JUDGMENT : 1. This group of Civil Revision Applications are arising out of the common question of law and fact, hence, both the sides requested to deal with and decide the same by common order. As a result of which, all Civil Revision Applications are dealt with by treating Civil Revision Application No.547 of 2018 as a lead matter. The decision in the lead matter would govern the grievance of all allied Civil Revision Applications. Hence, the facts are taken from the lead matter. 2. The petitioner of Civil Revision Application No.547 of 2018 has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for challenging the legality and validity of the impugned common order dated 9.3.2018 and has sought for following reliefs : “A. Your Lordships may be pleased to admit this application. B. Your Lordships may be pleased to set aside the impugned common order dated 9.3.2018 passed by the Ld. Principal Civil Judge, Patan in LAR Execution Application Nos.34 to 56 of 2012 with all consequential effects, so far as it rejects the claims of the applicants and further be pleased to declare that the applicants are entitled to recover the compensation as prayed for in LAQ Execution Application No.54 of 2012 (as amended subsequently) without any deduction of interest as recorded by the Ld. Executing Court in the impugned order and further be pleased to direct the respondent No.1 to deposit the due balance amount before the Ld. Executing Court forthwith, with further directions to the Ld. Executing Court to proceed with the execution proceedings forthwith; C. Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this application, Your Lordships may be pleased to stay the execution, operation and implementation of the impugned common order dated 9.3.2018 passed by the Ld. Principal Civil Judge, Patan in LAR Execution Application Nos.34 to 56 of 2012 qua the rejection of the claims of the applicants, on any conditions that may be deemed fit and proper by this Hon’ble Court; D. Your Lordships may be pleased to pass such other and further order in the interest of justice which may be deemed fit to this Hon’ble Court.” 3. The facts emanating the controversy are that for the purpose of establishing the head quarter and camps of North Gujarat University at village Samalpati and Matarvadi of Taluka Patan of the then District Mehsana, an intention was declared for acquiring the land and for that purpose, a notification came to be issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘the Act’) on 23.5.1987. This Section 4 notification was followed by Section 6 notification under the Act on 12.5.1988 issued by appropriate Government. It is the case of the petitioner that respondents have invoked urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act and took possession of the said land before passing of an award by respondent No.2 under Section 11 of the Act on 12.1.1995. Some of the affected land holders including the present petitioners have challenged the same by way of filing writ petitions before this Court in which this Court was pleased to grant adinterim relief qua possession, but no interim relief was granted against the proceedings for acquisition of subject land and finally, those writ petitions came to be dismissed. So, the case is pleaded by the petitioners that there was no interim relief operative throughout the proceedings in respect of the continuance of proceedings for acquisition of the land and such proceedings were never intercepted by any interim relief. It is the case of the petitioners that respondent No.2 on 21.9.1996, passed a common award under Section 11 of the Act in LAQ Case No.1 of 1987 (Part-II) and awarded a meager amount of compensation to the petitioners and feeling dissatisfied with the said meager amount of compensation, the present petitioners along with other claimants had approached the Reference Court under Section 18 of the Act by way of filing the land references and with respect to present lead matter, LAR number was ‘LAR No.844 of 1997’. These references were consolidated and by a common judgment and order on 1.8.2002, the Reference Court was pleased to allow all the references and directed the respondents to pay the additional compensation @ Rs.109.30 ps. as market value + other statutory benefit and interest. 3.1 This common judgment and award dated 1.8.2002 came to be challenged by the respondent – University before this Court by way of preferring various First Appeals and the said group of First Appeals was headed by First Appeal No.2613 of 2003. as market value + other statutory benefit and interest. 3.1 This common judgment and award dated 1.8.2002 came to be challenged by the respondent – University before this Court by way of preferring various First Appeals and the said group of First Appeals was headed by First Appeal No.2613 of 2003. This group of First Appeals came up for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court and the Division Bench, by a common judgment and order, dated 7.8.2012, was pleased to partly allow all First Appeals by slightly modifying the award of the Reference Court with respect to the market value of the subject land only and the date of entitlement of interest on solatium. Except these two issues, no change and no modification was made by the Division Bench and except the aforesaid subject, the entire award of the Reference Court came to be confirmed. The Division Bench, with respect to the market value of the land, has determined at Rs.60 per sq. mtr. instead of Rs.109.30 ps. awarded by the Reference Court and so far as the amount of interest on solatium is concerned, the same was directed to be counted w.e.f. 19.9.2001 instead of from the date of publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act and by this modification only, the entire award dated 1.8.2002 came to be confirmed. It is further the case of the petitioners that this very respondent – university assailed this order of this Court before the Apex Court and the Apex Court, while entertaining the SLP (C) No.518 of 2013 and allied SLPs, was pleased to partly allow the same and modified the judgment and award by determining the market value of the land at Rs.100 per sq.mtr. and there was no other modification made by the Apex Court in any form. Hence, with aforesaid slight modification, in substance, the original award of the Reference Court came to be confirmed and the Apex Court was pleased to dispose of all SLPs by common judgment and order dated 28.1.2015. and there was no other modification made by the Apex Court in any form. Hence, with aforesaid slight modification, in substance, the original award of the Reference Court came to be confirmed and the Apex Court was pleased to dispose of all SLPs by common judgment and order dated 28.1.2015. It is further the case of the petitioners that during the pendency of the First Appeals before this Court, the respondent – University had prayed for an interim order and the Division Bench vide order dated 12.12.2003 was pleased to stay the operation of the award of the Reference Court on a condition to deposit the entire amount with compensation together with interest within a period of 12 weeks. But a categorical statement was made by the petitioners that said 12 weeks’ period got over on 5.3.2004, but no amount was deposited by the respondent – University. However, on 2.4.2004, lumpsum amount in part came to be deposited and by an interim order dated 19.4.2004, the disbursement @ Rs.21/- per sq.mtr. on or before 10.5.2004 together with interest, cost and solatium as awarded was made and the balance shortfall was directed to be deposited upto 15.6.2004. But the respondent – university unfortunately had not even deposited that amount and on its own will, deposited against the lumpsum amount of 17.8.2004. So, in substance, the respondent – university, according to the petitioners, has made a consistent defaults and acted on its own. 3.2 A further case which has been projected by the petitioners is that in between, the petitioners – applicants have filed Execution Application No.51 of 2012 before the Executing Court for claiming an amount pursuant to the judgment and order passed by this Court. But then, on 11.8.2014, the Executing Court passed an order to close the execution proceedings as the amount was deposited before the Land Reference Court at Mehsana and the said amount was not transferred to the Executing Court at Patan. As a result of this, the applicants with other claimants approached this Court by way of Civil Revision Application No.427 of 2015 again with all other CRAs and thereafter, the Court was pleased to allow all CRAs and directed to transfer all fixed deposits to the Executing Court at Patan and further directed the Executing Court to proceed further with the execution proceedings. It is further the case of the petitioners that since the Apex Court has modified the judgment and order of this Court, as a result of this, the applicants have amended the execution applications pursuant to the said order and sought a further claim as amended in the execution proceedings. The total amount which has been claimed after amendment comes to Rs.66,49,310/- with respect to petitioners’ case of this lead matter and thereafter, when the execution proceedings went on since the original award of the Reference Court was confirmed throughout upto the Apex Court. But then, unfortunately, according to the petitioners, by passing a common order on 9.3.2018, the Executing Court was pleased to partly allow the claim of the applicants and partly rejected the claim by merely mechanically relying upon the calculations submitted by respondent – university and the final award came to be passed. Gist of the same is reproduced hereinafter : “Out of total claimed amount only Rs.12,08,030/- were ordered to be paid to the applicants, (i.e. the amount which was deposited by the respondent University). Beyond the scope of execution application and contrary to the award, the Ld. Executing Court illegitimately declared and held that the applicants are not entitled for the interests on the amount which were deposited by the University (invested into FDRs), but the applicants are entitled for interest only on the amount which are not deposited by the university as per the order / the award of the Hon’ble Court. Beyond the scope of execution application and contrary to the award, the Ld. Executing Court further declared and held that the applicants are not entitled for the interest for the period w.e.f. 1988 to 10.8.1994, during which stay of this Hon’ble Court was in operation in Special Civil Application No.4243/1988 and therefore, the said period is to be deducted from calculating the interest. The applicants were granted liberty to file fresh execution proceedings for recovering the balance due amount after making fresh calculation of the interest as directed in the impugned order.” 