JUDGMENT : Manoj Kumar Gupta, J. The instant petition seeks to challenge the order dated 16.4.2015 passed by Court of Small Causes in Misc. Case No.96 of 2013 rejecting the application of the petitioner under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC and the order dated 19.8.2015 passed by Additional District Judge, Court No.14, Varanasi in Rent Revision No.12 of 2015 dismissing the same. 2. The petitioner was tenant of a residential premises on first floor of building No.D-18/16 Mohallah Ahilyabai Brahmapuri, Varanasi on behalf of plaintiff-respondent (for short 'the landlord'/'plaintiff-landlord') on payment of a rent of Rs.200/- per month. A suit bearing No.61 of 2010 was instituted by the landlord in the Court of Small Causes against the petitioner for recovery of arrears of rent and for eviction after terminating the tenancy by notice dated 6.9.2010. The service of summons was effected by normal mode through the process server as well as by registered post. The summons as well as the registered cover were received back with the endorsement of refusal. The trial court, by order dated 3.8.2011, held service of summons to be sufficient on basis of endorsement of refusal made by Postman on the registered cover. The suit was decreed ex-parte on 22.2.2012. On 11.7.2013 the petitioner filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC seeking an order for setting aside the ex-parte decree. The application was accompanied by another application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the restoration application. On 28.10.2013, the petitioner filed an application supported by affidavit seeking permission to deposit the decreetal amount in compliance of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (for short 'the Act'). The landlord filed objection against the said application contending that compliance of Section 17 ought to have been made at the time of presenting the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. Consequently, the application filed on 28.10.2013 remained pending. On 4.4.2014, another application was filed by the petitioner with the same prayer. On 11.7.2014, the said application was allowed and the petitioner was permitted to deposit the decreetal amount on his own risk. The petitioner claims to have deposited Rs.28,000/- towards the amount due from him under the decree. Consequently, the application filed on 28.10.2013 remained pending. On 4.4.2014, another application was filed by the petitioner with the same prayer. On 11.7.2014, the said application was allowed and the petitioner was permitted to deposit the decreetal amount on his own risk. The petitioner claims to have deposited Rs.28,000/- towards the amount due from him under the decree. The trial court, by order dated 16.4.2015, rejected the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC holding that the petitioner had failed to comply with the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. It also held that the provisions of Section 17 are mandatory in character placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Vs. Mohal Lal Kesarwani and another, 2002 (1) ARC 186 and other decisions of this Court. It was held that the deposit of the amount due under the decree should have been made at the time of presenting the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, but since the deposit was made with considerable delay much after the filing of the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, therefore, the same could not be taken into consideration. The revisional court also took the same view and dismissed the revision. 3. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the object of Section 17 of the Act is to protect the interest of the decree holder and the said purpose stood achieved, as the decreetal amount was deposited on 11.4.2014, much before application under Order 9 Rule 13 came up for consideration, therefore, it is urged that the petitioner had substantially complied with the provisions of the Act and the courts below were not justified in declining to decide the application on merits. Alternatively, it was contended that service of summons was not effected by the trial court in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Order 5 CPC. It was urged that the service upon the petitioner was held to be sufficient on basis of endorsement of refusal made by the Postman, although according to learned counsel for the petitioner, service of summons by registered post is no more a recognised mode of service consequent to deletion of Rule 19-A of Order 5 by Act No.46 of 1999 w.e.f. 1.7.2002. Elaborating his submission, it was urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that once service by registered post is not a recognised mode of service, the court below erred in holding service of summons upon the petitioner as sufficient on basis of the endorsement of refusal made by the Postman. According to him, this amounts to procedural irregularity, a fault committed by the court itself. Consequently, the resultant ex-parte decree ought to have been recalled by the court in exercise of its inherent power under Section 151 CPC without insisting upon compliance of Section 17 of the Act. In support of the said contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgments of this Court in Balbir Singh Chauhan Vs. Vijai Kumar Agarwal, 1987 (1) AWC 388 , Akttaryar Khan Vs. Azahar Yar Khan, AIR 1994 Alld 1993 and Kamta Prasad Vs. Jaggiya AIR 1999 Alld 184. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the landlord submitted that the provisions of Section 17 being mandatory in character, the provisions thereof were required to be complied with strictly in accordance with the procedure laid down thereunder. Thus, according to him, for availing the benefit of Section 17, the deposit should have been made at the time of presenting the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC and any subsequent deposit would not enure to the benefit of the tenant. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath (supra) and a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Raj Kumar Makhija and others Vs. M/s S.K. and Co. and others, 2012 (9) ADJ 337 . 