ORDER : Though these writ petitions are listed to consider I.A.No.1/17 seeking vacating of interim order dated 13/06/2016 filed by respondent Nos.2 to 4, with the consent of learned counsel on both sides, they are heard finally. 2. Petitioners have sought a declaration that the acquisition proceedings initiated under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as “the KIAD Act”) by issuance of Notification under Sections 28(1) of the KIAD Act bearing No.VKI:327:SPQ:2005 dated 06/02/2006 and Notification No.CI 743 SPQ 2007 dated 17/12/2007 (Preliminary and Final Notifications respectively) stand lapsed by virtue of application of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2013 Act”) in respect of land measuring 1 acre 17 guntas in Sy.Nos.369 and 396, situated at Amani Bellandur Khane Village, Varthur Hobli, Bangalore East Taluk (hereinafter referred to as “the land in question”). The Notifications are produced at Annexures – A and B respectively. It is the case of the petitioners that the land in question amongst other lands was sought to be acquired by respondent Nos.1 to 3/authorities for the purpose of setting up a sewerage treatment plant by respondent No.4/Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board (BWSSB). Notification under Section 28(1) followed by a declaration and Final Notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act were issued. Petitioners, being owners of the land in question, had initially filed W.P.Nos.6326-6343/2009 before this Court assailing the said Notifications. The aforesaid writ petitions were dismissed by a learned single Judge by an order dated 29/07/2011. Being aggrieved by the order of learned single Judge, the petitioners herein preferred W.A.Nos.16026-16027/2011. The Division Bench, by judgment dated 16/04/2013, dismissed the writ appeals by confirming the order of learned single Judge dated 29/07/2011. Thereafter, petitioners preferred Special Leave Petition Nos.26299-26304/2013 and 28675/2013 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The said special leave petitions were also dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court by order dated 12/11/2014. Despite dismissal of special leave petitions, the petitioners filed review petition in R.P.No.1403/2014 before this Court, which was dismissed on 16/04/2015. Thereafter, Special Leave Petition No.1111/2015 was filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was also dismissed by order dated 19/08/2015. Subsequently, these writ petitions have been preferred seeking the aforesaid declaration under Section 24 of 2013 Act. Despite dismissal of special leave petitions, the petitioners filed review petition in R.P.No.1403/2014 before this Court, which was dismissed on 16/04/2015. Thereafter, Special Leave Petition No.1111/2015 was filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was also dismissed by order dated 19/08/2015. Subsequently, these writ petitions have been preferred seeking the aforesaid declaration under Section 24 of 2013 Act. According to the petitioners, in the instant case, the award in respect of the land in question has been passed on 1011/12/2008, but the award amount has not been paid to the owners of the land in question nor deposited before the reference Court. That the petitioners have further submitted that they are in physical possession of the land in question as no notice under Section 28(6) of the KIAD Act has been issued and no order regarding the same has been passed. That there is no evidence of possession of the land in question having been taken by the respondents/authorities. Having regard to Section 24 of the 2013 Act, petitioners have sought a declaration as noted above, which is to the effect that the acquisition of the land in question has lapsed. 3. In response to the writ petition, statement of objections have been filed by respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4. 4. According to respondent Nos.2 and 3, on the issuance of Preliminary Notification dated 06/02/2006, the procedure contemplated under Section 28(3) of the KIAD Act was followed and an order was passed on 11/09/2006. Respondent No.1, being satisfied with the report of respondent No.3 with regard to the necessity of acquisition of the land in question, amongst other lands, issued the declaration and Final Notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act. Thereafter, the land stood vested with the State Government free from all encumbrances as per Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act. Subsequently, notification under Section 28(6) of the KIAD Act was issued and the same was published in the newspaper for the information of interested persons and general public and possession of the land in question was taken on 28/02/2008 as per Section 28(7) of the KIAD Act. Thereafter, the lands were transferred to respondent No.4/BWSSB as per Section 28(8) of the KIAD Act on 06/03/2008. 5. Subsequently, compensation was sought to be determined under Section 29 of the KIAD Act. Thereafter, the lands were transferred to respondent No.4/BWSSB as per Section 28(8) of the KIAD Act on 06/03/2008. 5. Subsequently, compensation was sought to be determined under Section 29 of the KIAD Act. Since the land owners did not agree to attend the meeting conducted on 08/09/2008, a general award was passed on 10/12/2008 awarding Rs.35,00,000/per acre. The award was approved by the Deputy Commissioner concerned on 24/11/2009. A copy of the award is marked as Annexure – R2 to the statement of objections. It is averred that in view of the series of litigations before this Court as well as Hon’ble Supreme Court assailing the acquisition proceedings, which have been ultimately upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the award amount was not deposited on account of the interim orders passed in the said proceedings. That the Act is a special enactment and a self-contained code. That Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not apply to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act. Therefore, respondent Nos.2 and 3 have sought dismissal of the writ petitions. 6. Respondent No.4 has also filed statement of objections stating that an extent of 35 acres 25 guntas of land was required for the purpose of setting up a sewerage treatment plant (STP) and respondent Nos.1 to 3 acquired the said extent of land for the purpose of BWSSB to set up the said plant. That the cost of acquisition being a sum of Rs.13,13,70,390/- has been deposited by BWSSB before respondent Nos.2 and 3. Reiterating the fact that several writ petitions and special leave petitions as well as review petitions filed by the petitioners herein have all resulted in dismissal and the interim order being granted in the aforesaid cases not enabling the petitioners herein to seek disbursement of the compensation amount, respondent No.4 has contended that the petitioners cannot once again seek to file these writ petitions seeking a declaration as per Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. Placing reliance on several decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court touching upon the nature of acquisition made under the provisions of the KIAD Act in juxtaposition with acquisition made under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“1894 Act” for short) respondent No.4 has also sought for dismissal of the writ petitions. 7. Placing reliance on several decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court touching upon the nature of acquisition made under the provisions of the KIAD Act in juxtaposition with acquisition made under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“1894 Act” for short) respondent No.4 has also sought for dismissal of the writ petitions. 7. I have heard learned senior counsel, Sri Dhyan Chinnappa, for M/s. Crestlaw Partners, appearing for the petitioners, learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent No.1, learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 and Dr. Aditya Sondhi, learned senior counsel appearing for Sri K.B.Monesh Kumar, for respondent No.4 and perused the material on record. 8. At the outset, learned senior counsel for the petitioners drew my attention to the recent orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court so as to contend that this Court may defer hearing of these writ petitions having regard to the pendency of the matter before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, presently before the five Judge Constitution Bench with regard to the interpretation of Section 24 of the 2013 Act. Firstly, he referred to the a judgment in the case of State of Haryana & others vs. M/s. G.D.Goenka Tourism Corporation Limited & another [Special Leave to Appeal (C)..CC.No.8453/2017 dated 21/02/2018] (G.D.Goenka Tourism Corporation Limited), passed by three Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court wherein it has been observed that pending decision on making a reference (if at all) to a larger Bench, the High Courts are requested not to deal with any matter relating to the interpretation of section concerning Section 24 of the 2013 Act. Thereafter, on 06/03/2018, on a reference being made to a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was observed that the Constitution Bench shall consider all aspects including correctness of the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corporation vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [ (2014) 3 SCC 183 ] (Harakchand Misirimal Solanki) and Indore Development Authority vs. Shailendra (dead) through L.Rs. & others [2018 SCC online SC 100] (Indore Development Authority). According to learned senior counsel for the petitioners, the Hon’ble Supreme Court would make a comprehensive consideration of the applicability of Section 24 to acquisitions being made under State Acts also. & others [2018 SCC online SC 100] (Indore Development Authority). According to learned senior counsel for the petitioners, the Hon’ble Supreme Court would make a comprehensive consideration of the applicability of Section 24 to acquisitions being made under State Acts also. Subsequently, on 18/05/2018, a Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of Supreme Court have made it clear that it is open to the High Courts to decide any issue except the applicability of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act which could be considered before the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority. Hence, this Court may defer hearing of these writ petitions. 9. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.4 beneficiary of the acquisition as well as learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3, submitted that the applicability of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act to an acquisition made under the provisions of the KIAD Act (State Act) has already been decided by this Court in the case of D.Sharanappa and others vs. State of Karnataka & others as early as 09/01/2018 reported in ILR 2018 Karnataka 3250 (D.Sharanappa) by following the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB, Mysore vs. Anasuya Bai (dead) by Legal Representatives [ (2017)3 SCC 313 (Anasuya Bai); M.Nagabhushana vs. State of Karnataka [ (2011) 3 SCC 408 ] (M.Nagabhushana); Delhi Development Authority vs. Sukhbir Singh [ (2016) 16 SCC 258 ] (Sukhbir Singh); Government (NCT of Delhi) vs. Manav Dharam Trust [ (2017)6 SCC 751 ] (Manav Dharam Trust) and also other judgments rendered under the provisions of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (“BDA Act” for short) which is also a State enactment and therefore, there is no impediment for this Court to decide these writ petitions by following the order passed by this Court in the case of D.Sharanappa, which has been rendered by following the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. It is contended by learned senior counsel that the order in D.Sharanappa’s case has neither been stayed nor set aside and hence, holds the field with regard to acquisition made under the provisions of the KIAD Act and regarding the non-applicability of Section 24 of 2013 Act to an acquisition made under the provisions of the KIAD Act. 10. It is contended by learned senior counsel that the order in D.Sharanappa’s case has neither been stayed nor set aside and hence, holds the field with regard to acquisition made under the provisions of the KIAD Act and regarding the non-applicability of Section 24 of 2013 Act to an acquisition made under the provisions of the KIAD Act. It is also emphasized that the order in D.Sharanappa has been passed by this very Bench and hence, it would be in fitness of things that the said judgment is followed. It is contended that the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of G.D.Goenka Tourism Corporation Limited has to be understood in its proper perspective. The said observations have been made vis-à-vis an acquisition proceeding initiated under the provisions of 1894 Act and that the said observations would not apply to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act, which is a State enactment. That the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held in the case of Anasuya Bai and other cases that an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act is distinct from an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the 1894 Act. Therefore, if an acquisition has been initiated under the provisions of 1894 Act and the conditions mentioned in Section 24 of the 2013 Act apply, then in such a case, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court made in G.D.Goenka Tourism Corporation Limited would squarely apply. But when Section 24 of 2013 Act itself does not apply to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the Act under consideration, which is a State Act observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court would not apply. In support of the said contention reliance has been placed on a judgment of the Delhi High Court rendered by Division Bench in the case of Mool Chand vs. Union of India in W.P.