JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal is by the sole accused who is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.10,000/, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. 2. The case of the prosecution is that deceased Nirmala had married the accused about 2 ½ months prior to the incident. He was suspecting that she was carrying on illegal intimacy with her employer. On 11.6.2011 in the morning as usual, deceased had gone to attend coolie work in TAPCMS Mess belonging to her employer Chandranna Mestri. At about 8.00 p.m. accused came to the Mess and in the presence of her employer Chandranna, abused her in filthy language as to why she was continuing her illegal intimacy with the aforesaid Chandranna. He took her in an autorickshaw to Vinayaka Wine store where he consumed liquor. Even while consuming liquor he was abusing the deceased. Thereafter, he took a parcel of food and after reaching home at about 11.00 p.m. he once again started abusing her in filthy language and poured kerosene oil on her body and set her on fire. 3. According to the prosecution, during the occurrence accused latched the door from inside, but the deceased opened the latch and ran out of the house and on hearing her screams, her landlord P.W.1 Papanna and other neighbours rushed to the spot and doused the fire. She was taken to Pandavapura hospital. Accused also accompanied her to the hospital. She was referred to K.R.Hospital, Mysuru. In K.R.Hospital her statement was recorded by P.W.18, the PSI of Srirangapatna police station. Based on this statement, FIR was registered against the accused for the offence under Sections 307 and 285 of IPC. The deceased having succumbed to the burn injuries on 13.6.2011, charge under Section 302 was incorporated. On completing the investigation, charge sheet was laid against the accused under Sections 302 and 285 of IPC. 4. The accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried. The prosecution examined 18 witnesses and produced in evidence Exs.P1 to P28. The material objects were marked as M.Os.1 to 5. Accused took up the defence of total denial. On considering the above material, by the impugned judgment, the learned Sessions Judge found the accused guilty of the offence under Section 302 of IPC and accordingly sentenced him as above. The prosecution examined 18 witnesses and produced in evidence Exs.P1 to P28. The material objects were marked as M.Os.1 to 5. Accused took up the defence of total denial. On considering the above material, by the impugned judgment, the learned Sessions Judge found the accused guilty of the offence under Section 302 of IPC and accordingly sentenced him as above. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the accused has preferred this appeal. 5. We have heard Sri.S.J.Krishnoji Rao, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.Vijaya Kumar Majage, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-State. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/accused submits that the trial Court has committed serious error in convicting the accused for the above offence. The case of the prosecution is based exclusively on dying declaration. The dying declaration relied upon by the prosecution suffers from basic infirmities and improbabilities. There is no material to show that the deceased was in a fit condition to give her statement at the time of recording the alleged dying declaration Ex.P6. There is inordinate delay in submitting the FIR to the learned Magistrate which creates doubt in the case of the prosecution. There is no independent corroboration to the statements found in the dying declaration. The dying declaration attributed to the deceased does not inspire confidence. All the material witnesses including the landlord of the building wherein the deceased and the accused were residing at the relevant time have turned hostile to the prosecution. Under the said circumstance, there was no basis for the conviction of the accused. Thus he prays for acquittal of the accused by setting aside the impugned judgment and order of sentence. 7. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor has disputed the above submissions. He contends that the statement of the deceased was recorded soon after the incident in the hospital when she was in a fit condition to give her statement. There is consistent evidence of P.W.18 with regard to the implication of the accused. The testimony of P.W.18 is corroborated by P.W.6, the medical officer in whose presence the said dying declaration was recorded. The testimony of P.Ws.6 and 18 is not discredited in the crossexamination. There is consistent evidence of P.W.18 with regard to the implication of the accused. The testimony of P.W.18 is corroborated by P.W.6, the medical officer in whose presence the said dying declaration was recorded. The testimony of P.Ws.6 and 18 is not discredited in the crossexamination. There is abundant corroboration to the said dying declaration by way of MLC extract wherein at the earliest instance the victim has implicated the accused and has narrated the sequence of events. There is no reason to doubt or disbelieve the contents of this dying declaration. The incident has taken place in the house where only the deceased and the accused was residing. The trial Court has appreciated all these facts and circumstances of the case in a proper perspective. