JUDGMENT : Harsha Devani, J. In this appeal from order under Order XLIII rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") read with section 13 of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015, the appellant has called in question the order dated 1st January, 2019 passed by the Commercial Court, Ahmedabad below applications Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 1 in Commercial Trademark Suit No.1 of 2019. 2. Certain facts which may be necessary to decide this appeal are: The first respondent M/s Red Ribbon Entertainment Private Limited (original plaintiff) has come with a case that one Kartik Patel has conceptualized the idea of the disputed song/music composition/video of "Char Bangadi Wari Gaadi" in November 2015 with the help of professional team Kathiawadi Kings and turned the idea into a successful music video on 5th September, 2016. Mr. Kartik Patel became the owner of the said copyright work. The final song was uploaded on YouTube on 29th September, 2016. On 20th December, 2016, the appellant and the respondents No.2 and 3 (original defendants No.1 to 3) copied the wordings and the music and recorded the same song and uploaded the video of the song on YouTube on 20th December, 2016, thereby infringing the copyright of the plaintiff. Mr. Kartik Patel executed a deed of assignment in respect of the copyright of the song in favour of the plaintiff on 18th April, 2017. On 3rd January, 2017, the plaintiff's predecessor had filed a copyright infringement notice at YouTube claiming that their original work had been copied by the defendants and urging them to remove the same. The defendants filed a counter copyright infringement claiming that their work was original and was sung by Kinjal Dave (the appellant herein) and the lyrics were written by Manu Rabari. On 23rd February, 2017, the plaintiff sent a legal notice to the defendants alleging infringement of copyright. The defendants gave their reply to such notice on 7th March, 2017. It is further the case of the plaintiff that the defendants agreed to settle the matter by way of paying royalty but for one reason or the other, avoided settling the matter. The plaintiff came to know about the dispute between the defendants and his predecessor after the deed of assignment was executed. It is further the case of the plaintiff that the defendants agreed to settle the matter by way of paying royalty but for one reason or the other, avoided settling the matter. The plaintiff came to know about the dispute between the defendants and his predecessor after the deed of assignment was executed. Thereafter, the plaintiff immediately contacted the defendants to refrain from committing such illegal acts and pay compensation for illegal use of the said copyright work. The second respondent agreed to the same. However, the defendants did not abide by the same and continued to infringe the copyright. The plaintiff, therefore, instituted the suit being Commercial Trademark Suit No.1 of 2019. The plaint and the application under Order XXXIX rules 1 and 2 of the Code came to be verified on 14th November, 2018 and the suit and the interim injunction application were actually moved on 1st January, 2019, on which date the Commercial Court passed the impugned order. 3. Mr. Harshit Tolia, learned advocate with Mr. J.V. Vaghela, learned advocate for the appellant (original defendant No.1) drew the attention of the court to the provisions of rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code, to submit that the same mandates that if the court proposes to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay. Referring to the impugned order, it was submitted that in the entire order, there is no discussion whatsoever to the effect that non-grant of injunction would be defeated by delay. It was submitted that the Commercial Court has merely considered the aspect of prima facie case and balance of convenience and has granted an ex parte injunction without complying with the requirement of rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code. It was submitted that the Commercial Court has merely considered the aspect of prima facie case and balance of convenience and has granted an ex parte injunction without complying with the requirement of rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code. 3.1 Reliance was placed upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das, (1994) 4 SCC 225 and Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1993) 3 SCC 161 , for the proposition that whenever a court considers it necessary in the facts and circumstances of a particular case to pass an order of injunction without notice to other side, it must record the reasons for doing so and should take into consideration, while passing an order of injunction, all relevant factors, including as to how the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated if an ex parte order is not passed. 3.2 It was further submitted that in the application under Order XXXIX rules 1 and 2 of the Code, there are no pleadings for ex parte injunction. Moreover, the conduct of the plaintiff was required to be taken into consideration, viz., that though the suit was filed in November, 2018, it was not moved till 1st January, 2019, which is clearly indicative of the fact that the matter was not just urgent. It was urged that in these circumstances, the Commercial Court was not justified in granting ex parte interim injunction. 4. Vehemently opposing the appeal, Mr. Sunit Shah, learned counsel with Mr. Virendra Patel, learned advocate for the respondent No.1 (original plaintiff) submitted that while considering the present appeal from order, the conduct of the appellant is also required to be taken into consideration. It was submitted that the Commercial Court issued notice on 1st January, 2019 and the same was served on the appellant on or about 4th January, 2019, but the appellant waited till the returnable date, that is, 22nd January, 2019 before moving the present appeal, instead of filing its response to the plaint and injunction application. It was submitted that the Commercial Court issued notice on 1st January, 2019 and the same was served on the appellant on or about 4th January, 2019, but the appellant waited till the returnable date, that is, 22nd January, 2019 before moving the present appeal, instead of filing its response to the plaint and injunction application. Reliance was placed upon the decision of a learned Single Judge of this court in the case of J M S Labs v. Yusufali Eesmail Hadvaid, (1998) 2 GLR 1776 , wherein