(C) 4528/2015 on 17th January, 2019 [2019 SCC Online Del 6519] (Mool Chand), wherein it has been observed that the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the referral order dated 06/03/2018 did not intend to, and in fact, did not restrain the High Courts, in proceedings which are filed as writ petitions, wherein interpretation of Section 24 of 2013 Act is involved. Therefore, it is just and proper that this Court considers the case of the petitioners in light of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the order of this Court in the case of D.Sharanappa on the aspect of the relief sought for by the petitioners herein is concerned, which is a declaration under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act to the effect that the acquisition proceedings initiated has lapsed. 11. Learned senior counsel, Sri Dhyan Chinnappa appearing for the petitioners very fairly submitted that the same is covered by the judgment of this Court in D.Sharanappa, which has followed the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anasuya Bai and M.Nagabhushana and that he would have no further submission to make in that regard. 12. By way of response, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.4 and learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 as well as learned Addl. Government Advocate appearing for respondent No.1 submitted in unison that having regard to the dictum of this Court in the case of D.Sharanappa the writ petitions may be dismissed. 13. Having heard learned senior counsel as well as learned counsel for the respective parties and on perusal of the material on record, the following points would arise for my consideration: (i) Whether it is just and proper for this Court to defer consideration or hearing of these writ petitions in view of the pendency of the matter before the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the interpretation of Section 24 of the 2013 Act? (ii) If the answer to point No.1 is in the negative, whether the judgment of this Court in D.Sharanappa, which has followed the judgments of Anasuya Bai and M.Nagabhushana would squarely apply to the case of the petitioners herein? (iii) What order? The aforesaid points would be considered in seriatim. 14. The detailed narration of facts and contention would not call for a reiteration except highlighting the fact that the land in question was sought to be acquired by issuance of Preliminary Notification under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act on 06/02/2006, which was followed by declaration and Final Notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act on 17/12/2007. Under the Scheme of the Act, on publication of the declaration under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act in the official gazette, the land vests absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Under the Scheme of the Act, on publication of the declaration under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act in the official gazette, the land vests absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Where any land is vested in the State Government, the State Government may, by notice in writing, order any person who is in possession of the land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or any person duly authorized by it in that behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice. According to respondents, possession of the land in question was taken on 28/02/2008 under Section 28(7) of the Act. As per the Scheme of the Act, after taking possession, the award was passed on 10/12/2008. 15. Soon thereafter, on 12/03/2009, W.P.Nos.6326-6443/2009 were filed before this Court. The said writ petitions were tagged along with W.P.No.5650/2008 and on 16/03/2009, an interim order was passed staying dispossession and the same was continued till the disposal of the writ petitions. Ultimately, the writ petitions were dismissed on 29/07/2011 against which W.A.No.16513/2011 and connected matters with W.A.Nos.638-654/2012 were filed on 01/10/2011 before the Division Bench of this Court, which granted an order of status quo which operated till the disposal of the writ appeals. The said writ appeals were dismissed on 16/04/2013. Subsequently, SLP.Nos.26299-26304/2013 were filed on 13/07/2013, in which there was a direction to maintain status quo as on that date. The same was dismissed on 12/11/2014. Even after dismissal of the S.L.Ps., Review Petition No.1403/2014 was filed before this Court, which was dismissed on 16/04/2015 and subsequently, Special Leave Petition No.1111/2015 was filed by respondent No.3 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was also dismissed on 19/08/2015. Learned counsel for petitioners submits that even a curative petition was filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the same was dismissed. 16. Subsequently, these writ petitions have been filed on 09/06/2016, by contending that despite passing of an award, compensation amount has neither been paid nor deposited before the Court and therefore, under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act, the petitioners are entitled to a declaration that the acquisition has lapsed. 17. 16. Subsequently, these writ petitions have been filed on 09/06/2016, by contending that despite passing of an award, compensation amount has neither been paid nor deposited before the Court and therefore, under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act, the petitioners are entitled to a declaration that the acquisition has lapsed. 17. Reiterating the very same facts, learned senior counsel as well as other counsel for respondents contended that the series of litigations initiated by the petitioners herein and the interim orders passed by this Court as well as the Hon’ble Supreme Court directing maintenance of status quo stalled the acquisition proceedings being taken to its logical end and therefore, despite passing of an award, respondent – acquiring authorities did not deposit the compensation amount before the Reference Court and neither were the petitioners interested in claiming the said amount. It is contended that respondents cannot be blamed for the series of litigations initiated by the petitioners and stalling the acquisition process. Thereafter, the petitioners cannot contend that there is no payment of compensation made to them. It is submitted that Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of T.N. and another vs. Vasantha Bai [ AIR 1995 SC 1778 ], has stated that where there is a challenge to acquisition proceedings and stay of dispossession passed by the High Court, it would stymie further proceedings being taken and hence, respondents cannot be blamed for being remiss in paying compensation amount to the petitioners or deposit it before the Reference Court. 18. More importantly, it is contended that the declaration sought for by the petitioners under Section 24 (2) of 2013 Act, cannot be granted having referred to the judgments of this Court in the case of D.Sharanappa, which has been rendered by the following judgments of the Apex Court. 19. In light of the aforesaid factual matrix and rival contentions, Point No.1 is considered. 20. As already stated, learned senior counsel for the petitioners contended that this Court may defer consideration of this writ petition having regard to the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court restraining High Courts from considering any matter revolving around Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. The context in which the said observations have been made would have to be understood in the first instance. Section 24(2) of 2013 Act expressly refers to acquisition initiated under the provisions of the 1894 Act. The context in which the said observations have been made would have to be understood in the first instance. Section 24(2) of 2013 Act expressly refers to acquisition initiated under the provisions of the 1894 Act. But the present writ petition concerns acquisition which has been initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act, which is a State enactment. 21. In the judgment referred to by learned senior counsel for the petitioners, the matter arises in respect of an acquisition which was under the provisions of the 1894 Act. In fact, the judgment rendered by three Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation was considered in the case of M/s.G.D. Goenka Tourism Corporation limited, by three Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts were requested not to deal with any matter relating to interpretation or concerning Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. This order was passed on 07/03/2018. However, even before that date, on 09/01/2018, this Court in the case of D.Sharanappa, by following the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anasuya, M.Nagabhushana and also by referring to other judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sukhbir Singh and Manav Dharam Trust had concluded that Section 24(2) of 2013 Act is not applicable to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act which is a State enactment. Coincidentally, the order in D.Sharanappa has been rendered by this very Bench. It is difficult to accept a contention that an earlier judgment rendered by a Judge ought not to be followed by the very same Judge in a subsequent matter. Further, the case in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that no High Court shall adjudicate upon any dispute arising under or the interpretation of or concerning Section 24(2) of 2013 Act, has to be understood in the context of initiation of acquisition proceedings under the provisions of 1894 Act. The said observation do not apply where an acquisition is initiated under any State enactment or the Act under consideration. 22. Moreover, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.4 contended that a Constitution Bench dealing with a reference arising from a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not continue the said embargo on the High Courts. The said observation do not apply where an acquisition is initiated under any State enactment or the Act under consideration. 22. Moreover, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.4 contended that a Constitution Bench dealing with a reference arising from a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not continue the said embargo on the High Courts. In this context, reference is also made to the observations of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mool Chand, wherein it has been observed that the injunction or embargo placed on the High Courts not to deal with any matter concerning or interpretation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, has not been continued and hence, there is no restraint on the High Courts from proceeding with writ petitions where interpretation of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act is involved. 23. In my considered view, the submission of learned senior counsel and counsel for the respondents deserves to be accepted particularly when the decision of this Court concerning the interpretation of Section 24(2) in light of the applicability of the said Section to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act has already been deliberated upon by this Court as early as on 09/01/2018 i.e., much prior to the order of restraint being placed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was only subsequently, in March 2018. More significantly, the order in D.Sharanappa has been rendered by none other than myself and I am of the considered view that the said order is binding on me much more important than anybody else. It is a matter of judicial discipline that when a judgment is rendered by a particular Judge in a case, it must be followed consistently in other similar matters, unless the said judgment has been modified, varied or set aside by a Larger Bench. Consistency in decisions is a hallmark of rendering justice. Consequently, having regard to the observations of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, I am persuaded to answer Point No.1 against the petitioners and in favour of the respondents. 24. This takes me to Point No.2 which deals with the merits of the matter and as to whether the petitioners are entitled to a declaration that the acquisition has lapsed having regard to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. 24. This takes me to Point No.2 which deals with the merits of the matter and as to whether the petitioners are entitled to a declaration that the acquisition has lapsed having regard to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The said point should not take much time of this Court to answer as it has already been answered by this Court in the case of D.Sharanappa. For the purpose of immediate reference, the relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are extracted as under: “Re. Point No.3: Whether petitioners are entitled to a declaration that the acquisition of lands in question is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act? 23. Before considering this point, it would be relevant to extract Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. Section 24 of 2013 Act reads as under: “24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 24. The title or preamble to Section 24 reads as “Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894” shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. It is explicit, restricted in its scope and not expansive in nature. It is only where the acquisition process has been initiated under LA Act, 1894 that the acquisition would lapse, on the existence of conditions as stated in subsection (2) of Section 24. Same is the case with regard to Clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of Section 24. 