Judgment 1. Impugned in this petition is order No. P, VIII, 2/04,137, EC,II dated 13th December 2004, passed by respondent No. 5 (Commandant 137 Bn CRPF Musanboni, East. Singhbhum, Jharkhand) whereby, the petitioner has been dismissed from the services and his name has been struck off from the rolls of his unit. 2. The order, impugned has been assailed on several grounds but the ground which was strenuously urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner pertains to the alleged violation of principles of natural justice in holding the enquiry and the non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 27 of Central Reserve Police Forces Rules 1994 (for brevity, the rules of 1994) which lays down the procedure, to be followed in the disciplinary proceedings. Before adverting to the grounds of challenge, a brief look at the facts may be necessary. 3. The petitioner was appointed as Constable in the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) on 10.06.1996. On transfer of the petitioner to the newly raised unit from 98th Bn. CRPF, the petitioner was posted to 137 Bn. CRPF on 3rd September 2001. On 16th September 2001, at about 0430 Hrs, the petitioner left the unit without giving any prior intimation to his immediate seniors and without any permission from the competent authority. The petitioner did not turn up to join back for duties even after he was called upon to do so by the respondents by way of different communications, issued on 16.09.2001, 17.09.01. 01.01.2002, 08.01.2001, 18.06.2002 & 09.09.2002. Getting no response from the petitioner, the respondents initiated departmental enquiry against the petitioner and subsequently dismissed him from the services, w.e.f. 28th February 2002 vide order No. P. VIII-25/2002-EC-II-137. 4. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the dismissal order before the DIGP, CRPF, Jalandhar (Appellate Authority). The appeal was accepted and the petitioner was reinstated to the service, w.e.f., the date of reporting to the services vide order No. J.II. 1/2002-DA-I dated 14.06.2002, passed by the appellate authority. Despite the order of reinstatement, petitioner did not report for duties despite the fact that he was called upon to do so vide order dated 09.02.2002. Later on it came to the notice of the respondents that the Delhi Police had arrested the petitioner for commission of offence punishable under Section NDPS Act, as he was found to carry 225 grams of Charas. Later on it came to the notice of the respondents that the Delhi Police had arrested the petitioner for commission of offence punishable under Section NDPS Act, as he was found to carry 225 grams of Charas. In the aforesaid case, petitioner was later on granted bail and released on 13th September 2003. The petitioner reported to the unit for duties on 8th April 2004 and was taken on the strength of unit in terms of order dated 07.07.2004. He was reinstated into services as per the directions of appellate authority. It may be noteworthy that appellate authority while accepting the appeal of the petitioner directed his reinstatement but had however, directed to conduct a de novo enquiry after affording him an opportunity of being heard. 5. In compliance to the orders of the appellate authority a de novo enquiry was conducted and the petitioner was found guilty of charges and was consequently dismissed from the services, w.e.f. 13th December 2004 vide order, impugned in this writ petition. 6. Aggrieved, the petitioner served a legal notice upon the Director General of CRPF, New Delhi (respondent No. 2 herein), dated 25th January 2005, seeking his indulgence in the matter for setting aside the order of his dismissal. The petitioner getting no response from the respondent No. 2, approached this Court by way of instant writ petition. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the original record of enquiry. 8. The facts as noted above are not much in dispute. The petitioner was a Constable, substantively appointed in the CRPF. He left his unit without intimation to his superiors and without permission from the competent authority and remained absent from the duties. The petitioner was intimated time and again to join the duties but he choose not to do so. A departmental enquiry was conducted by the respondents in his absence in which he was found guilty of misconduct and was dismissed from the services. The appeal was preferred against the order before the appellate authority and the appellate authority while accepting the appeal against the order of dismissal directed reinstatement of the petitioner in the services with a direction to the respondent to conduct de novo enquiry in conformity with the principles of natural justice and the rules. The appeal was preferred against the order before the appellate authority and the appellate authority while accepting the appeal against the order of dismissal directed reinstatement of the petitioner in the services with a direction to the respondent to conduct de novo enquiry in conformity with the principles of natural justice and the rules. The petitioner who was supposed to join after his reinstatement in service, did not report to the unit for duties. He was put to notice by the respondents to join his duties, but later on it was revealed to the respondents that petitioner had been booked in an FIR in Delhi and had been arrested in connection with commission of offences punishable under Section NDPS Act. He was later on released and reported to the duties and respondents allowed him to join but initiated de novo enquiry in terms of the order of appellate authority. The charges were framed and were duly served upon the petitioner. 