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2019 DIGILAW 56 (GUJ)

Snehaben Ishanbhai Gandhi v. State of Gujarat

2019-01-23

A.S.SUPEHIA

body2019
JUDGMENT : A.S. SUPEHIA, J. 1. In the present writ petition, the petitioners seek quashing of F.I.R. being C.R. No. I-225 of 2017 registered with Manjalpur Police Station, Vadodara City, District Vadodara for the offences punishable under sections 143, 147, 394, 323, 504, 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (the IPC) as well as sections 3(1)(r), (s), (zc) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (the Atrocities Act) as well as all consequential proceedings pursuant to the aforesaid F.I.R. by exercising powers under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974 (the Cr.P.C.). 2. The facts of the case as mentioned in the memo of the application are as under: 2.1 Respondent no. 2-the first informant has filed the impugned F.I.R. alleging, inter alia, that the mother of respondent no. 2 got married to one Fakirbhai Katara, after the death of father of respondent no. 2. It is the case of respondent no. 2 that house of the accused Ishaan Gandhi is situated next to the house of the mother of respondent no. 2, where the accused Ishaan Gandhi was running his factory. It is alleged that the stepfather of respondent no. 2 had given complaints before Vadodara Municipal Corporation and the court about the nuisance on the part of the accused Ishaan Gandhi. It is alleged that after inquiry into the said complaints, the authority had put a seal on the premise of the accused-Ishaan Gandhi on 03.11.2017. It is alleged that on 05.11.2017, when the respondent no. 2 went to his mother’s house at that time one Bhupendrabhai, who is the domestic helper of the co-accused Ishaan Gandhi called him and informed about respondent no. 2. It is further alleged that the petitioners and co-accused went to the house of the mother of respondent no. 2 and abused them in the name of their caste by using filthy language and allegedly, petitioner no. 1 and co-accused Ishaan Gandhi hit respondent no. 2 and thereafter, co-accused Ishaan Gandhi gave bites to the mother of the respondent no. 2 and caused injury to her. It is further alleged that co-accused Ishaan Gandhi snatched away the gold chain from the neck of the mother of respondent no. 2 and, the accused threatened respondent no. 2 and his mother with dire consequences and thus, thereby committed the alleged offences. 2 and caused injury to her. It is further alleged that co-accused Ishaan Gandhi snatched away the gold chain from the neck of the mother of respondent no. 2 and, the accused threatened respondent no. 2 and his mother with dire consequences and thus, thereby committed the alleged offences. With the aforesaid and other allegations the FIR is filed against the petitioners. 3. Learned advocate Mr. P.P. Majmudar for the petitioners submitted that in fact the allegations in the impugned F.I.R. are absolutely false and the petitioners have not committed the alleged offences. It was submitted that the impugned F.I.R. has been filed with a view to pressurize the petitioners. Learned advocate further submitted that none of the ingredients of the alleged offences are made out against the petitioners. 3.1 Learned advocate for the petitioners submitted that according to the basic ingredients of the provisions of sections 3(1)(r)(s) and (zc) of the Atrocities Act, the first informant ought to have alleged that the first informant i.e. respondent No. 2 was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the petitioners-original accused with an intention to humiliate in a place within “public view” and in the present case, even on plain reading of the F.I.R., the said basic ingredient of the Atrocities Act are missing since no such allegation is made in the F.I.R. Also, it was submitted that on bare reading of the F.I.R. it does not transpire that the petitioners have committed any act or threatened the respondent no. 2 of social or economic boycott and committed any offence specified in the schedule against a person belonging to a Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe or property belonging to member of Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe. 3.2 In support of his submissions, learned Advocate Mr. Majmudar has placed reliance on the order dated 13.12.2018 rendered by this Court in Criminal Misc. Application No. 27478 of 2017 and has contended that this Court while considering the aforesaid provisions of the Atrocities Act, has quashed the F.I.R. Reliance was also placed on the judgment dated 23.11.2018 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 21130 of 2017 taking similar view. 3.3 Learned advocate for the petitioners further submitted that petitioner no. 1 has also registered one F.I.R. being C.R. No. II-224 of 2017 with Manjalpur Police Station, Vadodara City, District Vadodara against respondent no. Application No. 21130 of 2017 taking similar view. 3.3 Learned advocate for the petitioners further submitted that petitioner no. 1 has also registered one F.I.R. being C.R. No. II-224 of 2017 with Manjalpur Police Station, Vadodara City, District Vadodara against respondent no. 2-first informant and others for the offences punishable under sections 325, 323, 504, 506(2), 394, 143, 147, 148, 149 of the IPC and section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act, 1951 alleging, inter alia, that the accused persons named in the F.I.R. registered by petitioner no. 1 formed an unlawful assembly and caused injury to the husband of petitioner no. 1 and others with iron pipe and snatched away the gold chain from the neck of petitioner no. 1 and abused the petitioners and used filthy language and thus, they have committed the alleged offences. 