JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition has been filed challenging the memorandum no.F.NO.G:142:02:2019 issued by the President of the Institute of Cost Accountants of India, dated February 19, 2019. 2. The petitioner filed a complaint under Section 9 of The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) dated November 17, 2016 against the respondent no.7, alleging that the said respondent had humiliated and mentally harassed her by using abusive language, words with dual meaning and sexually coloured remarks on several occasions in the year 2015, more particularly August, 2015 and on later occasions further harassed her, by denying leave on medical grounds. 3. Proceedings before the Internal Complaints Committee (in short ICC) commenced on the satisfaction of the ICC that it was a fit case to be dealt with under Section 9 of the said Act. On April 21, 2017 the ICC gave it's recommendation under Section 13(3) of the said Act. On May 22, 2017 the petitioner lodged a First Information Report at the New Market Police Station and on the basis thereof, New Market Police Station Case NO.219 of 2017 dated May 22, 2017 under Section 354A of the Indian Panel Code was started. The investigation resulted in the submission of a charge sheet. The matter is pending trial before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 6th Court at Kolkata. Aggrieved by the recommendation of the ICC the respondent no.7 filed W.P. No.329 of 2017. The petitioner also being aggrieved by the delay on the part of the employer, namely, the Institute of Cost Accountants of India (hereinafter referred to as the institute), in implementing the recommendation of the ICC, filed W.P. No. 15088 (W) of 2017. Both the writ petitions were considered analogously by a learned Single Judge, of this Court and by an order dated July 18, 2017 the learned Single Judge disposed of both the writ petitions by granting liberty to the parties to approach the statutory appellate authority under Section 18 of the said Act. Pursuant to the liberty granted, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) (in short DCLC) on July 21, 2017 in terms of Section 18 of the said Act, read with Rule 11 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules). Pursuant to the liberty granted, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) (in short DCLC) on July 21, 2017 in terms of Section 18 of the said Act, read with Rule 11 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules). The said appeal was returned to the petitioner on September 12, 2017 by the office of the DCLC (Central), by enclosing a memorandum bearing No.F.No.22/(53)/2017-LS.II dated August 25, 2017 by which, the petitioner was informed that the DCLC (Central) was not the appellate authority and the appeal was thus being returned. Aggrieved by the said communication the petitioner filed another writ petition bearing no.W.P.No.25485 (W) of 2017. The said writ petition is pending before this court. Thereafter, the petitioner received a copy of the memorandum no. F.NO.G:142:02:2019 dated February 19, 2019 issued by the President of the Institute, that is, the respondent no.3 herein, from which the petitioner came to know that the respondent no.7 had been issued a show cause notice on September 12, 2018 calling upon the respondent no.7 to respond to the report of the ICC and on consideration of the response of the respondent no.7, the respondent no.3 remitted the matter back to the ICC with a direction for submission of a fresh report after consideration of the examinations, cross-examinations of the witnesses and all other submissions made by the petitioner and the respondent no.7. Aggrieved by the aforementioned memorandum dated February 19, 2019 the instant writ petition has been filed. 4. Mr. Kallol Bose, learned Advocate appearing on the behalf of the writ petitioner challenged the impugned memorandum primarily on four grounds. His first ground being that the respondent No.3 was not the appellate authority and did not have jurisdiction to issue the impugned memorandum, remitting back the matter to the ICC with a direction to file a fresh report upon consideration of the evidence, deposition of witnesses and submissions of the parties. Secondly, Mr. Bose, contended that the recommendation of the ICC dated April 21, 2017 made under Section 13(3) of the said Act was binding on the employer and the employer was mandated to act on the basis of the said recommendation within 60 days from receipt thereof. In support of this contention, Mr. Secondly, Mr. Bose, contended that the recommendation of the ICC dated April 21, 2017 made under Section 13(3) of the said Act was binding on the employer and the employer was mandated to act on the basis of the said recommendation within 60 days from receipt thereof. In support of this contention, Mr. Bose submitted that under Section 19 (i) of the said Act, it was the duty of the employer to treat sexual harassment as a misconduct under the service rules applicable to the respondent No.7 and impose punishment for such misconduct on the basis of the recommendation of the ICC and no regular disciplinary proceeding was further required to be initiated. According to Mr. Bose, the said Act was a special statute which was enacted in order to deal with complaints of sexual harassment of women at workplace and to provide for prevention and redressal of such complaints and matters incidental thereto or connected there with. He submitted that once a proceeding under the said Act had been initiated and