JUDGMENT : This appeal is filed impugning the judgment and decree dated 8.2.2012 by the Principal Judge, Family Court at Bengaluru (for short, 'Family Court') in proceedings commenced under Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in M.C.No.2501 of 2006. The Family Court by the impugned judgment and decree dated 8.2.2012 has dismissed this petition filed by the appellant for divorce. 2. The appellant and the respondent were married on 24.9.2004, and their marriage was finalized and solemnised by the elders of both the families. The appellant filed the aforesaid petition for divorce contending that the respondent was categorical that she was not interested in marrying the appellant but she was forced into matrimony by her parents. The respondent remained disinterested in every part of marriage life, and as such, the respondent refused consummation of marriage. The respondent was very abusive and she did not spare any occasion to insult and harass the appellant or his family members. The respondent was insisting upon the appellant to set up a separate residence, and the appellant, owing to such insistent demand, set up a separate residence in a rented premises. The appellant to ensure harmonious matrimonial life secured household articles even beyond his income. But the respondent’s conduct did not improve and she continued to avoid consummation of marriage and attending to household work. However, in the year 2005, the petitioner was shocked to learn that the respondent was in the family way as there was never any physical intimacy between them. The respondent, when enquired by the appellant, was evasive in her response and she would only retort stating that she was in the family way because of God's blessings. The appellant thereafter learnt that the respondent was in illicit relationship with someone even before marriage and because of such a relationship, she chose to stay away from the appellant. The respondent left the matrimonial home and gave birth to a child on 12.8.2006. The appellant caused a legal notice for an amicable resolution, but the respondent responded with allegations which only aggravated the ‘Cruelty’ caused to him. Therefore, the appellant filed the aforesaid petition for divorce. 3. The respondent, upon serve of notice of this petition, entered appearance and filed her objection statement contesting the appellant’s case. The respondent asserted that the allegations of non-consummation of marriage was false and her son, Mast. Therefore, the appellant filed the aforesaid petition for divorce. 3. The respondent, upon serve of notice of this petition, entered appearance and filed her objection statement contesting the appellant’s case. The respondent asserted that the allegations of non-consummation of marriage was false and her son, Mast. Shashibhushan was born on 12.8.2006 from the wedlock. The appellant had left the respondent abruptly without informing the respondent. The efforts made by her father to advise the appellant were futile. The appellant and respondent had a good happy marital life so long as the respondent paid money to the appellant, but the appellant abandoned the respondent when he refused to pay further money as demanded by the appellant. The respondent specifically contended that she was under duress by the appellant to sell her immovable property and make over the sale proceeds to the appellant, and only because the respondent refused to accede to such demand, the appellant abandoned her and the child. 4. The appellant has examined himself as PW.1 and has also examined three other witnesses. He has examined his relatives Sri. Prakash Raju, Sri. C.V. Arun Kumar and Sri. B.L. Dhananjay as PWs.2, 3 & 4. The appellant has marked exhibits P.1 to P.8 which include Marriage Photographs, Marriage Invitation Card and respondent’s correspondence with the appellant’s previous counsel. In addition, at the instance of the appellant, the blood samples of the appellant, the respondent and the child, Mast. Shashibhushan were subjected to DNA Typing. The DNA Report from the “Centre for DNA Fingerprinting and Diagnostics”, an autonomous institution of the Department of Biotechnology, Ministry of Sciences & Technology, Government of India, located at Hyderabad is marked as Exhibit C.1. The Report is that while the child’s DNA profile matched with the respondent’s DNA profile, it did match with the appellant’s DNA profile, and therefore, the appellant was not the natural father of the child. On the other hand, the respondent examined herself as RW.1 and marked Exs.R.1 to R.12 which include the photographs of the respondent and the petitioner, the Birth Certificate and School Identification card of the child. 5. The Family Court formulated the following questions for consideration, "(i) Whether the petitioner proves that after solemnization of marriage, the respondent had voluntary sexual intercourse with any other person other than the petitioner? 5. The Family Court formulated the following questions for consideration, "(i) Whether the petitioner proves that after solemnization of marriage, the respondent had voluntary sexual intercourse with any other person other than the petitioner? (2) Whether the petitioner proves that the respondent subjected him to cruelty and ill treatment within the meaning of sec. 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act?, and (3) Whether the petitioner proves that the respondent deserted him for a continuous period of not less than 2 years preceding the date of presentation of the petition?". 