3.3 It is this common order which has been passed by the Executing Court is made the subject matter of present CRAs submitted by the present petitioners along with other claimants in this group of CRAs. 4. 4. Mr.Mehul Rathod, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has vehemently contended that it is settled position of law that Executing Court cannot travel beyond the scope of decree which had attained the finality and in this case, right upto the Apex Court and, therefore, the order of reduction of compensation de-hors the Apex Court’s order, is wholly without jurisdiction. It has further been contended that after analyzing the entire record, the Reference Court has exercised the jurisdiction under Section 18 of the Act which judgment has been examined by the Division Bench of this Court and the same was modified and the proceedings went before the Apex Court in which also, the final Court of the country has confirmed the original award with certain modifications and as such, when the Division Bench of this Court and the Apex Court have examined this very award i.e. award dated 1.8.2002, as a part of judicial discipline and the scope of interference, the Executing Court could not have made an attempt to travel beyond the scope of its authority and as such, this being an order without jurisdiction, against the settled principle of law, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside with consequential relief as sought for in the revision petition. 4.1 Mr.Mehul Rathod, learned advocate, has further submitted that here is a case in which as a part of compulsory acquisition, the valuable land of the petitioners has been taken away by applying emergency clause and as against that, a very meager amount was awarded which is also not received in the hands of the petitioners. Hence, the Executing Court ought to have appreciated the plight of the petitioners. Learned advocate has further submitted that the issue related to an amount keeping in view the provision of Section 21(A)(1) has also been dealt with not only by the Reference Court, but by the Division Bench of this Court, as well and the said issue has been finalized at the time of disposal of SLP and as such, it would not open for the Executing Court to tinker with the decree which has attained finality and as such, keeping in view the doctrine of ‘finality’, the Executing Court could not have reduced the amount which has already been confirmed right upto the Apex Court. 4.2 Mr.Mehul Rathod, learned advocate, has submitted that the calculations which have been given by both the sides ought to have been examined at length by the Executing Court, instead of accepting the calculation of respondent – University by applying the provision contained under Section 23(1-A) of the Act and as such, there is a clear error committed by the Executing Court in passing the impugned order. It has further been submitted that throughout the proceedings, there was no stay with respect to the completion of process of acquisition and as such, it is not on account of petitioners’ litigation, the process of acquisition is halted at any time and, therefore, keeping in view the proceedings which were pending in this Court, the Executing Court cannot find out an excuse to reduce the amount which has already been awarded and confirmed upto the Apex Court. It has been submitted that the portion of the land in question is practically taken away in the price of peanuts and majority of them have been placed as landless persons and as a part of further damage to them, the Executing Court, though not opened, has reduced the amount which exercise is thoroughly uncalled for and not recognized by any proposition of law and hence, the order in question deserves to be corrected. 4.3 Mr.Mehul Rathod, learned advocate, has further submitted that the legality and correctness of the decree cannot be dealt with by the Executing Court and even looking to the provision contained under Section 23(1-A) of the Act, a further reduction was out of place and apart from that, even the judgments which have been rendered by the Reference Court as well as the Division Bench of this Court, the specific issues have been dealt with and clarified and by referring to some of the paragraphs contained in the said decisions, a contention is raised that there is absolutely no ambiguity in the award which has attained finality and, therefore, the Executing Court has acted without the authority of law. Apart from this, this point which has been raised here in the present proceedings was not raised at the time when contest was made before the Executing Court and as such, the Executing Court cannot pass a new decree by substituting the original one which has attained finality upto the Apex Court. Apart from this, this point which has been raised here in the present proceedings was not raised at the time when contest was made before the Executing Court and as such, the Executing Court cannot pass a new decree by substituting the original one which has attained finality upto the Apex Court. Learned advocate has submitted that it is settled law that amount deposited in the Court cannot be construed as satisfaction of the decree and as such, indicating the provision contained under Order 21 Rule 1 of the CPC, mere deposit by the university cannot be treated as satisfaction of decree. Learned advocate has further submitted that the amount which has been determined by the Reference Court and modified upto the Apex Court, is a reasonable, adequate and fair compensation which ought not to have been reduced by referring to merely a provisio to a substantive provision. Provisio of Section 23(1-A) cannot be read with isolation. As a result of this, there is a complete illegality committed by the Executing Court in passing the order. To substantiate his contention, Mr.Mehul Rathod, learned advocate, has relied upon the following decisions : (1) State of Gujarat v. Vallabh Mohan, reported in 2011 (O) GLHEL-HC 224458. (2) Dileshwar Sahu & Ors. v. Land Acquisition Officer, Sambalpur, reported in AIR 1989 ORISSA 47 (3) P.S.L. Ramanathan Chettiar & Ors. v. ORMPRM Ramanathan Chettiar, reported in AIR 1968 SC 1047 (4) State of Gujarat v. Gangaji Ramji, reported in 1995 (O) GLHEL-HC 214565. (5) State of Haryana v. K.L.Pasricha, reported in 1998 (46) DRJ (Delhi High Court) (6) Meenakshi Saxena & Anr. v. ECGC Limited, reported in (2018) 7 SCC 479 . 4.4 By referring to these decisions, a contention is raised that there is strong prima facie case and the order under challenge is ex-facie invalid, the revision petitions may be allowed, in the interest of justice. 5. To meet with the stand taken by learned advocate for the petitioners, Mr.Nishit P. Gandhi, learned advocate appearing for the respondent – University, has contended that in a situation like this, whenever there is a leverage opened for determining the amount, it is always for the Executing Court to fix the price and the compensation. 5. To meet with the stand taken by learned advocate for the petitioners, Mr.Nishit P. Gandhi, learned advocate appearing for the respondent – University, has contended that in a situation like this, whenever there is a leverage opened for determining the amount, it is always for the Executing Court to fix the price and the compensation. It has been submitted that the statutory benefits which are confirmed under the Act can always be examined and determined by the Executing Court and, therefore, there is no illegality of whatsoever nature committed by the court below. A contention is raised by learned advocate for the respondent – university that a close look at the explanation to Section 23(1-A) would make it clear that it is only within the domain of the Executing Court to look into and arrive at an amount which is payable to the claimant and, therefore, when that exercise keeping in view the explanation to Section 23(1-A) is done with a complete application of mind, it cannot be said that any illegality is crept in an order passed by the court below. 