Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 554 (GUJ)

Babubhai Mohamed Shekh v. Iqbal Husain Shekh

2019-05-06

A.J.SHASTRI

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Mr. S.P. Majmudar, learned advocate waives service of rule on behalf of the contesting respondents. 2. The present Civil Revision Application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is filed against an order dated 15.09.2017 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Kathor (Surat) in Civil Misc. Application No.2 of 2015. 3. The background facts of the present case are that a suit land, bearing Revenue Survey No.216 and Block No.200 admeasuring 2.56.86 sq. mtr. was originally owned and was running in the name of one Mr. Musa Asraf Rim and subsequent to his death on 13.05.1977, on account of mutation and partition, this property came in the hands of 7 legal heirs and a portion which is held by the legal heirs is reproduced in internal page 4 of the petition compilation. 3.1. It is the case of the applicants that No.1 Sarabibi, Wd/o Musa Asraf Rim & Hussai Asraf himself, out of land admeasuring 2-56-86 sq. mtr. sold their undivided portion of land admeasuring 1-00-84 sq. mtr. to applicant Nos. 2 and 3 namely Ms. Nazmabibi Babubhai Shekh & Hanbibabbibi Javidbhai Shekh respectively vide registered sale deed dated 19.05.2005, bearing registration No.1546 registered before the office of Sub-Registrar, Kamrej, Surat. Subsequent to the aforesaid sale deed with applicant Nos. 2 & 3, just after a period of four months on 19.09.2005, Husain Asraf Shekh entered into another sale transaction and filed a suit, bearing Regular Civil Suit No.38 of 2005 seeking declaration and injunction against the present applicants i.e. original defendant Nos.1 to 3 and other legal heirs i.e. defendant Nos. 4 to 12, who are the formal respondents. The declaration is sought to effect/to hold that the sole plaintiff has never given/signed by alleged power of attorney and the consequent sale deed dated 19.05.2005 and to hold the same as invalid/null and void and the applicants herein be restrained from alienating their right to third party. 3.2 It is further the case of applicants that some revenue proceedings were also initiated with respect to mutation entry No.2032 by Usman Asraf and Ismail Akbar on the basis of the sale deed dated 19.05.2005, which was certified on 26.05.2005. Such RTS/Takrari Case No. 20 of 2005 was rejected vide order dated 25.05.2006 and the mutation entry No.2032 came to be upheld. Such RTS/Takrari Case No. 20 of 2005 was rejected vide order dated 25.05.2006 and the mutation entry No.2032 came to be upheld. To this order, RTS Appeal No. 165 of 2006 also came to be lodged before the Deputy Collector, Bardoli, who was pleased to dismiss appeal of Ismail Akbar Shekh and confirmed the mutation entry no.2032. By that time, in addition to the aforesaid sale transaction, other five legal heirs have also executed their portion and sold it by registered sale deed dated 28.09.2005 and revenue entry also came to be mutated as Entry No. 2077 dated 07.03.2006. The same was also challenged by Usman Asraf and Ismail Akbar Shekh by initiating proceedings before the learned Deputy Collector and Mamlatdar, wherein also, Entry No.2077 came to be confirmed. Even subsequent to filing of the suit, the sole plaintiff died on 11.01.2006 and an application was submitted for bringing legal heirs of the sole plaintiff on 03.02.2006 at Exh.34. This application was kept for hearing on 03.03.2007, however, learned advocate for the proposed legal heirs did not cooperate for hearing, and ultimately, the learned Judge was constrained to dismiss the said application vide order dated 03.03.2007. Since learned Judge found that no attempt was made to bring legal heirs on the record of the sole plaintiff, who died, despite having been granted several opportunities, the learned Judge was left with no option but to abate the suit proceedings on 30.03.2007. 3.3 It is further the case of applicants that after inordinate delay of approximately 8 years (precisely 7 years 11 months and 28 days), the legal heirs of sole plaintiff came out with an application for seeking restoration, being Restoration Application No. 2 of 2015 along with condonation of delay Application No.02 of 2015 on the premise that they just came to know about disposal of the suit on 18.03.2015 for the first time and applied for certified copies. The reason which has been assigned is that the learned advocate Mr. S.N. Kazi, who was representing, has never informed the legal heirs of original plaintiff, who expired and as such, a request is made to set aside abatement of the suit and permit them to be impleaded in place of sole plaintiff by condoning the delay. The reason which has been assigned is that the learned advocate Mr. S.N. Kazi, who was representing, has never informed the legal heirs of original plaintiff, who expired and as such, a request is made to set aside abatement of the suit and permit them to be impleaded in place of sole plaintiff by condoning the delay. This application has been opposed by way of filing reply, but the record indicates that the revenue proceedings in parallel were attended, and on the other hand, projecting, as if they were not aware about the suit proceedings and despite the aforesaid situation, the learned Judge unfortunately allowed the application and condone delay of approximately 8 years by imposing cost of Rs.10,000/-, and it is this order dated 15.09.2017, which is made subject matter of the present Civil Revision Application. 