25. The said Section has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority vs. Sukhbir Singh and others [ (2016) 16 SCC 258 ] (Sukbhir Singh). In said case the acquisition was under the provisions of LA Act, 1894 and not under any other Central or State enactment. Further, it has been held as under: “11. Section 24(1) begins with a nonobstante clause and covers situations where either no award has been made under the Land Acquisition Act, in which case the more beneficial provisions of the 2013 Act relating to determination of compensation shall apply, or where an award has been made under Section 11, land acquisition proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as if the said Act had not been repealed. 12. To Section 24(1)(b) an important exception is carved out by Section 24(2). The necessary ingredients of Section 24(2) are as follows: (a) Section 24(2) begins with a non-obstante clause keeping subsection (1) out of harm’s way; (b) For it to apply, land acquisition proceedings should have been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act; (c) Also, an award under Section 11 should have been made 5 years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act; (d) Physical possession of the land, if not taken, or compensation, if not paid, are fatal to the land acquisition proceeding that had been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act; (e) The fatality is pronounced by stating that the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed, and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall, in this game of snakes and ladders, start all over again.” (underlining by me) 26. Further, in the case of Government (NCT of Delhi) vs. Manav Dharam Trust and another [ (2017) 6 SCC 751 ], (Manav Dharam Trust) referring to Sukhbir Singh, it has been observed as under: “24. The 2013 Act has made a sea change in the approach on the acquisition of land and compensation thereof. The only lapse under the 1894 Act was under Section 11A where what would lapse is the ... “entire proceedings for the acquisition of land” whereas under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, what gets lapsed is the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act which has culminated in passing of an award under Section 11 but where either possession was not taken or compensation was not paid within five years prior to 1-1-2014. In other words, the land acquisition proceedings contemplated under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act would take in both, payment of compensation and taking of possession within the five year period prior to 1-1-2014. If either of them is not satisfied, the entire land acquisition proceedings would lapse under the deeming provision. The impact of deemed lapse under Section 24(2) is that pervasive. To quote R.F. Nariman, J. in DDA v. Sukbhir Singh: (SCC p.283, para 26) “26. ... As is well settled, a deeming fiction is enacted so that a putative state of affairs must be imagined, the mind not being allowed to boggle at the logical consequence of such putative state of affairs. ... In fact, Section 24(2) uses the expression “deemed to have lapsed” because the Legislature was cognizant of the fact that, in cases where compensation has not been paid, and physical possession handed over to the State, vesting has taken place, after which land acquisition proceedings could be said to have been ended.” Thus, on account of the lapse, the encumbrance created in favour of the State comes to an end, and resultantly, the impediment to encumber the land also comes to an end. Even, according to the appellants, the transfers were illegal and void for the reason that there was an impediment for the transfer. Once the acquisition proceedings lapse, all impediments cease to exist.” (underlining by me) 27. The aforesaid observations have been made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the question whether subsequent purchasers/ assignees/power of attorney holders etc. Even, according to the appellants, the transfers were illegal and void for the reason that there was an impediment for the transfer. Once the acquisition proceedings lapse, all impediments cease to exist.” (underlining by me) 27. The aforesaid observations have been made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the question whether subsequent purchasers/ assignees/power of attorney holders etc. have locus standi to file a petition seeking declaration of lapse of acquisition proceedings under subsection (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act, which, even according to the Hon’ble Supreme Court was the only issue arising in that case. But, nevertheless, the aforesaid observations have been made in the context of land acquisition proceedings initiated under LA Act, 1894. 28. Further, in the case of Aligarh Development Authority vs. Meghsingh ( AIR 2016 SC 2912 ), which is also a case arising under the provisions of LA Act, 1894, at paragraph 6 and 7, it has been held as under: “6. Section 24 of the 2013 Act envisages mainly two situations; i) where the land acquisition proceedings had already been initiated under the 1894 Act but no award was passed till the date the new Act came into force. (ii) where the Award has been passed but neither the owner has been dispossessed nor has he been paid the compensation. Under the first, where the award had not been passed, the acquisition proceedings could continue; but the compensation will have to be determined under the scheme of 2013 Act. Under the second category, there is a statutory lapse of the proceedings. There is also an incidental third situation, where award under the 1894 Act had already been passed prior to coming into force of the 2013 Act, but payment is yet to be made and possession is yet to be taken. In that case, the further proceedings after the award could continue under the old Act of 1894; but if either payment or possession has not taken effect in five years prior to the 2013 Act, then proceedings will lapse. 7. In the case before us, since admittedly the award has not been passed, there arises no question of lapse. The land acquisition proceedings would continue but with the rider that the award will have to be passed and compensation determined under the provisions of 2013 Act.” (underlining by me) 29. 7. In the case before us, since admittedly the award has not been passed, there arises no question of lapse. The land acquisition proceedings would continue but with the rider that the award will have to be passed and compensation determined under the provisions of 2013 Act.” (underlining by me) 29. Thus, by following the observations and interpretation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it becomes clear that Section 24 of the 2013 Act, [whether it is subsection (1) or subsection (2)] applies only when acquisition proceedings have been initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. Therefore, on that short ground alone, it could be held that Section 24 of the 2013 Act is not applicable to an acquisition initiated under the BDA Act. 30. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anasuya Bai’s case while setting aside the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court has held as under: “28. The Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned judgment however, has quashed the acquisition proceedings itself holding that they have lapsed. For this purpose, the High Court has taken aid of Section 24 of the new LA Act in the following manner: (Anasuya Bai case, SCC OnLine Kar paras 13-14) ‘13. It is also noted that the acquisition proceedings including preliminary and final declaration have been passed under the provisions of the KIAD Act. But there is no provision under the KIAD Act to pass an award and award has to be passed only under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. If the award has to be passed under the LA Act, whether the new Act can be pressed into service to hold the acquisition proceedings are lapsed on account of non-passing of award within a period of 5 years under Section 11. If the award is passed under the LA Act, the enquiry has to be conducted by the Deputy Commissioner or Collector before passing the award. Section 11A contemplates that if the award is not passed within 2 years from the date of publication of the final declaration, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land shall automatically stands lapsed. If the award is passed under the LA Act, the enquiry has to be conducted by the Deputy Commissioner or Collector before passing the award. Section 11A contemplates that if the award is not passed within 2 years from the date of publication of the final declaration, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land shall automatically stands lapsed. It is no doubt true that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka has held that Section 11A of the Act is no application in respect of the land acquired under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act. We have to consider in this appeal as to whether Section 24(2) of the new Act is applicable in order to hold that the acquisition proceedings deemed to be lapsed due to non-payment of compensation and non-passing of the award within a period of five years from the date of declaration and with effect from nonpayment of compensation to the landowners. 14. The new Act does not say whether the Act is applicable to the land acquired under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Acquisition Act, 1894. What Section 24 says that if the award is not passed under Section 11 of the Act and the compensation is not paid within 5 years or more prior to new Act, if the physical possession of the land is taken or not especially the compensation is not paid or deposited in Court such proceedings deem to have been lapsed. In the instant case, it is not the case of the respondent that award is not required to be passed under the provisions of the LA Act. When the award is required to be passed under the LA Act, the respondents cannot contend that the provisions of the new Act cannot be made applicable on account of nonpayment of compensation within a period of five years.’ 29. This approach of the High Court, we find, to be totally erroneous. In the first instance, the matter is not properly appreciated by ignoring the important aspects mentioned in para 28 above. Secondly, effect of non-applicability of Section 11A of the old LA Act is not rightly understood. The High Court was not oblivious of the judgment of this Court in M. Nagabhushana case which is referred by it in the aforesaid discussion itself. Secondly, effect of non-applicability of Section 11A of the old LA Act is not rightly understood. The High Court was not oblivious of the judgment of this Court in M. Nagabhushana case which is referred by it in the aforesaid discussion itself. This judgment categorically holds that once the proceedings are initiated under the KIAD Act, Section 11A of the old LA Act would not be applicable. Such an opinion of the Court is based on the following rationale: (M. Nagabhushana case, SCC pp. 420-22, paras 29-36) “29. The appellant has not challenged the validity of the aforesaid provisions. Therefore, on a combined reading of the provisions of Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, it is clear that on the publication of the Notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act i.e. from 30-3-2004, the land in question vested in the State free from all encumbrances by operation of Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act, whereas the land acquired under the said Act vests only under Section 16 thereof, which runs as under: ‘16. Power to take possession.–When the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.’ 30. On a comparison of the aforesaid provisions, namely, Section 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act with Section 16 of the said Act, it is clear that the land which is subject to acquisition proceeding under the said Act gets vested with the Government only when the Collector makes an award under Section 11, and the Government takes possession. Under Section 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, such vesting takes place by operation of law and it has nothing to do with the making of any award. This is where Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act are vitally different from Sections 4 and 6 of the said Act. 31. A somewhat similar question came up for consideration before a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap v. State of Rajasthan. In that case the acquisition proceedings commenced under Section 52(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 and the same contentions were raised, namely, that the acquisition notification gets invalidated for not making an award within a period of two years from the date of notification. In that case the acquisition proceedings commenced under Section 52(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 and the same contentions were raised, namely, that the acquisition notification gets invalidated for not making an award within a period of two years from the date of notification. Repelling the said contention, the learned Judges held that once the land is vested in the Government, the provisions of Section 11A are not attracted and the acquisition proceedings will not lapse. (Pratap case, SCC p. 8, para 12). 32. In Munithimmaiah v. State of Karnataka this Court held that the provisions of Sections 6 and 11A of the said Act do not apply to the provisions of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (the BDA Act). In SCC para 15 at p. 335 of the Report this Court made a distinction between the purposes of the two enactments and held that all the provisions of the said Act do not apply to the BDA Act. Subsequently, the Constitution Bench of this Court in Offshore Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority, held that Section 11A of the said Act does not apply to acquisition under the BDA Act. 33. The same principle is attracted to the present case also. Here also on a comparison between the provisions of the said Act and the KIAD Act, we find that those two Acts were enacted to achieve substantially different purposes. Insofar as the KIAD Act is concerned, from its Statement of Objects and Reasons, it is clear that the same was enacted to achieve the following purposes: ‘It is considered necessary to make provision for the orderly establishment and development of industries in suitable areas in the State. To achieve this object, it is proposed to specify suitable areas for industrial development and establish a Board to develop such areas and make available lands therein for establishment of industries.’ 