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2019 DIGILAW 581 (KER)

Kinarullaparambath Abdul Azeez, S/o. Kunjabdulla v. Valiyaparambath Vasu, S/o. Narayanan

2019-07-22

A.HARIPRASAD, SHIRCY V.

body2019
JUDGMENT : A.HARIPRASAD, J Prominent legal questions arising in the above mentioned original petitions relate to the jurisdiction of a “Nyayadhikari”, as defined in Section 2(e) and appointed under Section 5 of the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008 ( in short 'Act of 2008), to try and dispose of cases filed under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (in short 'the B.R.C Act'), which the Nyadhikari received by transfer under orders of a District Judge, by invoking the power under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'C.P.C'). 2. Brief narration of facts may be necessary to appreciate the legal issues coming up for decision : O.P (R.C) No.99 of 2019 is arising out of R.C.P No.54 of 2015 originally filed before the Rent Control Court, Nadapuram under Section 11(3) of the B.R.C Act. The rent control petition was transferred under orders of the District Judge to the Gram Nyayalaya, Kunnummel Block, Kuttyadi and it was renumbered as R.C.P No.6 of 2016 there. Trial of the case was conducted before the Gram Nyayalaya by parties adducing evidence. After hearing the parties, the Gram Nyayalaya allowed the eviction petition by order dated 26-07-2017. The respondent/tenant filed R.C.A No.126 of 2017 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Vatakara. The appellate authority set aside the order of Gram Nyayalaya relying on a decision in Manager, Sai Service Station Ltd. & Another v. Dileep Ganesh ( 2018 (1) KLJ 63 ) rendered by a Division Bench of this Court, in which it is held that a Gram Nyayalaya is not a Rent Control Court and any order passed by Gram Nyayalaya under the B.R.C Act is without jurisdiction. Therefore, the Rent Control Appellate Authority, after setting aside the order of eviction passed by the Gram Nyayalaya, decided to remand the case to the Gram Nyayalaya with a direction to the Nyayadhikari to return the rent control petition for representation before the Rent Control Court having jurisdiction. 3. The issue raised in O.P.(R.C) No.100 of 2019 is that the petitioners filed R.C.P No.53 of 2015 before the Rent Control Court, Nadapuram urging a ground under Section 11(3) of the B.R.C Act, seeking eviction of the respondent. The eviction petition was transferred to Gram Nyayalaya and it was renumbered as RCP No.5 of 2016. After concluding the trial, an order of eviction was passed by the Gram Nyayalaya. The eviction petition was transferred to Gram Nyayalaya and it was renumbered as RCP No.5 of 2016. After concluding the trial, an order of eviction was passed by the Gram Nyayalaya. Notwithstanding the order of eviction, the petitioners are not in a position to execute the order of Gram Nyayalaya against the respondent in view of the decision in Manager, Sai Service Station. Hence the petitioners approached this Court. 4. O.P(R.C) No.101 of 2019 is filed by the petitioners in R.C.P No.56 of 2015, who sought eviction of the respondent under Section 11(3) of the B.R.C Act before the Rent Control Court, Nadapuram. This case was also transferred under orders of District Judge to Gram Nyayalaya. Trial of the case was conducted before the Gram Nyayalaya and after hearing both sides, the eviction petition was allowed. The respondent filed R.C.A No.127 of 2017 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority. In that matter, the petitioners filed an application for directing the tenants to deposit arrears of rent specified under Section 12 of the B.R.C Act. Even though the Rent Control Appellate Authority passed an order on that application under Section 12(3) of the B.R.C Act stopping all proceedings and directing the tenant/respondent to surrender the petition schedule building to the landlord, the petitioners/landlords now find that the order is inexecutable in view of the decision in Manager, Sai Service Station. Hence, they seek appropriate directions in this matter. 5. O.P(R.C) No.102 of 2019 arises out of R.C.P No.55 of 2015 filed by the petitioners before the Rent Control Court, Nadapuram, under Section 11(3) of the B.R.C Act against the respondent. This case was also transferred to Gram Nyayalaya. Here also, a trial was held by Gram Nyayalaya resulting in an order of eviction. But in view of the aforementioned decision, to the petitioner's dismay, the order is found to be inexecutable. Hence they have approached this Court. 6. Common questions arising in these cases are as follows : 1. Whether a Nyayadhikari, as defined in Section 2(e) and appointed under Section 5 of the Act of 2008 has jurisdiction to try and dispose of cases filed under the B.R.C Act ? 2. What is the legal effect of orders passed in such matters by the Nyayadhikari ? 