6. The Family Court concluded that the appellant had failed to establish that the respondent was in physical intimacy with another person and similarly the appellant had also failed to establish cruelty by the respondent within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Family Court also did not accept the appellant's case that the respondent had deserted him for a continuous period of not less than two years preceding the date of the petition because the petition, even according to the appellant was filed well within the stipulated period. The appellant pivoted his case on the assertion that the marriage between the appellant and the respondent was not consummated, but the respondent had given birth to a child on 12.8.2006 outside the wedlock. These facts established the respondent’s physical intimacy with another person, and constituted ‘Cruelty’ by the respondent. The family Court examined the appellant’s case in the light of the presumption under section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Family Court concluded that in the undisputed facts that the appellant and the respondent were married and they lived together with access to each other, the respondent was entitled to a presumption available under section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act. The court concluded that the presumption available under section 112, an inference of conduct drawn from the proven facts, is a device employed by the court to pronounce on an issue notwithstanding that there is no evidence or the evidence is insufficient, and the presumption has the effect of allocating the burden of proof of issue on one party or the other irrespective of the question on whom the general burden would be. Therefore, the appellant was under an obligation to rebut the presumption. But the appellant had not placed any material on record to rebut the presumption available to the respondent. Therefore, the appellant was under an obligation to rebut the presumption. But the appellant had not placed any material on record to rebut the presumption available to the respondent. Insofar as the DNA Typing Report relied upon by the appellant to disprove the paternity of the child and thus the chastity of the respondent, the Family Court relied upon different decisions, including the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Kamti Devi and another vs. Poshi Ram reported in AIR 2001 SC 2226 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court had declared that a DNA Typing Report, even if scientifically accurate, would not rebut the presumption available under section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 if the husband and wife were living together at the time of conception of the child. Further, the Family Court, upon appreciation of the appellant’s own testimony, including his statement in crossexamination held that the appellant’s case of non-consummation of marriage was not believable. Furthermore, the Family Court concluded that the evidence on record established that the respondent had not deserted the appellant but it was the appellant who had walked out on the respondent. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued in support of the appeal relying upon the later decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik vs Latha Nandlal Badwaik and another reported in 2014 SAR (Criminal) 186 contending that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has concluded that in the interest of justice, the courts should be furnished with the best available science and should not be left to bank upon presumptions; if DNA Test Report were to establish that a child is not born to the father, the father cannot be compelled to bear the fatherhood of the child on the basis of a presumption which is distinct from a legal fiction. This proposition is applicable in all force to the facts and circumstances of the case. The DNA Typing Report is categorical in its conclusion that while the DNA profile of the child matched with the DNA profile of the respondent, the child’s DNA profile did not match with the appellant’s DNA profile. This DNA Report thus established that the appellant is not the biological father. Consequentially, the respondent's infidelity is established, and as such, cruelty by the respondent is also established. 8. This DNA Report thus established that the appellant is not the biological father. Consequentially, the respondent's infidelity is established, and as such, cruelty by the respondent is also established. 8. The learned counsel emphasized that a scientific report, in the absence of a contest, would be part of the court's record, and could be relied upon by courts. A party, who is aggrieved by a scientific report, should summon the author of the report for cross-examination to test the probative value of the report, and if such exercise is not undertaken, the scientific report would be a part of the court's record and could be relied upon by the Court. But, the respondent had not made any effort to contest the DNA Type Report, and therefore, the DNA Typing Report would be a significant piece of evidence that the appellant can justifiably rely upon to rebut the presumption under section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1955. 