JUDGMENT : 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. By the said petition, the petitioner, a private limited company, has principally sought judicial review of the decision-making process behind an order as in Annexure P/17, which is an order of annual valuation dated January 10, 2014 passed by the Hearing Officer-VII under section 180 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. The petitioner prays that directions be issued by this Court to restrict the assessment of the annual value strictly in terms of the order dated April 24, 2013 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in F.M.A. No. 927 of 2013 with CAN No. 1454 of 2013. The said annual valuation is in respect of a property situated at 142-A Mahatma Gandhi Road, Kolkata-700 007, a demarcated portion with structures on it, of the mother premises No.142, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Kolkata - 700 007, which underwent several rounds of litigation before it was placed before now. 2. Whether the said property was liable to be assessed for property tax under the said Act of 1980, and whether the writ petitioner was liable for it before March 1, 2007, are questions which ask themselves once the order as in Annexure P/17 is considered. These have already been answered in an earlier round of litigation between the parties. 3. In the earlier round of litigation, a co-ordinate bench of this Court in W.P. No. 7650(W) of 2012 [B.K. Construction & Finance Co. (P) Ltd.--v--Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Others] was considering the judicial review of an order of annual valuation dated April 29, 2012 passed by the Hearing Officer-VII, Kolkata Municipal Corporation which the same writ petitioner had challenged. By an order dated April 24, 2012 a coordinate bench of this Court was pleased to dispose of the said writ petition without passing any order primarily because the writ petitioner had not used any written objection to the proposed valuation and had not preferred any appeal. 4. The said judgment was carried in appeal before an Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in F.M.A. No. 927 of 2013 with CAN 1454 of 2013. 4. The said judgment was carried in appeal before an Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in F.M.A. No. 927 of 2013 with CAN 1454 of 2013. Therein, the writ petitioner raised the question of the jurisdiction of the hearing officer to assess the said premises for property tax on the ground that it was an exempted property, and admittedly so, being recorded as a debutter/place of public worship by the respondent No. 1 itself, in terms of Section 172(1)(a)(i) of the Act of 1980, and also on the jurisdiction of the hearing officer to assess the said property in the hands of the writ petitioner for any period prior to March 1, 2007, when the deed of lease was executed in its favour. The respondent No. 1, however, contested the appeal only on the ground of alternative remedy, as appears from what has been recorded by the Hon'ble Division Bench. The Hon'ble Division Bench, however, made it clear that it was not seeking to revive any remedy which was barred by limitation but only considering whether the Hearing Officer acted without jurisdiction or not. On that basis, it was pleased to reject the objection raised on the ground of alternative remedy holding that the acts were without jurisdiction What the Hon'ble Division Bench was pleased to hold, in this regard, assumes significance and has been made the sheet-anchor of the petitioner's arguments. I extract the relevant portions below: - "Considering the submissions of both the parties, we are of the opinion that the Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction to assess the liability of the appellant/petitioner in respect of the period when the said appellant had no interest in the property and in doing so the Hearing Officer concerned acted beyond his authority and jurisdiction. In the present case, we are satisfied that the impugned order of the Hearing Officer is bad on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the said Hearing Officer travelled beyond his authority in assessing the liability of the appellant in respect of the property ignoring the fact that the said property was Debottar before 1st March, 2007 and was exempted from payment of property tax. Furthermore, the said appellant was also in no way connected with the property in question before 1st March, 2007. Furthermore, the said appellant was also in no way connected with the property in question before 1st March, 2007. For the reasons discussed hereinabove, the order of the Hearing Officer cannot be sustained and we set aside and/or quash the said order passed by the Hearing Officer concerned. In the aforesaid circumstances, the impugned under appeal passed by the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained and the same is accordingly set aside. Since a considerable time has already passed, we direct the Hearing Officer concerned to assess the property in question de novo in terms of this order after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to all the necessary parties including the appellant herein and also considering the specific objections raised on behalf of the appellant on merits at an early date but positively on or before 30th June, 2013." 