ORDER : R. DEVDAS J. Though the matters are listed for “Hearing-Interlocutory Application”, with the consent of the learned counsel on both sides, the matters are heard and disposed of finally. 2. The petitioners No.1 to 4 are working as Teachers in the 5th respondent Aided Institution, while petitioner No.5 is working as Peon-Watchman (Non-Teaching Staff). The 5th respondent was granted recognition in the year 1982-83. It is not in dispute that the 5th respondent was admitted to grant-in-aid in the year 1991. 3. Since the school was being run at the leased premises and since there was a decree of eviction against the Institution, the Institution was temporarily shifted to New BEL road, Devasandra. Thereafter, at the request of the 5th respondent, the respondent authorities permitted the management of the 5th respondent to shift to its own building at Nagashettihalli. When the matter stood thus, the 1st respondent-State Government, through the Department of Primary and Secondary Education, passed an order dated 19.08.2016, withdrawing the salary grants, allegedly without following the due process of law. Being aggrieved, the petitioners made representation to the 1st respondent to withdraw the said order and deploy them to any other suitable school for discharging their duties. On the request of the petitioners, the 3rd respondent the Deputy Director of Public Instructions forwarded a proposal to the Commissioner for Public Instructions for consideration of the representation made by the petitioners and for deployment of the petitioners to any other suitable schools. 4. At this juncture, the 1st respondent, who was the Head Mistress of the school was also directed to issue Transfer Certificates to all the students who were studying in the school, more particularly, the students in the 10th standard. However, another Government Order dated 19.08.2016, was issued by the 1st respondent-State Government, withdrawing the aid given to the staff of the school under Section 53 (2) (1) (i) of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983. Being aggrieved the petitioners approached this Court in W.P.Nos.2241-2248/2017 seeking quashment of the order dated 19.08.2016. The said writ petition was disposed of on 09.02.2017. It was observed in the order dated 09.02.2017 that the respondents have initiated the process for consideration of the representation given by the petitioners and it was also observed that the petitioners are without any gainful employment since September, 2016. The said writ petition was disposed of on 09.02.2017. It was observed in the order dated 09.02.2017 that the respondents have initiated the process for consideration of the representation given by the petitioners and it was also observed that the petitioners are without any gainful employment since September, 2016. Therefore, a direction was issued to the respondents to act in compliance with the provisions of law and dispose of the representations given by the petitioners, within a period of six weeks, consequently, the impugned order dated 22.04.2017, is issued by the 1st respondent, rejecting the claim of the petitioners. Being aggrieved, the petitioners are before this Court. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that during the course of these proceedings, directions were issued to the respondents to deploy the petitioners to any other aided Institution and therefore in compliance of the directions, the petitioners have been deployed to other Institution. However, the backwages were not paid to the petitioners and therefore, the prayer made by the petitioners in so far as disbursement of arrears of salary and continuity of service alone remains to be considered in these petitions. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners draws the attention of this Court to a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Shyamalatha Singh Vs. State of Karnataka and others, in W.A.No.1411/2012, which was disposed of on 11.10.2012. In that matter, under similar circumstances, where the salaries were denied to the teaching staff of an Aided Institution, the Division Bench observed that it is not the case of the Government that they had issued transfer orders pertaining to the petitioner to some other institution. Had this been the position that obtained and if the Teacher concerned did not report for duty at the indicated Institution, liability of the State for payment of salaries would have been temporarily halted. Since that was not a case, it was held that the petitioner was entitled for her salary. It was also held that respondent No.5 is a Private Aided Educational Institution which is deriving 100% salary grant from the State Government. Therefore, it was held, that it hardly matters whether respondent No.5 is directly discharging the State’s obligation to pay salaries to its Teachers, including the petitioner or whether the State does it by itself. It was also held that respondent No.5 is a Private Aided Educational Institution which is deriving 100% salary grant from the State Government. Therefore, it was held, that it hardly matters whether respondent No.5 is directly discharging the State’s obligation to pay salaries to its Teachers, including the petitioner or whether the State does it by itself. It was also held that the very fact that the petitioner was liable to be transferred from one Institution to another on the prerogative and decision of the Government it is clear that it is the Government’s obligation to pay the salary. In that view of the matter, the Division Bench allowed the appeal and directed the respondents to pay salary to the appellants for the period where the appellants did not receive the salary along with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. Further, it was also directed that if the dues were not paid within 30 days from today, interest shall stand escalated from 6% p.a. to 8% p.a. 7. Learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondent-State Government however tries to distinguish between the case on hand, and that of Smt. Shyamalatha Singh (supra). It was contended by the learned Additional Government Advocate that in the case of Smt. Shyamalatha Singh (supra), the Division Bench had observed that the appellant was discharging her duty diligently, while in the present case, the respondentDeputy Director of Public Instructions has observed that the results of the respondent No.5Institution was so poor that it reflected the teaching skills of the petitioners. 8. The contentions of the learned Additional Government Advocate cannot be accepted for the reason that the poor results in the examinations could not be imputed only to the Teachers. Even otherwise no opportunity was afforded to the petitioners to have their say with regard to the observations made by the Deputy Director of Public Instructions. This Court is also of the opinion that the observations made by the Deputy Director of Public Instructions, is firstly an imputation made without affording an opportunity to the affected parties i.e. the petitioners and secondly such unfounded imputation by itself cannot become a ground to deny them an order of transfer. As noted earlier, during the course of these proceedings, the petitioners have already been deployed to other Institution. Therefore, what remains to be decided is payment of arrears of the salaries. 9. As noted earlier, during the course of these proceedings, the petitioners have already been deployed to other Institution. Therefore, what remains to be decided is payment of arrears of the salaries. 9. In the light of the above and in the light of the decision of a Division Bench in the case of Smt. Shyamalatha Singh (supra), the writ petitions are allowed-in-part. The respondents No.1 to 4 are directed to pay the arrears of salaries to the petitioners, as claimed in the representation along with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. In terms of the orders issued by the Division Bench, it is also directed that if the respondents fail to pay the arrears, within a period of sixty days from today, the respondents shall be liable to pay the arrears of salaries along with interest calculated at the rate of 8% p.a. The respondents shall take into account the period when the petitioners were kept out to employment, for the purpose of continuity of the services of the petitioners. It is ordered accordingly.