34. The KIAD Act is of course a self-contained code. The said Act is primarily a law regulating acquisition of land for public purpose and for payment of compensation. Acquisition of land under the said Act is not concerned solely with the purpose of planned development of any city. It has to cater to different situations which come within the expanded horizon of public purpose. The said Act is primarily a law regulating acquisition of land for public purpose and for payment of compensation. Acquisition of land under the said Act is not concerned solely with the purpose of planned development of any city. It has to cater to different situations which come within the expanded horizon of public purpose. Recently, the Constitution Bench of this Court in Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra held that Section 11A of the said Act does not apply to acquisition under the provisions of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. 35. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the judgment of this Court in Mariyappa v. State of Karnataka. The said decision was cited for the purpose of contending that Section 11A is applicable to an acquisition under the KIAD Act. In Mariyappa before coming to hold that provision of Section 11A of the Central Act applies to the Karnataka Acquisition of Land for Grant of House Sites Act, 1972 (hereinafter “the 1972 Act”), this Court held that the 1972 Act is not a self-contained code. The Court also held that the 1972 Act and the Central Act are supplemental to each other to the extent that unless the Central Act supplements the Karnataka Act, the latter cannot function. The Court further held that both the Acts, namely, the 1972 Act and the Central Act deal with the same subject. But in the instant case, the KIAD Act is a self-contained code and the Central Act is not supplemental to it. Therefore, the ratio in Mariyappa is not attracted to the facts of the present case. 36. Following the aforesaid well-settled principles, this Court is of the opinion that there is no substance in the contention of the appellant that acquisition under the KIAD Act lapsed for alleged noncompliance with the provisions of Section 11A of the said Act. For the reasons aforesaid, all the contentions of the appellant, being without any substance, fail and the appeal is dismissed.” 31. For the reasons aforesaid, all the contentions of the appellant, being without any substance, fail and the appeal is dismissed.” 31. In fact even in the case of Anasuya Bai, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has placed reliance on its decisions in Munithimmaiah, Offshore Holdings (P) Ltd., and Girnar Traders (3), to hold that the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 and the BDA Act, 1976 being distinct, Section 24(2) of 2013 Act, is not applicable to an acquisition under the BDA Act and also in so far as acquisition under the KIAD Act is concerned. Therefore, the aforesaid dictum is conclusive and is squarely applicable to the case on hand. Section 24 of 2013 Act does not apply to acquisition initiated under provisions of KIAD Act. Therefore, point No.3 could be accordingly answered. Thus, from the aforesaid dicta of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the applicability of Section 24 of 2013 Act to acquisition of land under KIAD Act is excluded. 32. Moreover, the scheme and object of KIAD Act is different from LA Act, 1894. The KIAD Act has been enacted by Karnataka Legislature to make special provisions for securing the establishment of industrial areas in the State of Karnataka and generally to promote the establishment and orderly development of industries therein, and for that purpose to establish an Industrial Areas Development Board and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid. Under Section 3(1), the State Government may, by notification, declare any area in the State to be an industrial area for the purposes of this Act along with the limits of the area to which it relates. Section 4 of the Act deals with alteration of industrial area by exclusion of any area from an industrial area or including additional area as may be specified by issuance of a notification. Chapter III of the Act deals with establishment and constitution of the board. While the functions and powers of the Board are delineated in Chapter IV, Chapter V deals with finance, accounts and audit. Chapter VI deals with application of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974 and non-application of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, to Board premises. Chapter VII deals with acquisition and disposal of land. The provisions of Chapter VII apply to such areas from such dates as have been notified by the State Government under subsection (3) of Section 1. Chapter VII deals with acquisition and disposal of land. The provisions of Chapter VII apply to such areas from such dates as have been notified by the State Government under subsection (3) of Section 1. The procedure for acquisition of land is enunciated under Section 28 of the Act, which reads as under: "28. Acquisition of land: (1) If at any time, in the opinion of the State Government, any land is required for the purpose of development by the Board, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act, the State Government may by notification, give notice of its intention to acquire such land. (2) On publication of a notification under subsection (1), the State Government shall serve notice upon the owner or where the owner is not the occupier, on the occupier of the land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested therein to show cause, within thirty days from the date of service of the notice, why the land should not be acquired. (3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land and by any other person interested therein, and after giving such owner and person an opportunity of being heard, the State Government may pass such orders as it deems fit. (4) After orders are passed under subsection (3), where the State Government is satisfied that any land should be acquired for the purpose specified in the notification issued under subsection (1), a declaration shall, by notification in the official Gazette, be made to that effect. (5) On the publication in the official Gazette of the declaration under subsection (4), the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. (6) Where any land is vested in the State Government under subsection (5), the State Government may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of the land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or any person duly authorised by it in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice. (7) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under subsection (5), the State Government or any officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf may take possession of the land and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary. (7) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under subsection (5), the State Government or any officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf may take possession of the land and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary. (8) Where the land has been acquired for the Board, the State Government, after it has taken possession of the land, may transfer the land to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been acquired.” Section 29 deals with payment of compensation, which is extracted as under: “29. Compensation: (1) Where any land is acquired by the State Government under this Chapter, the State Government shall pay for such acquisition compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) Where the amount of compensation has been determined by agreement between the State Government and the person to be compensated, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement. (3) Where no such agreement can be reached, the State Government shall refer the case to the Deputy Commissioner for determination of the amount of compensation to be paid for such acquisition as also the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid. (4) On receipt of a reference under subsection (3), the Deputy Commissioner shall serve notice on the owner or occupier of such land and on all persons known or believed to be interested herein to appear before him and state their respective interests in the said land.” Section 30 of KIAD Act states that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of an enquiry and award by the Deputy Commissioner, the reference to Court, the apportionment of compensation and the payment of compensation, in respect of lands acquired under Chapter VII. 33. Thus, the main object of KIAD Act is establishment of industrial areas in the State and to promote orderly development of industrial areas and acquisition of land is incidental to the aforesaid object. Lands could be acquired only if the State Government is of the opinion that lands are required for the purpose of development by the Board, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act and not otherwise. Thus, the main object of the KIAD Act is not acquisition of land. 34. Lands could be acquired only if the State Government is of the opinion that lands are required for the purpose of development by the Board, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act and not otherwise. Thus, the main object of the KIAD Act is not acquisition of land. 34. By contrast, the scheme of the LA Act, 1894, which is since repealed by 2013 Act, was an expropriatory legislation to provide for acquisition of land for public purposes and for companies. Section 4 of the said Act dealt with publication of Preliminary Notification while Section 5A provided for hearing objections with regard to the proposed acquisitions. Section 6 dealt with the issuance of a declaration and Final Notification that the land was required for a public purpose. The said declaration was conclusive evidence that the land was needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may be. After making such a declaration, the appropriate government could acquire the land in accordance with the Act. In fact, Part II of the LA Act, 1894, dealt with acquisition which contemplated procedure for the passing of an award; notifying persons interested and taking possession of the land. Part II of the said Act, dealt with the provisions dealing with enhancement of compensation by the reference Court by the land owner seeking a reference for a higher compensation. Part IV dealt with apportionment of compensation, while Part V of the said Act concerned with payment. Acquisition of land for companies was dealt with in Part VII of the said Act and a special procedure was prescribed. Part VIII pertained to miscellaneous provisions. 35. However, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed strong reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of J.Venkatesh Reddy referred to above, which judgment has been rendered by placing reliance on two other judgments of this Court, viz., Smt. K.M.Chikkathayamma and others vs. The State of Karnataka, Urban Development Department and others [ILR 2016 KAR 1603] (K.M.Chikkathayamma) arising under BDA Act and M. Somashekar and others vs. State of Karnataka, Department of Industries and Commerce and others, [ILR 2017 KAR 1470] (M.Somashekar) arising under KIAD Act. It is urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that the aforesaid decisions are appealed against and the Division Bench of this Court has stayed the orders of the learned single Judge and directed maintenance of status quo by the parties. It is further urged that the aforesaid three decisions cannot be considered in light of the dicta of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to above and the recent decision of this Court in M/S.Evershine Monuments. 36. Having regard to the strong reliance placed on the aforesaid decisions by the learned counsel for the petitioners, they would be considered in seriatim. Chikkathayamma: 37. This Court while considering the dictum in Chikkathayamma’s case in the case of M/s. Evershine Monuments in the context of BDA Act and 2013 Act has observed as under: “33. Next, it is necessary to discuss Smt.K.M.Chikkathayamma and others vs. The State of Karnataka and others [ILR 2016 KAR 1603], which is a recent judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court and which is the sheetanchor of learned counsel for the petitioners. (a) The points for determination in the aforesaid case are culled out for immediate reference as under: “(a) Whether the petitions in WP 38868-70 and WP Nos.38871-74/2015 are maintainable in view of the acquisition proceedings initiated under the KUDA Act having been quashed and the same being the subject matter of an appeal before a Division Bench of this Court. (b) Whether the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 or the LA Act, 2013, should be applied to acquisition proceedings under the provisions of the KUDA Act and the BDA Act, if the proceedings are not completed as on the date of coming into force of the LA Act, 2013. (c) What order should follow in each of these petitions.” While considering point No.2 extracted above, learned Single Judge in the said case held with regard to interpretation of subsection (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act as under: “Section 24(2) of the LA Act, 2013 provides for lapse of acquisition proceedings commenced under the LA Act, 1894, on the satisfaction of certain conditions, which are as follows: a. The award of compensation should have been passed five years or more prior to the commencement of the LA Act, 2013. In that, it should have been passed prior to 01.01.2009; AND b. Physical possession of the land has not been taken; OR c. Compensation has not been paid. The Apex Court has interpreted the requirement of possession being taken under Section 24(2) of the LA Act, 2013, to mean that actual physical possession has to be taken and mere symbolic possession would not suffice.” Although learned Single Judge has noticed that subsection (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act applies to acquisition proceedings commenced under the LA Act, 1894, nevertheless has also held that the “answer to the second point for consideration is that it is the LA Act, 2013 that shall be applied to acquisition proceedings under the BDA Act, and KUDA Act, that have remained without being completed in all respects as on 1.1.2014, and proceedings that have been initiated thereafter.” Thus, learned Single Judge after referring to Section 24 of 2013 Act, held that it was applicable even to acquisitions made under the provisions of the BDA Act as well as KUDA Act. Learned Single Judge however noted that subsection (2) of Section 24 is a substantive provision of law which saves acquisition as well as affords the prospect of land sought to be acquired reverting to the land owner under certain conditions. 