the court despite finding that the reasons given by the trial court did not show how the ends of justice would be defeated by waiting for the grant of ad-interim injunction till the first returnable date, wherein the normal course would be to stay the operation of the ex parte injunction, observed that three cumulative features dissuaded him from granting such stay, the first being that the appeal was filed without filing a reply to the interim injunction application before the trial court though the defendant had nine days time to do so and without making a request before the trial court to vacate the ex parte injunction. It was submitted that the above decision would be squarely applicable to the facts of the present case and that the court may, therefore, not vacate the ex parte injunction, but fix a schedule for filing reply/rejoinder/hearing as has been done in that case. 4.1 Reliance was also placed upon an unreported decision dated 23.12.2015 of a learned Single Judge of this court in the case of Angur Foods Private Limited v. Patel Chaturbhai Ranchhodbhai and Co. rendered in Appeal from Order No.373 of 2015, wherein while disposing of the appeal, it was observed thus: "6. Only one relevant aspect, I would like to refer is the suit filed on 24.11.2015. Notice was made returnable on 19.12.2015. On filing of the suit, the trial Court has granted ex-parte interim relief. Having granted interim relief ex-parte, Court ought to have made returnable date of some shorter period, but in the present case it is material to note that notice, injunction etc. were served to the appellants within two days i.e. on 28.11.2015. The appellants appeared before the trial Court only on returnable date i.e. on 19.12.2015 and have filed their reply etc. were served to the appellants within two days i.e. on 28.11.2015. The appellants appeared before the trial Court only on returnable date i.e. on 19.12.2015 and have filed their reply etc. Matter came up before in-charge judge, on that date, hence, it was kept on 22.12.2015. Interim relief was extended till then. The present appeal is filed on 20.12.2015. In the circumstances of the case, submissions of learned counsel for the appellants for vacating the interim relief is not possible to accept." It was submitted that considering the conduct of the appellant in waiting till the returnable date before filing the present appeal from order this court may not interfere with the impugned order and relegate the appellant to the Commercial Court for seeking vacation of the ex parte interim injunction. 5. From the rival contentions noted hereinabove, it is evident that the main plank of the submissions of the learned advocate for the appellant for assailing the impugned order is that it has been passed without following the mandate of the provisions of rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code and is, therefore, invalid. It may, therefore, be apposite to refer to the provisions of rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code which reads thus: "3. Before granting injunction, Court to direct notice to opposite party -The Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party. Before granting injunction, Court to direct notice to opposite party -The Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party. Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the Court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, and require the applicant- (a) to deliver to the opposite party, or to send to him by registered post, immediately after the order granting the injunction has been made, a copy of the application for injunction together with- (i) a copy of the affidavit filed in support of the application; (ii) a copy of the plaint; and (iii) copies of documents on which the applicant relies, and (b) to file, on the day on which such injunction is granted or on the day immediately following that day, an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid have been so delivered or sent." 6. Thus, rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code contemplates issuance of notice of the application to the opposite party before granting an injunction except where the object of granting injunction would be defeated by the delay. In terms of the proviso thereto, the court is required to record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay. The proviso further requires the applicant to take action in terms of clauses (a) and (b) there under. The present case is confined to the obligation cast upon the court to record reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay. 7. In the light of the above statutory provision, it may be germane to examine the findings recorded by the Commercial Court to ascertain whether the requirements of the proviso to rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code have been complied with. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the first two paragraphs merely refer to the institution of the suit and the application below Exhibit 7. In the third paragraph, the Commercial Court has referred to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the first two paragraphs merely refer to the institution of the suit and the application below Exhibit 7. In the third paragraph, the Commercial Court has referred to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. In paragraphs 4 and 5 of the order, the Commercial Court has recorded its findings as under: "4. I have considered the submissions of the Learned Counsel for the plaintiff and perused the record and also both the songs played by the Learned Counsel for the plaintiff, before this Court. At this juncture, prima-facie, it appears that the wording and music of both the songs are deceptively similar and the defendants have copied "Char Bangadi Wari Gadi' from the plaintiff's song. Therefore, at this juncture, in my considered view, the plaintiff has prima-facie case in its favour and balance of convenience also lies in favour of the plaintiff. In these facts and circumstances of the case, issue summons to the suit and notice of the present application upon the defendants, returnable on 22nd January, 2019, on furnishing the complete set of paper book, with postal cover and A.D. Card duly affixed with requisite postal stamp, within three days from today. Direct Service is permitted. Service through e-mail is also permitted. 