JUDGMENT : B.N. Karia, J. 1. The present appellant, who was the original plaintiff in Regular Civil Suit No. 177 of 2013 before the trial court and appellant in Regular Civil Appeal No. 124 of 2017 before the first Appellate Court, has challenged the impugned judgment and order passed by the trial court as well as the first Appellate Court dated 7th July, 2017 and 13th March, 2019 respectively dismissing the suit as well as appeal preferred by him, in the present appeal. 2. This appeal was placed at admission stage, considering the facts that concurrent findings was arrived at by the learned trial court as well as first Appellate Court and only two issues were raised by the appellant mainly in respect of prior permission not obtained by the respondents/defendants under Section 51 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 from the Charity Commissioner for filing cross objection/counter claim before the trial court and the issue of adverse possession not properly considered by the trial court, this appeal is taken up for final hearing. 3. Short facts of the present case may be referred as under: 3.1. In the suit preferred by the plaintiff i.e. Regular Civil Suit No. 177 of 2013, it was alleged that the suit premises was situated in the city of Anand, consisting of one big room, kitchen, toilet, and bathroom of the ownership of the defendants. Since the childhood, the plaintiff was staying in the suit premises as he was adopted by the defendants as an orphan. Since the acceptance of the plaintiff by the defendants, the physical possession of the suit premises was handed over to him within the knowledge of the defendant and trustees of the defendant. Nobody had made any disturbance in the possession of the plaintiff since last 25 years or more. It was clarified that he was not tenant of the suit premises. That, two letters were written by the plaintiff through his advocate to the managers of the defendant No. 1. That, notice issued by the Anand Municipality in the year of 1999 in respect of house taxes of the suit premises was forwarded to the plaintiff with an instruction to pay the house taxes. It was relied by the plaintiff that owner of the suit premises was LP. That, notice issued by the Anand Municipality in the year of 1999 in respect of house taxes of the suit premises was forwarded to the plaintiff with an instruction to pay the house taxes. It was relied by the plaintiff that owner of the suit premises was LP. Mission Trust and the plaintiff was permitted to stay as a permissive user, and therefore, liability to pay the house taxes would be of the owner and not of the plaintiff as he was not owner of the suit premises. Thereafter, from 1999 to 2013, the house taxes of the suit premises was paid by the defendants. Thereafter in 2013 again, notice for the same purpose was forwarded to the plaintiff. The plaintiff replied through his advocate on 7th January, 2013. No response was received from the respondent side. That, on 10th May, 1999, the trustees of the defendant passed a resolution to allot the houses to the beneficiaries of Christian community staying in surrounding area of old D.S.P. Office, the Resolution was to be complied with by the defendants, but they failed to comply the aforesaid Resolution. That, plaintiff was in vacant and peaceful possession since last 25 years, and by way of adverse possession, he was the owner of the suit premises, and therefore, the suit was filed by him with a prayer to declare him as an owner by way of adverse possession of the suit premises and direct the defendants to comply with the Resolution passed on 10th May, 1999 transferring the suit premises in favour of the plaintiff and consequential reliefs. 3.2. On receiving summons issued by the court, the defendants appeared and filed their written statement as well as counterclaim vide Exhibit 10 denying all the contents raised in the suit. As per their contents, suit itself was not tenable at law and plaintiff has got no right to file the suit. They further contended that the suit premises was given to the plaintiff for using it as a licensee and plaintiff was trying to transfer the suit premises on his name as owner. That, they do not want to continue the plaintiff in the suit premises as a licensee, and therefore, it was revoked. In the counter claim, they prayed that plaintiff should vacate the suit premises and pay Rs. 1,500/- per month towards mesne profit. 3.3. That, they do not want to continue the plaintiff in the suit premises as a licensee, and therefore, it was revoked. In the counter claim, they prayed that plaintiff should vacate the suit premises and pay Rs. 1,500/- per month towards mesne profit. 3.3. The learned trial Judge, considering the pleadings of the parties, framed the issues vide Exhibit 39 for determination of the suit and counter suit. 3.4. After recording the evidence of the parties, the suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed with costs and counterclaim of the defendants was allowed with costs, by an order dated 7th July, 2013, directing the plaintiff to vacate the suit premises within a period of two months from passing of the order. Further direction was issued to the plaintiff to pay mesne profit of Rs. 1,500/- per month from 28th October, 2013 till the day of actual vacant possession is handed over. 3.5. Being dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the trial court, the plaintiff approached learned District Court by filing an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3.6. The learned lower Appellate Court, after hearing the parties, was pleased to dismiss the appeal vide its judgment and order dated 13th March, 2019. Hence, this appeal. 4. Heard Mr. Maulik M. Soni, learned counsel for the appellant. 5. It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that trial court has committed serious error of law as well as of facts in not considering the principles relating to possession become adverse to the defendants. It was further argued that before filing the counter-claim by the defendants, no permission of the Charity Commissioner under Section 51 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 was obtained by the defendants, which was mandatory. That, both the courts have committed substantial error in not accepting the prayer for rejecting the counterclaim made by the defendants. Hence, it was requested by learned counsel for the appellant to admit the appeal and quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the courts below. 6. Having perused the record, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, and from the averments made by the plaintiff, it is undisputed that the plaintiff was an orphan of the defendant institution and was permitted to stay in the suit premises owned by the defendant. 