ORDER : 1. The petitioner has preferred this Criminal Misc. Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking the following relief:- “It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Misc. Petition may kindly be allowed and the order dated 16.01.2019, 23.01.2019 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gulabpura, District Bhilwara whereby application under section 91 and 311 of Cr.P.C. and thereafter application for seeking time for approach the higher court for challenging the order dated 16.01.2019 filed by the petitioner was dismissed, may kindly be quashed and directed to learned Court to recalled the respondent no. 2 for evidence along with the relevant documents registered sale deed, income return for the period 2013-2014 and bank statement for the period 2011-2013.” 2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent no. 2 filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in which the trial Court recorded the evidence of PW-1 Om Prakash and thereafter recorded the evidence of the accused. The present petitioner accused filed an application under Sections 91 and 311 Cr.P.C. for recalling the respondent no. 2. It was stated that the complainant has not submitted any record or documents regarding transaction of the alleged amount of Rs. 15 lakhs and has also not submitted any income tax details and other documents which could prove that the complainant had no capacity to pay Rs. 15 lakhs. The learned trial Court rejected the said application of the petitioner vide impugned order dated 16.1.2019. 3.1 Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that due to the mistake of the counsel, initially such issues were not raised on behalf of the petitioner and even if he examined and cross-examined the complainant, then also, the petitioner was unable to suggest or get such details from the complainant. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hoffman Andreas vs. Inspector of Customs, Amritsar, (2000) 10 SCC 430 relevant paras nos. 6 to 9 whereof read as follows:- “6. Normally, at this late stage, we would be disinclined to open up a closed trial once again. But we are persuaded to consider it in this case on account of the unfortunate development that took place during trial i.e. the passing away of the defence Counsel midway of the trial. 6 to 9 whereof read as follows:- “6. Normally, at this late stage, we would be disinclined to open up a closed trial once again. But we are persuaded to consider it in this case on account of the unfortunate development that took place during trial i.e. the passing away of the defence Counsel midway of the trial. The Counsel who was engaged for defending the appellant had cross-examined the witnesses but he could not complete the trial because of his death. When the new Counsel took up the matter he would certainly be under the disadvantage that he could not ascertain from the erstwhile counsel as to the scheme of the defence strategy which the predeceased advocate had in mind or as to why he had not put further questions on certain aspects. In such circumstances, if the new Counsel thought to have the material witnesses further examined, the court could adopt latitude and a liberal view in the interest of justice, particularly when the court has unbridled powers in the matter as enshrined in Section 311 of the Code. After all the trial is basically for the prisoners and courts would afford the opportunity to them in the fairest manner possible. 7. We think that the plea of the defence that a further opportunity to put more questions to the three prosecution witnesses can be permitted on account of the unfortunate death of the defence Counsel pendente lite and a new Counsel has to evolve his defence strategy afresh. 8. We make note of the fact that the new defence Counsel filed the said petition for recalling the prosecution witnesses even before the accused was called upon to enter on his defence. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, without entering into merits of the contentions raised before us we deem it necessary, in the interest of justice, to afford an opportunity to the accused to further cross-examine the three prosecution witnesses who were already examined. We, therefore, set aside the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant and remit the case to the trial court with the following directions: 1. The court shall summon PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 to be cross-examined again on behalf of the accused. 2. The evidence already brought on record will remain as part of the evidence in the case. We, therefore, set aside the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant and remit the case to the trial court with the following directions: 1. The court shall summon PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 to be cross-examined again on behalf of the accused. 2. The evidence already brought on record will remain as part of the evidence in the case. After the defence counsel availing himself of the opportunity to further examine the three witnesses, if prosecution wants to adduce further evidence, it is open to the court to grant permission for the same. Accused shall then be called upon to enter on his defence. 3. After collecting such evidence, if any adduced by the accused, the trial Judge shall dispose of the case afresh in accordance with law and untrammelled by any findings or observations made in the judgment of the trial court or that of the High Court.” 