3.4 In view of the aforesaid F.I.R., the learned advocate for the petitioners submitted that thus, the impugned F.I.R. is a counterblast to the aforesaid F.I.R. registered by petitioner no. 1. It was further submitted that the impugned F.I.R. is filed with an oblique and ulterior motive and the same is filed with a view to wreak vengeance on the petitioners as well as with a view to spite the petitioners due to personal grudge. The learned advocate further submitted that on bare reading of the impugned F.I.R., none of the alleged offences are made out and the impugned F.I.R. is a sheer abuse of process of law. Reliance was also placed by the learned advocate for the petitioners on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 in support of his submissions. It was further therefore, submitted that continuing the investigation on the strength of the impugned F.I.R. would clearly amount to abuse of process of law and misuse of criminal machinery and accordingly, it was urged that the impugned F.I.R. as well as all other consequential and subsequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. are liable to be quashed under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 4. In response, vehemently opposing the present petition, the learned advocate Mr.Amrish Pandya appearing for respondent no. In response, vehemently opposing the present petition, the learned advocate Mr.Amrish Pandya appearing for respondent no. 2 submitted that the stepfather of the first informant and other residents have told the accused persons to immediately stop such illegal business in the society and the father of the first informant-Fakirbhai Babubhai Katara made a complaint against the owner of Preet Caterers i.e. Shirishbhai Gandhi before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Vadodara under section 133 of the Cr.P.C. being Case No. 9 of 2016 on 20.10.2016. It was further submitted that pursuant to the aforesaid complaint a notice was issued to them on 16.01.2017 and thereafter, a detailed inquiry was conducted in the said case by Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Vadodara and it was found that the accused persons are doing illegal business, which is causing public nuisance and, therefore, the accused persons were directed to stop the said business. 4.1 Learned advocate for respondent No. 2 further submitted that after passing of few days, the accused persons again started the said business flouting the order passed by the authority and, therefore, Fakirbhai Katara once again made a complaint to the Assistant Municipal Commissioner (South Zone) on 01.05.2017 with a request to take immediate steps against the owner of Preet Caterers and others. 4.2 Learned advocate for respondent No. 2 further submitted that even after passing of the orders against them, the accused persons continued with their illegal activities and, therefore, on 03.11.2017 in presence of the Ward Officer, Sanitary Inspector, Revenue Officer, Police Officers and other staff members, the corporation put a seal over the premises of the petitioners and a panchnama was also drawn to that effect and photographs as well as video recording were also done and a detailed report was prepared, which was submitted to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Vadodara City and pursuant to which, an order, disposing the complaint filed by Fakirbhai Katara, was passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Vadodara City in this regard on 05.01.2018. It was submitted that looking to the aforesaid order, it is clear that the accused persons were involved in the illegal business and their activities was creating nuisance in the public. It was submitted that looking to the aforesaid order, it is clear that the accused persons were involved in the illegal business and their activities was creating nuisance in the public. 4.3 Learned advocate for respondent No. 2 further submitted that as the seal was put on the premises of the accused persons on 03.11.2017, and the accused persons on 05.11.2017 at around 8:45 p.m., when the first informant went to meet his mother, the servant of the accused-Ishaan Gandhi and the petitioners and other accused persons came near the house of the mother of the first informant and started abusing her in filthy language against her caste and when the first informant requested them not to quarrel, they got excited and the accused-Ishaan Gandhi and his wife Snehaben i.e. petitioner No. 1 started beating the first informant by fist blows and when the mother of the first informant intervened and tried to save the first informant, the accused-Ishaan Gandhi inflicted bite on her both hands and even the father of the first informant-Fakirbhai was beaten by the accused-Bhupendra and Ankur Mistry and on hearing the quarrel, the people of the nearby residents gathered and these accused persons went away from the place of the incident and the accused-Ishaan Gandhi forcefully took away the gold chain from the neck of the mother of the first informant and also threatened them to death and the first informant took his parents to the S.S.G. Hospital, Vadodara for treatment and thereafter, the impugned F.I.R. has been lodged against the petitioners and other accused persons. 5. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State, Ms. Moxa Thakker has maintained the submissions advanced by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2-first informant. She submitted that the reliance placed on the judgments and orders of this Court by the petitioners cannot be made applicable to the present case. She further submitted that in fact this Court has not considered the amended provision of section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act and the decisions are based on pre-amended sections, though the offence was registered after the date of amendment of the provision of section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act. She further submitted that in fact this Court has not considered the amended provision of section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act and the decisions are based on pre-amended sections, though the offence was registered after the date of amendment of the provision of section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act. It was further contended by her that the offence has been committed in the society outside the house in presence of the independent witnesses and hence, it cannot be said that the offence is not committed in “public view.” She invited the attention of this Court to the statement recorded by the Investigating Officer of the independent witnesses, who have stated that the incident had occurred in their presence in the society. Thus, she submitted that at this stage the F.I.R. may not be quashed. 6. I have heard the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length and also perused the judgments and documents as pointed out by them. 7. The case of the petitioners as set forth by learned Advocate Mr. Majumdar is that none of the ingredients for the offence under the IPC and Atrocities Act are established in the impugned F.I.R. against the petitioners. 