completed no further disciplinary proceeding was required to be initiated by the employer for the imposition of the punishment. Finally, Mr. Bose urged that the remedy of the respondent no.7 was to prefer an appeal in terms of Section 18 of the said Act. The respondent No.7 not having preferred any appeal in spite of the liberty granted by this court in W.P. No.329 (W) of 2017 by order dated July 18, 2017, the recommendation of the ICC had become binding on the respondent no.7 and the same could not be challenged by him before any forum. According to him, the action of the President of the Institute in issuing the show cause notice to the respondent no.7 calling upon him to answer to the findings of the ICC and further action in issuing the impugned memorandum dated February 19, 2019, remitting the matter back to the ICC upon consideration of the answer to the show cause, with a direction to submit a fresh report was contrary to law and thoroughly misconceived, apart from being violative of the principles of natural justice and thus liable to be set aside. 5. Mr. 5. Mr. Atarup Banerjee, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent nos.1 to 4 submitted that the respondent No.3 was the appointing authority as also the disciplinary authority under the Institute of Cost Accountants of India, Officers Service Rules, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the service rules). Mr. Banerjee, submitted that the service rules permitted the appointing authority, that is, the respondent no.3 to remit the matter to the inquiring authority for fresh and further inquiry and report. Mr. Banerjee urged that the petitioner did not have a right of audience before the respondent no.3, at the stage of consideration of the answer to the show cause notice. He relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Union of India and Others vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan reported in (1991) 1 SCC 588 , and urged that the punishing authority was required to give the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to answer to the findings of the enquiry officer and to enable him to satisfy the punishing authority that he was innocent. Mr. Banerjee also attacked the report of the ICC on several grounds. First, that the complaint was not made within 3 months from the last date of the incident. Secondly, an opportunity for conciliation under Section 10 of the said Act was not given to the respondent no.7. Thirdly, cross-examination of witnesses were not allowed by the ICC to either of the parties. Mr. Banerjee submitted that the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 did not wish to use any affidavit-in-opposition and that the matter should be heard on the records available. 6. Mr. Behani, learned Advocate appearing on the behalf of the respondent no.7 also submitted that the respondent No.7 did not wish to file any opposition. According to him, the ICC was empowered to make a recommendation to the employer and, on receipt of such recommendation it was the duty of the employer to proceed against the accused employee in terms of the service rules of the employee. According to him, a conjoint reading of Section 13(3) of the said Act and Rules 7 and 9 of the said Rules, would indicate that the committee could only recommend to the employer to take action against the employee in terms of the service rules of the employee by treating sexual harassment as misconduct. According to him, a conjoint reading of Section 13(3) of the said Act and Rules 7 and 9 of the said Rules, would indicate that the committee could only recommend to the employer to take action against the employee in terms of the service rules of the employee by treating sexual harassment as misconduct. He submitted that the findings of the committee were merely recommendations, advisory in nature and were not binding. Mr. Behani urged that the service rules of the respondent no.7 permitted the employee to contest the disciplinary proceedings which were to follow pursuant to the recommendation of the ICC, irrespective of the fact that the statutory appeal had not been filed pursuant to the liberty granted by this court. He placed reliance on a decision of this court in the matter of Prof. Dr. Saswat Samay Das vs. Indian Institute of Technology & Ors. reported in 2016 SCC OnLine Cal 9957. In the said decision, the recommendation of the ICC was set aside for violation of the principles of natural justice. Mr. Behani urged before this court that in view of the fact that the respondent no.7 was not allowed an opportunity to cross-examine 'Random Witnesses', the proceedings before of the ICC was vitiated. Mr. Behani next relied on a Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Manohar s/o Manikrao Anchule vs. State of Maharashtra and another reported in (2012) 13 SCC 14 , where the procedure to be followed by the ICC had been laid down by the said court which included grant of an opportunity to the accused employee to cross- examine witnesses. He also relied on the decision of the High Court of New Delhi in Ashok Kumar Singh vs. University of Delhi & Ors., in order to substantiate that once the recommendation of the ICC was received by the disciplinary authority, it was imperative under the said Act, that the disciplinary authority should proceed in accordance with the service rules, after following the principles of natural justice before deciding whether any punishment should be imposed or not. 7. I have heard the learned advocates for the parties. It is necessary to point out that all the parties have submitted before this court that apart from the Officer's service rules, 1983, no separate disciplinary rules have been framed by the institute with regard to offences relating to sexual harassment at work place. 