9. Furthermore, the learned Counsel has argued that the appellant was categorical in his evidence that his marriage with the respondent was not consummated despite the fact that they had lived together for about 20 days in his father’s house immediately after the marriage and in a separate rented accommodation thereafter. Even the witnesses examined by the appellant are categorical that the respondent was disinterested in matrimony and in marital life with the appellant. This evidence, along with the DNA Typing Report, establish that the respondent was in physical intimacy with another person and had begotten a child because of such intimacy. These circumstances have not been considered by the Family Court and as such, the impugned judgment is perverse and irregular and the appeal deserves to be allowed with the appellant being granted divorce as prayed for. The learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the judgment insofar as the rejection of the appellant’s petition under section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent refuted the submission that the DNA Typing Report was not challenged by the respondent contending that the respondent challenged the DNA Typing Report on the ground that the appellant had access to the laboratory that examined the DNA profiles and as such, the report submitted is in favour of the appellant. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent refuted the submission that the DNA Typing Report was not challenged by the respondent contending that the respondent challenged the DNA Typing Report on the ground that the appellant had access to the laboratory that examined the DNA profiles and as such, the report submitted is in favour of the appellant. The learned counsel emphasized that it was undisputed that the marriage was solemnized on 24.9.2004, and that the appellant and the respondent had stayed together as husband and wife initially in the appellant’s father’s place and later in a rented premises. The appellant and the respondent stayed together till September 2005, when the appellant left to Cuttack on duty. The appellant returned to Bangalore in December 2005. They were together even then, and the child was born in the month of August 2006. These circumstances establish that the appellant and the respondent lived together as husband and wife till December 2005 and the child was born in the month of August 2006 and therefore, the respondent had been able to establish necessary ingredients for presumption under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as rightly drawn by the Family Court. The appellant had not placed any rebuttal evidence to dislodge this presumption except making a wild and substantial allegation of physical intimacy with a third person relying upon a doubtful DNA Typing Report. Therefore, the appellant was unjustified in alleging that the respondent was unchaste and asserting that he was not the father of the child. Further, the decision relied upon by the appellant would also not apply in the facts and circumstances of this case. As such, the impugned judgment does not suffer from any irregularity and no interference is called for in this appeal. 11. In view of the rival submissions, the question that arises for consideration is, whether the appellant is able to establish that the impugned judgment suffers from irregularity and the appellant is entitled to a decree of divorce under section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. 12. The appellant’s specific case is that he is subjected to cruelty by the respondent because she refused consummation of marriage despite staying under one roof, and such Cruelty is aggravated by the respondent’s infidelity as established by the birth of child out of the wedlock. 12. The appellant’s specific case is that he is subjected to cruelty by the respondent because she refused consummation of marriage despite staying under one roof, and such Cruelty is aggravated by the respondent’s infidelity as established by the birth of child out of the wedlock. Further, the appellant has also suffered cruelty because of the respondent’s recalcitrant conduct in abusing the respondent and his family members, insisting upon him to set up a separate residence, the respondent’s disinterest in a harmonious matrimonial life with the respondent so much that she would not even cook at home. The appellant to prove his case has relied upon his own testimony and the testimony of his relatives who have spoken of the respondent’s disinterest in matrimony and lack of physical intimacy between the appellant and the respondent. They have also spoken about the appellant setting up a separate residence at the instance of the respondent. These witnesses claim familiarity with the matrimonial affair between the appellant and the respondent because they frequently called upon the appellant and the respondent when they stayed together in a rented house, and they have also stayed over with the appellant and the respondent on multiple occasions. 13. The evidence of these witnesses is sought to be impeached because they are related to the appellant, and therefore they would speak in support of the appellant. The testimony of these witnesses could only be relevant as regards a possible fractured relationship between the appellant and respondent, but cannot be relied upon to adjudge whether there was any physical intimacy between the appellant and the respondent, especially when it is admitted by the appellant that he and the respondent stayed together. Even these witnesses have stated that the appellant and the respondent would stay together during the night in a separate room while they would, whenever they stayed over, sleep in a common hall. 14. The appellant's specific case is that, though the appellant and the respondent stayed together under one roof over a period of time, the respondent was disinterested in marriage, the respondent did not allow consummation of marriage, the appellant is not the father of the child born to the respondent, the respondent has not been loyal in matrimony, and as such, the appellant is subjected to cruelty. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the question whether the appellant's case could be accepted or not will have to be examined only on the basis of the evidence of the appellant and the respondent, and the conclusions in the DNA Typing Report, if that report could be accepted in law. The testimony of the other witnesses would, in any event, be limited to the incidental question of whether the relationship between the appellant and respondent was fractured, which would be one of the corroborative circumstances that could bolster the appellant's case. 15. It is suggested to the appellant in his crossexamination that the respondent refused consummation of marriage insisting upon a separate residence and therefore, the appellant set up separate residence. This suggestion corroborates the first limb of the appellant’s case that there was no consummation of marriage in the initial days after the wedding while the couple resided with the appellant's father. While the appellant contends that there was no consummation of marriage even after they shifted to the rented premises, the respondent states that they lived happily in a rented premises. She has also deposed that the appellant’s family members would visit them at the rented premises, and that the appellant and respondent lived happily in matrimony even as of December 2005 and they attended many functions during the later part of 2005, including the engagement ceremony on 4.12.2005. Further, the appellant and the respondent cohabited until June 2006 as the appellant has left abruptly without informing her, and she vacated the rented premises in the month of October 2006 after the child was born. The appellant also admits that the appellant and the respondent lived together till September, 2005 when he left for Cuttack for work on a short stint of two months. Thus, it is undisputed that the appellant and the respondent stayed together till September, 2005. But the dispute is as regards the consummation of marriage during the time they stayed together, and between October and December 2005 when the appellant returned from Cuttack after a two months’ stint there. 16. Thus, it is undisputed that the appellant and the respondent stayed together till September, 2005. But the dispute is as regards the consummation of marriage during the time they stayed together, and between October and December 2005 when the appellant returned from Cuttack after a two months’ stint there. 16. The undisputed facts are that the appellant and the respondent stayed together till September 2005, that they attended functions together even thereafter in the month of December, 2005 (which could presuppose some strands of marital life between them) and that the child was born in the month of 2006 are circumstances that would satisfy necessary ingredients to draw presumption available under section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. But this presumption is a rebuttable presumption, and the appellant seeks to rebut the presumption placing reliance upon the conclusion in DNA Typing Report which is unequivocal in its conclusion that the appellant is not the natural father of the child born to the respondent on 16.8.2006. After the authoritative pronouncement by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nandlal’s case supra, there cannot be any doubt that the DNA Report could be relied upon to rebut the presumption available under section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus: “17. We may remember that Section 112 of the Evidence Act was enacted at a time when the modern scientific advancement and DNA test were not even in contemplation of the Legislature. The result of DNA test is said to be scientifically accurate. Although Section 112 raises a presumption of conclusive proof on satisfaction of the conditions enumerated therein but the same is rebuttable. The presumption may afford legitimate means of arriving at an affirmative legal conclusion. While the truth or fact is known, in our opinion, there is no need or room for any presumption. Where there is evidence to the contrary, the presumption is rebuttable and must yield to proof. Interest of justice is best served by ascertaining the truth and the court should be furnished with the best available science and may not be left to bank upon presumptions, unless science has no answer to the facts in issue. Where there is evidence to the contrary, the presumption is rebuttable and must yield to proof. Interest of justice is best served by ascertaining the truth and the court should be furnished with the best available science and may not be left to bank upon presumptions, unless science has no answer to the facts in issue. In our opinion, when there is a conflict between a conclusive proof envisaged under law and a proof based on scientific advancement accepted by the world community to be correct, the latter must prevail over the former. 18. We must understand the distinction between a legal fiction and the presumption of a fact. Legal fiction assumes existence of a fact which may not really exist. However presumption of a fact depends on satisfaction of certain circumstances. Those circumstances logically would lead to the fact sought to be presumed. Section 112 of the Evidence Act does not create a legal fiction but provides for presumption. 19. The husband’s plea that he had no access to the wife when the child was begotten stands proved by the DNA test report and in the face of it, we cannot compel the appellant to bear the fatherhood of a child, when the scientific reports prove to the contrary. We are conscious that an innocent child may not be bastardized as the marriage between her mother and father was subsisting at the time of her birth, but in view of the DNA test reports and what we have observed above, we cannot forestall the consequence. It is denying the truth. “Truth must triumph” is the hallmark of justice. 