5. This judgment achieved finality. The respondent Corporation neither challenged it nor sought its review, on any ground whatsoever. It therefore bound the respondent No. 1 and its authorities. However, leaving the said judgment intact and in force, it proceeded, through its hearing officer to pass the order as in Annexure P/17. 6. By the said Order dated January 10, 2014, the Hearing Officer of the respondent No. 1 held inter alia, as follows: - "The case is taken up today at 11:30 am for order. The Advocate for the petitioner, Mr M.L Podder is present and concerned Dy, A.C and A.A.C is present. Being designated U/S 188 of KMC Act 1980, I have heard the matter is in connection with F.M.A 927 of 2013 with CAN 1454 of 2013 KMC Vs M/S B.K Construction Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd. I have perused the contents as kept in record of KMC as well as the written note of argument by the Ld. Advocate of the petitioner. I have also gone through purport of the order of Hon'ble Court in coming to the decision. Various orders relating to property have been presented before me by the petitioner's advocate who have been duly examined. The main contention of the case is the period of assessment done by KMC and challenged by the petitioner i.e 03/1994-95 to 03/2006. Since the lease deed was executed at 2007, the petitioner shirks the liability to pay property tax 2007. Various orders relating to property have been presented before me by the petitioner's advocate who have been duly examined. The main contention of the case is the period of assessment done by KMC and challenged by the petitioner i.e 03/1994-95 to 03/2006. Since the lease deed was executed at 2007, the petitioner shirks the liability to pay property tax 2007. While KMC claim tax of 5 Katha and 11 Chittak land of area for the period between 1994 and 2006. Examined two vital documents connected with this case namely the agreement made between 'Official Trustee of Government of West Bengal' and 'M/S B.K Construction Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd' on 12.08.1994 and the lease/ indenture between them on 01.03.2007. Any agreement in the foundation of any subsequent deed/indenture and here in this case also the agreement dated back to 1994-95 played a vital role and hence cannot be overlook. The subsequent culmination in the form of lease/indenture between them resulted from the agreement of 12.08.1994 The KMC has taken into consideration the said agreement while assessing the annual valuation the said agreement has been made for the purpose of development of the property and as soon as it was signed it became operative in 1994 and so was the possession and use over property (portion thereof) in question as per agreement The fact is further substantiated from the building plan which got sanctioned in 2006 i.e before execution of lease deed. This 50% of the property lost its old character in respect of mode of use and section 188 (2)(III) of KMC Act 1980 has been invoked. Besides section 172(1) (a) (1) of the said Act is not applicable since the portion of the property ceases to be used exclusively for the purpose of public worship, 'hence claim for exemption is not applicable. The agreement here cannot be left aside, as in pursuance of the instrument the demarcated North- West portion of the premises of 142, Mahatma Gandhi Road along with dilapidated building was delivered to M/S- B.K. Construction Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd. Since the possession of the portion the question was handed over for development by 'Official Trustee of Government of West Bengal' on 12.08.1994, the premises got separated from mother premises 142, M.G. Road and became 142A, M.G. Road. Pvt. Ltd. Since the possession of the portion the question was handed over for development by 'Official Trustee of Government of West Bengal' on 12.08.1994, the premises got separated from mother premises 142, M.G. Road and became 142A, M.G. Road. From the records facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that the period of assessment has been taken into account correctly from 03/1994-94 and objection raised do not stand. Now, I come to the point the justification of proposed A.V. by KMC by 03/1994-95. It is from the record of KMC that 7% of the estimated market value of the property in question (5 katha 11 chittak) has been impose as per section 175 (2) of KMC Act 1980. The estimated value of the said property is Rs. 7750000/- and A.V. comes to Rs.542500/- @ rate of 7% being fully N.R. This is confirmed. Let a copy of this order be supplied to the petitioner if asked for." 7. The agreement dated August 12, 1994 was not produced by either party to the writ petition. However, it appears from the face of the aforesaid, that the Hearing Officer held that the premises had ceased to be a debutter from the date that the agreement of August 12, 1994 was entered into, since the possession was handed over to the writ petitioner immediately thereafter, and therefore the writ petitioner was liable to make payment of the property tax from that date, and not from the date when the registered deed of lease was entered into by the Official Trustee of West Bengal and the Writ Petitioner, which was far later, on March 1, 2007. 