6. Having perused the record, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, and from the averments made by the plaintiff, it is undisputed that the plaintiff was an orphan of the defendant institution and was permitted to stay in the suit premises owned by the defendant. He has also admitted that he was not claiming any tenancy rights over the suit property. He has not paid any house taxes of the suit premises with the Anand Municipality where the suit property is situated. If we refer the cross-examination of the plaintiff - Exhibit 26, he has admitted that defendant No. 1 was the owner of the suit property and he has done nothing about getting permission to transfer this property. He has further admitted that the other trustees of the defendant were not joined as parties. Nothing has been shown and proved by the plaintiff that defendant has ignored the possession of the plaintiff of the suit property, but in fact from the beginning the defendants have demanded the suit property got vacant from the plaintiff and it was denied by him. The learned trial Judge has referred the judgments of the Bombay High Court and has rightly came to the conclusion that possession of the suit property can only said to be a gratuitous licensee and not by adverse possession. The issue of Resolution passed by the Trust in the meeting dated 10th May, 1999 was completely based on a different factual aspect. The plaintiff himself has admitted in his cross-examination that the Resolution was bearing different properties rather than the suit property. Otherwise the plaintiff cannot claim as of right to be an owner of the suit premises or to declare him as an owner as prayed for. 7. Section 51 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 provides as under:- "51.(1) If the persons having an interest in any public trust intend to file a suit of the nature specified in section 50, they shall apply to the Charity Commissioner in writing for his consent. The Charity Commissioner, after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as he thinks fit, may within a period of six months from the date on which the application is made, grant or refuse his consent to the institution of such suit. The Charity Commissioner, after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as he thinks fit, may within a period of six months from the date on which the application is made, grant or refuse his consent to the institution of such suit. The order of the Charity Commissioner refusing his consent shall be in writing and shall state the reasons for the refusal. (2) If the Charity Commissioner refuses his consent to the institution of the suit under sub-section (1) the persons applying for such consent may file an appeal to the Bombay Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1939, in the manner provided by this Act. (3) In every suit filed by persons having interest in any trust under section 50, the Charity Commissioner shall be a necessary party. (4) Subject to the decision of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal in appeal under section 71, the decision of the Charity Commissioner under sub-section (1) shall be final and conclusive." 8. Here, the defendants have not filed any suit against the plaintiff. They have filed counterclaim against the plaintiff praying for vacant possession of the suit premises. Section 51 of the Act would not applicable in the facts of the present case as the counterclaim is certainly permissible in the suit preferred by the plaintiff as per Order VIII, Rules 6A to 6B of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The issue of getting prior sanction under Section 51 of the Act by the defendants was never raised before the trial court by the plaintiff nor any evidence was produced by him as well as the arguments. The High Court, in the second appeal, cannot consider the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant in absence of any pleadings and issue. The scope of interference by the High Court in second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure after 1976 amendment has been drastically changed and is strictly confined to cases involving substantial questions of law. The legislative intention has been clearly spell out in series of cases of Hon'ble Supreme Court. The High Court would not be justified in dealing with any second appeal in absence of any substantial question of law. 9. The legislative intention has been clearly spell out in series of cases of Hon'ble Supreme Court. The High Court would not be justified in dealing with any second appeal in absence of any substantial question of law. 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria (Dead) through L.Rs., reported in (2012) 5 SCC 370 : ( AIR 2012 SC 1727 ) in para 101 has crystallized principles of law which emerges from the facts of the case as under:- "101 Principles of law which emerge in this case are crystallized as under: 1. No one acquires title to the property if he or she was allowed to stay in the premises gratuitously. Even by long possession of years or decades such person would not acquire any right or interest in the said property. 2. Caretaker, watchman or servant can never acquire interest in the property irrespective of his long possession. The caretaker or servant has to give possession forthwith on demand. 3. The Courts are not justified in protecting the possession of a caretaker, servant or any person who was allowed to live in the premises for some time either as a friend, relative, caretaker or as a servant. 4. The protection of the Court can only be granted or extended to the person who has valid, subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or license agreement in his favour. 5. The caretaker or agent holds property of the principal only on behalf of the principal. He acquires no right or interest whatsoever for himself in such property irrespective of his long stay or possession." 10. Here, admittedly the plaintiff was an orphan and since his childhood he was permitted by defendant institution to live in the suit premises. He cannot create any dispute by claiming any ownership of the suit premises as he has not acquired any title. Long possession even of any years or decades could not acquire any rights or interest in the suit premises by the plaintiff. An orphan can never acquire any interest in the property irrespective of his long possession. Such a possession, being an orphan, who was allowed to live in the premises for some time cannot be protected by the court of law. An orphan can never acquire any interest in the property irrespective of his long possession. Such a possession, being an orphan, who was allowed to live in the premises for some time cannot be protected by the court of law. Such a protection can only be granted or extended to the person who has valid, subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or license agreement in his favour. The plaintiff has acquired no right or interest whatsoever in suit property irrespective of his long stay and possession. 11. In view of the matter, the impugned judgment and order passed by the trial court as well as Appellate Court cannot be disturbed. Consequently, this Court directs that the appellant shall hand over the vacant possession and mesne profit of the suit premises to the defendant who is admittedly the owner of the suit property. 12. This Court finds no substantial question of law in this appeal. As a result, this appeal of the appellant fails and stands dismissed. ORDER IN CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) No. 1 of 2019 IN R/SECOND APPEAL NO. 176 OF 2019:- As the appeal is decided on merits and dismissed, the present civil application would not survive and stands disposed of accordingly.