8. I shall first endeavor to deal with the submissions advanced for the registration of the offences punishable under section 3(1) (r), (s), (zc) under the Atrocities Act. The same read as under: “3. Punishments for offences atrocities: (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe: (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view. (zc) imposes or threatens a social or economic boycott of any person or a family or a group belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.” 9. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the incident has not taken place within “public view” hence the ingredients of sections 3(1)(r), (s) of the Atrocities Act are not satisfied. On a perusal of the contents of the F.I.R., it transpires that the incident has occurred in the society where the petitioners and the first informant are residing. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the incident has not taken place within “public view” hence the ingredients of sections 3(1)(r), (s) of the Atrocities Act are not satisfied. On a perusal of the contents of the F.I.R., it transpires that the incident has occurred in the society where the petitioners and the first informant are residing. It is specifically alleged by the first informant that the petitioners on 05.11.2017 at 9.00 p.m. had gone at her house and started hurling abuses and on hearing the abuses, the first informant went outside her gate for pacifying them, at that time they had assaulted her. It is pertinent to note that in the F.I.R. dated 06.11.2017, lodged by the petitioners against the first informant, it is specifically narrated that the incident had happened outside the gate of their house. The further investigation also reveals that the incident has not occurred within the boundary walls of the house but the same has taken place in the society. The presence of the residents of the society is also established in the investigation. Thus, the alleged incident, as narrated in the F.I.R. can be said to have occurred in place within public view. Hence, it cannot be held that the ingredients of sections 3(1)(r), (s) of the Atrocities Act are not established. Apropos the offence under section 3(1)(zc) of the Atrocities Act is concerned, which stipulates of giving threat to impose social boycott and economical boycott to the petitioners, looking to the allegations made in the cross F.I.R. this court cannot delve upon the statement of the witnesses and the allegations made in the F.I.R. while exercising its inherent powers under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and the same can be examined by the trial Court. 10. The learned Advocate for the petitioners has premised his submissions on the judgment dated 23.11.2018 in the case of (Yunus Suleman Mansuri) (supra) and the order dated 13.12.2018 in the case of (Jayantibhai Babubhai Mali) (supra) for the offence registered under section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act. 10. The learned Advocate for the petitioners has premised his submissions on the judgment dated 23.11.2018 in the case of (Yunus Suleman Mansuri) (supra) and the order dated 13.12.2018 in the case of (Jayantibhai Babubhai Mali) (supra) for the offence registered under section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act. Section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act, as substituted after the amendment dated 26.01.2016, reads as under: “3(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe: (va) commits any offence specified in the Schedule, against a person or property, knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with such punishment as specified under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) for such offences and shall also be liable to fine.” 11. In the considered opinion of this Court, for the reasons as set out hereinafter, the view expressed in the judgment dated 23.11.2018 passed by this court in Criminal Misc. Application No. 21130 of 2017 (in the case of Yunus Suleman Mansuri Suleman Mansuri) and the order dated 13.12.2018 passed by this court in Criminal Misc. Application No. 27489 of 2017 (in the case of Jayantibhai Babubhai Mali), cannot be said to be a good law as far as the quashing of the offence under section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act is concerned: (a) In both the aforesaid writ applications, the FIRs were registered in the year 2017 for the offences punishable under the IPC and Section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act i.e. after the amendment in the provisions of the Atrocities Act w.e.f. 26.1.2016. (b) A perusal of the judgment dated 23.11.2018 in Criminal Misc. Application No. 21130 of 2017 will clarify that the same proceeds on the basis of un-amended provisions of section 3(2)(v) and section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act, though the offence is alleged to have been committed in the year 2017 after the amendment in sections. Section 3(2)(v) and section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act were amended w.e.f. 26.01.2016 and the expression “on the ground” was substituted to “knowing that such person.” The aforesaid judgment and the order are passed by placing reliance on the judgment dated 06.01.2016 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court rendered in Criminal Misc. Application No. 15188 of 2014 which, in the opinion of this court, is ill-founded. Application No. 15188 of 2014 which, in the opinion of this court, is ill-founded. In fact the Coordinate Bench has examined the un-amended provisions of section 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act as the offence, for which the F.I.R. was registered, was of the year 2014. (c) The Supreme Court in the case of Asharfi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2018 (1) SCC 742 has observed thus: “Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act has now been amended by virtue of Amendment Act 1 of 2016. By way of this amendment, the words “.......on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe” have been substituted with the words: “........knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.” Therefore, if subsequent to 26.01.2016 (i.e. the day on which the amendment came into effect), an offence under Indian Penal Code which is punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more, is committed upon a victim who belongs to SC/ST community and the accused person has knowledge that such victim belongs to SC/ST community, then the charge of Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act