JUDGMENT : G. Narendar, J. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Additional Government Advocate. 2. Office has raised objections regarding the maintainability of the writ petitions. The petitioners are before this Court seeking for issuance of writ of certiorari or any other writ or order to quash the notification dated 05.04.2016 issued by the 1st respondent vide Annexure-C to the writ petitions and for a further direction to regularize the services of the petitioners in the said post by relaxing the age criteria and giving weightage to the previous services rendered by them for appointment. 3. The 1st respondent is the Managing Director and Chairman of Gulbarga Electricity Supply Company Limited, Station Road, Kalaburgi, District Kalaburgi. As the 1st respondent is having its registered office in Kalaburgi, within the jurisdiction of the permanent bench at Kalaburgi, hence office has raised objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petitions before the Bench at Dharwad. 4. Originally the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court having its seat at Bangalore extended over the entire state of Karnataka. In 2004, a notification came to be issued for establishment of circuit Benches having their seat at Kalaburgi and at Dharwad. Thereafter, by resolution of the Full Court dated 03.02.2008, sitting of judges and Divisional Courts at Kalaburgi and Dharwad came to be commenced in the year 2008. The Full Court also fixed the territorial jurisdiction of the two circuit benches and matters arising within the districts of Bagalkot, Bellary, Belagavi, Dharwad, Gadag, Haveri, Uttar Kannada (Karwar) and Koppal was resolved to be heard and decided by the circuit Bench at Dharwad and similarly cases arising from the districts of Bidar, Bijapur, Gulburga and Raichur were to be heard and decided by the Bench at Kalaburgi. Subsequently, in the year 2013, vide notification issued by the Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Justice, dated 14.08.2013, the High Court of Karnataka (Establishment of Permanent Benches at Dharwad and Gulburga), Order 2013, the circuit benches came to be established as permanent benches of the High Court of Karnataka and the territorial jurisdiction of the respective benches continued as settled earlier by the Full Court resolution. 5. In the instant case, the petitioners are canvassing a general right praying for a common relief of regularization of their services. 6. 5. In the instant case, the petitioners are canvassing a general right praying for a common relief of regularization of their services. 6. It is claimed that they came to be appointed as junior station operators and helpers by the out sourced agencies and are not employees of the 1st respondent company. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the 1st respondent company has its registered office at Kalaburgi but some operations extends up to Koppal district, which falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the Dharwad Bench, but the registered office of the respondent is at Kalaburgi. The relief sought for is against the 1st respondent, who has its registered office at Kalaburgi. 7. It is fairly admitted by the learned counsels that the company has out sourced such similar work in respect of other districts also, which fall within the territorial jurisdiction of the Kalaburgi Bench. It is not in dispute that similarly placed persons, who are employed within the territorial jurisdiction of the Kalaburgi may also aspire for similar relief. In such an eventuality, it is but natural that the persons who are working under the outsourced agencies within the territorial jurisdiction of Kalaburgi Bench would have no option but to necessarily approach the Kalaburgi Bench only. In the event of this Court entertaining the writ petitions and passing orders, either upholding the contentions or negativing in contentions, it is not in dispute that the intra-court appeal would have to be heard by this Bench only. Similarly, any orders that may be passed in similar matters by the Bench at Kalaburgi in intra-court appeal would necessarily have to be preferred before the said Bench. In case of such an eventuality and if the learned judges either single judges or the Division Bench adopt a opposite stand or render divergent opinion, it could only lead to a serious stalemate leading to the writs and orders being issued by this Court render futile and leading to legal entanglements resulting in the delay of adjudication of the actual dispute that has arisen in the petition and leaving the parties to negotiate the legal niceties and complexities arising out of such a situation. It is also not in dispute that if the relief is granted and the parties are regularized, it is always open for the respondent to post them elsewhere and it is also an admitted fact that they are not employees of the respondent company but are seeking relief against the respondent on account of they being residents of a district which comes within the territorial ambit of this Bench. But the relief is sought against a company which has its registered office beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this Bench. Further, the enforcement of writ would be in respect of entity, which has its registered office outside the territories of this Bench. That apart, the petitioners who have approached this Bench could yet again approach the Kalaburgi Bench concealing the fact of they having approached this Bench. 