34. The said decision was rendered on 10.03.2016. It is stated at the Bar that the said decision has been appealed against by the BDA and a Division Bench of this Court has stayed the order passed in the said case.” xxx xxx xxx “37. In my humble opinion, the judgment in Chikkathayamma’s case as well as similar judgments in other cases, in the context of KUDA, 1987 and BDA Act have been rendered without making an analysis of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, with regard to its applicability to acquisitions initiated under those Acts as opposed to acquisitions initiated under LA Act, 1894. Further, judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in that regard have not been considered and followed and without bearing in mind the distinction in the object and scheme of the LA Act, 1894 and the BDA Act, as well as the decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in that regard. Learned Single Judge by his order has granted relief under subsection (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act. Learned Single Judge by his order has granted relief under subsection (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act. While a reference has been made to the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy, Munithimmaiah, and Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd., the said reference is not in depth, as a detailed consideration of the aforesaid judgments, which have been rendered on a detailed comparison of LA Act, 1894 with BDA Act, would have thrown light on the object and scope of Section 24 of 2013 Act. 38. Reliance placed on the observations made by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions referred to above in detail would clearly indicate that the object and scheme of the LA Act, 1894 and the BDA Act, being distinct and meant for different purposes, it cannot be construed that acquisition initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act, is an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. More significantly, the judgment in Chikkathayamma’s case does not take into consideration the dicta of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sukhbir Singh and the subsequent decision in the case of Manav Dharam Trust, which are directly on the issue of applicability of subsection (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act to only acquisitions initiated under LA Act, 1894. 39. With respect, the judgment in the case of Chikkathayamma and other judgments which are similar in nature cannot be considered to be binding precedent as they are contrary to the dicta of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to above as well as the provision of Section 24 of the 2013 Act and hence cannot be applied to the present cases which deal with acquisition under BDA Act. There are also additional reasons for holding so. 40. Revisiting the words of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, what is significant to note is the fact that the said Section expressly refers to land acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894. The said Section does not incorporate the words “or proceedings initiated under any other enactment”. Therefore, the expression “land acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894” are significant and must be given its natural and plain meaning and the said expression cannot be given an expansive interpretation by adding words to the provision, in the absence of the provision itself giving rise to any such implication. Therefore, the expression “land acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894” are significant and must be given its natural and plain meaning and the said expression cannot be given an expansive interpretation by adding words to the provision, in the absence of the provision itself giving rise to any such implication. In this regard, the rules of interpretation of a statute would become relevant and reliance could be placed on guiding principles of interpretation of statute. One such principle is that the Court is not entitled to read words into a provision of an Act or Rule for, the meaning is to be found within the four corners of the provision of an act or rule, as in the instant case. Therefore, while it is not permissible to add words or to fill in a gap or lacuna, on the other hand, effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature. Thus, the golden rule of construction is that the words of a provision of a statute, or rule must be first understood in the natural, ordinary or popular sense. Phrases and sentences must be construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. In other words, the golden rule is that the words of a statute prima facie be given an ordinary meaning. Natural and ordinary meaning of words should not be departed from “unless it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning”. Such a meaning cannot be departed from by the judges “in light of their own views as to policy” unless it is shown to adopt a purposive interpretation of the statute, which does not arise in the instant case. 41. Such a meaning cannot be departed from by the judges “in light of their own views as to policy” unless it is shown to adopt a purposive interpretation of the statute, which does not arise in the instant case. 41. In this context, Harbhajan Singh vs. Press Council of India reported in AIR 2002 SC 1351 could be relied upon wherein, Cross on “Statutory Interpretation” (Third Edition, 1995) has been relied upon as follows: “Thus, an ‘ordinary meaning’ or ‘grammatical meaning’ does not imply that the Judge attributes a meaning to the words of a statute independently of their context or of the purpose of the statute, but rather that he adopts a meaning which is appropriate in relation to the immediately obvious and unresearched context and purpose in and for which they are used.” 42. The aforesaid principles being squarely applicable to Section 24 of the 2013 Act, the same must be interpreted having regard to the intention of the Parliament. In this regard, one cannot lose sight of the fact that 2013 Act repeals only LA Act, 1894, and not any other Central or State enactment dealing with acquisition. Therefore, what are sought to be saved under Section 24 of the 2013 Act, are those acquisitions initiated only under LA Act, 1894 and not any acquisition initiated under any other Central or State enactment. Therefore, the words “acquisition proceedings initiated under any other enactment” cannot be added or supplemented by the Court after the expression “in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894” under both subsections 1 and 2 of Section 24 of 2013 Act. Further, the short title of Section 24 of 2013 Act reads as “Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.” This is another indication that Section 24 applies only to those acquisition “initiated” under the provisions of LA Act, 1894. 43. Further, Section 24 creates a new right in favour of land owners in as much as they are entitled to relief under certain circumstances as stipulated in Section 24 of the Act. One such relief is under sub-section(2) of Section 24 of the Act, dealing with lapse of acquisition by a fiction. It is a deeming provision, provided the stipulations therein are complied with or the conditions mentioned therein exist. One such relief is under sub-section(2) of Section 24 of the Act, dealing with lapse of acquisition by a fiction. It is a deeming provision, provided the stipulations therein are complied with or the conditions mentioned therein exist. One overbearing condition is that the acquisition must have been initiated under the provisions of LA Act, 1894. Thus, if acquisition is initiated under any other Central or State enactment, Section 24 does not apply. 44. The reasons as to why Parliament has incorporated Section 24 in the 2013 Act are evident and not far to see. The said section creates a new right in favour of land owners whose lands have been acquired under the provisions of LA Act, 1894, which has been repealed and substituted by 2013 Act. The 2013 Act is not a substitution for other Central enactments pertaining to acquisition of land or for that matter any other State enactment. Therefore, Section 24 uses the expression that the acquisition must have been initiated under the provisions of LA Act, 1894. But while creating a new right in favour of land owners under Section 24, Parliament at the same time has intended two further aspects: first, saving acquisition under LA Act, 1894 and second, not encroaching upon other Central or State enactments. As far as State enactments dealing with acquisitions are concerned, Parliament intentionally has not touched upon any State enactment. The reason being that several State enactments have been made drawing sustenance from Entry 5, List II or State List of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, whereas LA Act, 1894 as well as 2013 Act could be traced to Entry 42 List III (Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule. Moreover, as has been explained above, the object and scope of the BDA Act made under Entry 5 List II (State List) are distinct from LA Act, 1894 substituted by 2013 Act. 45. Further, the State enactments have their own provisions concerning lapse of acquisition such as Section 27 of BDA Act or KUDA Act and Section 24 of 2013 Act cannot trammel upon those provisions of the State Acts such as BDA Act or KUDA Act. The State enactments may have referred to certain provisions of LA Act, 1894, particularly with regard to determination of compensation and such other matters. The State enactments may have referred to certain provisions of LA Act, 1894, particularly with regard to determination of compensation and such other matters. Reference to LA Act, 1894 in the State enactments for certain purposes does not imply that the acquisition is initiated under LA Act, 1894. What is of prime importance for Section 24 of 2013 Act to apply is that acquisition proceedings must have been initiated under LA Act, 1894 and not any other law. Losing sight of this aspect would create confusion in the applicability of Section 24 of 2013 Act. If the said provision is to apply to acquisitions initiated under a State enactment, such as, BDA Act or KUDA Act, then Section 27 of the said Acts which also deal with lapse of acquisition under certain circumstances will be rendered nugatory, otiose or redundant on prevailing of circumstances mentioned in Section 24 of the 2013 Act. In this regard, it is also observed that when State Acts such as, BDA Act or KUDA Act, have specific provisions in the form of Section 27 concerning lapse of acquisition, Section 24 of the Parliamentary enactment i.e., 2013 Act, cannot be applied, when acquisitions are under State enactments. This is because, the State or Central Laws concerning acquisition are enacted under different entries and in different Lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and therefore, they operate in different fields. This is so, although, the State enactments may refer to the provisions of LA Act, 1894 for certain purposes. 46. At this stage itself, it may be observed that the issue as to whether LA Act, 1894 has been incorporated into BDA Act by the device of legislation by incorporation or legislation by reference is wholly foreign and outside the scope of controversy while considering the applicability of Section 24 to acquisition initiated under any law (whether State or Central), de hors LA Act, 1894. The arguments of learned counsel for the land owners – petitioners in Chikkathayamma’s case on the aforesaid aspect was unwarranted and wholly digressive from the issue to be considered in that case namely, whether Section 24 of 2013 Act was applicable to acquisitions initiated under any law other than LA Act, 1894, such as, BDA Act, KUDA Act. The arguments of learned counsel for the land owners – petitioners in Chikkathayamma’s case on the aforesaid aspect was unwarranted and wholly digressive from the issue to be considered in that case namely, whether Section 24 of 2013 Act was applicable to acquisitions initiated under any law other than LA Act, 1894, such as, BDA Act, KUDA Act. The dicta of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this regard after comparing the scheme of LA Act, 1894 and BDA Act, are binding and authoritative and the same cannot be brushed aside or ignored by not applying the same in appropriate cases, such as the present one. 47. Thus, 2013 Act has not only repealed the LA Act, 1894, but has substituted the said Act. The 2013 Act is a totally distinct enactment and a complete code by itself. Hence, for the aforesaid reasons, initiation of acquisition under State enactments such as BDA Act is not the same as initiation of acquisition under LA Act, 1894. 