9. From the perusal of record, it however, transpires that charges which were in English language were duly read over and explained to him which he acknowledged to have understood. He was put specific questions with regard to each charge and was given option to plead guilty or otherwise. He pleaded not guilty to the charges and claimed to be tried. He was specifically given option to have a defending Officer which he refused. He personally participated and contested the enquiry proceedings. The witnesses were examined and he was given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. As a matter of fact, as is evident from the record, the petitioner availed of that opportunity and cross-examined some of the witnesses. He was allowed to enter in his defence and lead the defence evidence which he did. 10. The Enquiry Officer concluded the enquiry and held the charges proved against the petitioner. The disciplinary authority even served upon the petitioner de novo enquiry report and solicited his response/reply thereto. The petitioner however, did not submit any reply to the enquiry report which was thereafter accepted by the disciplinary authority, i.e. respondent No. 5 and as a result of which the order impugned was passed. 11. The disciplinary authority even served upon the petitioner de novo enquiry report and solicited his response/reply thereto. The petitioner however, did not submit any reply to the enquiry report which was thereafter accepted by the disciplinary authority, i.e. respondent No. 5 and as a result of which the order impugned was passed. 11. From the sequence of events and the documents made available before me in the shape of original record of departmental enquiry, it is abundantly clear that respondents have not violated the principles of natural justice at any stage of proceedings. The procedure as laid down in Rule 27 of Rules has been religiously followed at each stage of the enquiry. In that view of the matter, it would not be possible to find fault with the procedure, followed by the respondents during the course of enquiry. The CRPF is a highly disciplined force, enjoined the onerous duty of maintaining internal security of the State. The Officers like the petitioner who have audacity to leave the unit, that too, without seeking permission of his superiors cannot be allowed to stay in such force even for a minute. Indiscipline would be the last thing to be tolerated in the disciplined force like CRPF. The respondents had been generous enough in setting aside the earlier order of dismissal of the petitioner on technical grounds for in the earlier departmental proceedings, the petitioner had not been provided any opportunity of being heard. In the de novo enquiry, the respondents took every care to see that the procedure laid down in Rule 27 of the Rules is followed and the petitioner is provided adequate opportunity to defend himself in the enquiry. 12. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the face of evidence, the charges leveled against the petitioner could not be said to have been substantiated, lacks substance. He therefore, tried to project it as a case of no evidence. It was further pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the departmental proceedings were recorded in Hindi and therefore, the petitioner who did not have any knowledge of Hindi was seriously prejudiced and could not effectively put up his defence. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has been noticed only for rejection. It was further pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the departmental proceedings were recorded in Hindi and therefore, the petitioner who did not have any knowledge of Hindi was seriously prejudiced and could not effectively put up his defence. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has been noticed only for rejection. The petitioner has voluntarily participated in the proceedings throughout and has never ever objected to the manner in which the proceedings was conducted. He was posed the questions in Hindi which he replied in Hindi. He may not have reading and writing skills in Hindi but he certainly understood it clearly and this is how he answered all the questions put to him. When the charges were read and explained to him and was asked to make option whether or not plead guilty, he responded well. That apart, it may not be out of place at this stage to take note of the settled legal position viz-viz the scope of judicial review with regard to the disciplinary proceedings. The Three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 749 . In paragraphs 12 & 13 has held:— “12. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented. The appellate authority has co- extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 781], this Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. “13. In Union of India & Ors. v. S.L. Abbas [ (1993) 4 SCC 357 ], when the order of transfer was interfered by the Tribunal, this Court held that the Tribunal was not an appellate authority which could substitute its own judgment to that bona fide order of transfer. The Tribunal could not, in such circumstances, interfere with orders of transfer of a Government servant. v. S.L. Abbas [ (1993) 4 SCC 357 ], when the order of transfer was interfered by the Tribunal, this Court held that the Tribunal was not an appellate authority which could substitute its own judgment to that bona fide order of transfer. The Tribunal could not, in such circumstances, interfere with orders of transfer of a Government servant. In Administrator of Dadra & Nagar Haveli v. H.P. Vora [(1993) Supp. 1 SCC 551], it was held that the Administrative Tribunal was not an appellate authority and it could not substitute the role of authorities to clear the efficiency bar of a public servant. Recently, in State bank of India & Ors. v. Samarendra Kishore Endow & Anr. [J] (1994) 1 SC 217], a Bench of this Court to which two of us (B.P. Jeevan Reddy & B.L. Hansaria, JJ.) were members, considered the order of the Tribunal, which quashed the charges as based on no evidence, went in detail into the question as to whether the Tribunal had power to appreciate the evidence while exercising power of judicial review and held that a Tribunal could not appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion to that of the disciplinary authority. It would, therefore, be clear that the Tribunal cannot embark upon appreciation of evidence to substitute its own findings of fact to that of a disciplinary/appellate authority. 13. The similar were the observation by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors AIR (1999) 2 SCC-10. Paragraph 6 of the Judgment deserves to be reproduced. “The findings, recorded in a domestic enquiry, can be characterised as perverse if it is shown that such a finding is not supported by any evidence on record or is not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person could have come to those findings on the basis of the that evidence. This principle was laid down by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Sree Rama Rao. 1964 2 LLJ 150 = AIR 1963 SC 1723 = 1964 (3) SCR 25 , in which the question was whether the High Court, under Article 226, could interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This principle was laid down by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Sree Rama Rao. 1964 2 LLJ 150 = AIR 1963 SC 1723 = 1964 (3) SCR 25 , in which the question was whether the High Court, under Article 226, could interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This decision was followed in Central Bank of India vs. Prakash Chand Jain, 1969 2 LLJ 377 (SC) = AIR 1969 SC 983 and Bharat Iron Works vs. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel & Ors. 1976 Labour & Industrial Cases 4 (SC) = AIR 1976 SC 98 = 1976 (2) SCR 280 = (1976) 1 SCC 518 . In Rajinder Kumar Kindra vs. Delhi Administration through Secretary (Labour) and Others. AIR 1984 SC 1805 = 1985 (1) SCR 866 = (1984) 4 SCC 635 , it was laid down that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man could come, the findings can be rejected as perverse. It was also laid down that where a quasi-judicial tribunal records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are his mere ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated. 14. From the aforesaid judgments, it clearly emerges that though the judicial review against the departmental proceedings under Article 226 Constitution of India even with regard to the interference with the findings of facts recorded therein is permissible yet the same is very limited. The Court would interfere only if the finding of guilt arrived at in the domestic enquiry is based on no evidence or on the evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and perverse. 15. From the perusal of the record I could not find any perversity in the findings of the facts recorded on the charges leveled against the petitioner. There is enough evidence brought on record which is cogent and reliable. Otherwise also, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not sit in an appeal against the decision of a disciplinary authority and reappreciate the evidence to come to a different conclusion. There is enough evidence brought on record which is cogent and reliable. Otherwise also, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not sit in an appeal against the decision of a disciplinary authority and reappreciate the evidence to come to a different conclusion. This Court would only interfere where the authority which holds the proceedings against a delinquent officer acts in a manner which is inconsistent of the rules of natural justice or is in violation of statutory rules, prescribing the mode of enquiry. It would also interfere; if the conclusion or findings of fact arrived at by the disciplinary authority are such that no reasonable person would have ever reached. Except for the exceptions aforesaid. This Court would be loath to interfere with the conclusions arrived at by the competent authority in the disciplinary enquiry. 16. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any merit in this petition. In the result, this petition is dismissed with connected IA(s). 17. The record produced by Mr. T. M. Shamsi, learned ASGI be returned him forthwith against proper receipt.