4. Learned advocate Mr. Rushabh R. Shah appearing on behalf of the applicants has contended that the order which has been passed by the Court below is not only unjust, but suffers from material irregularity in exercising discretion. It has been submitted that there was a gross delay of approximately 8 years in preferring an application, despite having knowledge about the suit proceedings and the fact of pendency of their application. It has been contended that at Exh.34 application was already disposed of long back on account of complete inaction on the part of original applicants i.e. legal heirs and though they were prosecuting the revenue proceedings, in which there was a clear reference about the suit number, still have chosen not to precipitate any action for being impleaded. It has further been submitted that the sole plaintiff, who filed a suit, had exercised in the year 2006 and for a pretty long period of one year since there was a clear non-cooperation, application at Exh.34 came to be rejected in the month of March 2007, and after almost a period of approximately 8 years, this application has been submitted without any explanation of delay in detail and there was no sufficient reason assigned as to why such a gross delay needs to be condoned. 4.1 Learned advocate Mr. Rushabh R. Shah appearing on behalf of the applicants has further submitted that despite such lack of cogent explanation, learned Judge has allowed application by imposing cost of Rs.10,000/- only. 4.1 Learned advocate Mr. Rushabh R. Shah appearing on behalf of the applicants has further submitted that despite such lack of cogent explanation, learned Judge has allowed application by imposing cost of Rs.10,000/- only. In fact, while exercising discretion, learned Judge ought to have appreciated that the only ground which is mentioned is substantially that learned advocate has not informed the applicants. Now, this reason is not sounding any confidence in view of the fact that it was an obligation of the applicants themselves to keep track of the litigation; if they were so serious. Further, it appears that in a parallel revenue proceedings, they were very much aware about the fact of suit, as there was a clear reference, and as such, it is ill-logical to believe that one has a clear knowledge about the revenue proceedings, and at the same time, not keeping track of the suit proceeding, which was already submitted prior to approximately 8 years, and as such, there appears to be no cogent explanation. 4.2 Learned advocate Mr. Rushabh R. Shah appearing on behalf of the applicants has further submitted that as such it is the obligation of the person to explain each day delay, but even if according to learned advocate Mr. Shah, such principle may not be strictly applied, then in that case also, some reasonable explanation for delay must be reflected and it is not the case that these applicants were residing in a remote place, where it was difficult for them to attend the Court proceedings. In fact, they were situated at a distance of just 5 to 6 Kms. where the Court is situated, and as such, there appears to be some deliberate move to file application after almost a period of 8 years. In fact, even on merit also, there was no good ground in the suit, as the father of legal heirs has sold an undivided share to the present applicants and by referring to a clear assertion that at all three stages, ranging from mutating their name, challenging the concurrent findings of the revenue authorities, by submitting RTS revision in the year 2014 knowledge is inferred. Hence, the reason which has been assigned for seeking condonation of delay is ipso facto not digestable. Accordingly, learned advocate Mr. Hence, the reason which has been assigned for seeking condonation of delay is ipso facto not digestable. Accordingly, learned advocate Mr. Rushabh R. Shah appearing on behalf of the applicants requested the Court to allow Civil Revision Application by holding that the discretion which has been exercised is not based upon sound principles. 4.3 To substantiate these contentions, learned advocate Mr. Rushabh R. Shah appearing on behalf of the applicants has relied upon decision delivered by coordinate Bench of this Court dated 11.05.2012 passed in Special Civil Application No.23728 of 2007, and by referring to paragraphs No.21 to 31, a contention is raised that the ratio laid down by the aforesaid decision is clearly attracting controversy here as well. Hence, revision application be allowed in the interest of justice. 5. To meet with the stand taken by learned advocate Mr. Rushabh R. Shah appearing on behalf of the applicants, learned advocate Mr. S.P. Majmudar appearing on behalf of contesting respondents has submitted that it is settled position of law that delay must be construed liberally, as has been laid down by catena of decisions. It has further been submitted that here is a case in which, unfortunately, learned advocate who represented original plaintiffs has not informed and to the is reasonable knowledge, the advocate appears to have expired, and as such, for the act of learned advocate, the litigant may not be allowed to suffer. A further contention is raised that on earlier occasion, when the application was submitted, the same was well within the period of four days, and as such, this inaction cannot be attributed to the respondents. It has further been submitted that it has been specifically mentioned about the date of knowledge, and as soon as the fact of abatement and dismissal came to the knowledge of the respondents, immediately certified copy was obtained and necessary application without any delay was submitted, and therefore, no delay is attributable to the respondents. Learned advocate Mr. Majmudar has further submitted that Mr. S.N. Kazi, learned advocate who was engaged by the