8. The writ petitioner has taken a very simple point to impeach the decision-making process. It says that when the Appellate Order dated April 24, 2013 has achieved finality, all these findings recorded by the Hearing Officer which are contrary to the findings of the Appellate Court, are barred by res judicata, actual or constructive and these findings are not in consonance with the said judgment. The writ petitioner says that all that the Hearing Officer was competent to do and had jurisdiction in terms of the Appellate Judgment dated April 24, 2013 was to decide the annual valuation from March 1, 2007 as against the writ petitioner. He could do nothing more. 9. Mr. The writ petitioner says that all that the Hearing Officer was competent to do and had jurisdiction in terms of the Appellate Judgment dated April 24, 2013 was to decide the annual valuation from March 1, 2007 as against the writ petitioner. He could do nothing more. 9. Mr. Mukherjee, Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1, would, however, submit as follows: - a. A judgment in respect of the self same property had been rendered by a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court prior to the judgment dated April 24, 2013 which was not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Division Bench which passed the order allowing the appeal on April 24, 2013. b. This judgment was rendered between the rival claimants to the shebaitship of the self-same debutter. This is the judgment in the case of Sankar Nath Mullick and Another--v--Smt. Lakshmi Sona Datta reported in (2004) 4 CHN 435 . I had brought it to the notice of the parties during the course of hearing of the case, and they had considered it before completing their submissions. c. The said judgment very clearly records that by an Ekrarnama dated May 25, 1820 and a post-script document dated February 27, 1822, a private religious endowment was created by the Settlor, Chitra Dassi, dedicated to the family deity. Therefore, it is a "private debutter" or a place of private worship and not a place of public worship. d. Had the later Bench noticed the judgment of the former Division Bench, it could not have been held that the property was an exempted property within the meaning of Section 172(1)(a)(i) of the said Act of 1980. e. So far as the liability of the petitioner is concerned, admittedly the petitioner took possession of the said land from after the date of the agreement dated August 12, 1994. Since it occupied the premises, pursuant to the agreement, and took steps to commercially exploit it, from that date onwards not only did the premises lose its character of even a private debutter, it was to be assessed in the hands of the petitioner, which was actually enjoying it from then, and not merely from March 1, 2007. 10. In support of his contentions, Mr. 10. In support of his contentions, Mr. Mukherjee, has placed reliance upon the following statutory provisions: - a. Section 172: Exemption of lands and buildings from property tax.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sections in this chapter,- (a) (i) Lands or buildings or portions thereof exclusively used for the purpose of public worship, (emphasis supplied by me). .......... b. The statutory scheme of the Act of 1980, inter alia Sections 182A, 183 and 193, which makes not merely the owner but also any occupier of the land or building, liable to pay the property tax. 11. These have been rebutted by Mr. Chatterjee, Learned Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner, in the manner as shall appear from what is written hereinafter. 12. I shall take the second point, about the liability of the writ petitioner to pay the property tax from August 12, 1994, first. The provisions of the law which bind the respondent No. 1, referred to by Mr. Mukherjee, in the first instance refers to a person to whom title has been transferred (Section 183 of the Act of 1980). Clearly, the title of a property is never transferred in a lease, even by a registered deed of lease for 99 years, far less by an agreement to lease. If it is contended that an agreement to lease was as good as a lease so far as the present case is concerned, even then, the incidence of tax under Section 193 is upon the lessor, not the lessee, so far as the Respondent No. 1 is concerned. What private treaty is there between the lessor and the lessee is immaterial when the respondent No. 1 purports to exercise statutory power. It must act only in the manner prescribed or not at all. Any other mode of action is necessarily to be construed to be forbidden. So far as Section 182A