JUDGMENT : SUNITA AGARWAL, J. 1. Heard Shri Siddharth Singhal learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Kartikey Saran and Shri Jahangir Haider, learned counsels for respondent nos.2 and 3. 2. The present petition is directed against the award of Permanent Lok Adalat dated 3.10.2018. The challenge is on the ground that the entire hearing of the matter had been carried out in the absence of the Chairman, Permanent Lok Adalat. The order passed by two non-judicial members of the Permanent Lok Adalat cannot be termed to be an award within the meaning of Section 22-E of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (hereinafter refer to ‘the Act, 1987’). 3. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is based on the provisions of Section 22-E of the Act, 1987, which provides that the award passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat under the Act shall be by a majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat. Placing Section 22-B of the Act, 1987, it is contended that every Permanent Lok Adalat consists of a person who qualifies the requirement of being “Chairman” of the Permanent Lok Adalat and two other persons qualified for appointment as members of Permament Lok Adalat as per the qualification prescribed under sub-section (2)(b) of Section 22-B of the Act, 1987. A conjoint reading of Section 22-B(2) and Section 22-E(3) shows that no hearing can take place in the absence of the Chairman of the Permanent Lok Adalat. The Chairman is necessarily to remain available for any decision in a dispute before the Permanent Lok Adalat. 4. Apart from the said ground, no other objection had been taken on the merits of the award under challenge. 5. To substantiate his submissions reference has been made to the judgment of High of Jharkhand in Amod Prasad Ram v. State of Jharkhard, Jharkhand State Legal Services Authority and District Legal Services Authority, East Singhbhum reported in, 2007 SCCOnline(Jhar) 445. Special emphasis has been given to the observations in paragraph ‘18’ of the said judgment. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, with reference to the provisions of Section 22-E (3) of the Act, 1987, submits that the present award is a majority award having been given by two members out of three. Special emphasis has been given to the observations in paragraph ‘18’ of the said judgment. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, with reference to the provisions of Section 22-E (3) of the Act, 1987, submits that the present award is a majority award having been given by two members out of three. There is nothing in the Act, 1987, which would require that the presence of Chairman is necessary for each “sitting” of the Permanent Lok Adalat. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that in all meetings of the Permanent Lok Adalat, the presence of Chairman is necessary, is wholly out of context and has no legal basis. 7. Considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. For dealing with the issue in hand, it would be necessary to go through the relevant provisions of the Act, 1987, which provide for constitution and organization of Permanent Lok Adalat. 8. Relevant Chapter (vi-A) contains provisions for pre-litigation conciliation and settlement. Section 22-A (a) provides for definition of Permanent Lok Adalat in Clause ‘A’ means a Permanent Lok Adalat established under sub-section (1) of Section 22-B. Section 22-B(1) provides that the Central Authority or the State Authority, as the case may be, shall establish a Permanent Lok Adalat at such places and for exercising such jurisdiction as may be specified in the notification, in respect to one or more public utility services for such areas, as indicated therein. 9. 9. Sub-Section (2) of Section 22-B which provides for constitution of Permanent Lok Adalat established for an area notified under sub-section (1) reads as under:- “(2) Every Permanent Lok Adalat established for an area notified under sub-section (1) shall consist of- (a) a person who is, or has been, a district judge or additional district judge or has held judicial office higher in rank than that of a district judge, shall be the Chairman of the Permanent Lok Adalat; and (b) two other persons having adequate experience in public utility service to be nominated by the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government on the recommendation of the Central Authority or, as the case may be, the State Authority, appointed by the Central Authority or, as the case may be, the State Authority, establishing such Permanent Lok Adalat and the other terms and conditions of the appointment of the Chairman and other persons referred to in clause (b) shall be such as may be prescribed by the Central Government.” 10. Section 22-C provides power and jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Adalat to take congnizance of cases brought before it. 11. Section 22-D is about the procedure to be followed by Permanent Lok Adalat while conducting the conciliation proceedings or deciding the dispute on merits under the Act, 1987. 