JUDGMENT : Petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P14 order dated 03.05.2019 of the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions in Appeal No.153/2018. 2. The grievance of the petitioner is against the 3rd respondent, who is allegedly undertaking unauthorised constructions in his property, which is adjacent to the petitioner's property. The petitioner would contend that the said construction is in violation of the provisions of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 as also the provisions under the Kerala Municipality Building Rules, 1999. The 2nd respondent, who is the Secretary of the 1st respondent Corporation issued Ext.P8 order of demolition dated 29.12.2017 under sub-section (3) of Section 406 of the Kerala Municipality Act. The said order was under challenge in Appeal No.153/2018 filed by the 3rd respondent before the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions. By Ext.P14 order, the Tribunal allowed that appeal and directed the 2nd respondent to take fresh steps for demolition of the unauthorised constructions made by the rd respondent, after issuing provisional order and show-cause notice under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 406 of the Kerala Municipality Act. Paragraph Nos.7 and 8 and also last paragraph of Ext.P14 order read thus: “7. Point No.(i) The impugned order produced as Ext.P3 is a confirmation order issued under Section 406(3) of the Municipality Act. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that prior to the issuance of the Ext.P8 appellant was not served with a provisional order and show cause notice as stipulated in Section 406(1) & (2) of the Municipality Act and since the procedure stipulated under Section 406 is not complied with the impugned order is unsustainable. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that a provisional order was issued to the appellant on 27.02.2017. It is true that copy of a provisional order dated 27.02.2017 is available in page No.69 of the file produced by the respondent. But no materials are available in the file produced by the 2nd respondent to substantiate that any such provisional order was served upon the appellant. More over in the impugned confirmation order also the provisional order is not shown as reference. In the absence of any evidence it cannot be found that a provisional order and show-cause notice was served upon the appellant. More over in the impugned confirmation order also the provisional order is not shown as reference. In the absence of any evidence it cannot be found that a provisional order and show-cause notice was served upon the appellant. Therefore, it can only be found that the impugned demolition order under Section 406(3) was served upon the appellant without serving a provisional order and showcause notice to him, and thus violating the procedure stipulated in Section 406 of the Municipality Act. Therefore, the impugned order is legally unsustainable. This point is found accordingly. 8. Point No.(ii) Considering the finding in point No.(i) appeal is to be allowed. In the result, appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 29.12.2017 is set aside. Secretary is directed to take fresh steps for demolition after issuing a provisional order and showcause notice under Section 406(1) & (2) of the Kerala Municipality Act specifically describing the unauthorised construction effected by the appellant and rules violated, and on getting reply to the showcause notice respondent has to pass a confirmation order for demolition, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant and 3rd respondent and also after duly considering the explanation submitted by the appellant. Entire process has to be completed within a period of 30 days from this date of receipt of copy of this order.” 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation, representing respondents 1 and 2. 4. The sole issue that arises for consideration in this writ petition is as to whether any interference is warranted on Ext.P14 order dated 03.05.2019 of the Tribunal in Appeal No.153/2018. 5. The reasoning of the Tribunal in Ext.P14 order, which is extracted herein-before, would make it explicitly clear that the Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the 3rd respondent on a specific finding that there is procedural violation, inasmuch as the 3rd respondent was not issued with a provisional order and show- cause notice, as contemplated under sub sections (1) and (2) of Section 406 of the Kerala Municipality Act. 6. Section 406 of the Kerala Municipality Act which deals with demolition or alteration of building work unlawfully commenced, carried on or completed reads thus: “406. 6. Section 406 of the Kerala Municipality Act which deals with demolition or alteration of building work unlawfully commenced, carried on or completed reads thus: “406. Demolition or alteration of building work unlawfully commenced, carried on or completed.-(1) Where the Secretary is satisfied- (i) that the construction, reconstruction or alteration of any building or digging of any well- (a) has been commenced without obtaining the permission of the Secretary or in contravention of the decision of the Council; or (b) is being carried on, or has been completed otherwise than in accordance with the plans or specifications on which such permission or decision was based; or (c) is being carried on, or has been completed in breach of any of the provisions of this Act or any rule or bye-law or order made or issued thereunder or any direction or requisition lawfully given or made under this Act, such rule, bye-law or order; or (ii) that any alteration required by any notice issued under section 395 has not been duly made; or (iii) that any alteration of or addition to any building or any other work made or done for any purpose in or upon any building has been commenced or is being carried on or has been completed in contravention of the provisions of section 405, he may make a provisional order requiring the owner or the person for whom the work is done to demolish the work done, or so much of it as, in the opinion of the Secretary, has been unlawfully executed or to make such alterations as may, in the opinion of the Secretary, be necessary to bring the work in conformity with the provisions of this Act, bye-laws, rules, direction, order or requisition as aforesaid, or with the plans and specifications on which such permission or decision was based, and may also direct that until the said order is complied with, the owner or such person shall refrain from proceeding with the