is concerned, the amended provision with effect from May 1, 2007 by virtue of Kolkata Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 2006, makes it clear that only when there is absence of the owner or the person liable to pay the property tax, can the occupier be asked to pay it. In the instant case, the hearing officer has not recorded the existence of the jurisdictional fact that the owner of the property is absent or the person liable to pay tax is absent. In the instant case, the hearing officer has not recorded the existence of the jurisdictional fact that the owner of the property is absent or the person liable to pay tax is absent. Therefore, he could not have had jurisdiction to make the writ petitioner liable to pay property tax for the said property by the impugned order, at least from before March 1, 2007. Furthermore, if the unamended provision is considered, by virtue of Section 232A of the Act of 1980, it would mean that the property tax is payable by the owner or the person liable to pay tax in respect of new building or existing building which not been assessed, or an existing building which has been redeveloped or substantially altered or improved after the last assessment but has not been subjected to revision of assessment consequent thereto, or where the bills have not been issued. The respondent No. 1 did not produce the completion certificate to show when the re-development was completed. In the facts of the case, the Hearing Officer has recorded that the building plan itself was sanctioned in 2006, therefore, it could not have been developed or substantially altered or improved before that, therefore, the finding that the writ petitioner was liable to pay property tax from August 12, 1994 is patently contrary to the materials on record and the statutory scheme relied upon by the respondents and is thus perverse. There is nothing recorded by the Hearing Officer, which is statutorily tenable, which would validate the decision-making process, and which would show that the writ petitioner was liable to pay any property tax for any period prior to March 1, 2007. 13. Coming now to the first point of the respondent No. 1, which I have summarized in paragraphs 9a to 9d, both inclusive and paragraph 10(a) of this Judgment, while it is true that the judgment in the case of Sankar Nath Mullick (supra) clearly indicates that the settlor created a private religious endowment, Mr. Chatterjee first submits that the said question cannot be reopened by the respondent No. 1 in view of the judgment inter partes being dated April 24, 2013. The Judgment in case of Sankar Nath Mullick (supra) is not a judgment inter partes. Chatterjee first submits that the said question cannot be reopened by the respondent No. 1 in view of the judgment inter partes being dated April 24, 2013. The Judgment in case of Sankar Nath Mullick (supra) is not a judgment inter partes. He further submits that nothing prevented the respondent No. 1 from seeking a review of the said judgment in the light of the earlier judgment of 2004 alleged not to have been noticed by the later Division Bench. Further, he submits properly construed, all that the earlier judgment decided was who was entitled to act as Shebaits of the said deity and from which date. It cannot be stretched to include anything else. On merits he contends that there is a distinction between the terms "public debutter" and "public place of worship". Even the Temple of Ma Bhabatarini in Dakshineswar was a private religious endowment, but a place where the public at large can worship. This is not a case where a person has endowed his family deity in his own home, and contended that since his house has a "Thakur Ghar", it is exempted from payment of property tax. He submits that the annexures to the writ petition even as late as on September 29, 2000 show receipts issued by the respondent No. 1 as would show that premises No.142, Mahatma Gandhi Road, was expressly treated to be a temple and an exempted property. Mr. Chatterjee took pains to demonstrate that even the lease deed spoke of the North Western Portion of the said premises No.142, Mahatma Gandhi Road, and that the number 142A was only allocated after the deed of lease had been entered into, and the earlier valuation set aside by the Appellate Judgment was in respect of that portion of premises No.142, Mahatma Gandhi Road. 14. There is substance in the submissions of Mr. Chatterjee. The legislature in its wisdom did not provide that the exemption would be given to a public debutter, but to a place used exclusively for public worship; I cannot therefore change the words of the statute to suit the convenience of the respondent No. 1. Whether it was exclusively used as a place of worship from August 12, 1994 or not, does not concern the writ petitioner. Whether it was exclusively used as a place of worship from August 12, 1994 or not, does not concern the writ petitioner. If it was not, since the owner is very much available, being the Deity, it was open to the respondent No. 1 to assess the said property from August 12, 1994 till March 1, 2007 in the hands of the said owner. The tax would have been payable by the debutter estate, and not the she baits or the Official Trustee personally. It has not done so. It cannot, in the absence of a finding that the owner or person liable to pay the property tax is absent, make the writ petitioner liable to pay the annual valuation from August 12, 1994 as occupier. In fact, the question of whether it is exempt or not has been laid to rest by the order of the Hon'ble Division Bench dated April 24, 2013, which was rendered inter partes and binds the respondent No. 1. 