12. Section 27 as contained in Chapter VII provides power of the Central Government to frame rules to carry out the provisions of the Act, 1987 including the terms and conditions of appointment of the Chairman and other persons in sub-section (2) of Section 22-B. Relevant Section 28 deals with the power of the State Government to frame rules relating to the appointments/powers and functions of the members of the State and the members Secretary of the State Legal Services Authority constituted under Section 6 of the Act, 1987. 13. The Central Government in exercise of its power under Section 27 of the Act has framed rules named as Permanent Lok Adalat (Other Terms and conditions of Appointment of Chairman and Other Persons) Rules, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules, 2003’). Under the definition Clause 2(b), “Chairman” has been defined as a person appointed as Chairman of the Permanent Lok Adalat established by the Central Authority or a State Authority under sub-section (1) of Section 22-B of the Act. Under the definition Clause 2(b), “Chairman” has been defined as a person appointed as Chairman of the Permanent Lok Adalat established by the Central Authority or a State Authority under sub-section (1) of Section 22-B of the Act. “Other persons” in the Rules means a person nominated under Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 22-B. Rule 3 provides for “sitting fee” of Rs.500/- “per sitting”, whereas any other member is entitled to “sitting fee” of Rs.400/- “per sitting”. For the purpose of attending the sitting of Permanent Lok Adalat, the Chairman and other persons is entitled to Conveyance Allowance of Rs.3000/- per month. Rule 4 provides for terms and conditions of service of Chairman and other persons of Permanent Lok Adalat which is reproduced as under:- “4. Terms and Conditions of Service of Chairman and other persons of Permanent Lok Adalat- (1) Before appointment, the Chairman and other person, shall have to take an undertaking that he does not and will not have any such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially his functions as such chairman or other person. (2) The Chairman and other persons shall hold office for a term of five years and shall not be eligible for re-appointment. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (2), Chairman or other persons may - (a) by writing under his hand and addressed to the Central Authority or, as the case may be, the State Authority, resign his office at any time; (b) be removed from his office in accordance with the provisions of rule 5. (4) When the Chairman is unable to discharge his functions owing to absence, illness or any other cause, the senior-most (in order of appointment) person of Permanent Lok Adalat holding office for the time being shall discharge the functions of the Chairman until the day on which the Chairman resumes the charge of his functions. (5) The Chairman or any other person ceasing to hold office as such shall not hold any appointment in, or be connected with the management or administration of an organization which has been the subject of the proceeding under the Act during his tenure for a period of five years from the date on which he ceases to hold such office.” 14. Rule 5 providing for resignation and removal of Chariman and other persons from office reads as under:- “5. Rule 5 providing for resignation and removal of Chariman and other persons from office reads as under:- “5. Resignation and removal--The Central Authority or State Authority, as the case may be, may remove from office, Chairman or other person who - (a) has been adjudged an insolvent; of (b) has been convicted of an offence which, in the opinion of the Authority, involves moral turpitude; or (c) has become physically or mentally incapable of acting as such Chairman or other person; or (d) has acquired such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially his functions as Chairman or other person; or (e) has or so abused his position as to render his continuance in office prejudicial to the public interest. Provided that the Chairman or any other person shall not be removed from his office on the grounds specified in clauses (d) and (e), except on inquiry held in accordance with the procedure prescribed in rule 6.” 15. Rule 7 deals with the place of sitting of the Permanent Lok Adalat as convened by the Chairman. This rule is reproduced below:- “7. Place of Sitting -- (1) The Permanent Lok Adalat may sit at a place specified by the Central Authority or the State Authority, as the case may be. (2) The working days and office hours of the Permanent Lok Adalat shall be the same as that of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be. (3) The sitting of the Permanent Lok Adalat, as and when necessary, shall be convened by the Chairman.” 