plaintiffs, the said learned advocate has not informed about the proceedings which has resulted into such kind of delay, as a result of this, in absence of any mala fide, delay ought to have been considered leniently. Learned advocate Mr. Majmudar has further submitted that Mr. S.N. Kazi, learned advocate who was engaged by the plaintiffs, the said learned advocate has not informed about the proceedings which has resulted into such kind of delay, as a result of this, in absence of any mala fide, delay ought to have been considered leniently. A further contention is raised that even in revenue proceedings, Deputy Collector has also no doubt taken note of the suit proceedings, but here is a case in which, both the sides were equally not aware about status of the suit which came to be abated, and therefore, the order which has been passed is perfectly justified and well within the discretion of learned trial Judge. 5.1 To substantiate these submissions, learned advocate Mr. S.P. Majmudar appearing on behalf of contesting respondents has relied upon few decisions, which are referred to hereinafter: (i) In the case of Bheraji Deepaji versus Vanzara Mangilal Laduji passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No.527 of 2010 on 04.01.2016, in which also, while condoning the delay lenient view is to be taken, which proposition is relied upon. (ii) In the case of Reeta Ramnayan Yadav versus Rajaram Balgovind Mishra passed by this Court in Civil Revision Application Nos.154 of 2011 to 157 of 2011 on 26.07.2011, and by referring to paragraph No.12 the contentions are raised. (iii) In the case of Mohatta Brothers, Ahmedabad versus Sheth Chaturbhaidas Chimanlal and others reported in 1981 SCC OnLine Guj 49 and has asserted that there is no abandonment of claim by the respondent. 5.2 Hence, when a balance view is taken by learned trial Judge by imposing cost, the same cannot be said to be invalid in any form. Alternatively, learned advocate has also submitted that some heavy cost may be imposed upon, while condoning the delay, but looking to the scope of revision application under Section 115 of the C.P.C., this is not a case in which any interference deserves, and by referring to the aforesaid decisions, learned advocate has submitted that the present Civil Revision Application is being devoid of merits and the same be dismissed. No other submissions have been made. 6. No other submissions have been made. 6. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the rival contentions, it appears that here is a case in which, the sole plaintiff had died long back i.e. in the year January 2006. Initially, the respondents have chosen to prefer Application at Exh.34, but then appears to have not vigilantly prosecuted the same. The said matter i.e. application was not dealt with at all, neither by the respondent nor by the advocate concerned, and as such, way back in March 2007, the same came to be dismissed. It appears that the learned trial Judge was rather constrained to dismiss the matter as no cooperation was shown after just submitting an application, and correspondingly, since the suit was filed by the sole plaintiff, the suit got abated by passing of an order on 30.03.2007. From the record, it appears that for a pretty long period of 8 years, practically no steps have been taken and simultaneously have processed with revenue proceeding, which is quite visible and as such, lethargy and negligence which has been shown appears to be unpardonable but appears to be rather deliberate since on one hand litigant is prosecuting the revenue proceedings and on the other hand, not looking at all about the suit which is a substantive litigation. Hence, it appears prima facie that for a pretty long period of 8 years, there is a complete negligence reflecting on record of the respondents. 6.1 From the application itself, it appears that substantial ground is tried to be made out that the concerned advocate has not informed about abatement of the suit, nor about the proceedings, and further the date of knowledge which has been mentioned as on 18.03.2015. But how that knowledge derived by the respondents is not stated anywhere. Further, it appears that undisputedly this application has been submitted after a period of 8 years without projecting any substantial explanation and further even the date of death of advocate concerned is also not mentioned anywhere. As such, the explanation which has been forwarded for seeking condonation and setting aside the abatement is not possible to be digested, as sufficient explanation. It is true that delay may be construed liberally, but that principle will not mechanically apply specially when there is a huge delay of practically 8 years. As such, the explanation which has been forwarded for seeking condonation and setting aside the abatement is not possible to be digested, as sufficient explanation. It is true that delay may be construed liberally, but that principle will not mechanically apply specially when there is a huge delay of practically 8 years. Law does not permit any equity being claimed by litigant, who is completely at negligence and inactive in tracking the matter. Hence, from the bare reading of application as well as the order which has been passed, the same is not satisfying the Court that any reasonable or sufficient explanation is forwarded. 