8. In this regard, this Court is of the opinion that the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ambica Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2007) 6 SCC 769 is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. The Hon'ble Apex Court, at para No.25, 26, 27, 31, 32 and 38 was pleased to observe as follows:- 25. Yet again in Suraj Woolen Mills Vs. Collector of Customs, (2000) 123 ELT 471 (Del), Lahoti, J. as the learned Chief Justice of India then was, noticed the aforementioned decision as also other decisions operating in the field and held (ELT p.477, paras 10-13) "10. The Division Bench decision in the case of Seth Banarsi Dass Gupta has been followed by another Division Bench in Birla Cotton, Spg. & WVG Mills Ltd Vs. CIT, 1980 123 ITR 354. The assessee carried on business in Jaipur. It had its registered office in Delhi. The assessment orders were passed by ITO at Jaipur and appeals were disposed by the AAC at Jaipur. The matter came up before the Tribunal at Delhi and was heard by the Central Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal as there was no Tribunal at Jaipur. The Division Bench held that the court to which reference should be made would be the court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the office of the ITO was situated. 11. Recently the same principle has been followed by this Court in Suresh Desai & Associates Vs. CIT, (1998) 230 ITR 912 . The Division Bench held that the court to which reference should be made would be the court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the office of the ITO was situated. 11. Recently the same principle has been followed by this Court in Suresh Desai & Associates Vs. CIT, (1998) 230 ITR 912 . In this judgment, the Division Bench has assigned yet another reason why the High Court of that State wherefrom the matter arises would only be competent to hear the reference. A decision of one High Court is a binding authority within its territorial jurisdiction; but it is not a binding precedent for another High Court or Tribunal outside its territorial jurisdiction. The Division Bench has held as under : "On account of the abovesaid doctrine of precedents and the rule of binding efficacy of the law laid down by the High Court within its territorial jurisdiction, the questions of law arising for decision in a reference should be determined by the High Court which exercises territorial jurisdiction over the situs of the Assessing Officer. Else it would result in serious anomalies. An assessee affected by an assessment order at Bombay may invoke the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court to take advantage of the law laid down by it and suited to him and thus get rid of the law laid down to the contrary by the High Court of Bombay not suited to the assessee. This cannot be allowed." 12. Having made a careful comparative reading of the provisions of the Income-tax Act and the Customs Act, as also the relevant rules and orders of the Tribunal we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the principles laid down in the abovesaid three Division Bench decisions of Delhi High Court can be applied and do apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 13. The present case arises out of the State of Bombay. The petitioner may have its factory establishment at Panipat in the State of Haryana but that is irrelevant. The adjudicating authority is at Bombay. Obviously it is bound by the law laid down under the provisions of the Customs Act or any other law as interpreted by the High Court of Bombay. The petitioner may have its factory establishment at Panipat in the State of Haryana but that is irrelevant. The adjudicating authority is at Bombay. Obviously it is bound by the law laid down under the provisions of the Customs Act or any other law as interpreted by the High Court of Bombay. For the purpose of the case at hand, the petitioner must be held bound by the law as applicable and as prevailing in the State of Maharashtra whereat the goods were to be imported and whereat the proceedings under the Act were concluded. In the case at hand if the CEGAT would have stated the case then the reference would have been made to the High Court of Bombay and in the event of the application for statement of case having been refused it is the High Court of Bombay which the petitioner should have approached for issuing a requisition to the Tribunal to state the case." 26. In Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi Vs. Enkay HWS India Ltd, (2002) 139 ELT 21, Arijit Pasayat & D.K. Jain, JJ. in a case arising under section 35H of the Central Excise Act opined :- "2. When the matter was placed for admission, we pointed out to learned counsel for the petitioner that this High Court does not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter, in view of the decision of this Court in Seth Banarsi Dass Gupta v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), (1978) 113 ITR 817 . In the said case, while dealing with the scope of entertaining reference under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short, 'the I.T Act'), it was observed that this High Court, that the State within whose territorial jurisdiction original adjudicating authority functions would have jurisdiction to deal with the reference under the concerned Statute. The view was again reiterated in Suresh Desai and Associates v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1998) 