JUDGMENT : Dr. B.R. Sarangi, J. 1. The petitioner, who was working as a Head Assistant-cum-Cashier in Kodala Branch of State Bank of India, has filed this writ application seeking to quash the order dated 17.08.2002 in Annexure-4 passed by the disciplinary authority-opposite party no.3 imposing punishment of removal from service and treating the period of suspension as not on duty, as well as the order dated 28.10.2002 in Annexure-3 of the appellate authority confirming the order passed by the disciplinary authority, and also the order dated 06.03.2007 in Annexure-1 passed by the Chief General Manager-opposite party no. 1 rejecting the representation filed by the petitioner. 2. The factual matrix of the case, in hand, is that the petitioner joined in the State Bank-of India as Cashier-cum-Clerk on 07.04.1982 and, thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Head Assistant Cash on 30.01.1999. Though the petitioner was Head Assistant Cash, but on 20.04.2000, he was in charge of three posts, i.e., in addition to his own post, he was in charge of Deputy Manager Cash and Cashier. On the said date, the petitioner received four government challans amounting to Rs.390/-, Rs.940/-, Rs.14550/- and Rs.1400/- (though actually the challan was for Rs.11400/-) total amounting to Rs.27,280/- deposited by a stamp vendor. But mistakenly Rs.17280/- was entered in the records owing to wrong stamping over one challan amounting to Rs.11400/-, which was erroneously construed by the petitioner as Rs.1400/-. Though the deposit challans and entries were checked and cross-checked by Accounts Manager and Branch Manager, the mistake was not looked into and challans were sent to the main office at Khalikote. 2.1. On 10.05.2000, petitioner came to know the mistake after 21 days at Chhatrapur District Treasury Office. Therefore, on 11.05.2000, he deposited Rs.10,000/-, but the Branch Manager-opposite party no. 4 asked him to give explanation. On 24.05.2000, the opposite party no. 3, without awaiting the explanation as sought by opposite party no. 4, passed the order of suspension. On 25.05.2000, the petitioner submitted explanation before opposite party no. 4 explaining the unfortunate incident. On 23.06.2000, the petitioner was charge sheeted and he was asked to file show-cause within seven days. In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted his reply to show cause on 17.07.2000. Thereafter, on 27.07.2002, after perusing the show cause reply filed by the petitioner, opposite party no. 3 called upon him for personal hearing. 4 explaining the unfortunate incident. On 23.06.2000, the petitioner was charge sheeted and he was asked to file show-cause within seven days. In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted his reply to show cause on 17.07.2000. Thereafter, on 27.07.2002, after perusing the show cause reply filed by the petitioner, opposite party no. 3 called upon him for personal hearing. But, thereafter, on 17.08.2002, opposite party no. 3, without considering the case of the petitioner, passed the order of removal from service and treated the suspension period as not on duty. Challenging such order, the petitioner preferred an appeal on 21.09.2002, but the appellate authority, without considering the appeal in proper perspective, rejected the same on 28.10.2002 by confirming the order passed by the disciplinary authority. Thereafter, a representation was filed by the petitioner on 23.03.2004, but the same was rejected by opposite party no. 2 on 14.01.2005. Challenging the order dated 14.01.2005 and 28.10.2002, the petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 6577 of 2006, which was withdrawn, vide order dated 10.08.2006, with a liberty to approach the authority, by filing representation, within two weeks. In compliance of order dated 10.08.2006, the petitioner filed a representation before opposite party no. 1, who, without delving into the matter and in a mechanical manner, rejected the representation filed by the petitioner vide order dated 06.03.2007 in Annexure-1 and confirmed the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority. Hence this application. 3. Mr. S.K. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner, while working as Head Assistant-cum-Cashier in Kodala Branch of State Bank of India, was subjected to a proceeding and called upon by the disciplinary authority to show cause vide letter dated 22.05.2002, which was received by the petitioner on 29.05.2002. Although the petitioner submitted his reply, but the disciplinary authority, without considering the same in proper perspective, imposed punishment of removal from service and treated the period of suspension as not on duty, in view of the provisions contained in paragraph-521 (5)(b) of the Sastry Award as amended in the 6th Bipartite Settlement. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred appeal, but the appellate authority, without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and without assigning reason, rejected the same on 28.10.2002 and confirmed the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred appeal, but the appellate authority, without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and without assigning reason, rejected the same on 28.10.2002 and confirmed the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority. The petitioner then approached to this Court by filing W.P.(C) No.6577 of 2006 which was disposed of as withdrawn, vide order dated 10.08.2006, with a liberty to the petitioner to approach the authority, by filing representation, within two weeks. In obedience to the said order, the petitioner submitted a representation on 22.08.2006 before the Chief General Manager, State Bank of India, but the same was also rejected on 06.03.2007 vide Annexure-1. It is contended that a glimpse on the orders under Annexures-3 and 4 would indicate that both the disciplinary authority and appellate authority have, without assigning any reason and without complying with the principles of natural justice, passed the orders. Therefore, he seeks for interference of this Court. 