16. A careful reading of the provisions of the Act, 1987 and the Rules, 2003 framed thereunder, it is evident that the Permanent Lok Adalat is established with the notification issued by the Central Authority or the State Authority, as the case may be. Such notification shall provide the place of establishment of the Permanent Lok Adalat and the area of its jurisdiction as also its jurisdiction in respect of one or more public utility services. Such notification shall provide the place of establishment of the Permanent Lok Adalat and the area of its jurisdiction as also its jurisdiction in respect of one or more public utility services. Insofar as the composition of Permanent Lok Adalat is concerned, Section 22-B provides that every Permanent Lok Adalat shall consists of a person who has been a judicial officer either in the rank of District Judge or Additional District Judge or has held judicial office higher in rank than that of a District Judge, who shall be the Chairman of the Permanent Lok Adalat. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) provides qualification for appointment of two other members of the Permanent Lok Adalat. 17. Thus, the Permanent Lok Adalat has been termed as a body comprising of three members which include one judicial member and two non-judicial members, constituted for hearing and decision on a matter brought before it. Under Section 22-C, upon taking cognizance of the case of the Permanent Lok Adalat, it is necessary that it shall conduct conciliation proceedings between the parties, taking into account the circumstances of the dispute and assist the parties in their attempt to reach at an amicable settlement of the dispute. If the parties fail to reach at an agreement under sub-section (7) of Section 22-C, the Permanent Lok Adalat is required to decide the dispute, if it does not relate to any offence i.e. not barred by the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 22-C. Section 22-C provides that while conducting the conciliation proceedings or deciding the dispute on merits, the Permanent Lok Adalat shall be guided by the principles of natural justice, fair play, equity and other principles of justice and shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 18. Section 22-E provides that every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on the parties and could be transmitted to a Civil court having local jurisdiction for execution. 18. Section 22-E provides that every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on the parties and could be transmitted to a Civil court having local jurisdiction for execution. Section 22-C(1) provides that party to the dispute shall bring the dispute before the Permanent Lok Adalat for cognizance being taken by it, before such a dispute is brought before any Court of law and after an application is made to the Permanent Lok Adalat, no party to the application shall invoke the jurisdiction of any Court for the said dispute.These provisions makes it clear that the Permanent Lok Adalat is considered as a Special Tribunal which is distinct and different from a Court. 19. The nature of proceedings before the Permanent Lok Adalat is initially of conciliation which is non-adjudicatory in nature. Only if the parties fail to reach at an agreement by conciliation, the Permanent Lok Adalat changes its role into the adjudicatory body by deciding the dispute. The power and jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Adalat to decide a dispute on merits has been called in question before the Apex Court in Bar Council of India v. Union of India reported in, (2012) 8 SCC 243 , wherein it has been held that the Permanent Lok Adalats under the Act, 1987 are set up as effective, alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangement made by the Parliament with an adjudicatory power for speedy adjudication of disputes, as an alternative to the ordinary mechanism of adjudication of disputes through the judicial course. Such a scheme is neither contradictory to the Constitution Scheme nor against the rule of law. The establishment of Permanent Lok Adalat and conferring them jurisdiction upto specific pecuniary jurisdiction in respect of one or more public utility services as contained in Section 22-A(b) before the dispute is brought before any court by any party to the dispute is not anathema to the rule of law. If other institutional mechanisms are set up by the Parliament instead of ordinary civil court, such mechansims or establishments cannot be faulted on the ground of arbitrariness or irrationality. The Permanent Lok Adalats under the Act, 1987 as amended by 2002 Amendment Act are in addition and not in derogation of the fora provided under various statutes. 20. If other institutional mechanisms are set up by the Parliament instead of ordinary civil court, such mechansims or establishments cannot be faulted on the ground of arbitrariness or irrationality. The Permanent Lok Adalats under the Act, 1987 as amended by 2002 Amendment Act are in addition and not in derogation of the fora provided under various statutes. 20. It was further held that it has, however, necessarily to be kept in mind that the disputes relating to public utility services has been entrusted to Permanent Lok Adalat only if the process of conciliation and settlement fails. The emphasis is on settlement in respect of disputes concerning public utility services through the medium of Permanent Lok Adalat. The settlement of dispute between the parties in the matter of public utility services is the main theme. Where despite the endeavours and efforts of the Permanent Lok Adalat, the settlement between the parties is not possible and the parties are required to have their dispute determined and adjudicated, to avoid non-adjudication of disputes relating to public utility services, the Parliament has conferred power of adjudication upon the Permanent Lok Adalat. 