6.2 Now, keeping the aforesaid factual matrix in mind, before examining the validity of an order, the Court deems it necessary to construe the word 'sufficient', 'adequate' and 'reasonable'. In the context of limitation issue, this Court has an assistance of one of the decisions of the Apex Court, which is in the case of Basawaraj and Anr. versus The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC 746 . The relevant observations contained in paragraphs No.11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 deserves to be quoted hereinafter, as finding it appropriate:- “11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide: Madanlal v. Shyamlal, AIR 2002 SC 100 ; and Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1201 .) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The Statute of Limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 24, p.181: "330. Policy of Limitation Acts. The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence". An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence' or laches. (See: Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn. (2005) 7 SCC 510 ; Rajendar Singh & Ors. v. Santa Singh & Ors., AIR 1973 SC 2537 ; and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 ). 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2002 SC 1856 , this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in A. R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1992 SC 1701 . 15. 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2002 SC 1856 , this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in A. R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1992 SC 1701 . 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature. 6.3 Yet another decision of the co-ordinate Bench of this Court on this very issue is also much of assistance to the present controversy, while deciding the revision application. The Court in Special Civil Application No.23728 of 2007 delivered a decision almost dealing with a similar situation like this which is decided on 11.05.2012 and has in terms held that delay does not deserves to be condoned. The relevant observations contained in paragraphs No.25, 26, 29 and 31 of the said decision, the Court deems it proper to reproduced hereinafter: “25. Under such circumstances, the Trial Court committed a serious error in condoning delay on the ground that the advocate Shri Upadhyay did not inform the original plaintiff as well the respondents about the dismissal of the suit for non prosecution. Under such circumstances, the Trial Court committed a serious error in condoning delay on the ground that the advocate Shri Upadhyay did not inform the original plaintiff as well the respondents about the dismissal of the suit for non prosecution. Even if I assume for a moment that the same is true by itself would be no ground to condone such a long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the Court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief. I regret to state that in the present case, learned advocate of the plaintiff Shri Upadhyay for some reasons has taken up the entire blame on his head and it appears that the same has been done only with a view to get the delay condoned. Over a period of time there is a growing tendency on the part of an advocate to file affidavit trying to explain the circumstances, under which, delay has occurred be it in preferring an appeal or filing an application for restoration of suit like in the present case etc. I am of the view that the practice of an advocate filing his affidavit in an application filed under Order 9 Rule 9 of Civil Procedure Code is totally wrong and deserves to be deprecated. I have noticed in many cases that even though an advocate is not at fault, he would file an affidavit taking the entire blame upon himself only because the lethargic and negligent litigant wants him to file such an affidavit so that the Court concerned in the name of substantial justice would condone the delay. Affidavit of an advocate may come on record in the rarest of rare circumstances and not as a matter of course. Affidavit of an advocate may come on record in the rarest of rare circumstances and not as a matter of course. Let me assume for a moment that in the present case, concerned advocate of the original plaintiff could not remain present on 20/9/1999 the day on which the Trial Court dismissed the suit for non prosecution and thereafter he was not able to keep a track of the suit but was it not the duty of the original plaintiff to keep watch on the proceedings and inquire once at least with his advocate as regards the status of the suit? This could have been done even if the original plaintiff and his family was in U.S.A. I do not blame the original plaintiff in going to U.S.A. but being a litigant in the Court of Law he is expected to keep a close watch on the proceedings as well as on the status of such proceedings. After filing a civil suit a litigant can not go off to sleep and wake up from a deep slumber after 5 years as if the Court is a storage of suits filed by such negligent litigants. If that be so, then Court would be quite justified in dismissing the suit for non prosecution and should be loathe enough to restore the suit unless strong grounds are made out by the party concerned. There is one more reason why I am very serious in commenting on the practice of advocates filing affidavit. There is a general impression in the mind of the litigants that if a lawyer would file an affidavit saying that he was unable to attend the Court or because of his negligence the suit or appeal came to be dismissed then the Court would very willingly accept such explanation and condone the delay. This impression needs to be eradicated. Advocates at time forget that in the zeal to help the client by filing such affidavit they would land up in difficulty if a litigant would file proceedings for compensation on the ground of deficiency in service. 26. At this stage, I deem fit and proper to quote para 8 of the Supreme Court decision in case of Salil Dutta Vs. T. M. & M. C. Private Ltd reported in (1993) 2 SCC 185 . “8. The advocate is the agent of the party. 