work. Provided that the Secretary may, on realisation of a compounding fees as may be fixed by the Government, regularise any constructions, reconstruction or alteration of any building or digging of any well, commenced, carried on or completed without getting a plan approved by the Secretary or in deviation of the approved plan, if such construction, reconstruction or alteration of the building or digging of the well does not contravene any of the provisions and specifications mentioned in this Act or the Building Rules made thereunder. (2) The Secretary shall serve a copy of the provisional order made under sub-section (1) on the owner or the person for whom such work is done together with a notice requiring him to show cause within a reasonable time, to be specified in such notice why the order should not be confirmed. (3) Where the owner or the person for whom the work is done fails to show cause to the satisfaction of the Secretary, the Secretary may confirm the order or modify the same to such extent as he may think fit to make, and such order shall then be binding on the owner or the person for whom the work is done and on the failure to comply with the order, the Secretary may himself cause the building or part thereof, demolished or the well dismantled, as the case may be and the expenses therefor shall be recoverable from the owner or such person. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), prosecution proceedings against the owner or the person for whom the work is done may be initiated. (5) Where the Government is satisfied that the construction, reconstruction or alteration of any building has been carried out in breach of any of the provisions of this Act or any rules made thereunder or any direction lawfully given by the Government, or Secretary, the Government may direct the Secretary of the Municipality to cause demolition of such construction, reconstruction or alteration unlawfully carried out and if such direction is not complied within the time limit specified in such direction, the Government may arrange the demolition and cost thereof shall be recovered from the Municipality.” 7. A reading of the provisions under Section 406 of the Kerala Municipality Act would show that if the Secretary is satisfied that construction, re-construction or alteration of any building or digging of any well is unlawfully commenced, carried on or completed he shall make a provisional order as contemplated under sub-section (1) of Section 406 of the Act. As per sub-section (2), he shall sever a copy of that provisional order on the owner or the person for whom such work is done together, with a notice requiring him to show-cause within a reasonable time, to be specified in his notice, why the order should not be confirmed. As per Sub-section (3) of Section 406 the Secretary may confirm that provisional order or modify the same to such extent as he may think fit to make, where the owner or the person for whom the work is done fails to show-cause to the satisfaction of the Secretary. On confirmation, such order shall be binding on the owner or the person for whom the work is done and on the failure to comply with the order, the Secretary may himself cause the building or part thereof, demolished or the well dismantled, as the case may be, and the expenses therefore shall be recoverable from the owner or such person. 8. In the instant case, the Tribunal in Ext.P14 order found that the 3rd respondent was not issued a provisional order and show-cause notice, as contemplated under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 406, before the issuance of Ext.P8 order dated 28.12.2017, which is an order for demolition in the nature of one under sub section (3) of Section 406 of the Act. After perusing the files relating to Ext.P8 order the Tribunal found that there are no materials on record to substantiate the fact that any provisional order together with show-cause notice, as contemplated by sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 406 of the Act was issued to the 3rd respondent before issuing Ext.P8 order of demolition. 9. After perusing the files relating to Ext.P8 order the Tribunal found that there are no materials on record to substantiate the fact that any provisional order together with show-cause notice, as contemplated by sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 406 of the Act was issued to the 3rd respondent before issuing Ext.P8 order of demolition. 9. In Mampad Grama Panchayat v. Convenor, Mampad Friends All India Sevens Football Tournament Committee and others, 2016 (5) KHC 846 in the context of Section 7A of the Kerala Local Authorities Entertainment Act, 1961, this Court held that sub-section (1) of Section 7A mandates that any general or special order of the Government granting exemption from the levy of entertainments tax any entertainment under Clause (a) or Clause (b) thereof, should be supported by reasons to be specified in such order. In view of the mandate of sub-section (1) of Section 7A, it is imperative for the Government to specify reasons in any general or special order issued under the said sub-section granting exemption from the levy of tax. It is well settled that, when the Statute requires to do certain thing in certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods or mode of performance are impliedly and necessarily forbidden. The said proposition of law is based on a legal maxim “expressio unius est exclusion alteris” meaning thereby that, if the Statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner, and following other course is not permissible. Paragraphs 9 to 13 of the said decision reads thus: “9. Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act empowers the local authority to exempt any entertainment from the levy of entertainments tax, where the local authority is satisfied that such entertainment is of the nature referred to in clauses (a) to (d) thereof. Therefore, the power of the local authority to grant exemption from the levy of entertainments tax is confined to entertainments of the nature referred to in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act. Therefore, the power of the local authority to grant exemption from the levy of entertainments tax is confined to entertainments of the nature referred to in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act. On the other hand, Section 7A of the Act, which begins with a non obstante clause, empower the Government to exempt from the liability to tax, (a) any entertainment or class of entertainments; or (b) any or all of the entertainments provided in a place owned by the Government or a Corporation owned or controlled by the Government, by general or special order and for reasons to be specified in such order. 