71 DLT 772 . That was also a case under Section 256 (2) of the I.T. Act. In a petition for reference arising under the Act in Central Excise Case No.5 of 1997 (Commissioner of Central Excise v. Technological Institute of Textile decided on 9-11-1998, it was held that the High Court within whose jurisdiction adjudicating authority functions would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the matter. In a petition for reference arising under the Act in Central Excise Case No.5 of 1997 (Commissioner of Central Excise v. Technological Institute of Textile decided on 9-11-1998, it was held that the High Court within whose jurisdiction adjudicating authority functions would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the matter. We have also expressed similar view in Central Excise Act Case No. 7 of 2000 disposed of on 30-10-2000 taking note of decision of the Apex Court in Stridewell Leather (P) Ltd. v. Bhankerpur Simbhaoli Beverages (P) Ltd, (1994) AIR SC 158, while dealing with the scope of expression "the High Court" under Section 10F of the Companies Act, 1956 (in short, the Companies Act'). 3. We find no substance in the plea of learned counsel for petitioner that site of the Commissionerate or appellate authority determines the jurisdiction in view of what has been stated in the aforesaid decision." 27. The said decisions were followed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Bombay Snuff (supra) to hold:- "6. The only difference in the legal position that existed at the time the above decision was rendered and the position that prevails today is that instead of the law envisaging a reference from the Tribunal to the High Court, the law now provides for an appeal from every order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. That difference does not however affect the reasoning underlying the view taken by this Court in regard to its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Section 35G. If a petition seeking reference under Section 35G was not maintainable in this court, there is no reason why an appeal under the said provision after its amendment can be said to be so maintainable. On the reasoning adopted by this court in Technological Institute of Textile's case (supra), an appeal under Section 35G must also be filed only in the High Court who has jurisdiction over the authority from whose order the proceedings have originated. The fact that the main seat of the CESTAT is situated in Delhi or that the appeal was heard and decided at Delhi would not mean that all appeals arising from cases so decided regardless from which State the case has originated can be maintained in this court." 28. xxxx 29. xxxx 30. xxxx 31. The learned Solicitor General relies upon the decision in Stridewell Leathers (P) Ltd. & Ors. Vs. xxxx 29. xxxx 30. xxxx 31. The learned Solicitor General relies upon the decision in Stridewell Leathers (P) Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Bhankerpur Simbhaoli Beverages (P) Ltd, (1994) 1 SCC 34 wherein construing Section 10A vis-a-vis Section 10F of Companies Act, 1956, it was held that the High Court would mean the High Court having jurisdiction in relation to a place at which the registered office of the Company concerned is situated as indicated in Section 2(11) read with Section 1A thereof. 32. We are, however, of the view that in terms of the Companies Act, "the High Court" was clearly intended to specify the particular High Court identified by Section 10F itself, and therefore, it was held not to be a High Court indicated by the place at which Company Law Board passes the order under appeal. 33. xxxx 34. xxxx 35. xxxx 36. xxxx 37. xxxx 38. We have noticed hereinbefore that if the decision of the High Court in the aforementioned question is taken to its logical conclusion, the same would lead to a great anomaly. It would also give rise to the problem of forum shopping. We may notice some examples to show that the determination of the appellate forum based upon the situs of the Tribunal would lead to an anomalous result. For example, an assessee affected by an assessment order in Bombay may invoke the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court to take advantage of the law laid down by it which may be contrary to judgments of the High Court of Bombay. This cannot be allowed. [See Suresh Desai and Associates V. CIT, (1998) 230 ITR 912 at pp.915-917 and CCE V. M/s. Technological Institute of Textile, (1998) 76 DLT 862 (DB). 9. In the opinion of this Court, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. There can be no denial of the fact that the registered office of the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the Kalaburgi Bench. 9. In the opinion of this Court, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. There can be no denial of the fact that the registered office of the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the Kalaburgi Bench. There can be also no denial of the fact that the writ issued by this Court would have to be implemented by the 1st respondent having its seat within the territory of the Kalaburgi Bench and also in view of the anomalous situation that may arise and as perceived by this Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the office objections require to be upheld. The registry is directed to transmit the papers of writ petitions to the Kalaburgi Bench. 10. Writ petitions are disposed off for statistical purpose.