5.1 Mr.Nishit P. Gandhi, learned advocate, has further submitted that looking at the orders of the Reference Court as well as this Hon’ble Court and the Apex Court, such issue of dealing with explanation to Section 23 has been left open for the Executing Court and resultantly, when the Executing Court has passed an order keeping in view of the explanation attached to Section 23(1-A), there is hardly any illegality being committed by the Executing Court. It has been submitted that the learned advocate is making an attempt to construe the powers of the Executing Court as compared to other decrees to be dealt with, the same principle cannot apply here in the present case, especially when explanation attached to Section 23(1- A) makes it clear that the period can be excluded by the Executing Court and as such, it cannot be said that the Executing Court has acted beyond the scope of its authority. Learned advocate has submitted that under the scheme of Land Acquisition Act, stage-wise determining authorities are prescribed and as a part of that scheme, when the Reference Court has arrived at a conclusion of a particular amount, the calculation about ultimate determination of compensation will have to be undertaken by the Executing Court only and, therefore, the provision contained under Section 23 are completely misconstrued by the learned advocate representing the petitioners. It has been submitted that here is a case in which Section 4 notification was issued in the year 1987 and despite the urgency clause having been applied, the possession came in the hands of the university only in the month of January,1995 and, therefore, throughout the proceedings before this Court when stay was operative, the possession could not be taken and as such, the entire acquisition proceedings were held up on account of such stay and, therefore, said period deserves to be excluded which has rightly been understood by the Executing Court. Hence, irrespective of the stay against possession, by virtue of the proceedings before this Court, since the proceedings were pending, the acquisition proceedings were held up and as such, said entire period deserves to be treated as a period to be excluded by virtue of explanation attached to section 23(1-A) which is a guiding factor for Executing Court to determine an amount. 5.2 Mr.Nishit P. Gandhi, learned advocate, has submitted that when the statute makes it clear, the intent of the said statute cannot be give go-bye, by general principles that Executing Court cannot go behind the decree. Hence, there is no error committed by the court below in any form. Accordingly, the revision petitions may be dismissed. 5.3 With respect to the period which has been excluded, the aforesaid submission was made. But so far as the interest which has been awarded and determined, learned advocate has submitted that the provision contained under Section 34 of the Act would be a yardstick for awarding an amount of interest and as such, by relying upon few decisions, learned advocate has submitted that no error is committed by the court below. Mr.Nishit P. Gandhi, learned advocate, has relied upon the following decisions : (1) A decision of the Kerala High Court rendered in L.A.Appeal No.465 of 2008, decided on 10.3.2010. Mr.Nishit P. Gandhi, learned advocate, has relied upon the following decisions : (1) A decision of the Kerala High Court rendered in L.A.Appeal No.465 of 2008, decided on 10.3.2010. (2) Bhavan Vaja v. Solanki hanuji Khodaji Mansang, reported in 1972 (O) GLHEL-SC 3489 (3) Sunder v. Union of India, reported in 2001 (3) GLH 446 (4) Sunder v. Union of India, reported in (2001) 7 SCC 211 (5) Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India, reported in (2006) 8 SCC 457 (6) Ivo Agnelo v. Government of Goa, reported in (2011) 11 SCC 506 (7) Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Limited, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 71 (8) Union of India v. Budh Singh, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 233 and by referring to aforesaid decisions, a contention is raised that revision petitions being devoid of merit, the same be dismissed by confirming the order which has been passed by the court below. No other submissions have been made. 6. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record, the Court is called upon to determine an issue as to whether even after the reference award which has been confirmed right upto the Apex Court with slight modification, whether the Executing Court can reduce the amount or determine a different compensation than which has been awarded by taking aid of explanation attached to Section 23(1-A) and Section 34 of the Act. Before dealing with this question and before answering the same, few circumstances which are reflecting on record clearly deserves to be observe hereinafter : (1) Here is a case in which the Reference Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 18 of the Act has passed an award which reads as under : “[1] These Land References are partly allowed. [2] It is ordered that the opponents do pay additional compensation to the present claimants at the rate of Rs.109.30 ps. (Rs.One hundred nine & thirty paisa)per sq. mtr. for agricultural lands and Rs.184.00ps. (Rs.One hundred eighty four only) for non-agricultural land i.e. S.No.864, over and above the compensation already awarded and paid by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. Further Rs.3,00,000/- (Rs.Three lacs) be paid to the claimants of main LAR for loss of business. (Rs.One hundred nine & thirty paisa)per sq. mtr. for agricultural lands and Rs.184.00ps. (Rs.One hundred eighty four only) for non-agricultural land i.e. S.No.864, over and above the compensation already awarded and paid by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. Further Rs.3,00,000/- (Rs.Three lacs) be paid to the claimants of main LAR for loss of business. [3] The opponents are further ordered to pay an additional amount of compensation at the rate of Rs.12% on aforesaid awarded amount to the claimants as per para.26 of this judgment and according to the provisions of Sec.23[1-A] of the Land Acquisition Act. [4] Opponents are further directed and ordered to pay the amount of solatium at the rate of 30% on the additional amount of compensation according to the provisions of u/s.23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. [5] The opponents are hereby ordered to pay interest on the additional compensation (including solatium u/s.23(2) and 12% price rise u/s.23[1-A] at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of taking possession or from the date of publication of notification under Sec.4 whichever is earlier in point of time as per discussion in para (24) of this judgment, for the first year and thereafter at the rate of 15% p.a. till realization of the payable aggregate amount according to the provision of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act and as per the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed in Civil Appeal No.6271 of 1998 in the case of Sunder v. The Union of India. [6] The opponents are ordered and directed to deposit the amount of compensation for S.No.867 as per para (26) of this judgment and to pay the same to the claimants of main LAR on furnishing surety to the extent of that amount. [7] The opponents are ordered and directed to deposit the total aggregate amount of compensation without deducting tax and without deducting 5% Government share and if already deducted, be deposit with this reference Court. [8] Considering the facts that the lands have already been acquired and claimants of main LAR have not been paid the amount of award regarding S.No.867 since long and 12% additional amount as per Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act. [8] Considering the facts that the lands have already been acquired and claimants of main LAR have not been paid the amount of award regarding S.No.867 since long and 12% additional amount as per Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act. Hence, I direct the opponents to make payment of aforesaid full payment within period of six month from today i.e. 50% amount within three months and remaining 50% within a period of three months thereafter as per the judgment of our own High Court given in First Appeal No.1521 of 2000 dated 16.10.2001. [9] Disbursement of the amount of compensation be made as per discussion in para- 29 if this judgment amongst claimants of main LAR No.246/01. [10] The opponents shall also pay the proportionate costs and shall bear its own cost(s). [11] No order regarding court-fee is passed in view of Full Bench decision of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of LADY TARAMATI v. THE SPECIAL LAND AQUISITION OFFICER, reported in 14 GLH 537 on furnishing a written undertaking by the claimants of each case to pay the court-fee, if in future required so. [12] An award in all the cases be drawn up accordingly. Signed and pronounced in the open court to-day on this 1st day of August, 2002. Date:1.8.2002 MAHESANA Sd/-Illegible (M.S.HSAIKH) EXTRA ASSISTANT JUDGE MAHESANA” The aforesaid operative part is having some background of reasoning which are contained in Para.26, 27 which are relevant to the issue. Hence, the Court deems it proper to reproduce the same hereinafter : “26. Learned advocate Mr.Shah has seriously submitted inviting my attention to the award para-13, wherein title regarding S.No.867 is observed to be disputable one and ordered to pay the amount of compensation for S.No.867 after clearance of title from competent authority for which he observed to refer the matter under Sec.30 or 31 of the Act for reference. He submitted seriously that in the instant case right from the beginning i.e. from 1966 till the completion of acquisition proceedings the said S.No.867 stood in the name