7. I have heard the learned advocates for the parties. It is necessary to point out that all the parties have submitted before this court that apart from the Officer's service rules, 1983, no separate disciplinary rules have been framed by the institute with regard to offences relating to sexual harassment at work place. The questions which need to be answered by this court are as follows:- (i) whether the respondent No.3 acted as an appellate authority while passing the order dated February 19, 2019; (ii) whether the memorandum dated February 19, 2019 issued by the President , remitting the matter back to the ICC, for submission of a fresh report was justifiable in law; (iii) whether the respondent no.7 was bound by the recommendation of the ICC in the absence of any appeal having been filed under Section 18 of the said Act; (iv) whether the recommendation of the ICC was binding on the employer and the only function of the employer was to issue the order of punishment as recommended by the ICC. 8. It appears from the order dated February 19, 2019 that the respondent no.3 as the appointing authority as also the disciplinary authority exercised his power under Rule 91 clause (viii) of the service rules of the institute. Rule 91 (viii) is quoted herein below:- "91(viii) The appointing authority, if it is not itself the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the inquiring authority for fresh or further inquiry and report and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of these rules as far as may be." 9. The first contention of Mr. Bose is answered in the negative. It appears that the respondent No.3 who was the disciplinary authority and also the appointing authority of the respondent No.7, in exercise of power conferred under Rule 91 (viii) had remitted the matter back to the ICC with a direction for submission of a fresh report after considering the examinations and cross-examinations of witness and submissions of the respective parties, had done so not as an appellate authority but, as the appointing authority. The legality of such action however, will be dealt with in the later part of this judgment. 10. The other questions framed by this court can be answered together. 11. The legality of such action however, will be dealt with in the later part of this judgment. 10. The other questions framed by this court can be answered together. 11. The said Act was promulgated pursuant to the request of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision of Vishaka and Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in (1997) 6 SCC 241 . A writ petition was filed before the Apex Court as a class action by certain social activist and NGOs, with the aim of focusing attention towards finding a suitable method for upholding the concept of gender equality and for prevention of sexual harassment of working women in all work places through a judicial process, in order to fill up a vacuum in the existing legislations. The Apex Court held that instances of violation of fundamental rights of gender equality including sexual harassment of women at work place was a clear violation of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court in the said decision laid down certain guidelines to be followed by employers at work places as well as by other reasonable persons and institutions in order to ensure prevention of the sexual harassment of women. The said guidelines popularly known as the Vishaka guidelines are quoted below:- "16.............................It is necessary and expedient for employers in work places as well as other responsible persons or institutions to observe certain guidelines to ensure the prevention of sexual harassment of women: 1. Duty of the Employer or other responsible persons in work places and other institutions: It shall be the duty of the employer or other responsible persons in work places or other institutions to prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment by taking all steps required. 2. Definition: For this purpose, sexual harassment includes such unwelcome sexually determined behaviour (whether directly or by implication) as: (a) physical contact and advances; (b) a demand or request for sexual favours; (c) sexually coloured remarks; (d) showing pornography; (e) any other unwelcome physical verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature. 2. Definition: For this purpose, sexual harassment includes such unwelcome sexually determined behaviour (whether directly or by implication) as: (a) physical contact and advances; (b) a demand or request for sexual favours; (c) sexually coloured remarks; (d) showing pornography; (e) any other unwelcome physical verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature. Where any of these acts is committed in circumstances where under the victim of such conduct has a reasonable apprehension that in relation to the victim's employment or work whether she is drawing salary, or honorarium or voluntary, whether in government, public or private enterprise such conduct can be humiliating and may constitute a health and safety problem. It is discriminatory for instance when the woman has reasonable grounds to believe that her objection would disadvantage her in connection with her employment or work including recruiting or promotion or when it creates a hostile work environment. Adverse consequences might be visited if the victim does not consent to the conduct in question or raises any objection thereto. 