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere with the well considered judgment rendered by the Court below. 8. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions made at the bar. Undeniably, the case of the prosecution is rested on the dying declaration attributed to the deceased. Law is now well settled that dying declaration can form the sole basis of conviction if it is free from any kind of doubt and the same inspires confidence in the mind of the Court. It is also well settled that there is no requirement of any certification with regard to physical and mental condition of the victim while giving statement with regard to cause of her death. The fact that the victim was in a fit condition to give her statement could nevertheless be proved either by medical evidence or by the surrounding circumstances and if the said material inspires confidence in the mind of the Court, that the statement given by the deceased is free and voluntary and not the outcome of tutoring or deliberation, such a dying declaration could be safely acted upon without independent corroboration. 9. In the instant case, in order to prove the dying declaration, the prosecution has relied upon the testimony of P.W.18, the PSI who recorded the said dying declaration. According to this witness, on receiving the information from K.R.hospital, he rushed to K.R.Hospital and made a requisition to the medical officer, seeking his opinion as to whether the victim was in a fit condition to give her statement. Thereafter, he proceeded to record her statement in the presence of the medical officer. According to this witness, on receiving the information from K.R.hospital, he rushed to K.R.Hospital and made a requisition to the medical officer, seeking his opinion as to whether the victim was in a fit condition to give her statement. Thereafter, he proceeded to record her statement in the presence of the medical officer. In his evidence before the Court, he has narrated the details of the statement made by the victim as found in the dying declaration Ex.P6. He has reiterated that the victim stated before him that on the date of the incident she had gone to TAPCMS mess belonging to P.W.3Chandranna mestri. At about 8.00 p.m. the accused came to the said mess and started abusing her in front of Chandranna as to why she was carrying on illicit relationship with him. Thereafter, he took her in an autorickshaw and consumed liquor in Vinayaka Wine store. Thereafter, he collected a food packet and both of them reached home at about 11.00 p.m. After reaching home, he once again started abusing her and poured kerosene oil on her and set her on fire. 10. P.W.18 has identified his signature on the said statement and has also identified the left toe mark of the victim which is marked as Ex.P6(a) and the signature of the medical officer is marked as Ex.P6(b). The evidence of P.W.18 is not discredited in the crossexamination except suggesting that the deceased had not given her statement as per Ex.P6 and that she was not in a fit condition to give her statement, by and large the evidence of PW18 has remained unshaken. He has asserted in the cross examination that he recorded Ex.P6 as per the say of the victim. 11. P.W.6, the medical officer, who has subscribed his signature on Ex.P6 has also deposed in line with P.W.18 stating that based on the requisition of P.W.18, he examined the victim and having found her fit to give her statement, he permitted P.W.18 to record her statement. This witness also has deposed the contents of the dying declaration in verbatim as if the said statement was recorded by him personally. But in the crossexamination, he has admitted that before giving his evidence in the Court he has gone through the contents of Ex.P6 and based on the said statement he has deposed before the Court. This witness also has deposed the contents of the dying declaration in verbatim as if the said statement was recorded by him personally. But in the crossexamination, he has admitted that before giving his evidence in the Court he has gone through the contents of Ex.P6 and based on the said statement he has deposed before the Court. This statement, in our view, demonstrates the interestedness of P.W.6 in giving evidence and weakens the credibility of his evidence. In appreciating his evidence, it is relevant to note that though this witness has asserted that after receiving the requisition from P.W.18 he examined the victim and being satisfied himself that the victim was in a fit condition to give her statement permitted P.W.18 to record the statement of the victim, yet in the dying declaration Ex.P6, this witness has not made any endorsement to the effect that the victim was in a fit condition to give her statement. Undeniably P.W.6 was a medical officer and he was expected to give his evidence based on records and not from his memory. His deposition indicates that without even looking into the medical records he has stated that the victim was in a fit condition to give her statement. We have verified the entire records and we find that prosecution has not produced any medical records to show the condition of the victim at the time of recording the alleged statement Ex.P6. In the absence of any certification to that effect in Ex.P6, and in the absence of reliable medical records in proof of the condition of the victim, merely on the basis of the oral say of PW6, it cannot be accepted that the victim was in a fit condition to give her statement as deposed by PW6. 