4. Mr. P.V. Balkrishnan, learned counsel for opposite party-Bank argued with vehemence and contended that, in view of the irregularities committed by the petitioner, a proceeding was initiated against him and charges framed against him having been proved, the disciplinary authority called upon him to show cause. In response thereto, the petitioner submitted his reply, and the disciplinary authority, on consideration of the same, passed the order of punishment, as already stated hereinbefore, in Annexure-4 dated 17.08.2002. Against such order of punishment, the petitioner preferred appeal and the appellate authority, taking into consideration the gravity of offence, rejected the same in Annexure-3 dated 28.10.2002. It is contended that the orders, referred to above, having been passed in due compliance of the provisions of law, the same may not be interfered with. It is further contended that the petitioner also filed a representation before the Chief General Manager, who, in its turn rejected the same, vide order dated 06.03.2007, having been satisfied that the petitioner has committed gross irregularity and, thereby, confirmed the orders passed by the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority. Therefore, the orders so passed by the authorities are wholly and fully justified, which do not call for any interference by this Court: 5. This Court heard Mr. S.K. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. P.V. Balkrishna, learned counsel for the opposite party-bank, and perused the record. Therefore, the orders so passed by the authorities are wholly and fully justified, which do not call for any interference by this Court: 5. This Court heard Mr. S.K. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. P.V. Balkrishna, learned counsel for the opposite party-bank, and perused the record. Pleadings having been exchanged, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, this writ petition is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 6. Admittedly, the petitioner, who was working as Head Assistant-cum-Cashier in Kodala Branch of State Bank of India., received a Government challan, wherein the amount described was Rs. 11,400/-, but the petitioner had shown the amount received from the customer as Rs. 1,400/-. Later on, when the shortfall surfaced, the petitioner deposited the balance amount and stated that it was an unseen mistake. Consequentially, he was called upon to give explanation, but, before he could submit his reply, he was placed under suspension, and a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him by issuing charge sheet. After the enquiry report was submitted finding the petitioner guilty of charges, the disciplinary authority called upon the petitioner to show cause, pursuant to which the petitioner submitted his reply denying all the charges levelled against him but the disciplinary authority, having not satisfied with the explanation submitted by the petitioner and considering the gravity of offence, inflicted punishment of removal from service and treated the suspension period as not on duty, vide order dated 17.08.2002 in Annexure-4, in view of paragraph-521 (5)(b) of the Sastry Award as amended in the 6th Bipartite Settlement. But, on perusal of the order passed by the disciplinary authority, it appears that the disciplinary authority has not assigned any reason with regard to the findings arrived at by it that the petitioner was guilty of charges levelled against him. Furthermore, challenging the order of the disciplinary authority, the petitioner had preferred appeal and the appellate authority, vide order dated 28.10.2002 in Annexure-3, evidently, without any application of mind and without assigning any reason, rejected the same and confirmed the order passed by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, on careful perusal of both the orders dated 17.08.2002 in Annexure-4 and dated 28.10.2002 in Annexure-3 passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority respectively, it can be seen that none of the authorities, while doing so, have assigned any reason. Therefore, on careful perusal of both the orders dated 17.08.2002 in Annexure-4 and dated 28.10.2002 in Annexure-3 passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority respectively, it can be seen that none of the authorities, while doing so, have assigned any reason. Furthermore, the order of dismissal has been apparently passed without following due procedure of law, apart from non-furnishing of reasons in support thereof. 7. It is of relevance to note that reasons being a necessary concomitant to passing an order, the appellate authority can thus discharge its duty in a meaningful manner either by furnishing the same expressly or by necessary reference to those given by the original authority. 8. In Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor, AIR 1974 SC 87 , it has been held that reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject-matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial and reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and conclusions reached. The reasons assure an inbuilt support to the conclusion and decision reached. Recording of reasons is also an assurance that the authority concerned applied its mind to the facts on record. It is vital for the purpose of showing a person that he is receiving justice. Similar view has also been taken in Uma Charan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 1915 , Patitapaban Pala v. Orissa Forest Development, Corporation Ltd. & another, 2017 (I) OLR 5 and in Banambar Parida v. Orissa Forest Development Corporation Limited, 2017 (I) OLR 625 . 