26. At this stage, I deem fit and proper to quote para 8 of the Supreme Court decision in case of Salil Dutta Vs. T. M. & M. C. Private Ltd reported in (1993) 2 SCC 185 . “8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the party who engage him. It is true that in certain situations, the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex-parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognized. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult. The observations made in Rafiq [ AIR 1981 SC 1400 ] must be understood as an absolute proposition. As we have mentioned hereinabove, this was an ongoing suit posted for final hearing after a lapse of seven years of its institution. It was not a second appeal filed by a villager residing away from the city, where the court is located. The defendant is also not a rustic ignorant villager but a private limited company with its head office at Calcutta itself and managed by educated businessmen who know where their interest lies. It is evident that when their applications were not deposed of before taking up the suit for final hearing they felt piqued and refused to appear before the court. May be, it was part of their delaying tactics as alleged by the plaintiff. Maybe not. But one thing is clear they chose to non-cooperate with the court. Having adopted such a stand towards the court, the defendant has no right to ask its indulgence. Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if they were totally unaware of the nature or significance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot be accepted and ought not to have been accepted.” 29. In the decision of M/s. Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG. Co Vs. Putting the entire blame upon the advocate and trying to make it out as if they were totally unaware of the nature or significance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot be accepted and ought not to have been accepted.” 29. In the decision of M/s. Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG. Co Vs. the Employees State Insurance Corporation [ 1971 (2) SCC 860 ], Honourable Supreme Court held as under: “The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting then in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura sub-veniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims. 31. Thus, I have no hesitation in coming to a conclusion that the discretion exercised by the Court below can be termed as arbitrary or fanciful vitiated by patent illegality resulting in exercise of jurisdiction not vested in law. Such being a case it would be my duty to exercise my supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution and correct the error. Such being a case it would be my duty to exercise my supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution and correct the error. To say that even in such gross cases like the present one Court should not interfere and disturb the order in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, will amount to giving premium to such negligent litigants and will also amount to overlooking and ignoring grave dereliction of duty and abuse of powers on the part of the Court below resulting in grave injustice to the other party.” 6.4 Yet another decision of a recent time, delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority and another versus Gopi Chand Atreja reported in AIR 2019 SC 1423 , the Apex Court has in terms propounded that lawyers' inaction, if projected for seeking condonation of delay then the same cannot be construed as a “sufficient cause”. Hence, relevant observations contained in the said decision are reproduced hereinafter: “18. If, according to the appellants HUDA, their lawyer did not take timely steps, which resulted in causing delay in its filing/refiling, then, in our view, it cannot be regarded as a sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 19. In our view, it was equally the duty of the appellants (their legal managers) to see that the appeal be filed in time. If the appellants noticed that their lawyer was not taking interest in attending to the brief in question, then they should have immediately engaged some other lawyer to ensure that the appeal be filed in time by another lawyer. 21. A delay of 1942 days (4 years 6 months), in our view, is wholly inordinate and the cause pleaded for its condonation is equally unexplained by the appellants. In any case, the explanation given does not constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 21. A delay of 1942 days (4 years 6 months), in our view, is wholly inordinate and the cause pleaded for its condonation is equally unexplained by the appellants. In any case, the explanation given does not constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was, therefore, rightly not condoned by the High Court and we concur with the finding of the High Court.” 6.5 In wake of the aforesaid proposition of law, when the facts of case on hand; as stated above, if are to be looked into, there appears to be a clear inaction on the part of the respondents in approaching the Court after almost a period of 8 years (precisely 7 years 11 months and 26 days) and the reason which has been assigned in an application which is reflecting on page 19 of the petition compilation will clearly suggests that the reason cannot be said to be “sufficient cause” for seeking condonation. The law of limitation, as state above, has a specific object and as such, whenever there is a long delay, stringent scrutiny of explanation deserves to be analysed and while doing so, there appears to be a complete lack of sufficient reason. Hence, when the statute has prescribed a particular period, it has to be maintained and the object of prescription of limitation cannot be given go-bye, by just imposing a cost, especially when no sufficient reason is put forth for claiming condonation. Since the law of limitation is based on sound public policy, absence of bona fide reasons should strictly assumes significance. The Court is, in the aforesaid situation, of the considered opinion that the learned Judge has not examined the issue and the conduct of respondents in true prospective. 