitioner remained unauthorized absence for the above mentioned period, how opposite party No. 4 paid salary on 01.01.1994 for the said period. For termination of service, no show-cause notice was served on the petitioner, nor was any notice ever communicated to him. Therefore, any document prepared by the Managing Committee for the purpose of the case, on the allegation of remaining unauthorized absence, cannot sustain in the eye of law. As such, the action taken against the petitioner is in gross violation of principles of natural justice. 2.4. Surprisingly, the petitioner was communicated with a letter by opposite party No. 2, vide memo dated 05.12.2002, rejecting the claim of the petitioner holding, inter alia, that the order of termination passed by the Managing Committee on 20.04/1994 was not to be treated as arbitrary and illegal. As the petitioner was an untrained graduate, on the date of his appointment, having not acquired B.Ed qualification, his services were terminated as per instructions of the Director, Secondary Education, Orissa dated 11.08.1997 that no untrained teacher is to be appointed in the High School, thereby, the petitioner was not eligible to be appointed as untrained graduate teacher. It is also stated that if the petitioner was prevented from discharging his duty, why FIR was not lodged by him before the local police station re larding unlawful action of the Managing Committee. Therefore, the contentions raised by the petitioner, that he was prevented from discharging his duty, was not accepted and accordingly, the appeal preferred by him was rejected vide order dated 05.12.2002 in Annexure-6. Hence this application. 3. Mr. D.N. Rath, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that at the time of appointment, the petitioner had no trained graduate qualification, but he was discharging his duty assigned to him. On the reopening day of the school, after X-Mas holidays, i.e., on 03.01.1994, he was prevented from discharging his duty and subsequently, he was terminated from service, vide resolution No. 20 dated 20.04.1994 giving effect to from 21.04.1994, without giving any opportunity to him, which amounts to violation of the principle of natural justice. On the reopening day of the school, after X-Mas holidays, i.e., on 03.01.1994, he was prevented from discharging his duty and subsequently, he was terminated from service, vide resolution No. 20 dated 20.04.1994 giving effect to from 21.04.1994, without giving any opportunity to him, which amounts to violation of the principle of natural justice. It is further contended that if the petitioner was terminated from service on the allegation of remaining unauthorized absence for two days, i.e., 29.11.1993 and 30.11.1993 and, thereafter, from 18.12.1993 to 02.01.1994, but fact remains for the said period he was paid his salary, therefore, it cannot be construed that the petitioner was remained unauthorized absence. Admittedly, on 29.11.1993 and 30.11.1993, he was not on leave and the period from 18.12.1993 to 02.01.1994, the school was closed on account of X-Mas holidays. But the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner had no B.Ed. qualification at the time of his appointment. Therefore, by virtue of instructions of the Director, Secondary Education, Odisha, vide letter dated 11.07.1997, the petitioner was terminated from service. But this plea cannot sustain in the eye of law, in view of the fact that the so called termination was effected on 21.04.1994, pursuant to resolution No.20 dated 20.04.1994, that is much before the instruction issued by the Director, Secondary Education. As such, the Joint Director (Schools) has not taken into consideration this fact in proper perspective and misconstrued the same saying that if the petitioner was prevented from discharging his duty, he should have lodged FIR in the local police station. Thereby, he confirmed the order of termination issued by the Managing Committee, which was done without compliance of the principle of natural justice and, therefore, the same has to be quashed. Furthermore, while issuing the instructions, the Director, Secondary Education has lost sight of the law laid down in Bibekananda Das v. State of Orissa and Others, 1997 (II) OLR 122 , wherein this Court held that continuance of an untrained (Graduate) teacher cannot be treated as illegal. Therefore, it is contended that the order so passed by the Joint Director (Schools) in Annexure-6 dated 05.12.2002 cannot sustain in the eye of law and the same is liable to be set aside. 4. Mr. Therefore, it is contended that the order so passed by the Joint Director (Schools) in Annexure-6 dated 05.12.2002 cannot sustain in the eye of law and the same is liable to be set aside. 4. Mr. P.K. Panda, learned Standing Counsel for School and Mass Education Department argued with vehemence justifying the order passed by the Joint Director (Schools) and reiterated the fact that since the petitioner had not acquired requisite qualification of trained graduate, the authority is justified in dismissing his services and, as such, the order passed by the Joint Director (Schools) confirming the said order cannot be considered to be illegal so as to warrant interference, of this Court at this stage. 5. Mr. D.K. Sahoo, learned counsel appearing for opposite party No. 4 contended that since the petitioner had not acquired trained graduate qualification, opposite party No. 4 is justified in terminating the services of the petitioner and the said order has been rightly confirmed by the Joint Director (Schools) in appeal. Therefore, no illegality or irregularity has been committed by the authority in terminating the petitioner from service. 