21. The Apex Court has further observed that it is settled law that an authority empowered to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and act as a Tribunal may not necessarily have all the trappings of the Court. What is essential is that it must be a creature of statute and should adjudicate the dispute between the parties before it after giving reasonable opportunity to them on principles of fair play and natural justice. It is not a constitutional right of any person to have a dispute adjudicated by means of a Court only. It was further observed that a division between the Court and the tribunal has been made by the Apex Court in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala reported in, (1961) AIR SC 1669 wherein it is stated that by Courts “the courts of civil judicature is meant” and by “tribunals “ those bodies of men who are appointed to decide the controversies arising under certain Special laws. All tribunals are not Courts though all Courts are tribunals. Certain special matters go before the tribunals whereas the residue goes to the ordinary Courts. Their procedure may differ but both essenially discharge their functions by acting “judicially”. 22. All tribunals are not Courts though all Courts are tribunals. Certain special matters go before the tribunals whereas the residue goes to the ordinary Courts. Their procedure may differ but both essenially discharge their functions by acting “judicially”. 22. In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma reported in, (1965) AIR SC 1595, it has been held that the tribunals decide special matters entrusted to them for their decision. The approach adopted by both the courts and tribunals is substantially the same. It is the State’s inherent judicial funcition which they discharge. In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu reported in, (1992) Supp2 SCC 651, it has been held that where there is a lis i.e. an affirmantion by one party and denial by another and the dispute necessarily involves a decision on the rights and obligations of the parties to it and an authority is called upon to decide it, that Authority is called a tribunal if it does not have all the trappings of a Court, as there is an exercise of judicial power. It was, thus, held in Bar Council of India (supra) that the competence of Parliament to make law creating tribunals to deal with disputes arising under or relating to a particular Statute or statutes or particular disputes is, thus, beyond question. The Apex Court has further considered that the mere fact that composition of Permanent Lok Adalat as provided under Section 22-B (2) of the Act, 1987, comprises of judicial as well as non-judicial members, it cannot be said such a composition becomes violative of principles of fairness and justice and contrary to Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The statutory recognition to the award of majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat, even if majority decision is by two non-judicial members does not mean that such majority decision lacks in fairness or sense of justice. The fact that no appeal is provided to an aggrieved party under the Act, 1987, by itself may not render that statute as unconstitutional as there is no inherent right of appeal as the appeal is a right which is always a creature of statute. 23. The fact that no appeal is provided to an aggrieved party under the Act, 1987, by itself may not render that statute as unconstitutional as there is no inherent right of appeal as the appeal is a right which is always a creature of statute. 23. The challenge to the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, 1987 has, thus, been upturned with the observations that if at all a party to the dispute has grievance against the award of Permanent Lok Adalat, it can always approach the High Court in its supervisory and extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 24. In the light of the above observations of the Apex Court, it can safely be concluded that the Permanant Lok Adalat is a Tribunal which is a body comprising of three members, one judicial and two non-judicial persons. Now coming to the procedure, relevant rules 4(4) & 7(3) of the Rules, 2003 is quoted here:- “Rule 4(4):- When the Chairman is unable to discharge his functions owing to absence, illness or any other cause, the senior-most (in order of appointment) person of Permanent Lok Adalat holding office for the time being shall discharge the functions of the Chairman until the day on which the Chairman resumes the charge of his functions.” Rule 7(3):- The sitting of the Permanent Lok Adalat, as and when necessary, shall be convened by the Chairman.” 