3. Preventive Steps: All employers or persons in charge of work place whether in the public or private sector should take appropriate steps to prevent sexual harassment. Without prejudice to the generality of this obligation they should take the following steps: (a) Express prohibition of sexual harassment as defined above at the work place should be notified, published and circulated in appropriate ways. (b) The Rules/Regulations of Government and Public Sector bodies relating to conduct and discipline should include rules/regulations prohibiting sexual harassment and provide for appropriate penalties in such rules against the offender. (c) As regards private employers steps should be taken to include the aforesaid prohibitions in the standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. (d) Appropriate work conditions should be provided in respect of work, leisure, health and hygiene to further ensure that there is no hostile environment towards women at work places and no employee woman should have reasonable grounds to believe that she is disadvantaged in connection with her employment. 4. Criminal Proceedings: Where such conduct amounts to a specific offence under the Indian Penal Code or under any other law the employer shall initiate appropriate action in accordance with law by making a complaint with the appropriate authority. In particular, it should ensure that victims, or witnesses are not victimized or discriminated against while dealing with complaints of sexual harassment. Criminal Proceedings: Where such conduct amounts to a specific offence under the Indian Penal Code or under any other law the employer shall initiate appropriate action in accordance with law by making a complaint with the appropriate authority. In particular, it should ensure that victims, or witnesses are not victimized or discriminated against while dealing with complaints of sexual harassment. The victims of sexual harassment should have the option to seek transfer of the perpetrator or their own transfer. 5. Disciplinary Action: Where such conduct amounts to mis-conduct in employment as defined by the relevant service rules, appropriate disciplinary action should be initiated by the employer in accordance with those rules. 6. Complaint Mechanism: Whether or not such conduct constitutes an offence under law or a breach of the service rules, an appropriate complaint mechanism should be created in the employer's organization for redress of the complaint made by the victim. Such complaint mechanism should ensure time bound treatment of complaints. 7. Complaints Committee: The complaint mechanism, referred to in (6) above, should be adequate to provide, where necessary, a Complaints Committee, a special counsellor or other support service, including the maintenance of confidentiality. The Complaints Committee should be headed by a woman and not less than half of its member should be women. Further, to prevent the possibility of any under pressure or influence from senior levels, such Complaints Committee should involve a third party, either NGO or other body who is familiar with the issue of sexual harassment. The Complaints Committee must make an annual report to the government department concerned of the complaints and action taken by them. The employers and person in charge will also report on the compliance with the aforesaid guidelines including on the reports of the Complaints Committee to the Government department. 8. Workers' Initiative: Employees should be allowed to raise issues of sexual harassment at workers meeting and in other appropriate forum and it should be affirmatively discussed in Employer-Employee Meetings. 9. Awareness: Awareness of the rights of female employees in this regard should be created in particular by prominently notifying the guidelines (and appropriate legislation when enacted on the subject) in suitable manner. 10. 9. Awareness: Awareness of the rights of female employees in this regard should be created in particular by prominently notifying the guidelines (and appropriate legislation when enacted on the subject) in suitable manner. 10. Where sexual harassment occurs as a result of an act or omission by any third party or outsider, the employer and person in charge will take all steps necessary and reasonable to assist the affected person in terms of support and preventive action. 11. The Central/State Governments are requested to consider adopting suitable measures including legislation to ensure that the guidelines laid down by this order are also observed by the employers in Private Sector. 12. These guidelines will not prejudice any rights available under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993." 