JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner, who is stated to be a stage carriage operator with Ext.P1 regular permit on the route Mavoor-Kizhissery via Cherupa, Ooorkkadavu, Vazhakkad, Edavannappara, Omanur and Pothuvettippara with halt at Edavannappara, in respect of stage carriage bearing registration No.KL-10/Q-9955, has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to consider and take a decision on Ext.P4 application dated 09.05.2019 with a request to operate stage carriage bearing registration No.KL-10/S-4203, in the place of stage bearing registration No.KL-10/Q-9955, on the route Mavoor-Kizhissery, covered by Ext.P1 permit. 2. On 04.07.2019, when this writ petition came up for admission, the learned Government Pleader sought time to get instructions. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 4. As can be seen from Ext.P3 proceedings dated 19.04.2018 of the 1st respondent Regional Transport Authority, a belated application for replacement made by the petitioner stands rejected with a finding that the petitioner has intentionally missed the opportunity for replacement and his request is against the provisions under Rule 152 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. The decision of the 1st respondent Regional Transport Authority in Ext.P3 proceedings (Item No.48) reads thus; “Heard. This is to consider the belated application for replacement of permit in respect of the stage carriage, KL-10/Q-9955, kept under suspended animation, operating on the route, Mayoor-Keezhissery as ordinary service vide permit No.10/4119/2014/M, which was valid from 10.09.2014 to 09.09.2019 to a later model stage carriage KL-10/S-4203. The stage carriage KL-10/Q-9955 is covered by regular permit which is valid from 10.09.2014 to 09.09.2019. The permit holder applied for the issue of clearance certificate in respect of the stage carriage KL-10/Q-9955, without surrendering the regular permit and thereby keeping the permit under suspended animation in obedience to the direction from Hon. High Court of Kerala, in W.P. (C)No.14245 of 2015(E), dated 12.05.2015. The Hon. Court has directed to issue the clearance certificate in respect of the stage carriage keeping the permit under suspended animation: Accordingly, the clearance certificate was issued to the stage carriage KL-10/Q-9955. Now, after three years the permit holder has submitted an application on 05.03.2018 for the replacement of the above said suspended animation permit to the later model stage carriage, KL-10/S-4203. Now, after three years the permit holder has submitted an application on 05.03.2018 for the replacement of the above said suspended animation permit to the later model stage carriage, KL-10/S-4203. This authority has considered the application and verified connected files in details in view of the directions contained in the judgment of Hon. High Court of Kerala. Normally, a permit which is under suspended animation has to be replaced by another stage carriage within four months from the issue of clearance certificate. Now the permit holder has applied for replacement after three years. This authority is of the opinion that the applicant has intentionally missed the opportunity for replacement his permit and this is against the provisions of KMVR 152. In the light of the above findings and observations, this authority is of the view that there is no necessity to condone the delay due to the intentional negligence and laxity of the applicant to operate a stage carriage. Hence this authority reject the application for replacement.” 5. Ext.P3 order of the 1st respondent is appealable before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which provides for an appeal by any person aggrieved by the refusal to grant permission under Section 83 of the Act, within the time limit of thirty days of the receipt of the order appealed against, as provided under sub-rule (1) of Rule 141 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules. Rule 141 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules reads thus; “141. Appeals and Revision Petitions.-(1) Time limit for filing.-An Appeal under Section 89 of the Act shall be filed within 30 days for the receipt of the order appealed against and an application for revision under Section 90 of the Act shall be presented to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal within 30 days of the date of the order against which the application is preferred: Provided that where an appeal petition or an application for revision is presented to the Tribunal within the said period but is returned by the Tribunal for representation in the prescribed manner and if such petitioner or application is re-presented within 15 days in the manner prescribed it shall be deemed to have been presented within the prescribed time for the purpose of this rule. (2) Fees.-A fee of one thousand rupees shall be paid in respect of each appeal and the fee payable in respect of each application for revision shall be one thousand rupees, payment being made by means of Treasury chalans to be enclosed with the memorandum of appeal or application of revision. (3) Manner of filing appeal or revision.-No appeal or revision petition shall relate to more than one order. Every appeal or revision petition shall be presented to the Tribunal as provided in the Kerala State Transport Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1988.” 