is attracted. Thus, after the amendment, mere knowledge of the accused that the person upon whom the offence is committed belongs to SC/ST community suffices to bring home the charge under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act.” (d) The opinion in both the order and the judgment are based on the expression “on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe” instead of expression “knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.” Thus, the judgment dated 23.11.2018 in Criminal Misc. Application No. 21130 of 2017 and order dated 13.12.2018 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 27489 of 2017 are passed in ignorance of the amended provisions of section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act, which is contrary to the observations of the judgment of the Apex Court and the amended provisions of section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act. Application No. 21130 of 2017 and order dated 13.12.2018 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 27489 of 2017 are passed in ignorance of the amended provisions of section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act, which is contrary to the observations of the judgment of the Apex Court and the amended provisions of section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act. The Court was required to examine the offence under the Atrocities Act on the issue that “whether the accused was having the knowledge that the first informant was a member of Scheduled caste or Scheduled tribe.” Instead the opinion proceeds on the foundation that “whether the offence is committed on the ground that the first informant was a member of Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe” (e) In both the aforesaid writ applications, the learned Advocates for the respective parties did not press the petition for quashing for the offences under the IPC. (f) Section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act stipulates that any person whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe commits any offence specified in the Schedule, against a person or property “knowing” that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe shall be punishable with such punishment as specified under the IPC for such offences and shall also be liable to fine. (g) The offences under the IPC which were not pressed fell in the schedule to section 3(2) (va) of the Atrocities Act. Thus, if the offence under the IPC, which figures in the Schedule is renounced, the resultant effect of section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act will come into play. The quashing of offence punishable under the IPC is sine qua non for setting aside the offence under section 3(2) (va) of the Atrocities Act. Non-pressing of the quashing petition for the offences prescribed in the schedule will not dilute the effect of the offence under section 3(2) (va) of the Atrocities Act. 12. The Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Rural Road Development Authority vs. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers and Cont. 2012 (3) SCC 495 while considering the principle of per incuriam has observed thus: “The principle of per incuriam has been very succinctly formulated by the Court of Appeal in Young vs. Bristol Aeroplane Company Limited, 1944 (1) K.B. 718. 33. 12. The Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Rural Road Development Authority vs. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers and Cont. 2012 (3) SCC 495 while considering the principle of per incuriam has observed thus: “The principle of per incuriam has been very succinctly formulated by the Court of Appeal in Young vs. Bristol Aeroplane Company Limited, 1944 (1) K.B. 718. 33. Lord Greene, Master of Rolls formulated the principles on the basis of which a decision can be said to have been rendered `per incuriam'. The principles are: “Where the court has construed a statute or a rule having the force of a statute its decision stands on the same footing as any other decision on a question of law, but where the court is satisfied that an earlier decision was given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or a rule having the force of a statute the position is very different. It cannot, in our opinion, be right to say that in such a case the court is entitled to disregard the statutory provision and is bound to follow a decision of its own given when that provision was not present to its mind. Cases of this description are examples of decisions given per incuriam.” 34. to 36.......... 37 The same principle has been reiterated by Lord Evershed, Master of Rolls, in Morelle Ld. vs. Wakeling and Another, (1955) 2 QB 379 at page 406. The principle has been stated as followed: “...As a general rule the only cases in which decisions should be held to have been given per incuriam are those of decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned; so that in such cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based is found, on that account, to be demonstrably wrong.......” 38............ 39. 39. In the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101 , a three-Judge Bench of this Court explained this principle of per incuriam very elaborately in paragraph 11 at page 110 of the report and in explaining the principle of per incuriam the learned Judges held: “......A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute.......” 13. Thus, both the decisions vide judgment dated 23.11.2018 in the case of (Yunus Suleman Mansuri) (supra) and the order dated 13.12.2018 in the case of (Jayantibhai Babubhai Mali) (supra) are given per incuriam and cannot be said to be a good law with reference to the quashing of the offence punishable under section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act since the amended provisions of sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act was not pointed out to the Court and the decisions are premised on the un-amended provisions of the sections of the Atrocities Act. 14. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the F.I.R. has been registered on 06.11.2017 for the alleged incident occurred on the night of 05.11.2017. Indubitably, the same will be governed by the amended provision of section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act, wherein the expression “on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe” instead of expression “knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.” The Apex Court in the case of Asharfi Versus State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) has held that “Thus, after the amendment, mere knowledge of the accused that the person upon whom the offence is committed belongs to SC/ST community suffices to bring home the charge under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act.” The facts of the present case suggest that the petitioners were having the knowledge that the first informant was a member of the schedule caste and schedule tribe since they were his neighbours and are well acquainted with him and his family members. Hence, the offence punishable under section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act registered against the petitioners does not call for any interference in exercise of the powers under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 15. Hence, the offence punishable under section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act registered against the petitioners does not call for any interference in exercise of the powers under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 15. Emphasis has also been laid down by the petitioners that no offence punishable under sections 143, 147, 394, 323, 504, 506(2) of the IPC are established against the petitioners. Prima facie the contents of the impugned F.I.R. expose the occurrence of the incident. There are cross FIR filed by petitioner No. 1. Further investigation also substantiates the alleged incident. At this stage, it will be hazardous to presume that no incident has occurred. 16. The Supreme Court in the case of Dinesh Patel vs. State of Gujarat, 2018 (3) SCC 104 , while examining the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has observed thus: “25. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and on perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to accept the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the Complainants finding force therein whereas we do not find any merit in the submissions urged by the learned counsel appearing for the accused persons. 26. The law on the question as to when a registration of the FIR is challenged seeking its quashing by the accused under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Code and what are the powers of the High Court and how the High Court should deal with such question is fairly well settled. 27. This Court in State of West Bengal and Others vs. Swapan Kumar Guha and Others, AIR 1982 SC 949 had the occasion to deal with this issue. Y.V. Chandrachud, the learned Chief Justice speaking 14 for Three Judge Bench laid down the following principle: “Whether an offence has been disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. If on a consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the Court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation in the offence to be completed for collecting materials for proving the offence. The condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under S.157 of the Code is that the F.I.R. must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. The condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under S.157 of the Code is that the F.I.R. must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under S.157 of the Code. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R., prima facie, discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on. The Court has then no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences.” 28............. 29............. 30. The High Court, in our view, failed to see the extent of its jurisdiction, which it possess to exercise while examining the legality of any First Information Report complaining commission of several cognizable offences by accused persons. In order to examine as to whether the factual contents of the FIR disclose any prima facie cognizable offences or not, the High Court cannot act like an investigating agency and nor can exercise the powers like an appellate court. The question, in our opinion, was required to be examined keeping in view the contents of the FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof. 31. At this stage, the High Court could not appreciate the evidence nor could draw its own inferences from the contents of the FIR and the material relied on. It was more so when the material relied on was disputed by the 17 Complainants and vis-a-se-versa. In such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the Court to examine the questions once the charge sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material.” 17. In such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the Court to examine the questions once the charge sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material.” 17. As per the law enunciated by the Supreme Court, this Court while exercising the inherent powers under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot act as an investigating authority nor can exercise the powers like an appellate court and appreciate the evidence and draw its own inferences from the contents of the F.I.R. The upshot of the foregoing observations and analysis leads to the inevitable conclusion of dismissing the writ petition. The present case does not fall within the parameters laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 . 18. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. Interim relief stands vacated. RULE is discharged. FURTHER ORDER: After the aforesaid judgment was pronounced, learned advocate Mr. P.P. Majmudar for the petitioners has requested for extension of the interim relief, the same is objected to by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor by placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of State of Telangana vs. Jabib Abdullah Jeelani and Others, AIR 2017 SC 373 and has submitted that if a petition has been dismissed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. further direction to the investigating agency not to arrest the accused persons would amount to an order under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. albeit without satisfaction of the conditions of the said provisions and the same is legally unacceptable. Thus, as per the law enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of Jabib Habib Abdullah Jeelani (supra) and in view of the aforesaid objection raised by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the request is not acceded to. The prayer is, accordingly, hereby declined. Petition dismissed.