12. The above conclusion is fortified from the findings recorded in the post mortem report and the spot panchanama and the inquest panchanama produced by the prosecution. A reading of the post mortem report as well as the MLC extract indicate that the victim was brought to the hospital with 95 to 96% superficial to deep burns. In the MLC extract at Ex.P11 it is noted that burns were present on face, both the upper limbs, lower limbs, chest, abdomen and whole back, neck except external genitalia. A reading of the post mortem report as well as the MLC extract indicate that the victim was brought to the hospital with 95 to 96% superficial to deep burns. In the MLC extract at Ex.P11 it is noted that burns were present on face, both the upper limbs, lower limbs, chest, abdomen and whole back, neck except external genitalia. Even in the post mortem report it is noted that second and third decree burns were present over face, neck, front, sides and back of chest and abdomen, both upper and lower limbs. Cuticle over burnt areas blackened and peeled off exposing red underlying tissue. The photographs at Exs.P23 to P28 indicate that the deceased had sustained extensive burns and it is noticed that the half of the lower lip was completely burnt. These facts render it difficult to believe that the victim was in a fit condition to speak with coherence making long syntax of sentences as recorded in the dying declaration Ex.P6. 13. Here itself it needs to be mentioned that Ex.P6 is recorded in the form of a narrative and not in the form of questions and answers. It is quite unbelievable that a person who had sustained 95 to 96% of burns would give such lengthy sentences in one breath as recorded by P.W.6. It is also relevant to note that in her statement she has even stated the exact time of the incident as 11.20 p.m. and has stated the exact time when they reached home. Though there is no requirement under law that a dying declaration cannot be recorded in a narrative form, but in the instant case, on going through the contents of Ex.P6, we find it difficult to believe that such a version could have been narrated by a victim who had sustained extensive burns over the face. It is in this context the non-production of medical records by the prosecution in our view leads to suspect the genuineness and authenticity of the dying declaration attributed to the deceased. 14. On scrutiny of the records, we find certain glaring circumstances which do not inspire confidence to place reliance on Ex.P6. Firstly, the deceased had sustained burns at about 11.20 p.m. and at the first instance she was taken to Pandavapura hospital. This fact is narrated in the dying declaration Ex.P6. 14. On scrutiny of the records, we find certain glaring circumstances which do not inspire confidence to place reliance on Ex.P6. Firstly, the deceased had sustained burns at about 11.20 p.m. and at the first instance she was taken to Pandavapura hospital. This fact is narrated in the dying declaration Ex.P6. If in fact she was taken to Pandavapura hospital with a history of burns, in all probability, the history of injuries would have been recorded in the Pandavapura hospital. Curiously this document is not produced before the Court, as a result, the earliest version with regard to genesis of the incident appears to have been suppressed by the prosecution. Even though, the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor has argued placing reliance on the MLC extract at Ex.P11, but in view of the fact that at the earliest instance the victim was taken to Pandavapura hospital, the information or the history furnished to the authorities in Pandavapura hospital, in our view, would have lent credibility to the case set up by the prosecution. 15. Secondly, we do not find any independent corroboration to the statements found in the dying declaration Ex.P6. Where the dying declaration is free and voluntary and the attendant circumstances show it to be reliable and that it has been recorded in accordance with law and that the deceased made the dying declaration on her own accord, then any further corroboration in proof thereof may not be necessary. But when the attending circumstances itself throw doubt about the fitness of the victim to give her statement, in our view, without corroboration such a declaration cannot be given any credence. 