6. This Court heard Mr. D.N. Rath, learned counsel for the petitioner; Mr. P.K. Panda, learned Standing Counsel for School and Mass Education Department for opposite parties No. 1 to 3; and Mr. D.K. Sahoo, learned counsel for opposite party No. 4. Pleadings have been exchanged between 'the parties, the writ petition is being disposed of finally with the consent of learned counsel for the parties at the stage of admission. 7. On perusal of the order impugned dated 05.12.2002, it would be seen that the Joint Director (Schools) has entertained the appeal in compliance of the order dated 25.03.2002 passed by this Court in OJC No. 8191 of 1997. Before the appellate authority, the contention was raised by learned counsel for opposite party No. 4 that the Managing Committee, as a disciplinary authority, by following due procedure terminated the service of the petitioner in compliance of principle of natural justice. On the other hand, the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner was that the petitioner was not terminated from service but he was prohibited by the Managing Committee from discharging his duty with effect from 03.01.1994. On the other hand, the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner was that the petitioner was not terminated from service but he was prohibited by the Managing Committee from discharging his duty with effect from 03.01.1994. But, such contention of learned counsel for the petitioner was disbelieved by the appellate authority, in view of the fact that if the Managing Committee had prohibited the petitioner from discharging his duty, the petitioner could have lodged FIR in the local police station against the unlawful action of the Managing Committee. Further, without considering the matter in proper perspective, he also found that there was no procedural violation in issuing the termination order by the Managing. Committee/Secretary in favour of the petitioner, and that by issuing show-cause notice enough opportunity was given to the petitioner to resume his duty and, instead of responding to the same, he preferred to receive the salary for the working period, i.e., for the month of December, 1993 to 01.01.1994. This finding of the appellate authority is based on surmises and conjectures. Once the petitioner received salary for the period, i.e., from December, 1993 to 01.01.1994, question of giving opportunity to the petitioner does not arise and nothing has been placed on record to indicate that the petitioner was allowed to discharge his duty. Merely because he had not lodged any FIR against the Managing Committee, for being prevented from discharging his duty, it cannot be said that he was not prevented from discharging his duty. Rather, the consequential action taken by the Managing Committee in terminating the petitioner from service, vide resolution No. 20 dated 20.04.1994, amply justifies the illegality committed by the authority, particularly when before such termination no communication was made to the petitioner nor any opportunity of hearing was given either initiating proceeding or otherwise, thereby the entire action of the authority was absolutely dehors the provisions of law. 8. Apart from the above, for the first time the appellate authority found that when the petitioner was appointed on 28.11.1991, he had not acquired B.Ed, qualification and, therefore, as per the instructions of the Director, Secondary Education, Odisha contained in letter dated 11.03.1997, that no untrained teacher is to be appointed in the High Schools which in turn deprive the schools of getting, fully permanent recognition, the petitioner was not eligible to hold a trained graduate post in the school. Admittedly, such letter of the Director, Secondary Education, Odisha was issued after the petitioner was prevented from discharging his duty and subsequently terminated from service on 20.04.1994. Therefore, such letter issued by the Director will have prospective application only and cannot have any retrospective effect. Even though the petitioner has no trained qualification, but there is no legal bar on the part of an untrained teacher to continue in the school, in view of law laid down in Bibekananda Das v. State of Orissa and Others, 1997 (II) OLR 122 , wherein it has been held that an Untrained (Graduate) Teacher was eligible to be appointed as an Assistant Teacher in a Non-Government (Aided) High School, but he would not be eligible to receive trained (graduate) scale of pay. Untrained (Graduate) scale of pay, however, would be admissible to him The petitioner being a pre 1993 appointee, his appointment cannot be disapproved merely because he does not possess the trained qualification (B.Ed). 9. Applying the said principle to the present context, since the petitioner was admittedly appointed on 28.11.1991, having no trained qualification, as a science teacher in the school in question, which is a Non-Government Aided High School, his continuance cannot be denied by virtue of letter issued on 11.03.1997 by the Director, Secondary Education, Odisha, since his appointment was made on 28.11.1991, that is to say much prior to issuance of such letter. 10. On perusal of the records, it reveals that while terminating the services of the petitioner, principle of natural justice has not been followed by giving opportunity of hearing to him. The sole of natural justice is 'fair play in action'. In HK (An Infant) in re, 1967 1 All ER 226 (DC), Lord Parker, CJU, preferred to describe natural justice as 'a duty to act fairly'. In Fairmount Investments Ltd. V. Secy of State for Environment, (1976) 2 ALL ER 865 (HL), Lord Russel of Killowen somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as 'a fair crack of the whip. In R. v. Secy. of State for Home Affairs, exp. Hosenball, Geoffrey Lane, LJ, (1977) 3 All ER 452 (DC & CA), preferred the homely phrase 'common fairness' in defining natural justice. Natural justice, another name of which sense justice, is the name of those principles which constitute the minimum requirement of justice and without adherence to which justice would be a travesty. of State for Home Affairs, exp. Hosenball, Geoffrey Lane, LJ, (1977) 3 All ER 452 (DC & CA), preferred the homely phrase 'common fairness' in defining natural justice. Natural justice, another name of which sense justice, is the name of those principles which constitute the minimum requirement of justice and without adherence to which justice would be a travesty. Natural justice accordingly stands for that "fundamental quality of fairness which being adopted, justice not only be done but also appears to be done". 11. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818 , the meaning of natural justice came up for consideration and the apex Court held as follows:- "The phase is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of cast-iron formula. Historically, "natural justice" has been used in a way, "which implies the existence of moral principles of self evident and unarguable truth", "natural justice" by Paul Jackson, 2nd Ed. Page-1, In course of time, judges nurtured in the traditions of British jurisprudence, often invoked it in conjunction with a reference to "equity and good conscience". Legal experts of earlier generations did not draw any distinction between "natural justice" and "natural law". "Natural justice" was considered as "that part of natural law which relates to the administration of justice". 12. In Bhagwan v. Kamchand, AIR 1965 SC 1767 , the apex Court held that the rule of law demands that the power to determine questions affecting rights of citizens would impose the limitation that the power should be exercised in conformity with the principles of natural justice. 13. In Shridhar v. Nagar Palika, Jaunpur, AIR 1990 SC 307 , the appellant was appointed to the post of Tax Inspector. His appointment was cancelled by the authorities on the representation made by a departmental candidate who contended that a Tax Inspector's post should has been exclusively filled by promotion. The authority as well as the High Court proceeded on the assumption that the extant Government orders provided for filling up the post of Tax Inspector exclusively by promotion and therefore the appellant's appointment was illegal. The Supreme Court did not agree with the interpretation of the Government order made by the High Court. The authority as well as the High Court proceeded on the assumption that the extant Government orders provided for filling up the post of Tax Inspector exclusively by promotion and therefore the appellant's appointment was illegal. The Supreme Court did not agree with the interpretation of the Government order made by the High Court. But, the Court proceeded to observe that since the order of appointment had conferred a vested right in the appellant to hold the post of Tax Inspector, that right could not be taken away without affording an opportunity of hearing to him. The Court observed as follows: "It is an elementary principle of natural justice that no person should be condemned without hearing. The order of appointment conferred a vested right in the appellant to hold the post of Tax Inspector, that right could not be taken away without affording opportunity of hearing to him. Any order passed in violation of principles of natural justice is rendered void. There is no dispute that the Commissioner's Order had been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellant therefore the order was illegal and void." In view of law laid down by the apex Court it cannot, however, be doubted that cancellation of appointment has adverse civil consequences and therefore before making the order of cancellation the employee concerned must be given an opportunity of making a representation and the elementary of principles of natural justice has to be complied with. 14. In Rajendra v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 90 , the apex Court held that even if the appointment is by mistake, the abrupt withdrawal of the same after the employee has worked for 17 months amounts to violation of natural justice. 15. By order dated 11.09.2017, this Court directed the State-opposite parties to produce the record in connection with the appeal No. 4 of 2002 disposed of by opposite party No. 2-Regional Director-cum-Joint Director, Sambalpur. In compliance of the same, learned Standing Counsel for School and Mass Education Department produced the file. On perusal of the same, it appears that nothing has been placed on record to indicate that there was compliance of the principle of natural justice while terminating the services of the petitioner, pursuant to resolution No.20, on 20.04.1994 giving effect to from 21.04.1994. 16. On perusal of the same, it appears that nothing has been placed on record to indicate that there was compliance of the principle of natural justice while terminating the services of the petitioner, pursuant to resolution No.20, on 20.04.1994 giving effect to from 21.04.1994. 16. In view of the law laid down by the apex Court and applying the same to the present case, this Court is of the considered view that the order so passed by the Joint Director (Schools) in Annexure-6 dated 05.12.2002 cannot sustain in the eye of law, as the same has not taken into consideration the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to violation of principle of natural justice, thereby, the same is liable to be quashed and hereby quashed. Consequentially, the order of termination, vide resolution No.20 dated 20.04.1994 giving effect to from 21.04.1994, passed by the Managing Committee also cannot sustain in the eye of law and the petitioner shall be deemed to be continuing in service as science teacher in opposite party No. 4-school. 17. The writ petition is thus allowed. However, there shall be no order as to cost. The records so produced by the learned Standing Counsel for School and Mass Education Department be returned to him forthwith.