6.6 Additionally, it appears that the discretion which has been entrusted with the Court, always to be exercised on the basis of sound principles of law and cannot be in an arbitrary or fanciful manner. The duty of a Court is to maintain the object of statute rather than to defeat by adopting an alternative mode by imposing cost; especially in a situation, where no sufficient cause is being projected by litigant. The duty of a Court is to maintain the object of statute rather than to defeat by adopting an alternative mode by imposing cost; especially in a situation, where no sufficient cause is being projected by litigant. 6.7 Hence, the aforesaid situation is driving at a one conclusion only that exercise of discretion by the Court is unwarranted in the peculiar background of the present facts, and as such, learned advocate appearing for the applicants has rightly submitted and relied upon decision delivered by the coordinate Bench, as referred to above. 6.8 In view of the aforesaid situation, the judgments which have been relied upon by the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, if are to be looked into, no doubt the said decisions are suggesting that a liberal view is to be taken, while dealing with an issue of limitation vis-à-vis delay. 6.9 The first judgment which has been relied upon, as a decision delivered by this Court on 04.01.2016 in Special Civil Application No.527 of 2010 and if the said decision to be looked into, it is essentially dealing with an issue about compensation to be paid to the legal heirs on the death of head of the family, and as such, the motor accident claim statute, being a social legislation having its own benevolent object, and as such, if in that background while dealing with an award of compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased person, if delay is construed, the said order cannot be allowed to be pressed as a straitjacket formula in a different set of circumstance. This Court is clearly inconformity with the said principle, but the background of fact is altogether different which is not permitting this Court to apply straightway particularly when another co-ordinate Bench on in almost similar issue has precisely dealt with. Second judgment which has been relied upon is a decision delivered by this Court on 26.07.2011 passed in Civil Revision Applications No.154 to 157 of 2011 to 157 of 2011 and the Court in that case was dealing with the proceedings which were lodged before the Charity Commissioner. So again, the Court had condoned the delay in that case in almost different contextual situation. So again, the Court had condoned the delay in that case in almost different contextual situation. A close reading of the said decision has no doubt taken a view to condone the delay, but in the very same decision, the Court has clarified that while considering the question of condonation of delay no straitjacket formula to be applied while coming to the conclusion whether the cause is sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not. Each case has to be weighed from its facts and circumstances in which the party acts and behaves, hence, this very decision has clarified in paragraph No.12. Hence, in the said judgment, since delivered in a peculiar set of that case, when the Court came to the conclusion that good ground was made out, but here a bare look at the record and the contents of application are clearly suggesting that lame excuse is made out, instead of projecting a sufficient cause explanation, here cannot be compared with the explanation which appeared in the aforesaid decision. 6.10 Yet another decision, which has been tried to be relied upon is a decision reported in AIR 1982 Gujarat Page 92 and while referring to the said decision no doubt each day delay is not expected to be explained by litigant, but that judgment has not indicated anywhere that in every situation, liberal view is to be taken. Here, the Court is not accepting also a litigant to explain each day delay, but at least for a pretty long period of 8 years, some substantial, sufficient, reasonable and understandable explanation must be made out. Here, the facts situation are altogether different, as a result of this, the Court is of the opinion that the decisions which have been relied upon by learned advocate for the respondents are not of any assistance. 