17. The DNA Report is filed by the Centre for DNA Fingerprinting and Diagnostics, Hyderabad pursuant to the warrant issued by the court. The appellant, the respondent and the child appeared before the authority on 23.7.2009 and their blood samples were collected. The respondent was accompanied by her father. Thereafter, the DNA Typing Report was filed into court under acknowledgement. The DNA Typing Report is categorical that the appellant is not the natural father of the child. But, the respondent has not contested this report which is unequivocal. The respondent was accompanied by her father. Thereafter, the DNA Typing Report was filed into court under acknowledgement. The DNA Typing Report is categorical that the appellant is not the natural father of the child. But, the respondent has not contested this report which is unequivocal. If the respondent wanted to dispute the veracity of the DNA Typing Report, it was incumbent upon the respondent to request the Family Court to summon the author of such Report to testify in support of the Report with liberty to the respondent to crossexamine the author. In the absence thereof, the Report will be a part of the court record and the appellant is entitled to rely upon to rebut the presumption. A useful reference may be made to a decision of a coordinate bench of this court in Parappa and others vs. Bhimappa and another reported in ILR 2008 Kar. 1840, which reads as follows: “19. A reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that the report of the Commissioner once submitted to the Court, shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record. It is not necessary that the said Commissioner's report is to be marked as an exhibit in the case. Similarly, it is not necessary that the said Commissioner is to be examined, to prove the contents of the said report. It is up to the choice of the party to examine the commissioner in respect of the matters referred to him or mentioned in his report. The examination referred to in the aforesaid provision is to be understood in the context of the word examination referred to in Chapter 10 of the Evidence Act. The examination includes examination in chief, cross examination and reexamination. Therefore, if a party to the proceedings has no grievance whatsoever against the report of the Commissioner the question of that party examining the Commissioner would not arise. However, if either of the parties do not accept the correctness of the Commissioner's report, it is open for them to file their written objections opposing the said Commissioner's report. Therefore, if a party to the proceedings has no grievance whatsoever against the report of the Commissioner the question of that party examining the Commissioner would not arise. However, if either of the parties do not accept the correctness of the Commissioner's report, it is open for them to file their written objections opposing the said Commissioner's report. In order to substantiate the said objections and to request the Court not to act on the Commissioner's report, with the permission of the Court, they have been given an opportunity to examine the Commissioner personally in the open Court touching any of the matters referred to by him or mentioned in his report, or as to his report, or as to the manner in which he has made the investigation. Normally, when objection is filed to the Commissioner's report contending that the said report is incorrect, to substantiate the said stand it is necessary for the party to examine the Commissioner personally in Court and cross examine him on those aspects in the light of the objections taken. If the party is successful in discrediting the entire report or a portion of the report in respect of which he has grievance, the Court in its discretion may reject the report of the Commissioner. However, if that cross examination do not substantiate the objection taken by the party, it is open to the Court to accept and act on the said Commissioner's report. Only when the Commissioner is examined, then the Court has to consider the report along with the oral evidence in order to appreciate the probative value of the said report and on such appreciation, may accept the report or may reject the report. If the report is rejected in total, it is open to the parties to have one more Commissioner appointed for the very same purpose. But for admission of the said Commissioner's report as evidence, it is not necessary that the Commissioner should enter the witness box, or he should produce the said report before the Court and the Court has to mark it as an exhibit in the case. In other words, without marking the Commissioner's report as exhibit, without the Commissioner being examined in the case, the said Commissioner's report can be taken as evidence in the case. In other words, without marking the Commissioner's report as exhibit, without the Commissioner being examined in the case, the said Commissioner's report can be taken as evidence in the case. Merely because the said piece of evidence is taken on record it does not follow that, all that is stated there is true or proved. Proof and relevancy is different from admissibility of the evidence. 