of deceased claimant Yusufbhai Noormohmad Nandoliya. He was served with notice under Sec.6, 9 and 12(2) of the said Act. He has invited my attention to the material fact to the effect that even possession thereof is obtained from the deceased Yusufbhai. He was served with notice under Sec.6, 9 and 12(2) of the said Act. He has invited my attention to the material fact to the effect that even possession thereof is obtained from the deceased Yusufbhai. As per revenue record the said survey number stands in the name of deceased Yusufbhai Noormohmad Nandoliya, therefore, there was no reason from Mamlatdar to initiate the proceeding under Sec.84(C) of Tenancy Act under the pretext of new tenure land being non-transferable without prior sanction of Collector that also after more than 35 years and, therefore, there was no reason for the Acquisition Officer to record such finding or to observe for making reference u/s.30 or 31 of the said Act. He has made the base for his submissions to the judgment of our own High Court given in the case of Patel Virabhai Devabhai v. Gujarat, reported in 2000 AIHC-4620 (Guj.), wherein proceedings initiated after 10 years held to be unsustainable, therefore, proceeding in the instant case initiated under Sec.84(C) of Tenancy Act after more than 35 years with regard to acquired land S.No.867 which has been shown standing in the name of deceased with effect from 1966 upto the completion of acquisition proceedings till the year 1996 and even after depositing the amount in the year 2000 hence such proceedings nothing but an after-thought action with a view to avoid payment of amount of compensation to the claimants. The said submissions appears to be wellfounded, of-course learned DGP, Mr.Trivedi has assailed the submission on the ground that even if it be taken to be granted that possession of disputed S.No.867 is obtained from the present claimants even if it be taken to be granted that it stood till today in the name of deceased Yusufbhai then also this Court under present reference cannot decide as per the report of Acquisition Officer reference under Sec.30 and 31 is required to be made and, therefore, at present this Court cannot direct anything under this reference. I have given my thoughtful considerations to the submissions of both the learned advocates but I am unable to put the seal of approval to the grievance raised by learned DGP Mr.Trivedi, because once the Acquisition Officer delivers the award he ceases to have the power of reference under Sec.30 or 31. I have given my thoughtful considerations to the submissions of both the learned advocates but I am unable to put the seal of approval to the grievance raised by learned DGP Mr.Trivedi, because once the Acquisition Officer delivers the award he ceases to have the power of reference under Sec.30 or 31. It may be noted that reference by Collector under this section i.e. 30 or 31 must be made before the completion of the award as set out in Sec.11 otherwise Collector will be unable to make an award. When once the amount as to award has become final, all questions for fixing compensation are then at an end. The duty of Collector in case of dispute, as to the relative rights of the persons together entitled to the money, is to place they money under control of the Court and and the parties then can proceed to litigate in the ordinary in the ordinary way to determine what their right and title to the property may be. It is pertinent to note that dispute occurring in Sec.30 of the Act means a quarrel between two or more rival parties laying claim over the whole or any part of the compensation money. Therefore, a mere doubt by Government or its officer about the title of claimant or about the eligibility of the claimant to receive the compensation money, in the absence of any other contending party laying claim to the whole or any part of the compensation money will not constitute an dispute within the meaning of Sec.30. The effect of the aforesaid discussion is to the effect that deceased Yusufbhai who was through out remain owner of disputed S.No.867 and from whom the possession is taken by Government Officer cannot be said to wait for decision and till then the amount awarded to S.No.867 should be kept pending and, therefore, at this juncture I have no option but to give direction to the Government and University to pay up the entire amount even for S.No.867 without waiting for reference under Sec.30 which is basically untenable. However, I give direction to pay the amount for compensation regarding S.No.867 on furnishing surety by claimants of main LAR. However, I give direction to pay the amount for compensation regarding S.No.867 on furnishing surety by claimants of main LAR. [27] Learned advocate Mr.Shah for the claimants has submitted that here in the instant case Acquisition Officer has not awarded the amount as per Sec.23(1-A) of the said Act under the guise of proceedings pending before High Court and Supreme Court but so far the amount at the rate of 12% is concerned, has to do nothing with the pending proceedings either before High Court or Supreme Court. What is required to be seen is that under Sec.23(1- A) additional compensation at the rate of 12% to be awarded with effect from date of notification upto the date of award or possession which is earlier. Here in the instant case possession of acquired S.Nos.867 and 864 is disputable one. However, the pronouncement of award is not in dispute and accordingly award has been pronounced by the Acquisition Officer on 4.9.1996. Therefore, all the claimants including the claimants of main LAR becomes entitled to this amount under Sec.23(1-A) from the date of notification i.e. 23.5.1987 to date of award i.e. 4.9.1996 hence that amount be awarded to all the claimants accordingly.” (2) So, the aforesaid discussion is clearly reflecting that there was a point of determination of the interest payable to the claimants. There was a clear reference to Section 23(1-A) of the Act for determining the additional compensation and there was a specific issue as to when the claimants are entitled to the amount and from which date. Hence, it clearly transpires that the Reference Court while determining the amount has taken a specific note of Section 23A, as well and then, awarded the amount which was questioned by the respondent – university before this Court. (3) Now, before the Division Bench of this Court, the stand of the respondent – University with respect to Section 23 of the Act appears to have been dealt with in clear terms. Not only Section 23(1-A) has been examined by the Court, but the other relevant provisions are also dealt with, namely, Section 23(2) and 28 and thereafter, by taking note of the said provisions, slight modification has been made by the Division Bench of this Court. Not only Section 23(1-A) has been examined by the Court, but the other relevant provisions are also dealt with, namely, Section 23(2) and 28 and thereafter, by taking note of the said provisions, slight modification has been made by the Division Bench of this Court. Para.52, 53 and 55 are relevant which may lead to a situation where the contention with respect to Section 23A raised by the respondent – University has been examined by the Division Bench of this Court and so far as the group of present revision petitions is concerned, the same has been specifically dealt with which is referred to in Para.56 which reads as under : “52.The other benefits granted by the reference court on the principal amount of compensation at the rate of Rs.60 per square metre are increased at the rate of 12% p.a. under section 23(1A) of the Act and the solatium under section 23(2) of the Act. Such being the statutory benefits, no interference is called for. However, on the aspect of interest as awarded by the reference court under section 28 of the Act is concerned, the same can be considered into two parts; one would be interest on the amount of compensation as per section 28 of the Act and the another would be the interest on the amount of benefit under section 23(1A) of the Act and solatium under section 23 (2) of the Act. 53. As per the decision of this Court dated 02.08.2011 in the case of Balusingh Hemataji Rathod Vs. State of Gujarat in First Appeals no.1179/89 with 881/89, which has been taken after following the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Gurpreet Singh Vs. Union of India reported in (2006) 8 SCC 457 and Iyasamy and anr. v. Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition reported in (2010) 10 SCC 464 the interest on solatium shall be required to be counted from 19.09.2001, i.e., the date on which the Apex Court pronounced the judgment in the case of Sunder vs. Union of India till the amount is paid or deposited with the court and the rate of interest shall be as per section 28 of the Act, viz., 9% p.a. for the first year and 15% for the subsequent years. 55. 