12. By the said judgment, the Apex Court made the guidelines binding and enforceable in law, until a suitable legislation was enacted to occupy the field. Thereafter, the said Act came into force on April 22, 2013. It was promulgated to make appropriate provisions for giving effect to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which was ratified on January 25, 1993, by the Government of India. The bill proposed to enact a persuasive legislation to provide for safe and secure environment to every woman, free from all sexual harassment by fixing the responsibility on the employer as well as the District Magistrate or Additional District Collector or Deputy Collector in every district in the state as a District Officer by a statutory redressal mechanism. Section 9 of the said Act gave the right to any aggrieved woman to make a complaint in writing against any sexual harassment at workplace to the ICC, if so constituted or the local committee in the absence of ICC within a period of 3 months from the date of the incident and in case of series of incidents, within a period of 3 months from the date of the last incident. Section 10 provided that the Internal Committee or, as the case may be may, before initiating the inquiry under Section 11 and at the request of the aggrieved woman take steps to settle the matter between the complainant and the accused person, with a proviso that monetary settlement should not be the basis of conciliation. 13. Section 10 provided that the Internal Committee or, as the case may be may, before initiating the inquiry under Section 11 and at the request of the aggrieved woman take steps to settle the matter between the complainant and the accused person, with a proviso that monetary settlement should not be the basis of conciliation. 13. Section 11 provided that subject to the provisions of Section 10, the ICC or the local committee, should, where the respondent was an employee, proceed to make an inquiry into the complaint in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the respondent and where no such rules existed, in such manner as may be prescribed. Section 11 further provided that where both parties were employees, the parties should be given an opportunity of being heard and a copy of the findings should be made available to both the parties enabling them to respond to such findings before the committee. Section 11(3) vested upon the ICC the same powers as were vested in a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, when trying a suit in respect of the matters relating to summoning and enforcing attendance of witnesses. 14. Section 12 provided the steps that may be taken by the ICC during the pendency of the inquiry. 15. Section 13 (1) provided that on the completion of the inquiry under the said Act, the Internal Committee should supply copy of the report of its findings to the employer and such report should be made available to the concerned parties. 16. Section 13(2) provided that in case the committee came to a conclusion that the allegations were not proved, it may recommend to the employer that no action was required to be taken. 17. Section 13(3) provided that where the Internal Committee arrived at a conclusion that the allegation against the employee had been proved, it should recommend that action be taken by the employer against the employee, by treating sexual harassment as a misconduct in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the employee or where no such service rules existed, in such manner as may be prescribed. 18. Section 13(4) provided that the employer should act on the basis of the recommendation of the ICC. 19. 18. Section 13(4) provided that the employer should act on the basis of the recommendation of the ICC. 19. Section 18 of the said Act provided that any person who was aggrieved by the recommendation made under sub-section (2) of section 13 or clause (i) or (ii) of sub-section (3) of Section 13 or sub-section (1) of Section 14 or Section 17 or by the non-implementation of such recommendation, may prefer in accordance with the provision of the service rules applicable to the said person an appeal to the Court or Tribunal or where no such service rules existed, without prejudice to the provisions contained in any other law for the time being in force, the person aggrieved may prefer an appeal in such manner as may be prescribed. 20. Section 19 of the said Act laid down the duties of the employers. Section 19 (i) provided that the employer had a duty to treat sexual harassment as a misconduct under the service rules and initiate action for such misconduct. 21. A harmonious reading of Sections 11, 13(3) and 13(4) would clarify the position that once there was a complaint before the ICC, the committee should proceed in terms of the service rules applicable to the employee and where no service rules existed, then the ICC should proceed in such manner as may be prescribed, and parties should be given an opportunity of being heard. While proceeding with such an inquiry the ICC would have the power vested in a civil Court which included examination of witnesses, discovery and production of documents, etc. As the ICC had the power to summon witnesses and take their statement, rules of natural justice demanded that the ICC should also enable the parties to cross-examine such witnesses. Section 13(3)(i) provided that when the charges made in the complaint were proved, the ICC was empowered to recommend to the employer that action should be taken against the employee by treating sexual harassment as a misconduct in accordance with the service rules of the respondent. Rules 7 and 9 are quoted below:- "7. Manner of inquiry into complaint.- (1) Subject to the provisions of section 11, at the time of filing the complaint, the complainant shall submit to the Complaints Committee, six copies of the complaint along with supporting documents and the names and addresses of the witnesses. Rules 7 and 9 are quoted below:- "7. Manner of inquiry into complaint.