5. In the meantime, the defendants, their successors, servant, agents, director and/or partners are hereby restrained from selling, conducting live stage concerts, online download forum, in form of music cassette, CD's and imitating the said copyright work in any manner which is similar to the plaintiff's copyright work in the song having title "Char Bangadi Wari Gadi", till the next date of hearing. Compliance of Order 39 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, within three days." 8. Thus, in paragraph 4, the Commercial Court has recorded a finding that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case in its favour and that the balance of convenience also lies in its favour and has ordered issuance of notice to the defendants, returnable on 22nd January, 2019, that is, after three weeks from the date of issuance of notice. In paragraph 5, the Commercial Court has granted interim relief against the defendants till the next date of hearing. 9. In paragraph 5, the Commercial Court has granted interim relief against the defendants till the next date of hearing. 9. On reading the impugned order in its entirety, it is evident that there is no discussion whatsoever as to how the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay. The Commercial Court has not referred to the other facts of the case as to when the cause of action had first arisen, the stage at which the plaintiff had instituted the suit and when it had been moved for hearing. Merely on the basis of two findings as regards prima facie case and balance of convenience, without considering the third factor regarding irreparable injury and without complying with the mandate of the proviso to rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code and recording its opinion as to how the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, the Commercial Court has granted ex parte interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff. 10. Rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code came up for interpretation before the Supreme Court in Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), wherein it was held thus: 32. Power to grant injunction is an extraordinary power vested in the court to be exercised taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The courts have to be more cautious when the said power is being exercised without notice or hearing the party who is to be affected by the order so passed. That is why Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code requires that in all cases the court shall, before grant of an injunction, direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite party, except where it appears that object of granting injunction itself would be defeated by delay. By the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, a proviso has been added to the said rule saying that "where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, the court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay". 33. By the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, a proviso has been added to the said rule saying that "where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, the court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay". 33. It has come to our notice that in spite of the aforesaid statutory requirement, the courts have been passing orders of injunction before issuance of notices or hearing the parties against whom such orders are to operate without recording the reasons for passing such orders. It is said that if the reasons for grant of injunction are mentioned, a grievance can be made by the other side that court has prejudged the issues involved in the suit. According to us, this is a misconception about the nature and the scope of interim orders. It need not be pointed out that any opinion expressed in connection with an interlocutory application has no bearing and shall not affect any party, at the stage of the final adjudication. Apart from that now in view of the proviso to Rule 3 aforesaid, there is no scope for any argument. When the statute itself requires reasons to be recorded, the court cannot ignore that requirement by saying that if reasons are recorded, it may amount to expressing an opinion in favour of the plaintiff before hearing the defendant. 34. The imperative nature of the proviso has to be judged in the context of Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code. Before the proviso aforesaid was introduced, Rule 3 said "the court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite-party". The proviso was introduced to provide a condition, where court proposes to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, being of the opinion that the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated by delay. The condition so introduced is that the court "shall record the reasons" why an ex parte order of injunction was being passed in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The condition so introduced is that the court "shall record the reasons" why an ex parte order of injunction was being passed in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this background, the requirement for recording the reasons for grant of ex parte injunction, cannot be held to be a mere formality. This requirement is consistent with the principle, that a party to a suit, who is being restrained from exercising a right which such party claims to exercise either under a statute or under the common law, must be informed why instead of following the requirement of Rule 3, the procedure prescribed under the proviso has been followed. The party which invokes the jurisdiction of the court for grant of an order of restraint against a party, without affording an opportunity to him of being heard, must satisfy the court about the gravity of the situation and court has to consider briefly these factors in the ex parte order. We are quite conscious of the fact that there are other statutes which contain similar provisions requiring the court or the authority concerned to record reasons before exercising power vested in them. In respect of some of such provisions it has been held that they are required to be complied with but non-compliance therewith will not vitiate the order so passed. But same cannot be said in respect of the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39. The Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. Such ex parte orders have far-reaching effect, as such a condition has been imposed that court must record reasons before passing such order. If it is held that the compliance with the proviso aforesaid is optional and not obligatory, then the introduction of the proviso by the Parliament shall be a futile exercise and that part of Rule 3 will be a surplus age for all practical purposes. Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code, attracts the principle, that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not all. This principle was approved and accepted in well-known cases of Taylor v. Taylor, 1875 1 ChD 426 and Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor, (1936) AIR PC 253. This principle was approved and accepted in well-known cases of Taylor v. Taylor, 1875 1 ChD 426 and Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor, (1936) AIR PC 253. This Court has also expressed the same view in respect of procedural requirement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act in the case of Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare, (1975) AIR SC 915. 35. As such whenever a court considers it necessary in the facts and circumstances of a particular case to pass an order of injunction without notice to other side, it must record the reasons for doing so and should take into consideration, while passing an order of injunction, all relevant factors, including as to how the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated if an ex parte order is not passed. But any such ex parte order should be in force up to a particular date before which the plaintiff should be required to serve the notice on the defendant concerned. In the Supreme Court Practice 1993, Vol. 1, at page 514, reference has been made to the views of the English Courts saying: "Ex parte injunctions are for cases of real urgency where there has been a true impossibility of giving notice of motion . An ex parte injunction should generally be until a certain day, usually the next motion day ." 11. In Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das (supra), the Supreme Court followed the above decision and also stated the factors which should weigh with the court in the grant of ex parte injunction, the relevant part whereof is extracted hereunder: ""36. As a principle, ex parte injunction could be granted only under exceptional circumstances. In Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das (supra), the Supreme Court followed the above decision and also stated the factors which should weigh with the court in the grant of ex parte injunction, the relevant part whereof is extracted hereunder: ""36. As a principle, ex parte injunction could be granted only under exceptional circumstances. The factors which should weigh with the court in the grant of ex parte injunction are (a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue to the plaintiff; (b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would involve greater injustice than the grant of it would involve; (c) the court will also consider the time at which the plaintiff first had notice of the act complained so that the making of improper order against a party in his absence is prevented; (d) the court will consider whether the plaintiff had acquiesced for sometime and in such circumstances it will not grant ex parte injunction; (e) the court would expect a party applying for ex parte injunction to show utmost good faith in making the application. (f) even if granted, the ex parte injunction would be for a limited period of time. (g) General principles like prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss would also be considered by the court." 12. Examining the facts of the present case in the light of the above principles, for the purpose of grant of ex parte interim injunction, the following factors, inter alia, were required to be taken into consideration: (i) The court would consider the time at which the plaintiff first had notice of the act complained so that the making of improper order against a party in his absence is prevented; (ii) the court would expect the party applying for ex parte injunction to show utmost good faith in making the application; and, (iii) general principles like prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss would also be considered by the court. 13. Insofar as the first factor is concerned, the facts reveal that the predecessor of the plaintiff had notice of the act complained as early as in January 2017 when he took action against the defendants by filing a "Copyright infringement notice". In February 2017, the predecessor of the plaintiff sent a legal notice to the defendants, to which the defendant No.2 replied on 7th March, 2017. The plaintiff's predecessor Mr. In February 2017, the predecessor of the plaintiff sent a legal notice to the defendants, to which the defendant No.2 replied on 7th March, 2017. The plaintiff's predecessor Mr. Kartik Patel assigned the rights in respect of the copyright work in favour of the plaintiff on 18th April, 2017. The plaintiff appears to be aware of the alleged infringement as can be culled out from the averments made in the plaint namely that the defendant No.2 had agreed to pay compensation and stop using the copyright work, he failed to live up to the promise. However, no action was taken by the plaintiff at the relevant time. Much later, the plaintiff instituted the suit in question being Commercial Trademark Suit No.1 of 2019. The plaint and the application under Order XXXIX rule 1 and 2 of the Code came to be verified on 14th November, 2018 and the suit and injunction application were actually moved after more than a month and came up for hearing on 1st January, 2019, on which date the Commercial Court passed the impugned order. In the opinion of this court, all these factors were relevant factors which should have been taken into consideration by the Commercial Court at the time of passing the ex parte injunction order. Apart from the delay in instituting the suit despite having notice of the alleged infringement of copyright, even after the suit was filed, the same was not moved for over a month. Evidently therefore, there was no urgency in the matter warranting grant of ex parte injunction. Unfortunately, the Commercial Court has failed to examine these aspects which were relevant for the purpose of considering the question of grant of ex parte interim injunction. In the opinion of this court, having regard to the aforesaid glaring facts, neither of the first two factors has been satisfied in the facts of the present case. 14. Insofar as the third factor is concerned, while the Commercial Court has recorded satisfaction regarding prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff, however, there is no finding as regards the irreparable loss. Therefore, the ingredients of the third factor have also not been fully satisfied. 