55. First Appeal no.611/05 preferred by the claimant and respondent in First Appeal No.2515/02 shall stand allowed to the extent that the claimant would be entitled to compensation at Rs.78 per square metre of the land under acquisition and the statutory benefits under section 23 (1A) of the Act, 23(2) of the Act but interest under section 28 of the Act as stated hereinabove. First Appeal No.611/05 shall stand allowed to the aforesaid extent.” (4) So, aforesaid observations of the Division Bench is also unmindful of statutory provision of Section 23(1-A), but has got a specific reference and dealt with and then, modification has been done. Resultantly, a bare perusal of the judgment of this Court reflects a consideration of an issue which has been raised by the respondent – University. This very decision of the Division Bench of this Court was taken up before the Apex Court by respective sides in a group of civil appeals and the Apex Court, after hearing at length, has examined the entire issue and all appeals were partly allowed, whereby the compensation rate was determined @ Rs.100/- per sq.mtr. and it has been categorically observed that further deduction for determining the valuation of land was not called for. Now, if that be the case, it looks like a situation where the Executing Court has erroneously tinkered with an award which has attained finality upto the Apex Court. For immediate perusal, the operative part of the order of the Apex Court is reproduced hereinafter: “7. In the appeals, we are concerned with the third group of matters. The High Court has found that comparable sale instances in the third group of matters are in the shape of saledeed Ex. 45, 46 and 47. The price per square meter comes to Rs.118.34, Rs.119.47 and 104.93. The lands which were sold were nonagricultural land. In the appeals, we are concerned with the third group of matters. The High Court has found that comparable sale instances in the third group of matters are in the shape of saledeed Ex. 45, 46 and 47. The price per square meter comes to Rs.118.34, Rs.119.47 and 104.93. The lands which were sold were nonagricultural land. The High Court while considering the aforesaid saledeeds, after deducting 30% value for determining the price of the agricultural land per sq.m. and thereafter adding 10% from the date of saledeed to the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act, has arrived at a finding that the price per sq.m. for land would come to Rs.108/-, Rs.101/and Rs.89/respectively, averaging approximately Rs.100/- per sq.m. Further deduction of 10% from the value so arrived at as land is large chunk, the price per sq.m. on strength of said sale deeds had been arrived at Rs.97, Rs. 90 and Rs. 80 respectively. However, considering the saledeeds filed for the purpose of first and fourth group of matters had averaged the price and thus it has arrived at value of Rs.60/- for agricultural land and Rs.78/for nonagricultural land. 8. In our view, we have to consider the sale instances available for the third group of matters. In the peculiar facts and circumstances, it would have been appropriate to deduct approximately 30% of the amount for development etc. Further deduction for determining the valuation of the land was not called for. In our opinion, it would be appropriate and just to award compensation at the rate of Rs.100/per sq.m. for entire land. 9. Reliance placed by the appellants on saledeeds Ex. 87 and 88 is of no avail as they are with respect to the area inside the extended limits of the municipality. We have comparable sale deeds Ex. P45 to 47 of the area in question itself. 10. Consequently, appeals are partly allowed, the compensation determined by the High Court with respect to the third group of matters is modified to the aforesaid extent. 11. Coming to S.L.P. [C] Nos.1692536/2013, in respect of other group of matters, admittedly no appeal or cross-objection was preferred as against the order passed by the Reference Court to the High Court. The High Court has, thus, rightly declined to enhance the compensation. 11. Coming to S.L.P. [C] Nos.1692536/2013, in respect of other group of matters, admittedly no appeal or cross-objection was preferred as against the order passed by the Reference Court to the High Court. The High Court has, thus, rightly declined to enhance the compensation. We agree with the reasons given by the High Court and dismiss the SLPs.” (5) The aforesaid situation which is clearly reflecting from the record of the case is leading to a situation where for determining the land with respect to present petitioners, a detailed exercise has been undertaken not only by the Reference Court, but by the higher forum, namely, the Division Bench of this Court as well as the Apex Court and as such, the detailed exercise has permitted the petitioners to seek an amount by way of execution which has ultimately been finally determined and even amendment in the execution proceedings have also been permitted, as it appears from the record. 7. Now, in view of aforesaid position which is prevailing on record, a bare perusal of the impugned order dated 9.3.2018 if to be looked into, it appears that both the parties have respectively submitted their calculations. But though the learned Principal Civil Judge, Patan being an Executing Court appears to have interpreted, tinkered with and travelled beyond the scope of the authority. By accepting the calculation to a substantial extent and thereto, without distinguishable material, there appears to be a substantial change in the ultimate award payable to the petitioners. 8. At this stage, a comparative analysis of operative parts of various orders if to be looked into, it would make it clear that to what extent the orders passed upto the Apex Court are practically modified in exercise of executing the powers. 9. The comparative information would make it clear that the Reference Court has awarded the market value to the extent of Rs.109.30 ps. per sq. mtr. The Reference Court also awarded additional amount of market value of land under Section 23(1-A) of the Act from 23.5.1987 to 12.1.1995 and the amount of solatium on market value under Section 23(2) of the Act has been given at 30% on additional amount of market value and the interest which has been awarded for the 1st year @ 9% per annum and after 1st year, @ 15% per annum. 10. 10. Now, this part of the award of the Reference Court how it has been modified ultimately by the Executing Court is referred to in the chart produced on record which clearly indicates that there is a substantial change made by the Executing Court which is referring in the last column mentioned ‘towards executing court column.’ A fact from the chart if to be looked into, it is the contention by learned advocate for the petitioners that Section 23(1-A) of the Act was clearly dealt with and this point of explanation was not agitated at any point of time and further, a reference is made to SCA No.4342 of 1988 is not the petition filed by any of the present group of petitioners and even if it is to be examined, then also there was no stay at all against the further proceedings of execution. But it was merely an interim relief qua possession and at no point of time, the execution of acquisition proceedings was at halt and as such, in that view of the situation, it is not open for the respondent – University to reduce an amount by resorting to explanation attached to Section 23(1-A), in peculiar set of circumstance of this nature. The background of aforesaid fact is clearly suggesting that a chart which has been produced by the respondent – University is a chart, according to the petitioners, is completely misleading which the Executing Court could not have allowed to be examined. The columns which have been introduced in the chart of calculation, especially Column Nos.9, 10 and 11 are the columns which are in the direction of reducing the compensation. Such consideration by the Executing Court is impermissible and if this be permitted, the same would have the effect of frustrating the very object of awarding reasonable compensation as well as to the object of doctrine of ‘finality.’ 11. In view of aforesaid circumstances, now a contention which has been tried to be raised by Mr.Gandhi, learned advocate for the respondent – University, the scheme of the Act will have to be briefly construed. 12. In view of aforesaid circumstances, now a contention which has been tried to be raised by Mr.Gandhi, learned advocate for the respondent – University, the scheme of the Act will have to be briefly construed. 12. Under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, the scheme is suggesting that on payment or deposit of amount awarded by the Collector in terms of Section 11 read with Section 31 of the Acct, the claimant cannot thereafter claim any interest on that part of compensation paid to him or deposited for payment to him once notice of deposit is given to him. Thereafter, when the reference court enhances the compensation with consequential enhancement in solatium and interest under Section 23(1A) of the Act and further awards interest on the enhanced compensation in terms of Section 28 of the Act, the claimant / decree holder can seek an appropriation of the amounts deposited pursuant to that award decree, only towards the enhanced amount so awarded by the reference court. While making the appropriation, he can apply the amount deposited, first towards the satisfaction of his claim towards interest on the enhanced amount, the costs, if any, awarded and the balance towards the land value, solatium and the payment under Section 23(1A) of the Act and if, there is a shortfall, claim that part of the compensation with interest thereon as provided in Section 28 of the Act and as covered by the award decree. The scheme further envisages that once the sum enhanced by the reference court, along with the interest is deposited by the State, there will be no occasion for the claimant i.e. awardee to seek a reopening of the amount awarded by the Collector, substituted by the amount awarded by the reference court and seek to have a re-appropriation of the amount towards what is due. Same would be the position in a case where the amount awarded by the reference court, including the interest is deposited, but the amount is further enhanced in appeal by the High Court. Again, the same principle would apply. The principle would continue to apply when the Supreme Court awards further enhancement in a further appeal to that Court. Same would be the position in a case where the amount awarded by the reference court, including the interest is deposited, but the amount is further enhanced in appeal by the High Court. Again, the same principle would apply. The principle would continue to apply when the Supreme Court awards further enhancement in a further appeal to that Court. If after the award by the reference court the amount is not deposited by the State, interest would run on the compensation in terms of Section 28 of the Act on that amount as provided in Section 28. The same would be the position regarding the enhancement given in appeal by the Supreme Court. The mandate of Section 34 and Section 28 that interest would run from the date the Collector takes possession till the particular amount is deposited as provided in those sections ensures that the claimant is recompensed adequately. Section 28 ensures that recompensed at each stage of enhancement of compensation. 