JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The appellant-State of Jharkhand has challenged the order dated 03.08.2016 passed in W.P.(S) No. 4385 of 2012, by which the penalty order dated 26.05.2012 has been quashed. 2. In the departmental enquiry, the writ petitioner-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) was inflicted penalty of censure and stoppage of two increments, however, without cumulative effect. 3. Two fold contentions have been raised by Mr. Shadab Bin Haque, the learned counsel for the appellants; (i) merely because a copy of the enquiry report has not been served upon the respondent the penalty inflicted upon the delinquent employee in a properly constituted departmental enquiry is not rendered illegal, and (ii) the writ Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the departmental authorities and quash the order of punishment. 4. As against the above, Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that to defend himself for a charge which touches upon black-marketing if a copy of the enquiry report is not furnished to the delinquent respondent it would definitely cause serious prejudice to him. It is contended that opinion of the Deputy Commissioner in his letter dated 20.09.2011 that the respondent has taken the decision to let-off the PDS shopkeepers with a simple warning were taken in the public interest and for smooth functioning of the PDS system is binding on the Department and while so, the writ Court has rightly interfered with the order of punishment. 5. The controversy which erupted on the effect of non-supply of the enquiry report to a delinquent employee was finally set at rest by a decision of Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad Vs. B. Karunakar and other” reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 . The decision in “B. Karunakar” came in view of the conflicting decisions in “Kailash Chander Asthana Vs. State of U.R” reported in (1988) 3 SCC 600 and “Union of India Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan” reported in (1991) 1 SCC 588 . In paragraph no. B. Karunakar and other” reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 . The decision in “B. Karunakar” came in view of the conflicting decisions in “Kailash Chander Asthana Vs. State of U.R” reported in (1988) 3 SCC 600 and “Union of India Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan” reported in (1991) 1 SCC 588 . In paragraph no. 30 of the reported judgment in “B. Karunakar”, it has been held that non-supply of enquiry report to a delinquent employee is a denial of reasonable opportunity and a breach of the principles of natural justice and therefore the delinquent-employee will be entitled to a copy of the report. But, it has also been held that merely because a copy of the enquiry report has not been furnished to a delinquent-employee the court/tribunal shall not automatically interfere with the order of punishment; what prejudice has been caused to him must be shown by the delinquent employee. In paragraph no. 31, the Supreme Court has held as under: 31. “Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer’s report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law.” 6. In “Haryana Financial Corpn. & Anr. Vs. Kailash Chandra Ahuja” reported in (2008) 9 SCC 31 , the Supreme Court taking note of the judgment in “B. Karunakar” has observed as under; 21. “From the ratio laid down in B. Karunakar it is explicitly clear that the doctrine of natural justice requires supply of a copy of the inquiry officer’s report to the delinquent if such inquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority. It is also clear that non-supply of report of the inquiry officer is in the breach of natural justice. But it is equally clear that failure to supply a report of the inquiry officer to the delinquent employee would not ipso facto result in the proceedings being declared null and void and the order of punishment non est and ineffective. It is also clear that non-supply of report of the inquiry officer is in the breach of natural justice. But it is equally clear that failure to supply a report of the inquiry officer to the delinquent employee would not ipso facto result in the proceedings being declared null and void and the order of punishment non est and ineffective. It is for the delinquent employee to plead and prove that non-supply of such report had caused prejudice and resulted in miscarriage of justice. If he is unable to satisfy the court on that point, the order of punishment cannot automatically be set aside.” 7. Now coming to the facts of the case, it needs to be indicated that after the respondent approached the writ Court he has filed an appeal against the order of punishment dated 26.05.2012, a reference of which finds mentioned in the letter dated 15.12.2014 vide Annexure-5 to the memo of this appeal. During pendency of the writ petition, he was directed to submit his response to the enquiry report; a copy of the enquiry report was furnished to him. 8. In this Letters Patent Appeal, notice to the respondent was issued on 18.08.2017 and the order dated 01.11.2017 reflects presence of the learned counsel for the respondent. Thereafter, this Letters Patent Appeal has been listed on 06.11.2017, 10.01.2018 and 17.01.2018. However, the respondent has not chosen to file an affidavit controverting the allegation on the appeal filed by him. In fact, it is an admitted fact the respondent has filed an appeal against the penalty order dated 26.05.2012 and his appeal has been dismissed. 9. Before the writ Court, what prejudice has been caused to him due to non-supply of the enquiry report was not demonstrated by the respondent. Nor before us. 10. The learned writ Court has interfered with the order of punishment dated 26.05.2012 primarily on three grounds; (i) a copy of the enquiry report was not served upon the writ petitioner, (ii) the charge of collusion with PDS shopkeepers in black-marketing of PDS goods is not proved to the hilt in the department proceeding, and (iii) the order revoking the suspension of the PDS shopkeepers was necessitated in the public interest as observed by the Deputy Commissioner. 