ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned counsel appears for the respondent-writ petitioner. I.A No.7888 of 2017 This application has been filed seeking condonation of delay of 97 days in preferring this application. Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the delay of 97 days must be explained by the appellant which, of course, has not been explained by the appellant-State of Jharkhand. No doubt, there should be sufficient cause shown by the appellants for condonation of delay in filing this Letters Patent Appeal beyond the period of limitation, but then, it is not really the length of delay which is the determinative factor. Ultimately it is discretion of the Court which it exercises on the basis of the pleadings of the parties. A negligent litigant cannot be granted indulgence, but a vigilant litigant must be afforded opportunity to contest the matter on merits. It is the stand taken by the appellant-State of Jharkhand that before this Letters Patent Appeal was filed, opinion of the learned Advocate-General was taken and, therefore, delay has occurred in filing this Letters Patent Appeal. Having considered the overall circumstance of the case, we are satisfied that I.A. No. 7888 of 2017 deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, delay of 97 days in filing L.P.A No. 503 of 2017 is condoned. L.P.A No. 503 of 2017 In view of the limited issue involved in this Letters Patent Appeal, with agreement of the learned counsel for the parties we have taken up the main appeal for hearing at this stage itself. 2. The respondent-writ petitioner (hereinafter referred to as writ petitioner) was aggrieved of the penalty order dated 06.06.2013 by which punishment of censure and recovery of Rs.2,05,935/-was inflicted upon him. In an enquiry he was exonerated, but without affording an opportunity of hearing he was inflicted the aforesaid punishment vide order dated 06.06.2013. The learned writ Court has referred to the decision in “Punjab National Bank And Others Vs. Kunj Behari Misra” reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held, thus: “16. In an enquiry he was exonerated, but without affording an opportunity of hearing he was inflicted the aforesaid punishment vide order dated 06.06.2013. The learned writ Court has referred to the decision in “Punjab National Bank And Others Vs. Kunj Behari Misra” reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held, thus: “16. In Karunakar case the question arose whether after the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution, when the enquiry officer was other than a disciplinary authority, was the delinquent employee entitled to a copy of the enquiry report of the enquiry officer before the disciplinary authority takes decision on the question of guilt of the delinquent. It was sought to be contended in that case that as the right to show cause against the penalty proposed to be levied had been taken away by the 42nd Amendment, therefore, there was no necessity to give to the delinquent a copy of the enquiry report before the disciplinary authority took the final decision as to whether to impose a penalty or not. Explaining the effect of the 42nd Amendment the Constitution Bench at p. 755 observed that: (SCC para 28) “All that has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry officer’s report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges.” The Court explained that the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, the enquiry officer’s report and the delinquent employee’s reply to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. It is the second right which was taken away by the 42nd Amendment but the right of the charged officer to receive the report of the enquiry officer was an essential part of the first stage itself. This was expressed by the Court in the following words: (SCC p. 754, para 26) “26. It is the second right which was taken away by the 42nd Amendment but the right of the charged officer to receive the report of the enquiry officer was an essential part of the first stage itself. This was expressed by the Court in the following words: (SCC p. 754, para 26) “26. The reason why the right to receive the report of the enquiry officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer form an important material before the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It is negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the enquiry, it is also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the enquiry officer along with the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the enquiry officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If the enquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute an additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. If the enquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute an additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However, when the enquiry officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusions. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the enquiry officer’s findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the enquiry officer and the representation of the employee against it. 17. These observations are clearly in tune with the observations in Bimal Kumar Pandit case quoted earlier and would be applicable at the first stage itself. The aforesaid passages clearly bring out the necessity of the authority which is to finally record an adverse finding to give a hearing to the delinquent officer. If the enquiry officer had given an adverse finding, as per Karunakar case the first stage required an opportunity to be given to the employee to represent to the disciplinary authority, even when an earlier opportunity had been granted to them by the enquiry officer. It will not stand to reason that when the finding in favour of the delinquent officers is proposed to be overturned by the disciplinary authority then no opportunity should be granted. The first stage of the enquiry is not completed till the disciplinary authority has recorded its findings. The principles of natural justice would demand that the authority which proposes to decide against the delinquent officer must give him a hearing. When the enquiring officer holds the charges to be proved, then that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who can make a representation before the disciplinary authority takes further action which may be prejudicial to the delinquent officer. When the enquiring officer holds the charges to be proved, then that report has to be given to the delinquent officer who can make a representation before the disciplinary authority takes further action which may be prejudicial to the delinquent officer. When, like in the present case, the enquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer but the disciplinary authority proposes to differ with such conclusions, then that authority which is deciding against the delinquent officer must give him an opportunity of being heard for otherwise he would be condemned unheard. In departmental proceedings, what is of ultimate importance is the finding of the disciplinary authority.” 3. The learned writ Court has quashed the punishment order dated 06.06.2013. The learned writ Court has held as under; 6. After bestowing my anxious considerations to the rivalized submissions and on perusal of the relevant records, I am of the considered view that the petitioner has been able to make out a case for interference, due to the following facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements: (I) On the basis of report submitted by Flying Squad Wing for making excess payment, in respect of construction of pond and well, to the contractors, the petitioner was served with a show cause notice, to which, the petitioner replied. It appears that considering the contents of reply, the matter was re-enquired by the Chief Engineer (Mechanical) who submitted second enquiry report. But, the disciplinary authority brushing aside the second enquiry without differing to the conclusion arrived at by the Chief Engineer (Mechanical) and without giving any cogent reason and even without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, straightway passed the impugned order, which is cryptic, bald and non-speaking, hence, the same is not sustainable in the eye of law. It is settled principles of law that whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority, then before coming to its own conclusion, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and further opportunity to represent before him must be afforded to such delinquent employee. View of this Court gets fortified by the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vs. Kunj Behari Misra as reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 . View of this Court gets fortified by the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vs. Kunj Behari Misra as reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 . (II) Furthermore, it appears that in the case at hand the departmental proceeding is fraught with procedural irregularity, as neither enquiry officer was appointed nor any witnesses was examined and even after second enquiry, no second show cause notice was served upon the petitioner, rendering the impugned order vulnerable for breach of principles of Audi Alteram Partem. 4. The decision in Kunj Bihari Mishra case has been reiterated in several other judgments including the one in “Yoginath D. Bagde Vs. State of Maharastra and Another” reported in (1999) 7 SCC 739 . In view of the settled position in law that even before a minor punishment is imposed the employee has a right to be heard, we find no infirmity in the impugned order dated 16.05.2017 by which the penalty order dated 06.06.2013 has been quashed, however, it is clarified that, as is the settled law that in cases in which an order has been quashed on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice the department may proceed with the enquiry from the stage at which the breach has been found committed by the departmental authority, the appellant-State shall be at liberty to proceed against the delinquent-employee, in accordance with law. 5. Accordingly L.P.A. No. 503 of 2017 stands disposed of. LAP disposed of.