5. In Kedar Nath (supra), the Supreme Court, after taking into consideration the scheme of the Act, held that the provisions of Section 17 are mandatory and non compliance therewith would entail dismissal of the application. The non compliance cannot be condoned or overlooked by the court. It was also held that the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC must be accompanied by deposit in the court of the amount due from the applicant under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment or in case an application is filed seeking permission of the court to furnish security, such an application should be filed upto the time of presentation of the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. The only exception is a case where previous application for furnishing security as prescribed under Section 17 is filed, but there is delay on part of the court in passing order on the application, it would not go against the applicant, as none can be made to suffer for the fault of the court. The relevant observations made by the Supreme Court in this regard are extracted below:- "A bare reading of the provision shows that the legislature have chosen to couch the language of the proviso in a mandatory form and we see no reason to interpret, construe and hold the nature of the proviso as directory. An application seeking to set aside an ex-parte decree passed by a Court of Small Causes or for a review of its judgment must be accompanied by a deposit in the Court of the amount due from the applicant under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment. The provision as to deposit can be dispensed with by the Court in its discretion subject to a previous application by the applicant seeking direction of the Court for leave to furnish security and the nature thereof. The proviso does not provide for the extent of time by which such application for dispensation may be filed. We think that it may be filed at any time up to the time of presentation of application for setting aside ex-parte decree or for review and the Court may treat it as a previous application. The obligation of the applicant is to move a previous application for dispensation. It is then for the Court to make a prompt order. The delay on the part of the Court in passing an appropriate order would not be held against the applicant because none can be made to suffer for the fault of the Court." A Division Bench of this Court in Raj Kumar Makhija (supra), considered the issue as to whether the proviso to Section 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act completely bars any rectification or removal of a bona fide error after the expiry of the period of limitation when substantial compliance by way of deposit of the decretal amount and furnishing security has been made within the period of limitation particularly when Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has been made applicable to Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure? After considering the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath (supra) and other decisions, the Division Bench held that although Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies in respect of filing of an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, but the provisions thereof do not apply to making of deposit of the decreetal amount or stipulation regarding furnishing of security. In other words, it was held that although an application under Order 9 Rule 13 could be filed after period of limitation alongwith application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, but the requirement of deposit of the decreetal amount or furnishing security for performance of the decree should be made upto the date on which application under Order 9 Rule 13 is filed. The Division Bench, in this regard, held as under:- "22. On a plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it would show that it will apply where an appeal or any application has been preferred beyond the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. On a plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would show that it applies to only (1) appeal or (2) making the application. 23. It follows that it does not apply to a deposit. Proviso to Section 17 talks about filing of a previous application for furnishing security, previous to the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree. Thus the period of limitation for filing such application has been provided for under the said proviso. We can usefully refer a Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Messars Janta Cycle and Motor Mart versus Asst.Commissioner(J), II Sales Tax Kanpur Range, Kanpur and another AIR 1969 Allahabad 200. 27. There being no provision under section 17 of the Act for conferring power on Court to condone the delay in complying its conditions, it is not correct to say that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would still be available to such person who has committed default in making the full deposit, and the Court can condone the delay in making the deposit." 6. Admittedly, the ex-parte decree was passed in the suit on 22.2.2012. Admittedly, the ex-parte decree was passed in the suit on 22.2.2012. The application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC was filed on 11.7.2013 alongwith an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the said application. However, alongwith the above applications, the petitioner did not file any application for permission to furnish security of the decreetal amount nor deposited the amount payable under the decree. On 28.10.2013, the petitioner, for the first time, filed an application seeking permission to deposit the decreetal amount. On 11.4.2017, the court permitted deposit of the decreetal amount at own risk of the petitioner and in pursuance whereof, he deposited the decreetal amount. However, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath (supra) and Division Bench of this Court in Raj Kumar Makhija (supra), the deposit made much after filing of application under Order 9 Rule 13 was of no avail and the courts below were perfectly justified in not giving benefit of the said deposit while construing compliance of Section 17 of the Act. The first submission urged by learned counsel for the petitioner has thus no force and is rejected. 7. Coming to the second submission regarding alleged fault on part of the court in proceeding ex-parte against the petitioner by holding service of summons to be sufficient on basis of endorsement of refusal made by the Postman, it would be advantageous to refer to certain provisions of Order 5. It is noteworthy that various amendments were made in the Code of Civil Procedure by Act No.46 of 1999 and Act No.22 of 2002 w.e.f. 1.7.2007. Prior to these amendments, Order 5 Rule 9 provided as under:- "9. Delivery or transmission of summons for service.