3. Common questions arising in these cases are as follows : 1. Whether a Nyayadhikari, as defined in Section 2(e) and appointed under Section 5 of the Act of 2008 has jurisdiction to try and dispose of cases filed under the B.R.C Act ? 2. What is the legal effect of orders passed in such matters by the Nyayadhikari ? 3. If it is found that Nyayadhikari has no jurisdiction to try and dispose of such cases and therefore the orders become nullity, can the evidence recorded by him in the proceedings be relied upon by the Rent Control Court later for deciding the cases ? 4. Is it necessary to take fresh evidence, if such cases are again sent back to the Rent Control Court having jurisdiction ? 7. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and respondent. 8. All the above points can be considered together. When the matter came up for admission, we directed the District Judge concerned to sent a report indicating as to why she did transfer R.C.P Nos.53, 54, 55 and 56 of 2015 from Rent Control Court, Nadapuram to Gram Nyayalaya, Kuttyadi. In obedience to the direction, the learned District Judge submitted a reply on 26-06-2019. Along with her letter, an official memorandum, issued by the High Court of Kerala dated 19-11-2016 bearing No.D7(B)-102812/2016, was produced. The report further shows that as per the official memorandum, the District Judge was directed to take necessary steps for commencement of the Nyayalaya, including appointment of ministerial staff, transfer of pending cases pertaining to the jurisdiction of the proposed Gram Nyayalaya from civil courts and magistrate courts concerned. 9. Notification issued by the Government of Kerala, Home (C) Department, bearing No.G.O(Ms.) No.301/2016/Home, dated 25-11-2016 would show the establishment of Gram Nyayalaya, Kunnummal at Kuttiyadi. 10. Learned District Judge had drawn our attention to Government notification issued by Home (C) Department G.O (Ms.) No.38/2016/Home dated 22-02-2016 whereby it was decided by the Government to add certain items in Part III of the First Schedule and Part III of the Second Schedule to the Act of 2008. As per the said notification, the B.R.C Act and the Kerala Survey and Boundaries Act, 1961 were added to the schedule, thereby expanding the jurisdiction of the Gram Nyayalayas. As per the said notification, the B.R.C Act and the Kerala Survey and Boundaries Act, 1961 were added to the schedule, thereby expanding the jurisdiction of the Gram Nyayalayas. Learned District Judge therefore reported that she madeover the cases to the Gram Nyayalaya by looking into the notification issued by the Government on 02-02-2016. 11. This Court in Manager, Sai Service Station case held that Nyayadhikaris under the Act of 2008 are not yet notified as Rent Control Courts as envisaged under Section 3 of the B.R.C Act. Therefore, it was found, in the absence of any notification under Section 3 of the B.R.C Act, the Nyayadhikaris cannot try and dispose of rent control petitions filed under the provisions of the B.R.C Act. We agree with the above view taken by the learned Judges in Manager, Sai Service Station case. 12. Glaring distinctions between pecuniary jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction on one hand and jurisdiction over the subject matter on the other are well known in the legal parlance. It is clear from Order XIV Rule 2 of C.P.C that an issue relating to the jurisdiction of the Court shall be tried first. This principle is clearly reflected in Section 21 of C.P.C as well, which says that objection as to the place of suing and competence of a Court with reference to pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be raised in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity. In all cases, where issues are settled, the question regarding jurisdiction shall be raised at or before such settlement of issues. It explicitly says that such questions shall not be allowed to be raised before an appellate or revisional Court unless such objection was taken at the first instance as stated above. 13. Marked difference between a court deciding a case without territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction and another court deciding a matter without jurisdiction over the subject matter is also well known. In the first category of cases, viz; decision taken without territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction, unless an objection regarding the lack of jurisdiction was raised before the first court at the earliest opportunity, it will not be allowed to be raised in an appeal or a revision and it will not affect validity of the decision. In the first category of cases, viz; decision taken without territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction, unless an objection regarding the lack of jurisdiction was raised before the first court at the earliest opportunity, it will not be allowed to be raised in an appeal or a revision and it will not affect validity of the decision. Whereas, when a court renders a decision in a case without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision is a nullity and non-est. Invalidity of the decree or order passed by a court without subject matter jurisdiction can be raised whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced and even in a collateral proceedings. It is settled law that enforceability of such a decree or order can be disputed even at the stage of the execution proceedings. 