- (1) Subject to the provisions of section 11, at the time of filing the complaint, the complainant shall submit to the Complaints Committee, six copies of the complaint along with supporting documents and the names and addresses of the witnesses. (2) On receipt of the complaint, the Complaints Committee shall send one of the copies received from the aggrieved woman under sub-rule (1) to the respondent within a period of seven working days. (3) The respondent shall file his reply to the complaint along with his list of documents, and names and addresses of witnesses, within a period not exceeding ten working days from the date of receipt of the documents specified under sub-rule (1). (4) The Complaints Committee shall make inquiry into the complaint in accordance with the principles of natural justice. (5) The Complaints Committee shall have the right to terminate the inquiry proceedings or to give an ex parte decision on the complaint, if the complainant or respondent fails, without sufficient cause, to present herself or himself for three consecutive hearings convened by the Chairperson or Presiding Officer, as the case may be. Provided that such termination or ex parte order may not be passed without giving a notice in writing, fifteen days in advance, to the party concerned. (6) The parties shall not be allowed to bring in any legal practitioner to represent them in their case at any stage of the proceedings before the Complaints Committee. (7) In conducting the inquiry, a minimum of three Members of the Complaints Committee including the Presiding Officer or the Chairperson, as the case may be, shall be present. ....... 9. Manner of taking action for sexual harassment.- Except in cases where service rules exist, where the Complaints Committee arrives at the conclusion that the allegation against the respondent has been proved, it shall recommend to the employer or the District Officer, as the case may be, to take any action including a written apology, warning, reprimand or censure, withholding of promotion, withholding of pay rise or increments, terminating the respondent from service or undergoing a counselling session or carrying out community service." 22. From a conjoint reading of the provisions of Section 13(3) of the said Act and Rules 7 and 9 of the said Rules, it emerges that where service rules existed, the report of the ICC was a fact finding report or a preliminary report with regard to the allegation of sexual harassment and the employer was bound to then proceed under the service rules before imposing any major penalty. 23. In this case, the ICC made a recommendation. The recommendation of the ICC is quoted below:- "After due consideration of the investigation of this case, ICC has come to the conclusion that the respondent should be awarded major penalty of Reduction in the Grade for Five years (static) along with Removal of Management Authority comprising sanctioning leaves and doing appraisals for five years. The above penalty is considered by the ICC in synchronization with the Sexual Harassment Policy and Disciplinary Procedures of the Institute of Cost Accountants of India." 24. The employer on the said recommendation was then mandated to initiate a disciplinary proceeding in terms of the service rules of the employee and only in cases where there were no service rules, was the ICC empowered to recommend punishment, but, in all cases where service rules existed, the disciplinary authority was mandated to proceed on the basis of the service rules by initiating a disciplinary proceeding before imposing any major penalty. Section 28 of the said Act also clarifies the position that the said Act was in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force meaning thereby, the said Act was also not an alternative to the service rules of an employee. Once the charge of sexual harassment was proved before the ICC, the basis for proceeding against the accused employee for committing the misconduct of sexual harassment was already there. In other words, with the findings of the ICC, the ground for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour were already in existence. In this case, the institute has its own service rules. In other words, with the findings of the ICC, the ground for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour were already in existence. In this case, the institute has its own service rules. Pursuant to the recommendation of the ICC, the service rules ought to have been followed and the employer, that is, the respondent no.3 herein ought to have initiated proceedings in terms of Rule 91of the service rules and should have proceeded from the stage of Rule 91(iii) and ought not to have issued the memorandum dated February 19, 2019 straight away under Rule 91 (viii) upon consideration of the response of the respondent No.7 to the show- cause notice issued by the respondent No.3. Invocation of power contained in Rule 91 (viii) does not require issuance of a show-cause notice to the employee and seeking a response from the employee to the enquiry report of the ICC. As such, the memorandum impugned to this writ petition is misconceived, contrary to law and contravenes the service rules. 