48. Further, it is noted that 2013 Act has, by virtue of Section 114 thereof, repealed LA Act, 1894. Section 114 reads as under: “114. Repeal and Saving: (1) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) is hereby repealed. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under subsection (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals.” Therefore, what is saved under Section 114 of 2013 Act are only those acts and actions initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, which ought to be saved having regard to the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, reads as under: “6. Effect of repeal. Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, reads as under: “6. Effect of repeal. Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not. (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.” However, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would apply only when a saving clause as per subsection 2 of Section 14 is not expressly provided under 2013 Act. Section 24 of the 2013 Act, which is in the nature of a saving clause has created new rights in favour of land owners whose lands had been acquired under LA Act, 1894. Subsection (1), lays down the conditions when the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894, would be amenable to the provisions of 2013 Act or, continued under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, on certain conditions or circumstances prevailing. Under subsection (2) of Section 24, the Parliament has, by a deeming provision, intended that if certain conditions are satisfied, the acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894, shall be deemed to have lapsed.” xxx xxx xxx “50. Therefore, for a declaration of lapse of acquisition, the preconditions or conditions precedent mentioned under subsection (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act must apply. Most importantly the said conditions must prevail in an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, and not with regard to acquisition initiated under any other enactment be it Central or State enactment. Most importantly the said conditions must prevail in an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, and not with regard to acquisition initiated under any other enactment be it Central or State enactment. Therefore, before land owners could seek relief under subsection (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act, which is a right created in their favour, the basic postulate that must be borne in mind is to ascertain, in the first instance, as to under which law, acquisition has been initiated; whether under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 or any other law. If it is under any other law, then in my view Section 24 would not be applicable to such acquisitions. The dicta of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Munithimmaiah, Bondu Ramaswamy, Offshore Holdings Private Limited clearly enunciate that an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act being distinct from an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, it cannot be held that acquisition process initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, would also encompass acquisition proceedings initiated under any other law such as, the BDA Act. As already noted, the two enactments being distinct having a different object and scope and acquisition of lands being only incidental to the main object and scope under the BDA Act, the acquisition proceedings initiated under the two Acts cannot be considered on par, so as to hold that land acquisition proceedings initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act is “land acquisition proceedings initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894.” 51. As already observed, Section 24 of the 2013 Act creates a new right in the land owners. For the exercise of said right, certain conditions have to exist, the most significant of them being, the initiation of proceedings for acquisition under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. Therefore, the said words must be given a natural interpretation and not an expansive or wide interpretation, so as to extend the right under Section 24 even in respect of land owners whose lands are subjected to acquisition under any State enactment, such as the BDA Act or KUDA Act. Therefore, the said words must be given a natural interpretation and not an expansive or wide interpretation, so as to extend the right under Section 24 even in respect of land owners whose lands are subjected to acquisition under any State enactment, such as the BDA Act or KUDA Act. In fact, the Parliament itself has been conscious of the fact that 2013 Act repeals and substitutes only LA Act, 1894, and not any other Central enactment or for that matter any other State enactment dealing with acquisition of lands. This is evident from Section 105 of the 2013 Act, which reads as under: “105. Provisions of this Act not to apply in certain cases or to apply with certain modifications: (1) Subject to subsection (3), the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule. (2) Subject to subsection (2) of Section 106, the Central Government may, by notification, omit or add to any of the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule. (3) The Central Government shall, by notification, within one year from the date of commencement of this Act, direct that any of the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement specified in the Second and Third Schedules, being beneficial to the affected families, shall apply to the cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule or shall apply with such exceptions or modifications that do not reduce the compensation or dilute the provisions of this Act relating to compensation or rehabilitation and resettlement as may be specified in the notification, as the case may be. (4) A copy of every notification proposed to be issued under subsection (3), shall be laid in draft before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in disapproving the issue of the notification or both Houses agree in making any modification in the notification, the notification shall not be issued or, as the case may be, shall be issued only in such modified form as may be agreed upon by both the Houses of Parliament.” The enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule referred to in subsection (1) of Section 105 consists of the following thirteen Parliamentary enactments, namely: “THE FOURTH SCHEDULE [See section 105] LIST OF ENACTMENTS REGULATING LAND ACQUISITION AND REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT 1. The Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 (24 of 1958). 2. The Atomic Energy Act, 1962 (33 of 1962). 3. The Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948 (14 of 1948). 4. The Indian Tramways Act, 1886 (11 of 1886). 5. The Land Acquisition (Mines) Act, 1885 (18 of 1885). 6. The Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act, 1978 (33 of 1978). 7. The National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956). 8. The Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 (50 of 1962). 9. The Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (30 of 1952). 10. The Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 (60 of 1948). 11. The Coal Bearing Areas Acquisition and Development Act, 1957 (20 of 1957). 12. The Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003). 13. The Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989).” 52. Therefore, Parliament itself has listed the Central enactments to which 2013 Act does not apply. This is because Parliament was conscious of the fact that LA Act, 1894 was substituted by the 2013 Act, which is distinct and different from the other Central enactments enumerated in the Fourth Schedule to the 2013 Act or State enactments. 53. Therefore, Parliament itself has listed the Central enactments to which 2013 Act does not apply. This is because Parliament was conscious of the fact that LA Act, 1894 was substituted by the 2013 Act, which is distinct and different from the other Central enactments enumerated in the Fourth Schedule to the 2013 Act or State enactments. 53. In the circumstances, it is concluded and held that Section 24 does not take within its scope nor does it apply to, acquisitions which have been initiated under the provisions of any other enactment particularly, State enactment, such as, BDA Act. The said Section is restricted to only those acquisitions which have been initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 only. Subject to compliance of the conditions mentioned under subsection (2) of Section 24, the land owner would be entitled to the deeming provision regarding lapse of acquisition and not otherwise. 54. In the result, Point No.(i) is answered by holding that petitioners are not entitled to relief under subsection (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, as the acquisitions in these cases were initiated under the provisions of the BDA Act and not under the LA Act, 1894. It is further held, with respect, that Chikkathayamma’s and other similar decisions, having regard to the dicta of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Munithimmaiah, Bondu Ramaswamy, Offshore Holdings Private Limited, are not applicable as binding precedent in the present case. Further, most of the decisions referred to above have granted relief on the basis of factual determination as per subsection 2 of Section 24 and without considering the question of law which arises in these cases. Further, in some cases, the petitioners have themselves not pressed subsection (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act. Even then, relief has been granted on a determination made on facts and by holding that there has been abandonment of acquisition/lapse of acquisition. 55. Hence, these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed, as the petitioners are not entitled to relief under subsection (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act as the said section does not apply to acquisition initiated under the provisions of BDA Act.” M.Somashekhar: 38. Further, in J.Venkatesh Reddy, learned Single Judge has placed reliance on another decision of this Court in M.Somashekhar. Further, in J.Venkatesh Reddy, learned Single Judge has placed reliance on another decision of this Court in M.Somashekhar. Therefore, it would be necessary to consider that case also, as reliance has been placed on the said decision by learned counsel for the petitioners. (a) In the aforesaid case, preliminary notification dated 06/02/2006 issued under Section 28(1) of KIAD Act was preceded by a declaration of industrial area made under Section 3(1) of the KIAD Act and followed by final notification dated 17/12/2007 issued by the State Government were assailed. Petitioner had sought for a declaration that the entire acquisition proceeding had lapsed as no compensation had been paid nor possession had been taken even after five years after the issuance of the said notifications by invoking Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. The principal question considered was, whether the provisions of 2013 Act were applicable to the lands of the petitioners where acquisition was initiated under the provisions of KIAD Act and if so, to what effect. In the said case, learned counsel for respondents therein contended that KIAD Act is a complete code in itself and the limitation prescribed under the LA Act, 1984 had no application to the acquisition under KIAD Act or for that matter BDA Act. That the statutory period prescribed under Section 6 of the LA, 1984 and Section 11A of the Central Act were not applicable to acquisition under KIAD Act or BDA Act. It was further contended that there was no repugnancy between the Central Act and the provisions of the KIAD Act even on the application of the doctrine of pith and substance. On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the petitioners that the provisions of LA Act, 1894 could not be applied for the purpose of payment of compensation with regard to acquisition initiated under the provisions of KIAD Act. That 2013 Act was applicable even to acquisition initiated under the provisions of KIAD Act. In the circumstances, petitioners had sought for a declaration that Section 24 of 2013 Act was applicable even to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of KIAD Act. (b) At paragraph Nos.19 to 29 of the said decision it has been held as under: “19. That 2013 Act was applicable even to acquisition initiated under the provisions of KIAD Act. In the circumstances, petitioners had sought for a declaration that Section 24 of 2013 Act was applicable even to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of KIAD Act. (b) At paragraph Nos.19 to 29 of the said decision it has been held as under: “19. In the background of the above, if the effect of provisions of Act 30 of 2013 (New Land Acquisition Act) particularly application of Section 24 of the said Act is examined, the inescapable conclusion would be that no matter whether the acquisition of the land was initiated under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act 1894 or under the provisions of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act 1966, for the purpose of payment of compensation, if the amended provisions of the New Land Acquisition Act are applicable, compensation has to be paid as per the said provisions. Otherwise, it will lead to discriminatory treatment resulting in violation of fundamental rights of the land looser under Article 14 of the Constitution. It is useful, at this stage, to refer to Section 24 of the New Land Acquisition Act. It reads as under: 