13. In light of aforesaid scheme of the original Act, if we consider the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 as amended by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1968 of 1984, after the publication of preliminary notification under Section 4 of the Act and after hearing of objections, a declaration has to be made under Section 6 of the Act. The Collector is then to take order for acquisition from appropriate Government or the officer authorized in that behalf by the Government. After completing the formalities contemplated and the enquiry made in terms of Section 11 of the Act, the Collector has to make an award indicating the true area of the land, the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land and the apportionment of the compensation among the person known or believed to be interested in the land. In making the said award, the Collector shall be guided by Sections 23 and 24 dealing with matters to be considered in determining the compensation and matters to be excluded in determining the compensation as enjoined by Section 15 of the Act. Under Section 12 of the Act, the award becomes final as between the Collector and the person interested and the Collector is to give notice of his award to persons interested. On making the award, the Collector may take possession of the land in terms of Section 16 of the Act. Under Section 12 of the Act, the award becomes final as between the Collector and the person interested and the Collector is to give notice of his award to persons interested. On making the award, the Collector may take possession of the land in terms of Section 16 of the Act. Under Section 31 of the Act, on making an award under Section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the person interested entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay it to them unless prevented by the contingencies stipulated Section 31 itself. Under Section 34 of the Act, when the amount of compensation awarded is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum from the time of taking possession till it shall have been paid or deposited. But if the compensation or any part thereof is not paid within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest payable at the rate of fifteen per cent per annum from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry. It is relevant to notice that on payment of the amounts thus due, the award made by the Collector stands satisfied. 14. A person interested, who is not satisfied with the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector is entitled to receive the amount under protest and could apply to the Collector requiring him to refer the matter to the Court in terms of Section 18 of the Act. The Collector is then to make a statement to the Court and the Court is entitled to fix the compensation subject to Section 25 of the Act which provides that the amount of compensation awarded by the Court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 of the Act. In fixing the compensation, the Court shall have regard to the matters referred to in Section 23 and 24 of the Act. In fixing the compensation, the Court shall have regard to the matters referred to in Section 23 and 24 of the Act. Under Section 26, every award shall be deemed to be a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and every reasoned award shall be deemed to be a judgment as defined in Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Section 27 of the Act, every award made by the Court shall also contain directions regarding the costs incurred in the proceedings in Court, the costs of the claimant found entitled to enhancement, normally to be borne by the Collector. Under Section 28 of the Act, the Court which has awarded compensation in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of nine per cent per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into Court. The proviso enjoins the Court to direct that where such excess or any part thereof is paid into Court after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per cent per annum, shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into Court after the date of such expiry. Two aspects require to be noted. One is that the interest is payable only on the excess amount of compensation awarded by the reference court and the second is that interest on the enhanced amount awarded is payable from the date of taking possession at the rate of 9% per annum for the first year after taking possession and thereafter at 15% per annum till the deposit of the excess is made. This clearly indicates that there is no scope for the reopening of the appropriation already made pursuant to the award. The other significant factor is that the award should specify the amount awarded as market value of the land separately and the other amount, if any, awarded under other heads of Section 23(1). 15. This clearly indicates that there is no scope for the reopening of the appropriation already made pursuant to the award. The other significant factor is that the award should specify the amount awarded as market value of the land separately and the other amount, if any, awarded under other heads of Section 23(1). 15. Under Section 54 of the Act, a person, still not satisfied with the decree of enhancement in his favour on the reference under Section 18 of the Act, has a right to file an appeal to the High Court and from the decision of the High Court in such an appeal, an appeal to the Supreme Court. If one were to go by the definition of 'Court' occurring in Section 3(d) of the Act, Section 28 providing for payment of interest on excess compensation may not apply to an appeal under Section 54 of the Act on the excess, if any awarded by the High Court or in subsequent appeal by the Supreme Court. But when in an appeal under Section 54 of the Act, the appellate court further enhances the compensation, it awards the compensation that the reference court ought to have awarded and so understood, Section 28 of the Act may be applied at the appellate stage. If the expression 'Court' used in Section 28 of the Act is understood in the generic sense, (on the basis that the context otherwise requires it), the result would be the same. The other provision relevant to be noted is Section 53 of the Act which makes the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to all proceedings before the Court under the Act save in so far as the provisions of the Code are found to be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act. Section 54 also does not keep out the Code, but makes the appeal under it subject to the provisions of the Code applicable to appeals from original decrees. 16. In the scheme of the Act, it is seen that the award of compensation is at different stages. The first stage occurs when the award is passed. Obviously, the award takes in all the amounts contemplated by Section 23(1) of the Act, Section 23(1A) of the Act, Section 23(2)of the Act and the interest contemplated by Section 34 of the Act. The first stage occurs when the award is passed. Obviously, the award takes in all the amounts contemplated by Section 23(1) of the Act, Section 23(1A) of the Act, Section 23(2)of the Act and the interest contemplated by Section 34 of the Act. The whole of that amount is paid or deposited by the Collector in terms of Section 31 of the Act. At this stage, no shortfall in deposit is contemplated, since the Collector has to pay or deposit the amount awarded by him. If a shortfall is pointed out, it may have to be made up at that stage and the principle of appropriation may apply, though it is difficult to contemplate a partial deposit at that stage. On the deposit by the Collector under Section 31 of the Act, the first stage comes to an end subject to the right of the claimant to notice of the deposit and withdrawal or acceptance of the amount with or without protest. 17. The second stage occurs on a reference under Section 18 of the Act. When the reference Court awards enhanced compensation, it has necessarily to take note of the enhanced amounts payable under Section 23(1), Section 23(1A), Section 23(2) and interest on the enhanced amount as provided in Section 28 of the Act and costs in terms of Section 27. The Collector has the duty to deposit these amounts pursuant to the deemed decree thus passed. This has nothing to do with the earlier deposit made or to be made under and after the award. If the deposit made, falls short of the enhancement decreed, there can arise the question of appropriation at that stage, in relation to the amount enhanced on the reference. 