10. Sub-section (1) of Section 7A of the Act, therefore, mandates that any general or special order of the Government granting exemption from the levy of entertainments tax any entertainment under Clause (a) or Clause (b) thereof, should be supported by reasons to be specified in such order. In view of the mandate of sub-section (1) of Section 7A, it is imperative for the Government to specify reasons in any general or special order issued under the said sub-section granting exemption from the levy of tax. This is more so, when any such Government order will have an adverse impact on the revenues of the local authorities, and since the local authorities mainly depend on such sources of revenue for carrying out their obligatory duties under the relevant Statutes. 11. It is well settled that, when the Statute requires to do certain thing in certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods or mode of performance are impliedly and necessarily forbidden. The said proposition of law is based on a legal maxim “expressio unius est exclusion alteris” meaning thereby that, if the Statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner, and following other course is not permissible. The said proposition of law is based on a legal maxim “expressio unius est exclusion alteris” meaning thereby that, if the Statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner, and following other course is not permissible. The said proposition of law about limitation of exercise of statutory power has first been identified by Jassel M. R. in the case of Taylor v. Taylor, 1876 (1) Ch.D. 426, wherein it was laid down that, where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, that thing must be done in that way, or not at all, and that other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. The Privy Council applied the said principle in the case of Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 . 12. In Ajanta Industries v. Central Board of Direct Taxes, (1976) 1 SCC 1001 a Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that, when law requires reasons to be recorded in a particular order, affecting prejudicially the interest of any person, who can challenge the order in Court, it ceases to be a mere administrative order and the wise or violation of the principles of natural justice on account of omission to communicate the reasons is not expiated. The said decision of the Apex Court was in the context of Section 127(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 which empowers the Commissioner of Income Tax to transfer any case from one Income Tax Officer subordinate to him to another, also subordinate to him, after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter, wherever it is possible to do so, and after recording his reasons for doing so. After taking note of the corresponding section in the Income Tax Act, 1922, i.e., Section 5(7A), the Apex Court held that, unlike Section 5(7A) of the 1922 Act, Section 127(1) of the 1961 Act requires reasons to be recorded prior to the passing of an order of transfer. However, the impugned order does not state any reasons whatsoever for making the order of transfer. However, the impugned order does not state any reasons whatsoever for making the order of transfer. The Apex Court held that, the requirement of recording reasons under S.127(1) of the 1961 Act is a mandatory direction under the law and non communication thereof is not saved by showing that the reasons exist in the file although not communicated to the assessee. The Apex Court held further that, the reason for recording of reasons in the order and making those reasons known to the assessee is to enable an opportunity to the assessee to approach the High Court under its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or even the Apex Court under Art.136 of the Constitution in an appropriate case for challenging the order, inter alia, either on the ground that it is a mala fide or arbitrary exercise or that, it is based on irrelevant and extraneous considerations. 13. In the instant case, sub-section (1) of Section 7A of the Act empower the Government to exempt an entertainment or class of entertainments, etc. from the levy entertainments tax, for reasons to be specified in the general or special order passed by the Government granting such exemption. Going by sub-section (2) of Section 7A, on such general or special order being passed, the local authority concerned shall be bound to comply with such order of exemption. If the reasons stated by the Government in granting exemption from the levy of entertainments tax is vitiated by arbitrary exercise of power or based on irrelevant or extraneous considerations, it would be open to the local authority concerned to challenge the same invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In order to exercise such right efficaciously, the reasons for granting such exemption should be made known to the local authority concerned. 10. In the instant case, the 2nd respondent who is the Secretary of the 1st respondent Corporation issued Ext.P8 demolition order in exercise of his powers under sub-section (3) of Section 406 of the Kerala Municipality Act. The specific finding of the Tribunal in Ext.P14 order is that there are no materials on record to substantiate the fact that the 2nd respondent complied with the procedure contemplated in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 406 of the Act before issuing Ext.P8 demolition order. The specific finding of the Tribunal in Ext.P14 order is that there are no materials on record to substantiate the fact that the 2nd respondent complied with the procedure contemplated in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 406 of the Act before issuing Ext.P8 demolition order. In exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court is not sitting in appeal over Ext.P18 order of the Tribunal. When the reasoning of the Tribunal in Ext.P14 order, after perusing the relevant files, is neither perverse or patently illegal, no interference on the said order is warranted, in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the result, this writ petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. The submission made by the learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation that further action as directed in Ext.P14 order of the Tribunal shall be taken by the 2nd respondent, without any further delay, is recorded.