24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. “(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), (a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holding has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 20. A careful perusal of Section 24(1) would show that if, as on the date the New Act came into force with effect from 1.1.2014 no Award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act has been made, then the provisions of the New Act relating to determination of compensation shall be applicable. But, where an Award has already been made, then the proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Old Act as if the Old Act had not been repealed. This sub section (1) of Section 24 has no application because it is stated in the Statement of Objection filed by respondent No.4 that Award was passed on 10.12.2008 and was approved by the Government on 16.11.2009. But, subsection (2) of Section 24 states that where an Award has been made under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, five years or more, prior to the commencement of the New Land Acquisition Act but physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid, the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government if it so chooses, shall initiate the said proceedings afresh in accordance with the provisions of the New Act. 21. The question is whether subsection 2 of Section 24 has any application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 21. The question is whether subsection 2 of Section 24 has any application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. As referred to in the preceding paragraphs by considering the ratio of the judgments of the Apex Court that for the purpose of determination and payment of compensation there cannot be any discrimination between one land owner whose lands are acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and another land owner whose lands are acquired under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act. 22. The New Land Acquisition Act insofar as it provides for right to fair compensation would be applicable even where the acquisition was under the State law namely Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act wherever the acquisition was incomplete in that Award was not passed or possession was not taken for five years or more from the date of passing of award. By virtue of Section 24(2) cases where acquisition had resulted in passing of the award five years or more prior to the commencement of the New Act but physical possession of the same had not been taken or compensation had not been paid the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. However, the State would be entitled to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the New Act. The scope, purpose and object of the provisions in the new Act including Section 24(2), if carefully considered, it cannot be equated to or restricted for the scope and object of Section 11A introduced by the Amending Act, Act 68/1984. 23. The purpose and intent behind this provision enacted by the Parliament in the new Act is to ensure that a person who has not been paid compensation for several years cannot be forced to part with his land for payment of compensation under the provisions of the Old Land Acquisition Act which provisions were regarded as insufficient and inadequate for ensuring payment of comprehensive fair compensation package for the land owners by adopting a scientific method for calculation of market value coupled with a comprehensive rehabilitation and resettlement package for land owners including subsistence allowance, jobs, houses, transportation allowance and resettlement allowance etc. This is evident from the many laudable objects contained in the statement of objects and reasons to the New Land Acquisition Act. This is evident from the many laudable objects contained in the statement of objects and reasons to the New Land Acquisition Act. If such benefit is available to a person whose land has been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and in whose favour though award had been passed under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, five years or more prior to the commencement of the New Land Acquisition Act but physical possession thereof had not been taken or compensation had not been paid, then denial of such benefit in favour of land owners whose lands had been acquired under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 would be violative of his right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, Section 24 of the new Act in essence deals with determination of compensation and payment thereof in respect of acquired lands prior to New Land Acquisition Act came into force. The effect of Sub Section 2 of Section 24 would be that cases where acquisition was initiated prior to new Land Acquisition Act came into force which had not been completed despite lapse of five years or more from the date of passing of Award by paying compensation or by taking physical possession of the land, the said proceedings cannot be continued under the Old Act because payment of compensation under the provisions of Old Act would be unrealistic, unfair and result in depriving the owners of their legitimate right for fair compensation guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution R/w Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, if the Government intends to acquire such land, it has to initiate fresh proceedings whereupon compensation shall be payable based on the market value of the land as on the date of publication of preliminary notification. This result will ensure no matter whether the acquisition proceedings had been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act or under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, as long as the intention behind the legislation is to provide just and fair compensation by introducing a deeming clause that old acquisition proceedings falling under sub section 2 of Section 24 of the New Land Acquisition Act stand lapsed. It is immaterial whether the Old Acquisition was under the Land Acquisition Act or under any of the provisions of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act because as per Section 29 and 30 of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of enquiry and award, reference to Court, apportionment of compensation and payment of compensation. 25. In Nagabhushan's case (AIR 2011 SC 2113) and in Girinar Traders' case (2011)3 SCC 1 ), the Apex Court has held that KIAD Act and the MRTP Act being self contained Codes, Section 11A which pertained to time frame of acquisition and the consequence of default thereof including lapse of acquisition proceedings was inapplicable for the acquisition under KIAD & MRTP Acts because reference to some of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act in KIAD & MRTP Act was for a limited purpose and could not be made use of to hamper the purpose and object of the local enactments. In addition, it has been held that the Central Act could not be treated as supplemental to the local enactments. 26. The scenario has completely changed in the light of enactment of new LA Act. Need for preparation of a social impact assessment report before publication of preliminary notification (Sections 4 to 9 of LA, 2013) exclusion of multi-cropped lands from acquisition (Section 10), provisions for preparation of Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme (Sections 16 to 18) award of 100% solatium, (Section 30) allotment of alternative land, one time subsistence allowance, special provisions for SC/STs, etc., have introduced sea change in the matter of acquisition of land for public purpose. 27. Even a perusal of Sections 107 & 108 of the New Act makes it clear that the State Legislatures are free to enact any law to provide enhanced or additional benefits to the land losers regarding higher compensation or better rehabilitation. This, further makes it clear that while better benefits under the local laws can be extended to the land losers, if the local laws do not provide for atleast minimum benefits as stipulated in the New Land Acquisition Act, 2013, then enforcing such provisions would certainly incur the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution, in so far as the land losers are concerned. 28. 28. Hence, it has to be stated that if the amendment made to the Land Acquisition Act by enacting a new legislation is not imported into the KIAD Act, it would render the KIAD Act wholly unworkable offending Article 14 especially in the context of the provisions under Section 24(2) of the Act of which we are now concerned. Therefore, the fact that the KIAD Act incorporates certain provisions of the LA Act regarding payment of compensation etc., and therefore, it is a legislation by incorporation does not make any difference in protecting the interest of the land losers in getting fair compensation and other benefits as provided in Section 24(2) of the Act. 29. When it comes to payment of compensation, it includes determination of compensation, the market value payable, the solatium, interest and other amounts as provided under the New Act and also necessarily includes payment of the same compensation to such of the old cases which fall under Section 24. No discrimination can be made with reference to the purpose of acquisition or the provisions of law under which the acquisition is made in the matter of extending the benefits regarding payment of compensation as the same will tantamount to discriminatory treatment violative of the rights of land owners under Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, provisions of Section 24 have to be held to be applicable even in case where the land is acquired under Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act.” J.Venkatesh Reddy: 39. Next it is necessary to discuss about the dictum of the learned single Judge of this Court in J.Venkatesh Reddy: (a) In that case, this Court was considering the applicability of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of KIAD Act. It is observed that LA Act, 1894 is a general law many State legislatures have enacted special laws for establishment and development of industries by having Industrial Areas or Industrial Corridor or Industrial facilities. Karnataka State Legislature has enacted the KIAD Act and the said Act has received assent of the President of India. Section 47 of the KIAD Act provides that the provisions of the KIAD Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained therein with any other law. Karnataka State Legislature has enacted the KIAD Act and the said Act has received assent of the President of India. Section 47 of the KIAD Act provides that the provisions of the KIAD Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained therein with any other law. (b) It was contended by the petitioners in the said case that 2013 Act, inter alia, provides for acquisition of lands for industrial areas and the provisions of the 2013 Act (Central Act) totally takes away the power of State Governments, hitherto exercised under the State Acts for acquisition of lands for industrial areas. Therefore, the provisions of KIAD Act are repugnant to 2013 Act or otherwise inoperative and the State Government is not competent to exercise power under the KIAD Act (State Act), for the purpose of establishing and acquiring land for industrial areas. It was further contended that Entry 42 ListIII (Concurrent List) of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution provides for acquisition and requisitioning of property. Therefore, the said Central enactment would prevail over the State enactment, having regard to Articles 246(2) and 254 of the Constitution. However, in the said case, the State, through Additional Government Advocate contended that doctrine of repugnancy under Article 254 would apply only where there is law enacted by the Parliament and law enacted by a Legislature of a State in respect of one of the subjects enumerated under the Concurrent List. It was contended that Article 254(2) applies only where two enactments in question substantially, and in pith and substance, cover the very same field in the Concurrent List. That the 2013 Act has repealed and substituted LA Act, 1894 which provided for acquisition for public purposes. The said enactment is traceable to Entry 42 ListIII of Seventh Schedule of Constitution pertaining to “acquisition and requisitioning of property”. But KIAD Act, 1966 is an enactment of the Karnataka Legislature with the object of enhancing industrial development in the State and the said enactment is traceable to “Industries” under Entry 24 ListII of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. (c) Attention was drawn to the statement of objects and reasons of the KAID Act which reads as under: “It is considered necessary to make provision for the orderly establishment and development of Industries in suitable areas in the State. (c) Attention was drawn to the statement of objects and reasons of the KAID Act which reads as under: “It is considered necessary to make provision for the orderly establishment and development of Industries in suitable areas in the State. To achieve this object, it is proposed to specify suitable areas for Industrial Development and establish a Board to develop such areas and make available lands therein for establishment of Industries.” Reference was also made to the Preamble of KIAD Act and it was contended that the Act in pith and substance it is a legislation enacted for the primary purpose of industrial development and hence is traceable to the legislative field, “Industries” under Entry 24 ListII of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Ramtanu Cooperative Housing Society Limited and Offshore Holdings Private Limited. Also, reference was made to Hanumanrao Morbaji Gudadhe vs. State of Maharashtra [ 2015(6) Mh.L.J. 127 ], wherein the applicability of 2013 Act to the Maharashtra Regional and Town Country Planning Act, 1966 was