25. Rule 91 of the service rules is quoted below:- "91. Procedure for imposing major penalties: (i) No order imposing any of the major penalties specified in clauses (e), (f) and (g) of Rule 75 shall be made except after an enquiry is held in accordance with this rule. (ii) Whenever the appointing authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against an employee it may itself enquire into or appoint any other persons (hereinafter called the Inquiring Authority) to enquire into the truth thereof. (iii) Where it is proposed to hold an enquiry, the appointing authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations against the employee. The charges, together with a statement of the allegations on which they are based shall be communicated in writing to the employee, who shall be required to submit within such time as may be specified by the appointing authority not exceeding 15 days, a written statement whether he admits or denies any of or all the charges. (iv) On receipt of the written statement of the employee, or if no such statement is received within the time specified, an enquiry may be held by the appointing authority itself, or by the Inquiring Authority under sub- clause (ii) above. (iv) On receipt of the written statement of the employee, or if no such statement is received within the time specified, an enquiry may be held by the appointing authority itself, or by the Inquiring Authority under sub- clause (ii) above. Provided that the appointing authority or the Inquiring Authority may decide not to hold an enquiry in respect of the charges admitted by the employee in his written statement. The Inquiring Authority shall, however, record its findings on each such charge. (v) If it is decided to hold an enquiry, an employee shall be permitted to cite and bring witnesses on his behalf and examine the relevant records but shall not be permitted to engage a lawyer at the enquiry. (vi) Whenever any enquiring authority, after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in an enquiry ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, is succeeded by another inquiring authority which has, and which exercises such jurisdiction, the inquiring authority so succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded by its predecessor, or partly recorded by its predecessor and partly recorded by itself. Provided that if the succeeding inquiring authority is of the opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses whose evidence has already been recorded is necessary in the interest of justice, it may recall, examine and cross examine any such witnesss. (vii) After the conclusion of the enquiry, a report shall be prepared and it shall contain (a) gist of the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour, including evidence in support of the charges; (b) a gist of the defense of the employee in respect of each article of charge; (c) an assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charge. (viii) The appointing authority, if it is not itself the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the inquiring authority for fresh or further inquiry and report and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of these rules as far as may be. (ix) The appointing authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose. (ix) The appointing authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose. (x) If the appointing authority having regard to its finds on all or any of the charges, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Rule 75 should be imposed on the employee it shall make an order imposing such penalty. (xi) If the appointing authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge is of the opinion that no penalty is called for, it may pass an order exonerating the employee concerned. 26. It is also pertinent to mention here, that Section 18 of the said Act makes it very clear that an aggrieved person had a right of appeal under the said Act without prejudice to the provisions in any other law for the time being in force. This clarifies the position that even if the respondent no.7 had the right to prefer an appeal against the findings of the ICC before the appellate authority, as per the liberty granted by this court, yet, the respondent no.7 had the right to contest the disciplinary proceeding which was to be initiated under the service rules. In the service rules applicable to the respondent No.7 there is no Court or Tribunal functioning as the appellate authority. The parties have also not been able to produce any notification under Rule 11 of the said Rules, notifying the appellate authority either. However, in this case whether an appellate authority had been notified is not required to be answered. In my view, despite the provision of appeal under Section 18 of the said Act, the respondent No.7 was entitled to contest the disciplinary proceedings and non-filing of the statutory appeal would not take away the right available to the respondent No.7 under his service rules. Further, in this case, the parties have not produced any policy adopted by the institute, treating the enquiry before the ICC as an enquiry in terms of Rule 91 of the service rules, in case of allegations of sexual harassment. The ICC was not acting as an inquiring authority in terms of Rule 91 of the service rules. Further, in this case, the parties have not produced any policy adopted by the institute, treating the enquiry before the ICC as an enquiry in terms of Rule 91 of the service rules, in case of allegations of sexual harassment. The ICC was not acting as an inquiring authority in terms of Rule 91 of the service rules. The records and the procedure adopted by the ICC does not indicate that the proceedings before the ICC, in this case, was in accordance with the service rules of the respondent no.7 or that the ICC was functioning as a delegate of the disciplinary authority in terms of the service rules. As per Rule 9 of the said Rules, only when there were no service rules governing the accused employee, could the ICC recommend the punishment as prescribed by the said Rules. 