6. In view of the provisions under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, read with sub-rule (1) of Rule 141 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, an appeal filed under Section 89 of the Act challenging an order which is appealable under clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (1) has to be filed before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, within thirty days from the date of receipt of that order. As per the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 141, such an appeal presented to the Tribunal within the said period, but is returned by the Tribunal for representation in the manner prescribed, shall be re-presented within fifteen days. As per sub-rule (2) of Rule 141, a fee of Rs.1000/-shall be paid in respect of each appeal. As per sub-rule (3) of Rule 141, no such appeal shall relate to more than one order and every such appeal shall be presented to the Tribunal as provided in the Kerala State Transport Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1988. 7. In Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Das Agarwal [ (2014) 1 SCC 603 ], the Apex Court held that non-entertainment of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when an efficacious alternative remedy is available is a rule and self imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, despite the existence of alternative remedy. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, despite the existence of alternative remedy. However, High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner and he has approached the High Court without availing the same, unless he has made out an exceptional case warranting such interference or there exists sufficient ground to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. 8. In Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C.[ (2018) 3 SCC 85 ] the Apex Court reiterated that the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought not to be entertained if alternative statutory remedies are available, except in cases falling within the well defined exceptions as observed in Chaabil Das Agarwal's case (supra), i.e., where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice. After referring to the law laid down in Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes [ AIR 1964 SC 1419 ] and Titaghur Paper Mills Company Ltd. v. State of Orissa [ (1983) 2 SCC 433 ] the Apex Court held that High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. 9. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. 9. In Thansingh Nathmal's case (supra) a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Article. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily, the court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not, therefore, act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up. 10. In Titaghur Paper Mills' case (supra) a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that, the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Titaghur Paper Mills' case (supra) a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that, the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford [(1859) 6 CBNS 336] at page 356 in the following passage: "There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon statute ..... But there is a third class, viz., where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it ..... the remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to." The rule laid down in that passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspaper Ltd. [1919 AC 368] and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. [1935 AC 532] and Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. [ AIR 1940 PC 105 ]. It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights and has been followed by the Apex Court throughout. 11. In Pavithran V. State of Kerala ( 2009 (4) KHC 4 ), a Full Bench of this Court held that, whenever an adverse order is passed against a person, unless the same is challenged before the appropriate forum, within the prescribed time limit, the said order will become final. 12. In the absence of an appeal filed under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, Ext.P3 order dated 19.04.2018 of the 1st respondent Regional Transport Authority has attained finality. 13. 12. In the absence of an appeal filed under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, Ext.P3 order dated 19.04.2018 of the 1st respondent Regional Transport Authority has attained finality. 13. The petitioner made Ext.P4 representation dated 09.05.2019 before the 2nd respondent Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority to place the matter once again in the next meeting of Regional Transport Authority to reconsider the request for replacement of stage carriage bearing registration No.KL-10/Q-9955, with a stage carriage bearing registration No.KL-10/S-4203. 14. In Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh [ (1977) 4 SCC 145 ] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that a writ of mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of that officer to discharge the statutory obligation. The chief function of a writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep subordinate tribunals and officers exercising public functions with in the limit of their jurisdiction. Paragraph 15 of the said decision reads thus; "15. .......... There is abundant authority in favour of the proposition that a writ of mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of that officer to discharge the statutory obligation. The chief function of a writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep subordinate tribunals and officers exercising public functions with in the limit of their jurisdiction. It follows, therefore, that in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute to enforce its performance. (See Lekhraj Satramdas Lalvani v. Deputy Custodian-cum-Managing Officer [ 1966 (1) SCR 120 : AIR 1966 SC 334 ], Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. The Governing Body of the Nalanda College [1962 Supp (2) SCR 144 : AIR 1962 SC 1210 ] and Dr. Umakant Saran v. State of Bihar [ (1973) 1 SCC 485 : AIR 1973 SC 964 ]. In the instant case, it has not been shown by respondent No. 1 that there is any statute or rule having the force of law which casts a duty on respondents 2 to 4 which they failed to perform. Umakant Saran v. State of Bihar [ (1973) 1 SCC 485 : AIR 1973 SC 964 ]. In the instant case, it has not been shown by respondent No. 1 that there is any statute or rule having the force of law which casts a duty on respondents 2 to 4 which they failed to perform. All that is sought to be enforced is an obligation flowing from a contract which, as already indicated, is also not binding and enforceable. Accordingly, we are clearly of the opinion that respondent No. 1 was not entitled to apply for grant of a writ of mandamus under Art.226 of the Constitution and the High Court was not competent to issue the same." (underline supplied) 15. In Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Sunder Lal Jain [ (2008) 2 SCC 280 ] the Apex Court held that, in order that a writ of mandamus may be issued, there must be a legal right with the party asking for the writ to compel the performance of some statutory duty cast upon the authorities. In the said decision, the Apex Court noticed the principles on which a writ of mandamus can be issued have been stated as under in 'The Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies' by F. G. Ferris and F. G. Ferris, Jr. that, mandamus is, subject to the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, the appropriate remedy to enforce a plain, positive, specific and ministerial duty presently existing and imposed by law upon officers and others who refuse or neglect to perform such duty, when there is no other adequate and specific legal remedy and without which there would be a failure of justice. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said decision read thus; "11. The principles on which a writ of mandamus can be issued have been stated as under in 'The Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies' by F. G. Ferris and F. G. Ferris, Jr. : Note 187.-Mandamus, at common law, is a highly prerogative writ, usually issuing out of the highest court of general jurisdiction, in the name of the sovereignty, directed to any natural person, corporation or inferior court within the jurisdiction, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, and which appertains to their office or duty. : Note 187.-Mandamus, at common law, is a highly prerogative writ, usually issuing out of the highest court of general jurisdiction, in the name of the sovereignty, directed to any natural person, corporation or inferior court within the jurisdiction, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, and which appertains to their office or duty. Generally speaking, it may be said that mandamus is a summary writ, issuing from the proper court, commanding the official or board to which it is addressed to perform some specific legal duly to which the party applying for the writ is entitled of legal right to have performed. Note 192.-Mandamus is, subject to the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, the appropriate remedy to enforce a plain, positive, specific and ministerial duty presently existing and imposed by law upon officers and others who refuse or neglect to perform such duty, when there is no other adequate and specific legal remedy and without which there would be a failure of justice. The chief function of the writ is to compel the performance of public duties prescribed by statute, and to keep subordinate and inferior bodies and Tribunals exercising public functions within their jurisdictions. It is not necessary, however, that the duty be imposed by statute; mandamus lies as well for the enforcement of a common law duty. Note 196.-Mandamus is not a writ of right. Its issuance unquestionably lies in the sound judicial discretion of the Court, subject always to the well settled principles which have been established by the Courts. An action in mandamus is not governed by the principles of ordinary litigation where the matters alleged on one side and not denied on the other are taken as true, and Judgment pronounced thereon as of course. While mandamus is classed as a legal remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles. Before granting the writ the Court may, and should, look to the larger public interest which may be concerned -an interest which private litigants are apt to over look when striving for private ends. The Court should act in view of all the existing facts, and with due regard to the consequences which will result. It is in every case a discretion dependent upon all the surrounding facts and circumstances. Note 206.-.......... The Court should act in view of all the existing facts, and with due regard to the consequences which will result. It is in every case a discretion dependent upon all the surrounding facts and circumstances. Note 206.-.......... The correct rule is that mandamus will not lie where the duty is clearly discretionary and the party upon whom the duty rests has exercised his discretion reasonably and within his jurisdiction, that is, upon facts sufficient to support his action. 