25. As per Rule 7(3) of the Rules, 2003 providing for terms and conditions of appointment of Chairman and other persons, the “sitting” of the Permanent Lok Adalat as and when necessary, has to be convened by the Chairman for transaction of its business. The literal meaning of word “Convene” as per Combined Oxford-Indian Dictionary is “to call a meeting or come or bring together for a meeting or activity.” The convener is a person who convenes the meeting of a Committee. Thus, within the meaning of Rule 7(3), the Chairman of Permanent Lok Adalat is Convener of the meeting or call a meeting of the Permenant Lok Adalat on a particular date which is construed as “sitting” under the said rule. 26. As indicated above, the Chairman alone cannot constitute a Permanent Lok Adalat as he has to convene a meeting of himself and other two members of the Permanent Lok Adalat for transaction of its business. 26. As indicated above, the Chairman alone cannot constitute a Permanent Lok Adalat as he has to convene a meeting of himself and other two members of the Permanent Lok Adalat for transaction of its business. The “sitting” will be complete only when all the members are assembled on a day, when the “meeting” was convened by the Chairman. There is nothing in the Act or the rules which would provide meeting or the “sitting” of the Permanant Lok Adalat being convened by any other member than the Chairman. The power given to the senior-most member of the Permanant Lok Adalat holding the office (in the order of appointment) under Rule4(4) is to discharge the functions of the Chairman owing to his absence or illness or any other cause, has no relevance, insofar as, the procedure of convening a “meeting” or “sitting” of the Permanant Lok Adalat as provided under Rule 7(3) of the Rules, 2003. Both the said procedural provisions are independent of each other. In the opinion of the Court, the word “functions” as used in Rule 4(4) of the Rules, 2003 refers to the administrative functions being discharged by the Chairman and does not speaks of power given to the senior-most member, (other than the Chairman) to convene a “meeting” or “sitting” of the Permanant Lok Adalat. 27. It may be an altogether different situation where a meeting or the “sitting” has been convened by the Chairman on the date fixed and after the meeting was called to order, he could not transact the business or left the meeting i.e. vacate the chair or adjourn the meeting without the consent of the meeting with a view to obstruct or interrupt the business of the meeting and the business on the day of “sitting”, convened by the Chairman, had been transacted by the other members i.e. the non-judicial members. 28. It is an altogether a different case where the award is passed by the majority of persons other than the Chairman, constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat i.e. the two non-judicial members and the Chairman of the Permanant Lok Adalat disagreed with them. The Disagreement of the Chairman or him not being in consensus with the other two members is an altogether different affair. 29. The Disagreement of the Chairman or him not being in consensus with the other two members is an altogether different affair. 29. It is not correct to say that Section 22-E (3) provides quorum to convene a “meeting” or “sitting” for transaction of business in absence of the Chairman. The said provision attaches validity to the majority award but can not be construed as the provision as regards quorum. 30. It is well settled principle of law that when an authority or body is constituted under the statute, its constitution provided in the statute has to be strictly adhered to. A body of three members, which is known as Permanent Lok Adalat, appointed under Section 22-B of the Act, 1987 can transact its business in a validily convened meeting called to order by the Chairman, whose presence is necessary at the time of convening the meeting i.e. at the beginning. The meeting once legally convened or called to order cannot be adjourned without being held. The presence of Chairman is, thus, necesary for a valid meeting of the Permanent Lok Adalat. It is requisite that there should be an authority in whom rests the power to conduct and control the proceedings. It is “chair” as commonly called that controls and a person who occupies the chair presides over the meeting. To validity transact business, the meeting must be properly convened i.e. there must be present a quorum and meeting is presided over by a duly appointed Chairman. 31. However, where no quorum is prescribed, the majority of members may transact the business in a meeting validity called to order by the Chairman, as the decision by the majority of the members is valid. 