14. This principle has been reiterated in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra ( (1990) 1 SCC 193 ), a three bench decision rendered by the Supreme Court clearly, in the following words : “26. Thus it is settled law that normally a decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction, after adjudication on merits of the rights of the parties, operates as re judicata in a subsequent suit or proceedings and binds the parties or the persons claiming right, title or interest from the parties. Its validity should be assailed only in an appeal or revision as the case may be. In subsequent proceedings its validity cannot be questioned. A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter or on other grounds which goes to the root of its exercise or jurisdiction, lacks inherent jurisdiction. It is a coram non judice. A decree passed by such a court is a nullity and is non est. its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the authority of the court to pass a decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party. If the court has jurisdiction but there is defect in its exercise which does not go to the root of its authority, such a defect like pecuniary or territorial could be waived by the party. If the court has jurisdiction but there is defect in its exercise which does not go to the root of its authority, such a defect like pecuniary or territorial could be waived by the party. They could be corrected by way of appropriate plea at its inception or in appellate or revisional forums, provided law permits.....” 15. When we take cognizance of the fact that Gram Nyayalayas have not been notified as Rent Control Courts under Section 3 of the B.R.C Act for trial and disposal of rent control petitions, we can only find that Nyayathikaris have no subject matter jurisdiction on such petitions, thereby rendering the orders passed by them on rent control petitions nullity and non-est. It goes without saying that such orders are not executable. 16. Another question arising for consideration is about the utility of evidence recorded by a Nyayadhikari in the course of trial of rent control petitions without having subject matter jurisdiction. It is trite that a trial without subject matter jurisdiction is no trial at all and it cannot have any sanctity of a valid trial. The end result of such a trial is a non-est decree or order. Such a trial process is vitiated because the defect in the jurisdiction goes to the root of the Court's authority. When a trial before a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter results in a null, void and non-est decree or order, it will be very clear that the oral evidence recorded during the vitiated trial cannot assume any significance or validity to be called a deposition recorded during a judicial proceedings. 17. The term “judicial proceedings” is not defined in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ( in short 'the Evidence Act'). In many decisions, it has been held that “judicial proceeding” includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath. Judicial proceeding is “any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be taken or in which any judgment, decree, sentence or final order is passed on recorded evidence”. It has aslo been stated that a judicial proceeding means a proceeding in which judicial functions are being exercised. Judicial proceeding is “any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be taken or in which any judgment, decree, sentence or final order is passed on recorded evidence”. It has aslo been stated that a judicial proceeding means a proceeding in which judicial functions are being exercised. It is therefore vividly definite that a proceeding whereby Nyayadhikari disposing of rent control petitions without subject matter jurisdiction can never be regarded as a judicial proceeding since the lack of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter. 18. For the aforementioned reasons, it will be clear that Section 33 of the Evidence Act, which deals with relevancy of certain evidence for proving, in subsequent proceeding, the truth of the facts stated therein has no application to this situation. For clarity, we shall extract Section 33 of the Evidence Act : “S.33. Relevancy of certain evidence for proving, in subsequent proceeding, the truth of facts therein stated.-Evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding or before any person authorized by law to take it, is relevant for the purpose of proving, in a subsequent judicial proceeding, or in a later stage of the same judicial proceeding, the truth of the facts which it states, when the witness is dead or cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or if his presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, the Court considers unreasonable : Provided that the proceeding was between the same parties or their representatives in interest; that the adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to cross-examine; that the questions in issue were substantially the same in the first as in the second proceeding. Explanation.-A criminal trial or inquiry shall be deemed to be a proceeding between the prosecutor and the accused within the meaning of this section.” 19. It will be clear that this section applies only when the situations enumerated therein, like when a witness is dead, or cannot be found or kept out of the way by the adverse party etc. are satisfied. It will be clear that this section applies only when the situations enumerated therein, like when a witness is dead, or cannot be found or kept out of the way by the adverse party etc. are satisfied. Moreover, to apply the aforementioned Section, it is a condition precedent that the evidence sought to be used in a subsequent judicial proceeding must have been recorded in an earlier proceeding, which should be an actual and real judicial proceeding. In this case, whole trial of a rent control petition before Nyayadhikari is bad for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Hence, the principles in Section 33 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to salvage the depositions recorded in the rent control proceedings before a Nyayadhikari for using them in a subsequent proceedings before the Rent Control Court. 20. In support of our view, we may cite two decisions viz; Sankappa Rai and others v. Keraga Pujary and others (AIR 1931 Madras 575) and Sudhindra Nath v. The State (AIR 1953 Calcutta 339). In both the decisions, the point clearly held is that any proceeding done without subject matter jurisdiction cannot be regarded as a judicial proceeding to which Section 33 of the Evidence Act applied. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Varghese v. State ( 1976 KLT 893 ) has followed the above said decisions and held that for attracting Section 33 of the Evidence Act, previous deposition must be in a judicial proceeding and proceedings without jurisdiction are not judicial proceedings. We therefore, conclude that evidence recorded by a Nyayadhikari during the course of trial of rent control petitions without subject matter jurisdiction cannot be regarded as previous depositions, which can be put to use under Section 33 of the Evidence Act. 21. We notice the law stated in Section 145 of the Evidence Act, which permits a witness to be cross examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing. Said provision deals with all sorts of previous statements. 21. We notice the law stated in Section 145 of the Evidence Act, which permits a witness to be cross examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing. Said provision deals with all sorts of previous statements. Essential difference between deposition of a party to a judicial proceeding and that of a witness, when it is sought to be used in a subsequent proceeding, lies in the fact that the deposition of a party is a substantive evidence in a subsequent judicial proceeding between the same parties or any one claiming through them, but the previous deposition of a witness cannot be regarded as a substantive evidence. It can be used only under Section 145 of the Evidence Act to contradict the witness. 22. Section 17 of the Evidence Act defines the expression “admission” and Section 18 lays down five classes of persons who can make admissions. Section 21 of Evidence Act deals with proof of admissions against persons making them, and by or on their behalf. Admission made by a witness, whether he be a party witness or an independent witness, in a judicial proceeding is placed in a higher pedestal than an admission made by him otherwise. However, the deposition recorded by a Nyayadhikari in a rent control petition without subject matter jurisdiction cannot claim any of the above attributes, except the use of it under Section 21 in the manner provided under Section 145 of Evidence Act. 23. For the aforementioned reasons, we find that when the rent control petitions are transferred back to the Rent Control Court having jurisdiction, the transferee court will have to conduct a de nova trial in all these cases and evidence recorded by Nyayadhikari cannot be used for deciding merits of the cases. At the most, the evidence can be used for any purpose, other than that is provided in Section 33 of the Evidence Act. Hence, retrial of all the cases is highly essential. 