12. These very principles have been adopted in our country. In Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh [ (1977) 4 SCC 145 : AIR 1977 SC 2149 ], after referring to the earlier decisions in Lekhraj Satramdas Lalvani v. N.M. Shah [ AIR 1966 SC 334 ], Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. Nalanda College [ AIR 1962 SC 1210 ] and Dr. Umakant Saran v. State of Bihar [ (1973) 1 SCC 485 : AIR 1973 SC 964 ], this Court observed as follows in paragraph 15 of the reports: "15. .......... There is abundant authority in favour of the proposition that a writ of mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of the officer to discharge the statutory obligation. The chief function of a writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep subordinate Tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limit of their jurisdiction. It follows, therefore, that in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. ......... In the instant case, it has not been shown by respondent No. 1 that there is any statute or rule having the force of law which casts a duty on respondents 2 to 4 which they failed to perform. All that is sought to be enforced is an obligation flowing from a contract which, as already indicated, is also not binding and enforceable. All that is sought to be enforced is an obligation flowing from a contract which, as already indicated, is also not binding and enforceable. Accordingly, we are clearly of the opinion that respondent No. 1 was not entitled to apply for grant of a writ of mandamus under Art.226 of the Constitution and the High Court was not competent to issue the same." Therefore, in order that a writ of mandamus may be issued, there must be a legal right with the party asking for the writ to compel the performance of some statutory duty cast upon the authorities. The respondents have not been able to show that there is any statute or rule having the force of law which casts a duty on the appellant bank to declare their account as NPA from 31st March, 2000 and apply RBI guidelines to their case." 16. In State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra [ (1996) 9 SCC 309 ], the Apex Court held that, under the Constitution a mandamus can be issued by the Court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and said right was subsisting on the date of the petition. The duty that may be enjoined by mandamus may be one imposed by the Constitution or a Statute or by Rules or orders having the force of law. But no mandamus can be issued to direct the Government to refrain from enforcing the provisions of law or to do something which is contrary to law. Paragraph 10 of the said decision reads thus; "10. Notwithstanding the aforesaid Statutory Rule and without applying the mind to the aforesaid Rule the High Court relying upon some earlier decisions of the court came to hold that the list does not expire after a period of one year which on the face of its erroneous. Further question that arises in this context is whether the High Court was justified in issuing the mandamus to the appellant to make recruitment of the Writ Petitioners. Under the Constitution a mandamus can be issued by the Court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and said right was subsisting on the date of the petition. Under the Constitution a mandamus can be issued by the Court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and said right was subsisting on the date of the petition. The duty that may be enjoined by mandamus may be one imposed by the Constitution or a Statute or by Rules or orders having the force of law. But no mandamus can be issued to direct the Government to refrain from enforcing the provisions of law or to do something which is contrary to law. This being the position and in view of the Statutory Rules contained in Rule 26 of the Recruitment Rules we really fail to understand how the High Court issue the impugned direction to recruit the respondents who were included in the select list prepared on 4.4.87 and the list no longer survived after one year and the rights, if any, of persons included in the list did not subsist. ......." 17. In Bhaskara Rao A.B. v. CBI [ (2011) 10 SCC 259 ], the Apex Court reiterated that, generally, no court has competence to issue a direction contrary to law nor can the court direct an authority to act in contravention of the statutory provisions. The courts are meant to enforce the rule of law and not to pass the orders or directions which are contrary to what has been injected by law. Vide: State of Punjab v. Renuka Singla [ (1996) 8 SCC 90 ], State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra [ 1996 (9) SCC 309 ], Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. [ (1996) 4 SCC 453 ], University of Allahabad v. Dr. Anand Prakash Mishra [ (1997) 10 SCC 264 ] and Karnataka SRTC v. Ashrafulla Khan [ (2002) 2 SCC 560 ]. 18. Having failed to challenge Ext.P3 order by filing an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, within the time limit specified in sub-rule (1) of Rule 141 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, after remitting the requisite fee, the petitioner cannot seek a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to consider and take a decision on Ext.P4 application, which is one filed seeking reconsideration of Ext.P2 application for replacement, which has already been rejected by Ext.P3 order dated 19.04.2018. This Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, cannot issue any such direction, in contravention of the statutory provisions referred to hereinbefore, as no mandamus can be issued to do something, which is contrary to law. In the result, this writ petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.