32. In the light of the said statutory provisions as reflected from the reading under Section 22-B and 22-E(3) of the Act, 1987 and Rule 7(3) read with Rule 4(4) of the Rules, 2003 and in the light of the law relating to convening of meeting and quorum, there remains no doubt that for transaction of business by the Permanent Lok Adalat i.e. for making of a valid award, it was necessary that the “sitting” of Permanent Lok Adalat is validity convened by the Chairman who is authorised to do so. In the absence of the Chairman, it was not possible for the remaining two non-judicial members to convene or call a “meeting” or “sitting” of the Permanent Lok Adalat to transact its business i.e. to make an award. The rule of upholding of award by majority of two non-judicial members as reflected from the provisions of Section 22-E (3) of the Act, 1987 cannot be construed to mean that two non-judicial members were competent to convene the meeting. Had the legislature contemplated any such situation, it would have provided the procedure or measure in the Rules, 2003, itself. It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into the statutory provision or re-write the provision which is plain and unambiguous. While interpreting the provision, the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. What has not been provided in the statute cannot easily be inferred by the Court. 33. Two principles of construction, one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading of statute/statutory provision as a whole are well settled. Under the first principle, a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself. But, at the same time, a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the powers of the statute or sub-section must be construed together and every clause of a Section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be moreso if liberal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous result which could not have been intended by the legislature. An intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imported to a stature if there is same other construction available. (Ref:-Padmasundara Rao (Dead) & Ors. v. State of T.N. & Ors. reported in, (2002) AIR SC 1334 (paragraph 14)) 34. The object of interpreting a statute or any statutory provision is to ascertain the intention of the legislature or the authority enacting it. (Ref:-Padmasundara Rao (Dead) & Ors. v. State of T.N. & Ors. reported in, (2002) AIR SC 1334 (paragraph 14)) 34. The object of interpreting a statute or any statutory provision is to ascertain the intention of the legislature or the authority enacting it. The intention of the maker is primarlity to be gathered from the language used which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also what has not been said. As a consequence, the court shall read the statute by implying plain and simple meaning to it. The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. (Ref: Union of India v. Rajiv Kumar reported in, (2003) 6 SCC 516 ). What has not been provided in the statute cannot be added by judicial interpretative process unless it is necessary to do so as to give effect to the statutory provisions. 35. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which provides for composition of the District Forum (consisting of one judicial member and two non-judicial members) and the manner in which, the proceedings is to be conducted by it. It is contended that Section 14(2) of the said Act provides that every proceedings shall be conducted by the President of the District Forum and at least one member shall be sitting together. It further provides that in case for any reason a member is unable to conduct a meeting till it is completed, the President and other member shall continue to proceed from the stage at which it was last heard by the previous member. The legislature had, thus, contemplated therein that the proceedings of the District Forum can be adjudicated by two or the three members, constituting the same. 36. Similarly the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 contemplates formation of Bench and upholding of order by majority. 37. As there is no such contemplation in the statutory provision and the Rules made thereunder i.e. Act, 1987 and Rule, 2003, i.e. of “meeting” or “sitting” of Permanent Lok Adalat being conducted in the absence of the Chairman, it cannot be accepted that two non-judicial members were competent to transact the business i.e. to make an award in absence of the Chairman. 38. 38. In the light of the above principle of interpretation of statute, this Court having carefully gone through the statutory provisions i.e. Act, 1987 and Rules 2003 reached at a conclusion that for passing a valid award, it is must that the “sitting” by the Permanent Lok Adalat is convened by the Chairman. In absence of the Chairman, it was not possible for the two non-judicial members to convene “sitting” or “meeting” for making an award. For transaction of its business or making of award, it is necessary that a “meeting” or “sitting” of the Permanent Lok Adalat comprising of all the members, under the Chairmanship of the judicial member, is convened, for adjudication of the dispute brought before it or making of a valid award under Section 22-E(3) of the Act, 1987. The fact that the Chairman was not present in the meeting is evident from the reading of the award itself. Having said so, the objections of learned counsel for the petitioner to the validity of the award of the Permanent Lok Adalat is liable to be upheld. 39. For the aforesaid, the award dated 3.10.2018 is hereby set aside. The matter is remitted back for fresh consideration on merits of the claim by the Permanent Lok Adalat, by convening a “sitting” in the light of the observations made hereinabove. 40. In view of the above observations, the present petition is allowed.