24. In O.P(R.C) No.101 of 2019, the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Vatakara as per order in RCA No.127 of 2017 allowed an application under Section 12(3) of the B.R.C Act finding that the tenant did not deposit admitted arrears during currency of the appeal and therefore he was directed to surrender the petition schedule building to the landlord forthwith. 24. In O.P(R.C) No.101 of 2019, the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Vatakara as per order in RCA No.127 of 2017 allowed an application under Section 12(3) of the B.R.C Act finding that the tenant did not deposit admitted arrears during currency of the appeal and therefore he was directed to surrender the petition schedule building to the landlord forthwith. This order is also unsustainable in law as it is passed without any jurisdiction. Reasons are obvious. The rent control petition was disposed of by a Gram Nyayalaya. Order passed in the rent control petition by Nyayadhikari is itself a nullity and therefore the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Vatakara gets no appellate power on a matter disposed of by a court without subject matter jurisdiction. In other words, there is no appealable order under Section 18 of the B.R.C Act. Axiomatic is the proposition that appellate power is co-extensive and co-terminus to that of the original authority. If the original authority completely lacks jurisdiction to decide a case, the appellate authority also certainly will not have any right to entertain an appeal. Hence the order passed in RCA No.127 of 2017 by the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Vatakara under Section 12(3) of the B.R.C Act directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building is clearly illegal and non-est. 25. We find in O.P(R.C) No.99 of 2019 that the Rent Control Appellate Authority, as per judgment in R.C.A No.126 of 2017, after correctly finding that Nyayadhikari has no jurisdiction to try and dispose of rent control petitions, wrongly remanded the case to the Gram Nyayalaya with a direction to the Nyayadhikari to return the rent control petition for presenting before proper Rent Control Court. We find use of the expression “remand” is not legally correct. As stated earlier, once it is found that the Nyayadhikari has no subject matter jurisdiction to deal with rent control petitions, the decision rendered by him thereon becomes a nullity and non-est. Therefore, no appeal could be laid to the Rent Control Appellate Authority against such a decision. Unchallengably, the power to remand a case to a lower court or a judicial tribunal is a facet of the appellate power. Therefore, no appeal could be laid to the Rent Control Appellate Authority against such a decision. Unchallengably, the power to remand a case to a lower court or a judicial tribunal is a facet of the appellate power. There can be no appellate power, available to an Appellate Authority, emanating from Section 18 of B.R.C Act in a case where the original authority, which disposed of the petition, cannot be regarded as a Rent Control Court. Only course that could have been adopted by the Appellate Authority was to declare that the decision by the Nyayadhikari in the rent control petition is null and void and then direct the parties to take back the eviction petition from Nyayadhikari and present it before a Rent Control Court having jurisdiction. Remand of a case by Appellate Authority can be done only to a lower authority having jurisdiction. Hence, the expression used by the Rent Control Appellate Authority cannot be regarded as legalistic. Resultantly, the captioned original petitions are disposed as follows : Gram Nyayalaya, Kunnummel Block, Kuttyadi is directed to transmit the records in the rent control petitions referred to above to the Rent Control Court, Nadhapuram for trial and disposal in accordance with law. Prayers made in the original petitions seeking a declaration that the petitioners are entitled to execute the orders passed by Gram Nyayalaya in rent control petitions are declined for the aforementioned reasons. Likewise, prayers in the original petitions to direct the Rent Control Court to consider the depositions of witnesses recorded by Gram Nyayalaya in the eviction proceedings as substantive piece of evidence are also declined. The Gram Nyayalaya shall notify the parties about the date of return of the eviction petitions so as to enable them to come and receive the same for presentation before appropriate court. All pending interlocutory applications will stand closed.