22. In a civil proceedings when an expert is appointed as a Commissioner by the Court at the instance of one of the parties to the proceedings, the Court may issue commission to such experts for the purpose of elucidating any matter in dispute directing him to make such investigation and to report thereon to the Court. It is thereafter when the commissioner/expert submits his report to the Court which appointed him, the report of the Commissioner shall become evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record. Therefore, the report of the commissioner/expert prepared and submitted on the orders of the Courts stands on a totally different footing in the matter of admissibility than the report of an expert prepared at the instance of either of the parties of the suit or at the instance of the prosecution in a criminal case. This fundamental difference is to be borne in mind before appreciating the report of the expert/Commissioner”. 18. Though the respondent has not contested the DNA Typing Report, a feeble effort is made to impinge the DNA Report in the appellant’s crossexamination by suggesting that he had influenced the outcome of the DNA Report. But, this has remained a feeble effort as the respondent is not able to place any material, either by her own evidence or the evidence of others, to substantiate such feeble effort. Therefore, the DNA Report remains a significant and an uncontroverted material on record, which the court has to consider. The conclusion in the Report is strengthened by the tenuous evidence as regards the cohabitation between the appellant and the respondent during the relevant time i.e., between October, 2009 and December, 2009. Even the respondent has admitted that, though the appellant and the respondent stayed together, initially with the appellant’s father and later in two separate rented accommodations, that the appellant was in Cuttack from October, 2005 till December, 2005 and they have not stayed together beyond December, 2005. Even the respondent has admitted that, though the appellant and the respondent stayed together, initially with the appellant’s father and later in two separate rented accommodations, that the appellant was in Cuttack from October, 2005 till December, 2005 and they have not stayed together beyond December, 2005. In fact, the respondent’s only evidence as regards their cohabitation during December, 2005 is that the appellant and the respondent attended a few functions together in the month of December, 2005. However, other than such assertions, the respondent has not furnished details about the nature of cohabitation between them during the month of December, 2005. If the respondent had furnished such details, and established them, those details would have overwhelmed any doubt. In the absence of such details, when the conclusions in the DNA Report and the other circumstances are considered in conjunction with the appellant’s consistent assertion that the marriage was not consummated because of the respondent’s disinterest, the appellant’s case gains credence. Further, the presumption under section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 would also stand rebutted. If the presumption that the child born on 16.8.2006 is born to the appellant stands rebutted, and the evidence as regards cohabitation during the relevant time frame is tenuous, necessary inference will have to be drawn as against the respondent’s fidelity. 19. The question whether a spouse's infidelity would constitute cruelty to the other spouse should be examined in the facts and circumstances of a given case. It is settled law that no uniform standard can ever be laid down to conclude what would constitute cruelty in a given set of facts and circumstances, and that all circumstances that could constitute cruelty, especially mental cruelty, would be difficult to enumerate. As such, the married life of spouses at loggerheads will have to be reviewed as a whole, as against examining a few isolated instances over a short period of time to ascertain whether there has been 'Cruelty' in contradiction to difference because of normal wear and tear in a relationship. Therefore, the test to determine 'Cruelty' is a persistent conduct of a spouse resulting in deterioration of relationship to an extent that the wronged spouse finds it extremely difficult to live with the other spouse. The appellant and the respondent have stayed separately for over 14 years. Therefore, the test to determine 'Cruelty' is a persistent conduct of a spouse resulting in deterioration of relationship to an extent that the wronged spouse finds it extremely difficult to live with the other spouse. The appellant and the respondent have stayed separately for over 14 years. The circumstances discussed above do not speak about respondent’s fidelity in acceptable terms, and further, the evidence on record, especially the testimonies of PW2, PW3 and PW4, demonstrates that the appellant and the respondent have not lead a happy marital life with the appellant complaining of lack of interest and humiliation by the respondent. Thus, in the light of the evidence on record, and the discussion as aforesaid, this court is of the considered opinion that the appellant has established a case of 'mental cruelty' by the respondent. But the Family Court has erred in rejecting the petition by the appellant even as regards 'Cruelty' solely on ground of presumption under section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Therefore, the question formulated for consideration in this appeal is answered in the affirmative in favour of the appellant. As such, the following order: (a) The appeal is allowed. (b) The impugned order dated 08.02.2012 passed in M.C.No.2501 of 2006 by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bengaluru, is set aside. The petition filed for divorce is allowed. (c) The marriage solemnized between the appellant and the respondent on 24.9.2004 at Amenities Hall, Indian Institute of Science Community Hall, Bengaluru, is dissolved. (d) No costs.