16. On going through the entire evidence on record, we find that the prosecution has utterly failed to produce any corroboration to the contents of the dying declaration. As already stated above, in the dying declaration the victim has narrated the sequence of events right from the time she left the house till she succumbed to the burns. She has stated that the accused took objections to her relationship with her employer Chandranna and in his presence, he abused her in the mess. Her employer Chandranna is examined as P.W.3 but he has failed to support the prosecution and the prosecution has failed to bring on record any circumstance to probabalize the theory that the incident has taken place as narrated in the dying declaration. Her employer Chandranna is examined as P.W.3 but he has failed to support the prosecution and the prosecution has failed to bring on record any circumstance to probabalize the theory that the incident has taken place as narrated in the dying declaration. As a result, the narration made in the dying declaration has remained unsubstantiated. 17. The other statement made in the dying declaration that soon after the incident the owner of the house Sri.Papanna P.W.1 rushed to the spot and questioned the accused and also helped the victim to douse the fire is also not proved. Even this witness has failed to support the prosecution and no circumstances are brought out in his evidence to show his presence at the spot of occurrence soon after the incident. The ambulance driver who took the deceased to the hospital is also not examined. This witness could have spoken about the condition of the victim when she was brought to the hospital. The prosecution having not produced the case history and the records of the treatment given to the deceased, nonexamination of the ambulance driver throws further doubt on the case of the prosecution. 18. Even with regard to the marriage of the victim and the deceased there is no clear and cogent evidence. One of the witnesses examined by the prosecution namely, the sister of the victim has denied the knowledge of any marriage between the victim and the accused. There is no clear evidence to show that as on the date of the incident the accused and the deceased were living together as husband and wife. The prosecution has based its case solely on the dying declaration Ex.P6. But on consideration of the entire material, we find that the dying declaration is surrounded with suspicious circumstances and unexplained inconsistencies, which do not inspire confidence in us to hold that a conviction could be based solely on the dying declaration Ex.P6. As a result, we hold that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. 19. The above circumstances if analyzed in the backdrop of the unexplained delay in reaching the FIR to the learned Magistrate, we do not have any hesitation to discard the entire case of the prosecution. In this regard, we have taken note of the evidence of PW18. 19. The above circumstances if analyzed in the backdrop of the unexplained delay in reaching the FIR to the learned Magistrate, we do not have any hesitation to discard the entire case of the prosecution. In this regard, we have taken note of the evidence of PW18. According to this witness, he recorded the statement of the victim between 3.15 and 3.50 a.m. on 12.6.2011 and based on the said statement FIR was registered on the same day. The FIR is at Ex.P18. It reveals that the information was received in the police station at 4.20 a.m. on 12.6.2011. But the FIR has reached the Magistrate only after the death of the victim i.e., at 10.30 a.m. on 13.6.2011. There is no explanation whatsoever by the prosecution for the said delay. Though in normal circumstances this delay would not have been given significance, but in the instant case, having regard to the fact that the prosecution has suppressed the material which would have thrown light about the authenticity of the dying declaration, this delay leads to the inevitable inference that the prosecution appears to have got up this document only after the death of the deceased, and that appears to be the reason as to why P.W.6 has not made any endorsement on Ex.P6 as to the condition of the victim. A person with 90 to 95% of burn injuries is admitted in the hospital, it is likely that she might have been given immediate medication and administered with sedatives and other drugs which would have rendered her unfit to give her statement. Therefore, considering all the above facts and circumstances, we are unable to accept the case of the prosecution. We find that the prosecution has failed to bring home the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. As a result, we hold that the conviction of the accused cannot be sustained. 20. Consequently, appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and the order of sentence dated 16.11.2013 passed in S.C.No.226/2011 on the file of III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mandya (sitting at Srirangapatna) is set aside. The accused is acquitted of the charge under Section 302 of IPC and is directed to be set at large forthwith, if not required in any other case. Office to communicate the operative portion of this order to the Superintendent of jail, where the accused is housed.