15. It needs to be appreciated that the order of the Hon'ble Division Bench was passed in reference to a challenge against an order of annual valuation dated April 29, 2011 by which the period of assessment for which tax liability was imposed upon the writ petitioner was taken as 3/1994-95. The said order clearly identified that the premises in respect of which such annual valuation has been carried upon is premises No. 142A, Mahatma Gandhi Road. The effect of setting aside the said order with the observation that the premises in question was a debutter property and fall within the exemption of section 172 of the Act of 1980 clearly identifies that the said observation was not merely in respect of premises No. 142 Mahatma Gandhi Road exclusive of premises No. 142A Mahatma Gandhi Road. It is therefore observed that the decision passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench must be understood in that light. The Hearing Officer acted wholly without jurisdiction and contrary to the rule of law by trying to resurrect, on similar reasoning as had been set aside, the very same annual valuation as against the very same person for the very same period, though the reasoning behind that was held to be without jurisdiction. 16. Mr. Mukherjee had also impeached the maintainability of the writ petition for the prayer of certiorari and cited some precedents on the point. 16. Mr. Mukherjee had also impeached the maintainability of the writ petition for the prayer of certiorari and cited some precedents on the point. However, none of those decisions, including that of Ebrahim Aboobakar and Hawababai Aboobakar of Bombay--v--Custodian General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi reported in AIR 1952 SC 319 holds that where a nullity is challenged or that where an authority passed an order without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in violation of the principles of natural justice, a writ of certiorari does not lie. I have expressly held, that in this case, the Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction to hold contrary to the judgment inter partes in an earlier round of litigation involving the same issue and the same property by merely resurrecting the earlier order, more concisely and with a different date, though the same had been set aside. 17. As a consequence I allow the writ petition by quashing the impugned order dated January 10, 2014 as in Annexure P/17 and by further direction the respondents particularly the respondent No. 4 to assess the annual value of premises No.142A, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Kolkata - 700 007 and Assessee No.11-043-19-0155-9 (the writ petitioner 1) with effect from March 1, 2007 strictly in terms of the Judgment and Order dated April 24, 2013 passed in FMA No.927 of 2013 with CAN 1454 of 2013 within three months from the date of communication of this Order, by a reasoned order, after giving the writ petitioner and any other person concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard. I make it clear that on the basis of the annual valuation so decided, bills shall be raised and served on the petitioner. I make it clear that on the basis of the annual valuation so decided, bills shall be raised and served on the petitioner. The interim order dated April 18, 2019 is modified to the following extent, that whatever money has been deposited by the writ petitioner to the respondent No. 1 as against property tax, and held by the respondent No. 1 in its suspense account, shall be adjusted with the tax due from the petitioner calculated on the basis of the annual valuation arrived at in compliance of this order and the bills raised on that basis, from the 1st quarter of 2007--2008 (March--May, 2007), and until the current bills are raised and served on the writ petitioner on the basis of the new annual valuation made by the respondent No. 1 in terms of this order, nothing shall be payable by the writ petitioner on account of current bills. This order shall not prevent the respondent No. 1 from seeking to make liable any person other than the petitioner for the payment the property tax in respect of premises No.142, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Kolkata - 700 007 for any period prior to March 1, 2007, in accordance with law and after acting in the manner prescribed and observing due process. 18. The writ petition is allowed to the above extent. There shall be no order as to costs.