ORDER 1. This appeal under section 2 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyaylaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, has been filed by the appellant being aggrieved by order dated 24.7.2019 passed in Review Petition No. 82/2016 and order dated 6.1.2016 passed in Writ Petition No. 16/2016. 2. Heard on I.A. No. 3546/2019, an application seeking permission to file writ appeal. 3. In this application, appellant has mentioned that earlier he was posted as Collector district Datia and at present he is posted as Deputy Secretary, Government of M.P. Bhopal. 4. During period of posting of appellant as Collector, Datia, a copy of order dated 6.1.2016 passed in Writ Petition No. 16/2016 was received by him in his official capacity as Collector Datia. Vide order dated 6.1.2016, learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition directing the petitioner to file statutory appeal under section 44 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (hereinafter referred to as 'MPLRC') before the Collector, Datia who was in turn directed that the same if done within a period of ten working days, shall be entertained and decided on its own merits by adverting to all the contentions of the petitioner and the law on the issue. 5. Appellant in compliance of the said order entertained the appeal and after considering the rival submissions of the parties found that as per the law, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Datia is the competent authority to decide said appeal and accordingly vide order dated 20.1.2016, sent the record to Sub-Divisional Officer, Datia to decide the appeal as per law. Pursuant to which the Sub-Divisional Officer decided the appeal vide order dated 27.1.2016. 6. Thereafter, the petitioner had filed Contempt Case No.129/2016 against the present appellant and one another. 7. State Government had filed Review Petition No. 82/2016 mentioning therein that the statute does not provide for first appeal under section 44 of the MPLRC to the Collector, and therefore, direction to the Collector to decide such appeal directly be reviewed as there is an error apparent on the face of the record. 8. 7. State Government had filed Review Petition No. 82/2016 mentioning therein that the statute does not provide for first appeal under section 44 of the MPLRC to the Collector, and therefore, direction to the Collector to decide such appeal directly be reviewed as there is an error apparent on the face of the record. 8. It is submitted that said review petition was dismissed as was filed by the State vide order dated 24.7.2019, therefore, this I.A. has been filed seeking permission to file such writ appeal on the ground that appellant was not impleaded as party in the writ petition in individual capacity but the impact and effect of said order has resulted in filing of contempt petition impinging on the personal rights and authorities of appellant which he had exercised as Collector Datia. Therefore, leave be granted to him to file writ appeal in personal capacity. 9. Along with this application, another I.A. No. 3554/2019 has been filed seeking condonation of delay. It is mentioned in this I.A. that impugned order was passed on 6.1.2016 and thereafter review petition was filed for recalling/modifying said order with a delay of 23 days which was graciously condoned by learned Single Judge which was decided on 24.7.2019 and simultaneously cognizance has been taken in the contempt petition, therefore, delay in filing the writ appeal be condoned in the interest of justice. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Vinod Kumar v. State of U.P. As reported in AIR 2001 SC 1739 , wherein it has been held that advocate has no locus standi to file writ petition in his own name and substitute himself for his client, particularly, when petition was not filed in public interest and nothing prevented, affected person from filing writ petition. It is submitted that affected persons can always file a writ petition and as a natural corollary, a writ appeal. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner/respondent No.1 herein submits that learned Single Judge had directed the District Collector, Datia to decide the appeal on merits. The Collector in flagrant violation of the directions issued by this Court transferred the appeal to the Sub-Divisional Officer to decide it on merits though he was directed to adjudicate the appeal on merits. 12. The Collector in flagrant violation of the directions issued by this Court transferred the appeal to the Sub-Divisional Officer to decide it on merits though he was directed to adjudicate the appeal on merits. 12. It is submitted that this act of the Collector was contemptuous and to avoid the contempt proceedings, the State Government preferred the review petition which was dismissed by learned Single Judge vide order dated 24.7.2019. It is submitted that since this writ appeal has been filed by the then Collector in his personal capacity though he has no locus to assail the order passed by learned Single Judge in his personal capacity, and therefore, has no locus to file instant appeal as he was neither the party to the proceeding before learned writ Court nor he is personally effected by the impugned order. 