15. 14. Insofar as the third factor is concerned, while the Commercial Court has recorded satisfaction regarding prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff, however, there is no finding as regards the irreparable loss. Therefore, the ingredients of the third factor have also not been fully satisfied. 15. Insofar as compliance with the provisions of Order XXXIX rule 3 of the Code is concerned, in the above cited decisions, the Supreme Court has held that the imperative nature of the proviso has to be judged in the context of rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code. Before the proviso aforesaid was introduced, rule 3 said "the court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite-party". The proviso was introduced to provide a condition, where court proposes to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, being of the opinion that the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated by delay. The condition so introduced is that the court "shall record the reasons" why an ex parte order of injunction was being passed in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this background, the requirement for recording the reasons for grant of ex parte injunction cannot be held to be a mere formality. This requirement is consistent with the principle, that a party to a suit, who is being restrained from exercising a right which such party claims to exercise either under a statute or under the common law, must be informed why instead of following the requirement of rule 3, the procedure prescribed under the proviso has been followed. The party which invokes the jurisdiction of the court for grant of an order of restraint against a party, without affording an opportunity to him of being heard, must satisfy the court about the gravity of the situation and the court has to consider briefly these factors in the ex parte order. It has been further held that the Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. It has been further held that the Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. Such ex parte orders have far-reaching effect, as such a condition has been imposed that court must record reasons before passing such order. If it is held that the compliance with the proviso aforesaid is optional and not obligatory, then the introduction of the proviso by the Parliament shall be a futile exercise and that part of rule 3 will be a surplus age for all practical purposes. The proviso to rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code, attracts the principle, that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not at all. 16. Thus, it is mandatory for the court to record its reasons, howsoever briefly, as to why it proposes to grant ex parte interim injunction without giving notice to the opposite party. Moreover, the party which invokes the jurisdiction of the court for grant of order of restraint against a party without affording an opportunity to him of being heard must satisfy the court about the gravity of the situation and the court has to briefly consider these factors in the ex parte order. 17. The plaintiff who has invoked the jurisdiction of this court has not satisfied the court about the gravity of the situation; moreover, the court has failed to take into consideration the relevant factors prior to granting ex parte interim injunction. The impugned order is totally bereft of any reasoning on this count, which renders it unsustainable. 18. Besides, a perusal of the impugned order reveals that the Commercial Court is not oblivious to the provisions of the proviso to rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code, inasmuch as it has directed the plaintiff to comply with the provisions thereof; however, to the extent of the obligation cast upon the court under the said proviso, the same has been totally ignored. 19. 19. Insofar as the two decisions rendered by learned Single Judges of this court on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 are concerned, wherein despite the fact that the proviso to rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code had not been complied with, the court refused to set aside the order granting ex parte injunction because the affected party had come to the court on or about the returnable date, this court is of the considered opinion that having regard to the mandatory nature of the proviso to rule 3 of Order XXXIX of the Code and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to hereinabove, namely that the requirement for recording the reasons for grant of ex parte injunction cannot be held to be a mere formality and that when the statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner it has to be done in that manner or not at all, this court is not inclined to non suit the appellant only on the ground that she has approached this court on date on which the notice was made returnable. 20. In the light of the above discussion, the appeal succeeds and is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order dated 1st January, 2019 passed by the Commercial Court, Ahmedabad below applications Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 1 in Commercial Trademark Suit No.1 of 2019, is hereby quashed and set aside. It is, however, directed that the appellant/defendant No.1 shall file her reply to the plaint as well as the injunction application within a period of three days from today. The first respondent (original plaintiff) shall file its rejoinder thereto, if any, within a period of two days from the date of receipt of a copy of the reply. The Commercial Court shall thereafter endeavour to hear the application Exhibit 7 and decide the same finally as expeditiously as possible, and preferably within a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. 21. It is clarified that this court has not entered into the merits of the controversy. The Commercial Court shall decide the interim injunction application independently on the merits of the case without in any manner being influenced by any observation made in this order. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. 21. It is clarified that this court has not entered into the merits of the controversy. The Commercial Court shall decide the interim injunction application independently on the merits of the case without in any manner being influenced by any observation made in this order. Civil Application No.1 of 2019 : In the light of the order passed in the main appeal, this application for stay does not survive and is accordingly dismissed.