9. Apart from what have been stated above, the record reveals that the authorities, while passing the orders, have violated the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as, nothing has been placed on record to indicate that opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner. In other words, it can be well said that the orders have been passed by both the authorities without compliance of the principles of natural justice. 10. It is settled position of law that the sole of natural justice is 'fair play in action'. In HK (An Infant) in re, (1967) 1 All ER 226 (DC), Lord Parker, CJU, preferred to describe natural justice as 'a duty to act fairly'. In Fairmount Investments Ltd. V. Secy. 10. It is settled position of law that the sole of natural justice is 'fair play in action'. In HK (An Infant) in re, (1967) 1 All ER 226 (DC), Lord Parker, CJU, preferred to describe natural justice as 'a duty to act fairly'. In Fairmount Investments Ltd. V. Secy. of State for Environment, (1976) 2 ALL ER 865 (HL), Lord Russel of Killowen somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as 'a fair crack of the whip'. In R. v. Secy., of State for Home Affairs, ex p. Hosenball, Geoffrey Lane, LJ (1977) 3 All ER 452 (DC & CA), preferred the homely phrase 'common fairness' in defining natural justice. Natural justice, another name of which is sense justice, is the name of those principles which constitute the minimum requirement of justice and without adherence to which justice would be a travesty. Natural justice accordingly stands for that "fundamental quality of fairness which being adopted, justice not only be done but also appears to be done". 11. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818 , the meaning of natural justice came up for consideration and the apex Court held as follows:- "The phase is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of cast-iron formula. Historically, "natural justice" has been used in a way, "which implies the existence of moral principles of self evident and unarguable truth", "natural justice" by Paul Jackson, 2nd Ed. Page-1, In course of time, judges nurtured in the traditions of British jurisprudence, often invoked it in conjunction with a reference to "equity and good conscience". Legal experts of earlier generations did not draw any distinction between "natural justice" and "natural law". "Natural justice" was considered as "that part of natural law which relates to the administration of justice". 12. In Bhagwan v. Ramchand, AIR 1965 SC 1767 , the apex Court held that the rule of law demands that the power to determine questions affecting rights of citizens would impose the limitation that the power should be exercised in conformity with the principles of natural justice. 13. In Shridhar v. Nagar Palika, Jaunpur, AIR 1990 SC 307 , the appellant was appointed to the post of Tax Inspector. 13. In Shridhar v. Nagar Palika, Jaunpur, AIR 1990 SC 307 , the appellant was appointed to the post of Tax Inspector. His appointment was cancelled by the authorities on the representation made by a departmental candidate who contended that a Tax Inspector's post should has been exclusively filled by promotion The authority as well as the High Court proceeded on the assumption that the extant Government orders provided for filling up the post of Tax Inspector exclusively by promotion and therefore the appellant's appointment was illegal. The Supreme Court did not agree with the interpretation of the Government order made by the High Court. But, the Court proceeded to observe that since the order of appointment had conferred a vested right in the appellant to hold the post of Tax Inspector, that right could not be taken away without affording an opportunity of hearing to him. The Court observed as follows: "It is an elementary principle of natural justice that no person should be condemned without hearing. The order of appointment conferred a vested right in the appellant to hold the post of Tax Inspector, that right could not be taken away without affording opportunity of hearing to him. Any order passed in violation of principles of natural justice is rendered void. There is no dispute that the Commissioner's Order had been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellant therefore the order was illegal and void." In view of law laid down by the apex Court it cannot, however, be doubted that removal from service has adverse civil consequences and therefore before making the order of removal the employee concerned must be given an opportunity and the elementary of principles of natural justice has to be complied with. 14. Similar question had come up for consideration before this Court in Akshya Kumar Routray v. State Bank of India (W.P.(C) No. 2599 of 2001, disposed of on 20.08.2019) and this Court held that the order having been passed without assigning any reason and without complying the principles of natural justice, quashed the same. 15. 14. Similar question had come up for consideration before this Court in Akshya Kumar Routray v. State Bank of India (W.P.(C) No. 2599 of 2001, disposed of on 20.08.2019) and this Court held that the order having been passed without assigning any reason and without complying the principles of natural justice, quashed the same. 15. In view of the facts and law, as discussed above, this Court is of the considered view that the order dated 17.08.2002 so passed by the disciplinary authority in Annexure-4, the order dated 28.10.2002 passed by the appellate authority in Annexure-2, and consequential order dated 06.03.2007 in Annexure-1 passed by the Chief General Manager, while disposing of the representation of the petitioner, cannot sustain in the eye of law and are liable to be quashed and are hereby quashed. The matter is remitted back to the disciplinary authority to pass a reasoned and speaking order afresh in accordance with law by complying with the principles of natural justice. 16. The writ petition is thus allowed. However, there shall be no order as to cost.