- (1) Where the defendant resides within the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is instituted, or has an agent resident within that jurisdiction who is empowered to accept the service of the summons, the summons shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be delivered or sent to the proper officer to be served by him or one of his subordinates. (2) The proper officer may be an officer of a Court other than that in which the suit is instituted, and, where he is such an officer, the summons may be sent to him by post or in such other manner as the Court may direct." 8. (2) The proper officer may be an officer of a Court other than that in which the suit is instituted, and, where he is such an officer, the summons may be sent to him by post or in such other manner as the Court may direct." 8. The summons upon the defendant who resides within the jurisdiction of the Court was to be made through proper officer (known in legal parlance as process server). By a High Court Amendment made on 29.3.1958, sub-rule (3) was added. It permitted service of summons upon the defendant by sending it to him by registered post. This was in lieu of or in addition to the service of summons through process server. Sub-rule (3) added by the High Court amendment was to the following effect:- "(3) In lieu of or in addition to, the procedure indicated in sub-rule (1), such summons may also be served by sending it by registered post addressed to the defendant at the place where he ordinarily resides or carries on business or works for gain. Unless the cover is returned undelivered by the post office on account of proper address or other similar reason, the summons may be deemed to have been delivered to the addressee at the time when it should have reached him in the ordinary course." 9. The service of summons by post in addition to the process server, was also recognised as acceptable mode of service by inserting Rule 19-A by Act No.104 of 1976. The said rule 19-A inserted by Act No.104 of 1976 read thus:- "19-A. Simultaneous issue of summons for service by post in addition to personal service (1) The Court shall, in addition to, and simultaneously with, the issue of summons for service in the manner provided in rules 9 to 19 (both inclusive), also direct the summons to be served by registered post, acknowledgment due, addressed to the defendant, or his agent empowered to accept the service, at the place where the defendant, or his agent, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain: Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall require the Court to issue a summons for service by registered post, where, in the circumstances of the case, the Court considers it unnecessary. (2) When an acknowledgment purporting to be signed by the defendant or his agent is received by the Court or the postal article containing the summons is received back by the Court with an endorsement purporting to have been made by a postal employee to the effect that the defendant or his agent had refused to take delivery of the postal article containing the summons, when tendered to him, the Court issuing the summons shall declare that the summons had been duly served on the defendant: Provided that where the summons was properly addressed, prepaid and duly sent by registered post, acknowledgment due, the declaration referred to in this sub-rule shall be made notwithstanding the fact that the acknowledgment having been lost or mislaid, or for other reason, has been received by the Court within thirty days from the date of the issue of the summons]." 10. No doubt, Rule 19-A of Order 5 was omitted by Act No.46 of 1999 w.e.f. 1.7.2002. However, it is noteworthy that simultaneously by Act No.22 of 2002, which also became effective from 1.7.2002, service of summons by registered post continued to be recognised as a valid mode of service by incorporating a specific provision in this regard in Rule 9 of Order 5 CPC, which now reads as follows:- "9. Delivery of summons by Court.--(1) Where the defendant resides within the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is instituted, or has an agent resident within that jurisdiction who is empowered to accept the service of the summons, the summons shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be delivered or sent either to the proper officer to be served by him or one of his subordinates or to such courier services as are approved by the Court. (2) The proper officer may be an officer of a Court other than that in which the suit is instituted, and, where he is such an officer, the summons may be sent to him in such manner as the Court may direct. (2) The proper officer may be an officer of a Court other than that in which the suit is instituted, and, where he is such an officer, the summons may be sent to him in such manner as the Court may direct. (3) The services of summons may be made by delivering or transmitting a copy thereof by registered post acknowledgment due, addressed to the defendant or his agent empowered to accept the service or by speed post or by such courier services as are approved by the High Court or by the Court referred to in sub-rule (1) or by any other means of transmission of documents (including fax message or electronic mail service) provided by the rules made by the High Court: Provided that the service of summons under this sub-rule shall be made at the expenses of the plaintiff. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), where a defendant resides outside the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is instituted, and the Court directs that the service of summons on that defendant may be made by such mode of service of summons as is referred to in sub-rule (3) (except by registered post acknowledgment due), the provisions of rule 21 shall not apply. (5) When an acknowledgment or any other receipt purporting to be signed by the defendant or his agent is received by the Court or postal article containing the summons is received back by the Court with an endorsement purporting to have been made by a postal employee or by any person authorised by the courier service to the effect that the defendant or his agent had refused to take delivery of the postal article containing the summons or had refused to accept the summons by any other means specified in sub-rule (3)when tendered or transmitted to him, the Court issuing the summons shall declare that the summons had been duly served on the defendant : Provided that where the summons was properly addressed, pre-paid and duly sent by registered post acknowledgment due, the declaration referred to in this sub-rule shall be made notwithstanding the fact that the acknowledgment having been lost or mislaid, or for any other reason, has not been received by the Court within thirty days from the date of issue of summons. (6)The High Court or the District Judge, as the case may be, shall prepare a panel of courier agencies for the purposes of sub-rule (1)." 