6.11 In fact, the Court has further an advantage of a decision of the Apex Court in the case of H. Dohil Constructions Company Private Limited versus Nahar Exports Limited and another reported in (2015) 1 SCC 680 , in which also, the Apex Court has dealt with an issue of ordinate delay. In the said decision, the Apex Court has clearly observed that there must be stringent scrutiny of explanation needed to determine sufficiency of cause of such delay. In the said decision, the Apex Court has clearly observed that there must be stringent scrutiny of explanation needed to determine sufficiency of cause of such delay. In the said decision, the Court has relied upon some of the decisions of Apex Court and than arrived at a conclusion that reasons in that case have been assigned casually, hence, not accepted, as sufficient explanation. The relevant observations contained in the said decision referred to in paragraphs No. 22 and 23 since relevant are reproduced hereinafter:- “22. In this context a Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in T.N. Mercantile Bank Ltd. v. Appellate Authority can be usefully referred to paras l4 and 17 are relevant for our purpose, which read as under: (LLN pp. 462-64) “14. We are unable to agree with the reasoning of the learned Judge that no litigant ordinarily stands to benefit by instituting a proceeding beyond time. It is common knowledge that by delaying a matter, evidence relating to the matter in dispute may disappear and very often the party concerned may think that preserving the relevant records would be unnecessary in view of the fact that there was no further proceeding. If a litigant chooses to approach the Court long after the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, he cannot say that no prejudice would be caused to the other side by the delay being condoned. The other side would have in all probability destroyed the records thinking that the records would not be relevant as there was no further proceeding in the matter. Hence to view a matter of condonation of delay with a presupposition that no prejudice will be caused by the condonation of delay to the respondent in that application will be fallacious. In our view, each case has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of the case. Length of the delay is a relevant matter to be taken into account while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. It is not open to any litigant to fix his own period of limitation for instituting proceedings for which law has prescribed periods of limitation. * * * 17..... Length of the delay is a relevant matter to be taken into account while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. It is not open to any litigant to fix his own period of limitation for instituting proceedings for which law has prescribed periods of limitation. * * * 17..... Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long time, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay, and m such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that substantial justice deserved to be preferred as against technical considerations. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. Rules of limitation are based on principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. Is a litigant liable to have a Damocles' sword hanging over his head indefinitely for a period to be determined at the whims and fancies of the opponent?” 23. We may also usefully refer to the recent decision of this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee where several principles were culled out to he kept in mind while dealing with such applications for condonation of delay. Principles (iv), (v), (viii), (ix) and (x) of para 21 can be usefully referred to, which read as under: (SCC pp. 658- 59) “21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. * * * 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of e prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.” 6.12 While considering the aforesaid proposition of law laid down on this issue by various decisions of the Apex Court, this Court on the scrutiny of present explanation given by the respondents, finding it difficult to accept the same as a sufficient cause and the discretion which has been exercised by the Court below is not a sound exercise discretion and there appears to be a clear error of exercise of jurisdiction. Hence, the order under challenge deserves to be corrected. 6.13 Now, while dealing with final issue which has been raised by learned counsel for the opponents that scope of revision application is limited to substitute the finding. But, here a the case in which there is complete ignorance shown by the Court about aforesaid proposition of law laid down by various decisions of the Apex Court and further, there was complete lack of sufficiency of explanation, and therefore, this Court is of the opinion that scope of revision is not that much limited to allow perpetuation of illegality and serious irregularity, while exercising discretion. A case is made out by the revision applicants and the Court would not like to tinker with the object of law of limitation by just allowing the party to pay some higher amount of costs which may have the effect of frustrating the very object of the provisions. As stated above, the law of limitation has its own object and significance behind the prescribing period. Resultantly, it is not open for the applicants to just pay costs and dilute the object of limitation. 6.14 Accordingly, the present Civil Revision Application is allowed and the impugned order dated 15.09.2017 passed by the Additional Civil Judge, Kathor (Surat) in Civil Misc. Application No.2 of 2015 is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute. Further order When the judgment is pronounced, learned advocate Mr. 6.14 Accordingly, the present Civil Revision Application is allowed and the impugned order dated 15.09.2017 passed by the Additional Civil Judge, Kathor (Surat) in Civil Misc. Application No.2 of 2015 is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute. Further order When the judgment is pronounced, learned advocate Mr. S.P. Majmudar appearing on behalf of contesting respondent has requested the Court to suspend the operation of present order so as to enable him to approach the higher forum. The Court considering the request, though opposed by the petitioners, deems it proper to extend the time for a period of four weeks from today. Revision allowed.