18. The third stage occurs, when in appeal, the High Court enhances the compensation as indicated already. That enhanced compensation would also bear interest on the enhanced portion of the compensation, when Section 28 is applied. The enhanced amount thus calculated will have to be deposited in addition to the amount awarded by the reference Court if it had not already been deposited. 19. The fourth stage may be when the Supreme Court enhances the compensation and at that stage too, the same rule would apply. 20. The enhanced amount thus calculated will have to be deposited in addition to the amount awarded by the reference Court if it had not already been deposited. 19. The fourth stage may be when the Supreme Court enhances the compensation and at that stage too, the same rule would apply. 20. So, under the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, the different stages are provided as indicated above and as such, the compensation awarded would include not only the total sum awarded as per subsection (1) of Section 23 but, the remaining subsections thereof, as well. It is therefore clear that from Section 34, the expression ‘awarded amount’ would mean the amount of compensation worked out in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 23 including all subsections thereof. The scheme which has been analyzed by the Apex Court has summed up the position of provisions of Land Acquisition Act in case of Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 71 . The relevant extract contained in Para.8 of the said decision deserves to be quoted hereinafter : “A reading of the above provisions would establish that the award consists of (a) the compensation determined under Section 23(1), (b) solatium on the market value determined under Section 23 (2), as additional sum for compulsory nature of acquisition, and (c) payment of interest on the amount of compensation under Section 11, on excess or part thereof under Section 26 awarded by court from the date of taking possession till date of payment or deposit into the court at the rates specified under the respective provisions of Sections 34 and 28. Under Section 23(1A), additional amount at 12 per centum per annum shall be paid or deposited from the date of notification under Section 4(1) till date of award or taking possession of land, whichever is earlier. The additional amount under Section 23(1A) and solatium under Section 23(2) are in addition to the compensation under Section 11 and excess amount determined under Section 23(1) read with Section 26 and Section 54. The additional amount under Section 23(1A) and solatium under Section 23(2) are in addition to the compensation under Section 11 and excess amount determined under Section 23(1) read with Section 26 and Section 54. Equally, under Section 26 of the Act award is deemed to be a decree under Section 2(2) of the CPC for the excess amount determined by the Court; this would be so proprio vigore, when the appellate court under Section 54 has further enhanced the compensation." 20.1 And as such, upon analyzing the scheme, the Apex Court has propounded that the general rule of Executing Court not being entitled to go behind the decree, may not be stricto senso be made applicable as compared to ordinary rule of appropriation in respect of money decree. The Apex Court in case of Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India, reported in (2006) 8 SCC 457 has, in terms, held that Meghraj v. Bayabai ( (1969) 2 SCC 274 ) was applicable to a case of execution under the Land Acquisition Act since the provisions of the Act were inconsistent with Order 21 Rule 1 and as such, in Para.16, by referring Mathunni Mathai’s case ((1995) 2 SCC 71), it has been noticed by the Apex Court that the provisions of the Act were not brought to the attention of the Court and the decision invited thereon. Hence, the observations made therein could not govern a case of execution of an award / decree under the Land Acquisition Act. Further, considering the question arises in various cases pending in courts all over the country, the Apex Court in Para.54 of the said judgment in case of Gurpreet Singh (supra) has clarified as under: “54. One other question also was sought to be raised and answered by this Bench though not referred to it. Considering that the question arises in various cases pending in Courts all over the country, we permitted counsel to address us on that question. That question is whether in the light of the decision in Sunder (supra), the awardee/decree holder would be entitled to claim interest on solatium in execution though it is not specifically granted by the decree. It is well settled that an execution court cannot go behind the decree. That question is whether in the light of the decision in Sunder (supra), the awardee/decree holder would be entitled to claim interest on solatium in execution though it is not specifically granted by the decree. It is well settled that an execution court cannot go behind the decree. If, therefore, the claim for interest on solatium had been made and the same has been negatived either expressly or by necessary implication by the judgment or decree of the reference court or of the appellate court, the execution court will have necessarily to reject the claim for interest on solatium based on Sunder (supra) on the ground that the execution court cannot go behind the decree. But if the award of the reference court or that of the appellate court does not specifically refer to the question of interest on solatium or in cases where claim had not been made and rejected either expressly or impliedly by the reference court or the appellate court, and merely interest on compensation is awarded, then it would be open to the execution court to apply the ratio of Sunder (supra) and say that the compensation awarded includes solatium and in such an event interest on the amount could be directed to be deposited in execution. Otherwise, not. We also clarify that such interest on solatium can be claimed only in pending executions and not in closed executions and the execution court will be entitled to permit its recovery from the date of the judgment in Sunder (September 19, 2001) and not for any prior period. We also clarify that this will not entail any reappropriation or fresh appropriation by the decreeholder. This we have indicated by way of clarification also in exercise of our power under Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution of India with a view to avoid multiplicity of litigation on this question.” 21. So, in view of the aforesaid stages of awarding of compensation, it appears that the general rule will have not to be observed in a mechanical manner. So, in view of the aforesaid stages of awarding of compensation, it appears that the general rule will have not to be observed in a mechanical manner. Now, in the light of aforesaid provisions and the scheme of the Act, if we peruse the facts on hand, the same would clearly suggest that the Executing Court in the impugned order has just accepted the calculation of the respondent – University and without taking trouble of examining the facts at length, has disposed of execution petitions in light of Order 21 Rule 105 of the CPC and surprisingly, has observed that fresh Darkhast proceeding is permitted to be filed. This appears to be a nonexercise of jurisdiction, though vested in it. The order impugned is clearly suggesting that the calculation which has been suggested by the petitioners has not at all been considered and just in an ipse dixit manner, the order is passed. The Court is of the view that even though the execution proceedings have been amended and permitted to be amended in light of decision delivered by the Apex Court, still, however, it appears that with a view to evade the examination of effect of the original award having been modified first at the High Court level and then, at the level of the Apex Court, the Executing Court has disposed of execution petitions which, in considered opinion of this Court, is not just and proper. 