11. The provision for service of summons by registered post acknowledged due thus continued to be recognised as a valid mode of service. The amended provision also provided for service of summons by speed post or by such courier service as are empowered by the High Court or by the court referred to in sub-rule (1) or by any other means of transmission of documents (including fax message or electronic mail service) provided by the rules made by the High Court. The deletion of Rule 19-A was for the reason that a more exhaustive procedure for service of summons not only by registered post, but by other modes like speed post, courier service, fax and electronic mail service were also introduced as valid mode of service under sub-rule (3) of Rule 9 of Order 5. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that as a result of deletion of Rule 19-A, service of summons by registered post upon the petitioner was not valid and court below committed a mistake in proceeding ex-parte against the petitioner on basis of such service, thus has no force and is accordingly rejected. 12. One more facet of the said argument was that where the service of summons was by refusal, the serving officer should have been examined by the court before the endorsement of refusal made by him could be relied upon for holding the service to be sufficient. In support of the said contention, reliance was placed upon Rule 19 of Order 5 CPC, which reads thus:- "19. Examination of serving officer.--Where a summons is returned under rule 17, the Court shall, if the return under that rule has not been verified by the affidavit of the serving officer, and may, if it has been so verified, examine the serving officer on oath, or cause him to be so examined by another Court, touching his proceedings, and may make such further enquiry in the matter as it thinks fit; and shall either declare that the summons has been duly served or order such service as it thinks fit." Rule 19 applies where the summon is returned under Rule 17, which reads thus:- "17. Procedure when defendant refuses to accept service, or cannot be found.--Where the defendant or his agent or such other person as aforesaid refuses to sign the acknowledgment, or where the serving officer, after using all due and reasonable diligence, cannot find the defendant,2 [who is absent from his residence at the time when service is sought to be effected on him at his residence and there is no likelihood of his being found at the residence within a reasonable time] and there is no agent empowered to accept service of the summons on his behalf, nor any other person on whom service can be made, the serving officer shall affix a copy of the summons on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the house in which the defendant ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, and shall then return the original to the Court from which it was issued, with a report endorsed thereon or annexed thereto stating that he has so affixed the copy, the circumstances under which he did so, and the name and address of the person (if any) by whom the house was identified and in whose presence the copy was affixed." 13. It is noteworthy that Order 5 Rules 17 and 19 remained untouched by the Amendments made by Act No.46 of 1999 and Act No.22 of 2002. Order 5 Rule 19 applies where the summon is returned under Rule 17 by the serving officer. Order 5 Rule 16 prescribes that where the serving officer delivers or tenders a copy of the summons to the defendant personally, or to an agent or other person on his behalf, he shall require the signature of the person to whom the copy is so delivered or tendered to an acknowledgment of service endorsed on the original summons. Evidently, the procedure prescribed under Order 5 Rules 16, 17 and 19 are in relation to service of summons through the process server. They do not apply to a case where in addition to normal mode of service through process server, the service is also effected by registered post, as in the instant case. Evidently, the procedure prescribed under Order 5 Rules 16, 17 and 19 are in relation to service of summons through the process server. They do not apply to a case where in addition to normal mode of service through process server, the service is also effected by registered post, as in the instant case. In such cases, the presumption of service is made under Order 5 Rule 9 (5) CPC itself, which provides that where the summon is received back with an endorsement made by a postal employee that the defendant had refused to take delivery of the postal article, the court serving the summons shall declare that the summons had been duly served on the defendant. The law does not mandate that before relying upon the endorsement, the court has to examine the postman. It may be a different matter that the defendant, in order to rebut the presumption, may choose to examine the postman. In the instant case, the service of summons was held sufficient on basis of the endorsement made by the postman that the defendant had refused to take delivery of the summons. The order of the court passed in this regard was strictly in accordance with the legal provisions contained under Order 5 Rule 9 (5) CPC. It cannot be held that there was any error on part of the court in holding the service sufficient on basis of the said postal endorsement. Accordingly, the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner that the court below committed a procedural mistake in proceeding ex-parte against the petitioner on basis of endorsement of refusal made by the postman and thus, it should have set aside the ex-parte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC in exercise of its inherent power, also does not have any force and is accordingly rejected. In view of the above conclusion, the decisions cited by learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention that where an ex-parte decree had been passed on account of fault of the court, the provisions of Section 17 are not required to be complied with would have no application to the facts of the instant case. 14. No other submission has been made by learned counsel for the petitioner. 15. The petition lacks merit and is dismissed.