considered and it was contended by the State that the two enactments are different and operate in different fields. That while 2013 Act is a general and broad legislation exclusively regulating land acquisition for public purposes, the KIAD Act is a self contained Code enacted primarily for the purposes of industrial development and competency and source of power of enactment could be traced to different entries in different Lists. Therefore, placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.Karunanidhi Vs. Union of India & another, reported in (1979)3 SCC 431 , learned Additional Advocate General for the State contended that issue of repugnancy between two enactments would not arise. (d) Further, Additional Advocate General delineated on the Scheme of KIAD Act and compared it with the Scheme of 2013 Act and submitted that KIAD Act is enacted for industrial development which incidentally touches upon the subject of land acquisition but the same is not its dominant intention. Therefore, KIAD Act is not repugnant to 2013 Act. Thus the State contended that Section 24 of 2013 Act is not applicable to acquisition proceedings commenced under the KIAD Act. Therefore, KIAD Act is not repugnant to 2013 Act. Thus the State contended that Section 24 of 2013 Act is not applicable to acquisition proceedings commenced under the KIAD Act. (e) On the aforesaid submissions, this Court raised the following points for his consideration: Points for consideration: (i) Whether Section 3(1) and Sections 28 to 31 of the KIAD Act are repugnant to the provisions of the 2013 Act. (ii) Whether Section 24 of the 2013 Act is applicable to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act. (iii) Whether there could be a deemed divesting of the acquired land in terms of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, which provides for a lapsing of the acquisition proceedings if the conditions specified therein are satisfied, notwithstanding the deemed vesting of the land in terms of Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act. (iv) Whether the decision of the Apex Court in The Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB, Mysore vs. Anasuya Bai, would entail dismissal of these petitions. (Incidentally, after these petitions were heard and reserved for Orders, the Apex Court having rendered the above decision it is necessary to address this issue).” (f) While discussing Point No.(iv) and despite making detailed reference to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anasuya Bai to the effect that Section 24(2) of 2013 Act is not applicable to acquisition initiated under the provisions of KIAD Act, learned single Judge, nevertheless, held that since some of the provisions of KIAD Act were in challenge in some of the petitions, it could not be said that the petitions had become infructuous. However, learned Single Judge has expressly noticed that Section 24(2) of 2013 Act does not apply to acquisition initiated under the provisions of KIAD Act. But while answering point No.(i), learned Single Judge has held that with effect from 01/01/2014, with the coming into force of the 2013 Act, compulsory acquisition of land anywhere in the country could only be in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. But while answering point No.(i), learned Single Judge has held that with effect from 01/01/2014, with the coming into force of the 2013 Act, compulsory acquisition of land anywhere in the country could only be in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. While answering the question as to whether Section 24 of 2013 Act is applicable to acquisition initiated under the provisions of KIAD Act, learned Single Judge held as under: “The contention that Section 24(2) of 2013 Act specifically refers to the acquisition initiated under the 1894 Act and therefore is inapplicable to the acquisition initiated under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act is erroneous. Section 24 of 2013 Act should not be read in isolation, but should be read in conjunction with Section 30 of the KIAD Act. Section 103 of the 2013 Act advances the contention of the petitioner to the effect that the provisions of 2013 Act have to be read in conjunction with the provisions of the KIAD Act.” “Further, Section 114 (1) of the 2013 Act repeals the 1894 Act with effect from 1-1-2014. Section 30 is now to be read as referring to the 2013 Act. It is noticed that in Offshore Holdings (Private) Limited vs. Bangalore Development Authority (supra), the Supreme Court, when confronted with the question of whether Section 11A of the 1894 Act (introduced by an amendment in 1984) would automatically apply to land acquisitions under the Bangalore Development Authority Act, had held Section 36 therein (a provision akin to Section 30 of the KIAD Act) to be a case of “legislation by incorporation”. That finding of the Apex Court, with all due respect to the Apex Court, will have no applicability in determining the applicability of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act in terms of Section 30 of the KIAD Act, in the backdrop of the wholesale repeal of the 1894 Act and its replacement with the 2013 Act. The construction which advances a harmonious gel between various statutes within the Constitutional mandate has to be preferred by the Court. The construction therefore which harmoniously brings together Section 24 of the 2013 Act and Section 30 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 has to be preferred to a construction which brings Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act in conflict with Section 30 of the KIAD Act, 1966. The construction therefore which harmoniously brings together Section 24 of the 2013 Act and Section 30 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 has to be preferred to a construction which brings Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act in conflict with Section 30 of the KIAD Act, 1966. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is applicable to acquisition proceedings under the KIAD Act.” 40. At this stage itself, it may be observed that the judgment in M.Somashekhar was rendered on 15/12/2016 which was prior to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anasuya Bai which was rendered on 25/01/2017. Having regard to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anasuya Bai, the judgment in M.Somashekhar is with respect, no longer good law in the context of applicability of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of KIAD Act. Further, in M.Somashekhar reliance has also been placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Chikkathayamma. However, in view of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on Section 24(2) of 2013 Act in the case of Anasuya Bai and this Court in M/S. Evershine Monuments, the decision in Chikkathayamma is no longer a judicial precedent as the latter decision which is rendered under BDA Act does not take note of the judicial dicta of Hon’ble Supreme Court on the scheme and provisions of BDA Act being distinct from the provisions of LA Act, 1894. Therefore, it is deduced that the decision in J.Venkatesh Reddy following the decision in M.Somashekhar as well as Chikkathayamma is no longer good law. 41. Further, in M/S. Evershine Monuments, it has been observed on a detailed analysis of Section 24 of 2013 Act, in light of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Manav Dharam Trust and Sukhbir Singh as well as the aforesaid decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered under the provisions of the BDA Act and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anasuya Bai rendered under the provisions of KIAD Act, that Section 24(2) would not be applicable either to BDA Act or KIAD Act. Therefore, the decision in J.Venkatesh Reddy also is no longer good law in view of the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anasuya Bai, so also the dictum of this Court in M.Somashekhar, which are in respect of KIAD Act. 42. Further, the answer given to point No.(iii) in J.Venkatesh Reddy to the effect that on the lapse of acquisition by virtue of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act, there is deemed divesting of the acquired land in favour of the land owners is also not a correct conclusion arrived at. Merely because Anasuya Bai’s case did not involve a challenge to the constitutional validity of the provisions of the KIAD Act and in J.Venkatesh Reddy there was such a challenge, in my humble opinion, is of no relevance to a consideration of the question as to whether Section 24(2) of 2013 Act is applicable to an acquisition initiated only under the provisions of 1894 Act or it encompasses other Acts such as KIAD Act, which is a State enactment. 43. Therefore, the acquisition in these writ petitions having been initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act, it cannot be held that the said acquisition has been initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. More significantly, the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anasuya Bai’s case is directly on the point of inapplicability of subsection (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the Act in question, which has been ignored in J.Venkatesh Reddy while expressing a contra opinion. 44. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, it is held that the petitioners are not entitled to any declaration on the premise that the award has not been passed within the period of two years as stipulated under Section 11A of L.A. Act, 1894 and therefore, the acquisition has lapsed. Also, no declaration of lapse of acquisition under Section 6 of LA Act, 1894 can be given to the petitioners in the instant case. Further, no declaration under subsection (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act, on the premise that the award of compensation not having been made and physical possession not having been taken, there is deemed lapse of acquisition cannot also be granted in the instant case. 45. In the result, the writ petitions are dismissed. Interim order granted by this Court on 09/02/2015 stands vacated. 45. In the result, the writ petitions are dismissed. Interim order granted by this Court on 09/02/2015 stands vacated. Parties to bear their respective costs.” Having regard to the aforesaid decision, it is held that the petitioners herein are not entitled to any declaration on the premise that although the award has been passed, there has been no payment or deposit of compensation and hence, the acquisition has lapsed. Accordingly, Point No.2 is answered against the petitioners and in favour of respondents. 25. Another aspect of the case must be emphasized. The reason as to why there has been no payment or non-deposit of compensation by the respondent – authorities, is on account of the repeated litigations being filed by the petitioners herein which have been narrated in detail above. At every stage, as to when the writ petitions, writ appeals, S.L.Ps, review petitions were filed either before this Court or before the Apex Court, interim orders were sought by the petitioners and were granted by the Courts. The interim orders were in the nature of status quo or stay of dispossession or of like nature. Hence, the respondents/authorities neither proceeded to pay compensation to the petitioners nor deposited it before the Reference Court. There was always an uncertainty about what the decision in the cases and possibly the respondents were of the view that in the event petitioners were successful in getting the acquisition quashed, it would be difficult for them to recover compensation from the land owners if the same is already paid to them. Hence, as a matter of precaution, compensation though determined was not paid to the petitioners nor deposited before the Court. Significantly, petitioners also did not claim compensation, quite naturally, as they were agitating the matter before this Court as well as before the Hon’ble Supreme Court questioning the very acquisition of the lands in question. Therefore, today, the petitioners cannot condemn the respondents on account of they not paying the compensation to the petitioners nor in depositing the amount before the Reference Court. After all, funds from the public exchequer, was not paid to the petitioners in view of the uncertainty created by the petitioners herein in assailing the very acquisition of the land in question. The payment of compensation was not made to the petitioners respecting the interim orders passed by this Court and also, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. After all, funds from the public exchequer, was not paid to the petitioners in view of the uncertainty created by the petitioners herein in assailing the very acquisition of the land in question. The payment of compensation was not made to the petitioners respecting the interim orders passed by this Court and also, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, there is no fault on the part of the respondents for not paying the compensation to the petitioners nor depositing it before the Reference Court. 26. It may also be emphasized that even after the Supreme Court dismissed the S.L.Ps, the petitioners filed R.P.No.1403/2014, assailing the Division Bench Order. The said revision petition was itself not maintainable as once the Apex Court dismissed the S.L.Ps. challenging an order of the Division Bench, the said order could not have been challenged before the Division Bench of this Court by filing the review petition passed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. After the dismissal of the S.L.Ps, review petition was filed and possibly, even a curative petition and after being unsuccessful taking shelter under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, the present writ petition has been filed. This is one more attempt made by the petitioners to some how stall the conclusion of the acquisition proceedings. 27. In the circumstances, the writ petitions are dismissed, but without any order as to costs.