22. While going through the impugned order, it appears that the conclusion which has been arrived at on what basis, is not so cogently carved out in the order under challenge. Though the Court found that respondent – University has not deposited full amount of compensation payable to the petitioners, but then for deficit amount also, though having held that interest is available to the petitioners, such calculation exercise is not undertaken and has disposed of the execution proceedings by permitting fresh Darkhast to be launched by the petitioners. Though the Court found that respondent – University has not deposited full amount of compensation payable to the petitioners, but then for deficit amount also, though having held that interest is available to the petitioners, such calculation exercise is not undertaken and has disposed of the execution proceedings by permitting fresh Darkhast to be launched by the petitioners. The resultant effect of this is that though the land of the petitioners has been compulsorily acquired long back and though the earlier award of the Collector was enhanced by the Reference Court by taking specific notice of provision contained under Section 23(1A) of the Act as a whole way back in 2002, the same having been confirmed with modification by the Division Bench of the High Court in the year 2012 and reconfirmed with further modification by the Apex Court in the year 2015, the Court below has not provided the effect of long drawn litigation till date and this exercise of discretion is clearly appeared to be uncalled for. 23. Upon hearing the learned advocates in this group of revision petitions, an attention is drawn by the respondent – University about the chart which has been produced before the court below in corelation with the analytical chart provided by the petitioners and it appears that the point of explanation attached to Section 23(1A) is not the subject matter before the court below, appears to have not been agitated so far. Further, Special Civil Application No.4342 of 1988 is categorically stated to be not filed by the present petitioners and there was no stay with regard to the proceedings. Now, even these circumstances as a whole to be considered as canvassed before this Court, it clearly suggest that the Executing Court has failed to exercise its discretion in examining the effect of gradual modification which took place of the original award. The Court is of the view that it is bounden duty of the Executing Court to see that the effect of the decree be implemented in its true letter and spirit. The permission to initiate fresh execution proceedings would not only lead to a multiplicity of proceedings, but would have the effect of rendering the finality ineffective attached to the original award with modification right upto the Hon’ble Apex Court. The permission to initiate fresh execution proceedings would not only lead to a multiplicity of proceedings, but would have the effect of rendering the finality ineffective attached to the original award with modification right upto the Hon’ble Apex Court. This easy way of disposing of execution proceedings even after permitting to amend the same is nothing but a clear example of not exercising the jurisdiction which is vested in it. Here is a case in which not only the Executing Court has not considered the scheme of the Act in its true spirit, but has also not given the effect to the long drawn litigation which has attained the finality right upto the Hon’ble Apex Court. 24. Undisputed chart provided to the Court by the petitioners as to what has happened to the original award of the Collector, in a Reference Court, in a litigation before the High Court and before the Hon’ble Apex Court and what effect is given in execution, the said chart itself is suggesting a situation that the Executing Court in a laconic manner has disposed of the proceedings in a manner in which it is not befitting. Such chart is reflecting following situation which deserves to be considered. COMPENSATION AWARDED BY THE LD. COURTS & LD. EXECUTING COURT Court Market value of land per sq. mtr. in add. Award Addl. Amount on market value of land u/s 23(1A) (i.e.23.5.87 to 12.01.95) Solatium on market value u/s.23(2) Interest on Market Value + Addl. Comp. u/s.23(1A) + Solatium u/s.23(2) 1 2 3 4 5 Reference Court 109.3 12% p.a. To be calculated from S.4(1) Notification to taking over possession (i.e. 23.5.87 to 12.1.95) 30% on Addl. Amount of market value. For 1st year 9% p.a. And after 1st years, 15% p.a. To be calculated from S.4(1) Notification (23.5.87) or from date of taking over possession (12.1.95), whichever is earlier to till realization 15% High Court 60 Not modified by Honourable High Court Not modified by Honourable High Court * Calculation of Interest amount on Solatium was modified and ordered to be calculated from 19.9.01 (i.e. from the sunder’s case) instead of S.4(1) Notification i.e. 23.5.87. * No modification qua amount of interest on market value and additional compensation u/s.23(1A). Supreme Court 100 As above No Modification As above No Modification As above No Modification Executing Court * Interest on Addl. * No modification qua amount of interest on market value and additional compensation u/s.23(1A). Supreme Court 100 As above No Modification As above No Modification As above No Modification Executing Court * Interest on Addl. Amount of market value u/s.23(1A) was ordered to be recalculated by excluding the period from 1988 to 10.8.94 on the ground that the claimants have filed SCA No.4342/1988 and got stay of proceedings. *.The claimants are not entitled for interest on the amount already deposited by the University and invested in FDR. *. Claimant entitled for interests only on the deficit amount deposited. 25. The Court is mindful of the observations of the Apex Court in case of Birwati Chaudhary & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in (2018) 9 SCC 458 . The observations made in Para.7 and 8 since relevant are reproduced hereinafter: “7. The reason to remand the case has occasioned due to the fact that firstly, no adequate reason is given n the impugned order for not granting stay; and secondly, the reason given does not in itself justify the rejection having regard to the nature of controversy involved in the writ petition. 8. In short, justifiable reason(s) to support either the grant or rejection need(s) to be stated keeping in view the facts and the law applicable to the controversy involved. It is not so found in the impugned order and hence the order of remand is called for to decide the matter afresh in accordance with law.” 26. In light of aforesaid position which is prevailing on record, this Court is of the opinion that the order under challenge i.e. order dated 9.3.2018 lacks application of mind. The entire exercise remained undecided in its true sense. As a result of this, the Court is inclined to remand the matters back to the Executing Court for reconsideration on the basis of aforesaid material which is prevailing on record. 27. At this stage, since the Court is directing the Executing Court to reconsider the claim of the petitioners and to give effect to the litigation which has ended upto the Hon’ble Apex Court, the judgments which are relied upon are not being analyzed at length so as to see that the Executing Court can freely exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. But here the Court is of the considered opinion that the general principle that the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree like in ordinary execution of money decree, would not apply in strict sense looking at the scheme of the Act and what has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court as referred to above and as such, without much dwelling in analyzing the decisions which have been brought to the notice, the Court is remanding the matters back to the Executing Court by disposing of these Civil Revision Applications with following observations and directions: (1) The impugned order dated 9.3.2018 is quashed and set aside hereby with a consequential direction to the concerned Executing Court to reconsider LAR Execution proceedings bearing Nos.34 to 56 of 2012 and decide afresh after hearing both the sides and after considering the calculations in detail produced by both the sides. (2) In the process of reconsideration of the execution, the claim of the petitioners the concerned Executing Court is obliged to examine and consider the effect of the order passed by the Reference Court, the High Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court and shall consider the calculation put forth by both the sides. (3) The Executing Court is also directed to consider the detailed observations which have been made by the Reference Court under Section 18 of the Act, precisely Para.27, 36 and 37 with operative portion of an order dated 1.8.2002 and also to consider the relevant observations made by the High Court in its order dated 7.8.2012, precisely in Para.52, 53, 55, 56 and 57 and also the decision delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court dated 20.1.2015 by considering the said judgment and observations after Para.7 onwards and then, shall pass afresh order in exercise of its jurisdiction. (4) The Executing Court shall take up this reconsideration process at the earliest in view of the fact that acquisition process is of 1987 and the long drawn litigation has ended upto the Hon’ble Apex Court in 2015 and also keeping in view the fact that the respondent – University has not deposited the full amount of compensation as observed by the Executing Court itself in its last paragraph of the order and shall undertake this exercise of reconsideration within a period of 8 weeks from the date of receipt of wring of this Court. (5) The Executing Court is also directed to pass afresh order with cogent reasons after extending full opportunity to the parties concerned. (6) The petitioners as well as respondents are directed further to cooperate with the Executing Court in arriving at a just decision upon reconsideration and shall not asked for unnecessary adjournments which may delay the process of reconsideration. (7) It is made clear that though this Court has observed the scheme of the Act and noted down the observations of the High Court as well as the Apex Court, this Court has not clearly opined anything on merit since the Executing Court is expected to reconsider at length. Hence, it is open for the Executing Court to take into consideration all the relevant materials being part of the record for reconsidering the claim of the petitioners. 28. With these observations and directions, the present Civil Revision Applications stand partly allowed, with no order as to costs. Rule is made absolute in each matter to the aforesaid extent.

PATEL VENABHAI MOHANBHAI v. NORTH GUJARAT UNIVERSITY