3.2 The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P. Sanjeeva Rao vs. State of A.P. 2012 (2) WLC (SC) Cri. 178, paras 11 to 16 whereof reads as follow:- “11. We are, therefore, inclined to believe that the two prosecution witnesses were not cross-examined by the counsel for the appellant not because there was nothing incriminating in their testimony against the appellant but because counsel for the appellant had indeed intended to cross-examine them after the Trap Laying Officer had been examined. The fact that the appellant did not make a formal application to this effect nor even an oral prayer to the Court to that effect at the time the cross- examination was deferred may be a mistake which could be avoided and which may have saved the appellant a lot of trouble in getting the witnesses recalled. But merely because a mistake was committed, should not result in the accused suffering a penalty totally disproportionate to the gravity of the error committed by his lawyer. Denial of an opportunity to recall the witnesses for cross-examination would amount to condemning the appellant without giving him the opportunity to challenge the correctness of the version and the credibility of the witnesses. It is trite that the credibility of witnesses whether in a civil or criminal case can be tested only when the testimony is put through the fire of cross-examination. It is trite that the credibility of witnesses whether in a civil or criminal case can be tested only when the testimony is put through the fire of cross-examination. Denial of an opportunity to do so will result in a serious miscarriage of justice in the present case keeping in view the serious consequences that will follow any such denial. 12. The nature and extent of the power vested in the Courts under Section 311 Cr.P.C. to recall witnesses was examined by this Court in Hanuman Ram vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, (2008) 15 SCC 652 . This Court held that the object underlying Section 311 was to prevent failure of justice on account of a mistake of either party to bring on record valuable evidence or leaving an ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses. This Court observed: “This is a supplementary provision enabling, and in certain circumstances imposing on the Court, the duty of examining a material witness who would not be otherwise brought before it. It is couched in the widest possible terms and calls for no limitation, either with regard to the stage at which the powers of the Court should be exercised, or with regard to the manner in which it should be exercised. It is not only the prerogative but also the plain duty of a Court to examine such of those witnesses as it considers absolutely necessary for doing justice between the State and the subject. There is a duty cast upon the Court to arrive at the truth by all lawful means and one of such means is the examination of witnesses of its own accord when for certain obvious reasons either party is not prepared to call witnesses who are known to be in a position to speak important relevant facts. The object underlying Section 311 of the Code is that there may not be failure of justice on account of mistake of either party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses examined from either side. The determinative factor is whether it is essential to the just decision of the case. The object underlying Section 311 of the Code is that there may not be failure of justice on account of mistake of either party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses examined from either side. The determinative factor is whether it is essential to the just decision of the case. The section is not limited only for the benefit of the accused, and it will not be an improper exercise of the powers of the Court to summon a witness under the Section merely because the evidence supports the case of the prosecution and not that of the accused. The section is a general section which applies to all proceedings, enquires and trials under the Code and empowers the Magistrate to issue summons to any witness at any stage of such proceedings, trial or enquiry. In Section 311 the significant expression that occurs is "at any stage of inquiry or trial or other proceeding under this Code." It is, however, to be borne in mind that whereas the section confers a very wide power on the Court on summoning witnesses, the discretion conferred is to be exercised judiciously, as the wider the power the greater is the necessity for application of judicial mind.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. Grant of fairest opportunity to the accused to prove his innocence was the object of every fair trial, observed this Court in Hoffman Andreas vs. Inspector of Customs, Amritsar, (2000) 10 SCC 430 . The following passage is in this regard apposite: “In such circumstances, if the new Counsel thought to have the material witnesses further examined, the Court could adopt latitude and a liberal view in the interest of justice, particularly when the Court has unbridled powers in the matter as enshrined in Section 311 of the Code. After all the trial is basically for the prisoners and courts should afford the opportunity to them in the fairest manner possible.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. After all the trial is basically for the prisoners and courts should afford the opportunity to them in the fairest manner possible.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. The extent and the scope of the power of the Court to recall witnesses was examined by this Court in Mohanlal Shamji Soni vs. Union of India and Another, 1991 Supp (1) 271, where this Court observed: “The principle of law that emerges from the views expressed by this Court in the above decisions is that the criminal court has ample power to summon any person as a witness or recall and re-examine any such person even if the evidence on both sides is closed and the jurisdiction of the court must obviously be dictated by exigency of the situation, and fair-play and good sense appear to be the only safe guides and that only the requirements of justice command and examination of any person which would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.” (Emphasis supplied) 15. Discovery of the truth is the essential purpose of any trial or enquiry, observed a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes vs. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria through LRs. 2012 (3) SCALE 550 . A timely reminder of that solemn duty was given, in the following words: “What people expect is that the Court should discharge its obligation to find out where in fact the truth lies. Right from inception of the judicial system it has been accepted that discovery, vindication and establishment of truth are the main purposes underlying the existence of the courts of justice.” 16. We are conscious of the fact that recall of the witnesses is being directed nearly four years after they were examined in chief about an incident that is nearly seven years old. Delay takes a heavy toll on the human memory apart from breeding cynicism about the efficacy of the judicial system to decide cases within a reasonably foreseeable time period. To that extent the apprehension expressed by Mr. Rawal, that the prosecution may suffer prejudice on account of a belated recall, may not be wholly without any basis. Delay takes a heavy toll on the human memory apart from breeding cynicism about the efficacy of the judicial system to decide cases within a reasonably foreseeable time period. To that extent the apprehension expressed by Mr. Rawal, that the prosecution may suffer prejudice on account of a belated recall, may not be wholly without any basis. Having said that, we are of the opinion that on a parity of reasoning and looking to the consequences of denial of opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, we would prefer to err in favour of the appellant getting an opportunity rather than protecting the prosecution against a possible prejudice at his cost. Fairness of the trial is a virtue that is sacrosanct in our judicial system and no price is too heavy to protect that virtue. A possible prejudice to prosecution is not even a price, leave alone one that would justify denial of a fair opportunity to the accused to defend himself.” 3.3 The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Dalveer Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, 2013 (4) WLC (Raj.) 593, in which the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court’s judgment in the case of P. Sanjeeva Rao (supra) has been relied by this Court in para no. 7. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 submits that the petitioner cannot be allowed to perpetually continue with the trial and since the case is going on for a long time and the conduct of the petitioner is such that he did not put any such question or suggestion before the complainant at the time of trial and did not also make any statement in his defence while rendering the same on 16.6.2014, therefore, the petitioner cannot be permitted to take up all these issues at this belated stage. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 has also pointed out that the petitioner was declared absconder by the trial Court on 8.3.2017 and standing warrant arrest was issued, whereupon he was arrested on 25.7.2018 and released on bail on 27.7.2018. The matter thereafter was prolonged for final hearing and even after the matter was listed on 30.7.2018, 29.8.2018, 28.9.2018, 20.10.2018 and 30.10.2018, the matter could not be decided and at such a belated stage, the application was filed by the petitioner. 5. The matter thereafter was prolonged for final hearing and even after the matter was listed on 30.7.2018, 29.8.2018, 28.9.2018, 20.10.2018 and 30.10.2018, the matter could not be decided and at such a belated stage, the application was filed by the petitioner. 5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the material available on record, this Court is of the opinion that the precedent law cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not apply to the facts in hand. The Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly observed in Hoffman Andreas’s case (supra) that normally, at this late stage, the Apex Court would be disinclined to open up a closed trial once again. The only circumstance which persuaded the Apex Court was the death of the counsel in that matter and not upon the change of the counsel. The precedent law cited was rendered in peculiar circumstances and in no case could be made applicable in the present case. Further, the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Sanjeeva Rao (supra) does not come to the rescue of the petitioner because in that case, no effort was made by the party to make any cross examination and thus, to complete the process of adjudication, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the peculiar facts of that case permitted cross examination whereas, in the present case, the cross examination was conducted way back and the petitioner failed to put those issues to the complainant. Moreover, the trial under the Negotiable Instruments Act cannot be compared with that of trial under regular Cr.P.C. and hence, the specific law of Negotiable Instruments Act is meant to have faster proceedings and, therefore, any unconvinced intervention in the final disposal of the case is not called for. 6. Moreover, this Court finds that the petitioner had ample opportunities to submit the details regarding the question of the source of amount of the complainant and his income tax details or details of his acquiring the amount in question. While the complainant was being examined and cross examined, no such suggestion or indication was made. This Court finds that at this belated stage, when the matter was kept for final disposal in 2014 and thereafter, the petitioner absconded and the trial Court had to issue standing warrant and thereafter, the petitioner could be arrested, therefore, the trial Court rightly rejected the application. This Court finds that at this belated stage, when the matter was kept for final disposal in 2014 and thereafter, the petitioner absconded and the trial Court had to issue standing warrant and thereafter, the petitioner could be arrested, therefore, the trial Court rightly rejected the application. 7. In view of the above, the present Misc. Petition, being devoid of any merit, is hereby dismissed.