27. The scheme of the Act in my opinion, does not envisage that the proceeding before the ICC would be treated as a regular disciplinary proceeding before an inquiring authority in terms of the service rules governing an employee unless, the employer adopted a policy or framed a rule, thereby amending the existing service rules or dispensing with any of the provisions of the service rules. In this case, proceedings before the ICC was not a regular disciplinary proceeding under Rule 91 of the service rules. The proceeding before the ICC was not in consonance with Rule 91 of the service rules either. The ICC did not adhere to the procedure prescribed under the service rules of the respondent No.7 for imposing major penalty. The ICC also did not make available the copy of the report to the parties inviting their respective response to the report. Thus, the argument of Mr. Bose that the finding of the ICC was binding on the employer, that is, the respondent No.1 as also the respondent No.3 and that the punishment should be imposed straight away cannot be accepted as that would violate the principles of natural justice and would be contrary to the principles governing service jurisprudence. It cannot be the proposition of law that once the proceeding before the ICC was concluded and a recommendation was made, the employer was bound to impose a major penalty of misconduct without initiating any disciplinary proceeding under the service rules. It cannot be the proposition of law that once the proceeding before the ICC was concluded and a recommendation was made, the employer was bound to impose a major penalty of misconduct without initiating any disciplinary proceeding under the service rules. As the recommendation of the ICC, was not interfered with by this Hon'ble Court in W.P. No.329 (w) of 2017 and the respondent No.7 did not prefer any statutory appeal, the finding and recommendation of the ICC has set forth the grounds for initiating a disciplinary proceeding against the employee for commission of the offence of sexual harassment which was to be treated as a misconduct under the service rules. The provisions of the said Act cannot be treated to be in super session of the service rules but, the provisions of the said Act and Rules are an appropriate complaint mechanism created in an organisation or work place to protect the female employees from any gender injustice or harassment at their workplace and for timely disposal of such complaint in order to ensure that the complaints were aptly dealt with. It also provided a forum for the female employees for effective disposal of their grievances. The said Act mandated that sexual harassment, if proved, should be treated as misconduct under the service rules and punishment should be imposed in accordance with the service rules. Similarly, an FIR registered on the basis of the recommendation of the ICC would also result in initiation of an investigation and the ultimate punishment would be imposed for the commission of the offence under the Indian Penal Code only if, the offence was proved at the trial. The recommendation of the Apex Court in Vishaka (supra) regarding disciplinary action and complaint mechanism also propagates the said principle. The said Act principally lays down the same proposition and there is no contradiction between the two. The relevant paragraph is quoted below:- "5. Disciplinary Action: Where such conduct amounts to mis-conduct in employment as defined by the relevant service rules, appropriate disciplinary action should be initiated by the employer in accordance with those rules." 28. I agree with the contention of Mr. The relevant paragraph is quoted below:- "5. Disciplinary Action: Where such conduct amounts to mis-conduct in employment as defined by the relevant service rules, appropriate disciplinary action should be initiated by the employer in accordance with those rules." 28. I agree with the contention of Mr. Bose to the extent that the respondent No.3 failed to adhere to the procedure prescribed by the service rules and the said Act by wrongly issuing the impugned memorandum asking for a fresh report thereby, setting aside the report and recommendation of the ICC upon consideration of the answer of the respondent No.7 to the show cause notice issued to him, without considering the fact that the recommendation was in favour of the petitioner. 29. For the reasons aforesaid, the order dated February 19, 2019 suffers from illegality and is quashed and set aside both, on the ground of procedural impropriety and also violation of the principles of natural justice. The respondent no.3 is directed to take immediate steps as indicated above in accordance with Rule 91 of the service rules, treating sexual harassment as misconduct. A charge sheet under Rule 91(iii) of the service rules should be issued and the proceedings should be conducted from that stage as per the service rules. It is expected that the disciplinary proceedings thus initiated should be concluded within a period of three months from initiation thereof. The contentions of the respondent institute and the respondent no.7, that the report of the ICC was vitiated due to the illegality in the procedure followed by the ICC, cannot be decided in this case as the decision of the ICC is not under challenge before this Court. 30. The writ petition is allowed in part and disposed of with the above directions. There shall be no order as to costs. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for be given to the parties on priority basis.