11. 11. Having scrutinized the materials brought on record and after hearing the rival contentions, we are unable to agree with the reasons assigned by the learned writ Court. 12. Long back, it was held that interference with an order of punishment by the writ Court in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must remain confined to two situations; the order of punishment has been passed in breach of the rules of natural justice and, the order of punishment is contrary to the Discipline and Conduct Rules. Of course, where it appears to the writ Court that the departmental authorities have excluded from consideration a relevant material which ought to have been considered or considered irrelevant or extraneous materials which has led to the departmental authority to a wrong conclusion, the Court may quash the order of punishment, but it is not sufficiency of evidence which can be examined by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If it is found that an authority legally vested with jurisdiction has arrived at a conclusion which is reasonably supported by the evidence laid during the departmental enquiry, the High Court would not exercise its jurisdiction in a manner as if it is a Court of Appeal. After all, the writ Court does not act as an appellate authority; it does not sit in appeal over the decisions of the departmental authority [refer, “State of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs. Chitra Venkata Rao” reported in (1975) 2 SCC 557 ]. 13. Vide Resolution dated 05.08.2011 a departmental proceeding was initiated against the respondent. The charges as contained in the Prapatra-K which has been served upon the respondent vide letter dated 31.03.2011 were framed on eight counts. The main charge against him is that without conducting an enquiry and physical verification of the records he has brushed aside the complaints of black-marketing against the PDS dealers with a simple warning and that is what he has done in atleast eight cases which establishes that he was in league with the PDS dealers in black-marketing of the PDS goods. The charge-memo refers to thirty-six documents including the reports on the complaints made against the PDS dealers, which were relied by the Department in support of the charges framed against the appellant. The charge-memo refers to thirty-six documents including the reports on the complaints made against the PDS dealers, which were relied by the Department in support of the charges framed against the appellant. The Deputy Commissioner, Godda has submitted his comments vide letter dated 20.09.2011 to the charges levelled against the appellant; this is not a document referred in Prapatra 'K'. The enquiry report runs into 32 pages and it has exhaustively dealt with the charges against the respondent and his defence. Five of the eight charges have been found proved. In respect of charge no. 3, the enquiring officer has simply observed; “no special comments”. It was not a case pleaded by the respondent before the writ Court that the departmental enquiry was conducted in breach of the rules of natural justice, except that a copy of the enquiry report was not served upon him. In fact, the enquiry report prima-facie reveals that adequate opportunity was offered to the respondent to defend himself. Merely because some of the charges have not been found proved, in our opinion, the entire enquiry report cannot be brushed aside. It does not warrant any strenuous exercise to hold that comments of the Deputy Commissioner, Godda through letter dated 20.09.2011 is not what would guide the enquiring officer. Comments of the Deputy Commissioner, Godda is at best a piece of evidence, which, in the present case the enquiring officer has duly considered. In a case where there is absolutely no evidence brought against a delinquent employee during the departmental proceeding or where the punishment inflicted upon the delinquent employee is so disproportionate to the charges proved that it shocks conscience of the court, the writ Court would step in and interfere with the order of punishment. But, if there is some evidence on the basis of which the decision taken by the departmental authorities can be supported, the writ Court would not interfere with the order of punishment. It is preponderance of probability which is the test applied in a departmental enquiry, whereas in a criminal trial a charge must be proved beyond all shadow of reasonable doubt. Stand taken by the appellant that the charge of colluding with the PDS dealers in the departmental enquiry must have been proved to the hilt is without substance. It is preponderance of probability which is the test applied in a departmental enquiry, whereas in a criminal trial a charge must be proved beyond all shadow of reasonable doubt. Stand taken by the appellant that the charge of colluding with the PDS dealers in the departmental enquiry must have been proved to the hilt is without substance. The test of preponderance of probability applied in a departmental enquiry cannot be converted into one of beyond all shadows of reasonable doubt. In “Union of India vs. Sardar Bahadur” reported in (1972) 4 SCC 618 , the Supreme Court has held that the disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial and the standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. 14. The learned writ Court has apparently committed a mistake in law in interfering with the punishment order dated 26.05.2012 on the ground that the charges against the delinquent employee has not been proved to the hilt and that the Deputy Commissioner has opined that the decisions taken by the respondent was necessitated in the public interest. 15. In the above facts, finding serious infirmity in the impugned order dated 03.08.2016 passed in W.P.(S) No. 4385 of 2012, it is set-aside. 16. L.P.A. No. 10 of 2017 is allowed.