13. This argument of learned counsel for the petitioner/respondent No.1 deserves to be out-rightly rejected inasmuch as provisions contained in section 2 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyaylaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 are clear that appeal shall lie from a judgment or order passed by one Judge of High Court in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to a Division Bench comprising of two Judges of the same High Court. Thus, appellant, being a party affected inasmuch as admittedly contempt proceedings have been drawn against him on the basis of order passed in the writ petition, has a locus. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has placed reliance on the judgment of Uttarakhand High Court in case of Arvind Kumar Lohani and others v. Uttarakhand State Information Commission and another, as reported in, 2018 (2) UAD 478, wherein petition was filed by the Public Information Officers as appointed under the Right to Information Act, who had challenged order dated 7.2.2012 passed by second appellate authority which had directed the petitioner as Information Officer to supply the information as sought by the respondent No. 2. 15. Therefore, it is submitted that petitioner, exercising quasi judicial authority, has no locus to file this appeal. 16. 15. Therefore, it is submitted that petitioner, exercising quasi judicial authority, has no locus to file this appeal. 16. The high Court held that writ petition by petitioner in personal capacity by engaging office of the Chief Standing Counsel will not lie as the office of Chief Standing Counsel is obliged to represent the State or any authority within the State in such other civil cases in which he might be directed or required to appear. 17. Interpreting such provisions in Legislative Secretary-cum-Legal Remembrance Manual, it has been held that the term “authority” herein used would mean the 'office' and not the government officer personally, more particularly, when the office of Chief Standing Counsel is called to defend personal liability of an officer, who has been harnessed individually with a liability under the law. 18. Thus, it is apparent that law laid down in case of Arvind Kumar Lohani (supra), is that an individual officer cannot be represented by the office of Chief Standing Counsel as the function of Chief Standing Counsel is to represent the State or any authority within the State and not the government officer personally. Present case is not covered under the facts and circumstances of the case of Arvind Kumar Lohani (supra), and this judgment is clearly distinguishable and is not applicable to the facts of present case. 19. Office has reported delay of 1211 days in filing this writ appeal. It is apparent that out of these 1211 days, time with effect from 1.3.2016 to 24.7.2019 was bonafidly spent in pursuing and prosecuting review petition. When outcome of review petition was made known then this writ appeal has been filed most expeditiously on 30.7.2019 without any further delay, and therefore, delay in filling the writ appeal being bonafide and just deserves to be condoned and is hereby condoned. 20. Consequently, permission to pursue the writ appeal in individual capacity is also granted as we are prima facie satisfied that appellant is a person aggrieved of the order of learned Single Judge of the High Court made in exercise of the original jurisdiction. 21. Accordingly, I.A. Nos. 3546/2019 and 3554/2019 stand disposed of. 22. On the merits of the writ appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submits that in Writ Petition No.16/2016, SDO Datia was not made a party in personal capacity. There was no allegation of malafides against said SDO. 21. Accordingly, I.A. Nos. 3546/2019 and 3554/2019 stand disposed of. 22. On the merits of the writ appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submits that in Writ Petition No.16/2016, SDO Datia was not made a party in personal capacity. There was no allegation of malafides against said SDO. In the writ petition, petitioner had challenged the order dated 29.12.2015 passed by Tahsildar (Nazul), Tahsil Datia under section 248 of the MPRLC vide which Tahsildar directed the petitioner to remove the encroachment/construction measuring 966.54 square feet on land situated at Nazul Sheet No.34C on the land survey No.171 measuring 285.00 square meter within seven days and to bring said land in its original position and has also imposed fine equivalent to 20% of the market value of said land i.e. Rs. 53,292/- and in case of non-compliance of the order within seven days, reserved an option to propose civil jail for the petitioner. 23. This order was challenged on the ground that Tahsildar Nazul had without giving any opportunity to the petitioner recorded order sheet that the petitioner counsel does not want to make arguments. Thereafter, it is mentioned in the petition that though inspection of survey No. 171 and 172 was carried out on an application moved by the petitioner before the Collector Datia who had in turn forwarded it to the Tahsildar, yet without taking such spot inspection report into consideration, order dated 29.12.2015 was passed by the Tahsildar. Thereafter, there are bald allegations that Tahsildar was under influence and had shown the house of the petitioner as encroachment as per the ex-parte statement of Revenue Inspector without application of mind and on behest of the SDO, but despite making such allegations, and also making allegation against the Tahsildar that he was acting under the political influence and under the influence of State authorities, none of the respondents who were alleged to be acting under political influence or under the influence of State authorities were impleaded as party in individual capacity affording them opportunity to rebut such allegation. 24. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that since section 44 does not provide for any appeal from the order of Tahsildar directly to the Collector, therefore, the Collector was justified in making over the matter to the SDO for decision in terms of the statutory provisions contained in section 44 of the MPLRC. 24. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that since section 44 does not provide for any appeal from the order of Tahsildar directly to the Collector, therefore, the Collector was justified in making over the matter to the SDO for decision in terms of the statutory provisions contained in section 44 of the MPLRC. After receiving such file, SDO passed a speaking order and decided the appeal; and against such order, petitioner has alternative remedy of filing second appeal before the Divisional Commissioner and therefore firstly writ petition was not maintainable directly before the High Court and secondly appellant had statutory right of appeal as provided under the statute. Forum of a statutory appeal could not have been changed or altered except by amending the statute. 25. It is submitted that all these aspects have been glossed over by learned Single Judge despite admitting in the impugned order dated 24.7.2019 passed in R.P. 82/2016 that, 'no first appeal lies from an order of Tahsildar to Collector directly'. It is submitted that addition of a caveat by learned Single Judge that “but the argument raised by State herein could have been accepted if any particular statutory remedy available to the petitioner have been taken away”. This qualification as has been mentioned in the impugned order is not just because statutes are there not only to balance rights of petitioner but to balance right of the parties to a litigation. It is also submitted that learned Single Judge has admitted that “in the instant case the Court while passing of the order in writ jurisdiction was given the impression that SDO is prejudiced against the petitioner and therefore, this Court in the attending facts and circumstance, where adjudication required going into disputed questions of facts, decided to adopt via media by directing that petitioner should avail the remedy of appeal not to the SDO but to the next higher authority i.e. Collector.” 26. Overstepped the jurisdiction inasmuch as no via media could have been adopted by the writ Court in violation of the statutory provisions specially when there is clear delineation of jurisdiction, unless a statute is declared to be ultra vires, that is bound to be followed in letter and spirit, thus, it is also submitted that if there would have been any pleading of malafide against a particular SDO then at best Court could have directed the Collector to have assigned that particular case to some other SDO so to prevent any prejudice being affected in the case. Having not adopted this course, impugned order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and deserves to be setaside. 27. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1/petitioner, on the other hand, submits that reasoning of learned Single Judge is just and correct and in administration of justice via media was worked out which cannot be faulted with as exercise of a jurisdiction not vested in the learned Single Judge. As far as Judgment in Arvind Kumar Lohani (supra), is concerned, it has been observed by Uttarakhand High Court that under the duties defined in clause 5.04 sub-clause (3) in particular the Chief Standing Counsel which includes within its ambit the Additional Chief Standing Counsel also do not include duty to cater to individual Government officials is clearly distinguishable and not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 28. After hearing arguments of learned counsel for the parties and going through the record, this Court is of the opinion that in terms of unambiguous provisions contained in MPLRC, section 44 since does not provide for an appeal from an order of Tahsildar to the Collector. Present appellant in his official capacity of Collector was justified in sending the matter to SDO to take decision in terms of the statute. It is also apparent from the relief sought by the petitioner in the writ petition that he had not claimed any relief of transferring the case from the concerned SDO to any other SDO or to direct the Collector to hear appeal on his own. It is also apparent from the relief sought by the petitioner in the writ petition that he had not claimed any relief of transferring the case from the concerned SDO to any other SDO or to direct the Collector to hear appeal on his own. In absence of such relief, in our opinion learned Single Judge has exceeded its jurisdiction in passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions contained in the MPLRC, and therefore, such order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and deserves to set-aside and is hereby set aside. Parties to bear their own costs. ...................