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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 588 (MP)

NEERENDRA SINGH CHAUHAN v. STATE OF M. P.

2019-08-16

ATUL SHREEDHARAN

body2019
ORDER : – The present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, aggrieved by the order dated 3-7-2019 passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (herein after) referred to as the ‘STAT’ for the sake of brevity) in Appeal No. 36/19 preferred by the respondent No. 4 Smt. Salma Khan. 2. The petitioner states that he is in the transport business and has been operating buses on the strength of permits granted by the Transport Authority. In the year 2007, the State of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra executed a reciprocal agreement under section 88(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “Act of 1988”) for the routes between Betul to Nagpur. By the said agreement, the number of trips for the routes which comes under the territorial jurisdiction of both the States were fixed. For the routes in question, there were six trips fixed under three permits. The petitioner as well as the respondents No. 4 and other bus operators submitted their application for grant of inter-State permits on the routes, in question. In all, eleven applications including that of the petitioner and the respondent No. 4 were received by the authority. 3. The petitioner submits that along with the application, he had filed all the relevant documents for the proposed vehicle bearing Registration No. MP 28-P/1299 along with the stand by vehicle bearing No. MP20AP/2299. It is further submitted by the petitioner that he has submitted all the documents pertaining to the vehicle including the no-objection certificate issued by the Transport Department with regard to deposit of the road tax. The petitioner further states that there are no tax dues against the petitioner and such an objection was never raised against him. 4. As regards the respondent No. 4, the petitioner alleges that she had also submitted an application for grant of permit on the aforementioned route but deliberately concealed details pertaining to vehicle bearing No. MP 48-P/0768 along with the application and in the affidavit submitted by her. It is the case of the petitioner that there were tax dues against the aforementioned vehicle owned by the respondent No. 4. 5. The respondent No. 2 is stated to have held a meeting on 28-9-2018 and heard all the applicants. It is the case of the petitioner that there were tax dues against the aforementioned vehicle owned by the respondent No. 4. 5. The respondent No. 2 is stated to have held a meeting on 28-9-2018 and heard all the applicants. The petitioner raised an objection against the respondent No. 4, application on the ground that there were tax dues against the vehicleowned by her hearing No. MP48-P/0768 and that the respondent No. 4 did not mention about this vehicle in her affidavit. 6. The respondent No. 2 i.e. the State Transport Authority (hereinafter referred to as the “STA” for short) heard all the parties concerned, took into account the objections and passed a speaking order on 28-2-2019 thereby granting permits to the present petitioner, Mr. Vijay Shukla and M/s District Transport Service. The petitioner contends that the STA has given separate findings against each applicants and has also given reasons for rejecting the applications of the respondent No. 4 on the ground that it found the respondent No. 4 to be a defaulter on account of non-payment of the road tax on vehicle bearing No. MP48-P/0768 and that the affidavit sworn by the respondent No. 4 bore incorrect facts and therefore she was found guilty of suppresio veri and suggestio falsi. It was also observed in the order of the STA that upon verification from the department website, it was found that on 2-2-2019 an amount of Rs. 22,35,981/- was due towards the road tax upon the respondent No. 4 and subsequently, on 6-2-2019, on the same website, the amount was corrected and above as Rs. 1,40,990/-, which the respondent No. 4 had deposited the same day i.e., 6-2-2019. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to page No. 37 of the petition, (Annexure P/2), which is an order dated 28-2-2019 passed by the STA, Specifically, attention has been drawn to the internal page No. 7 of the said order, which deals that the respondent No. 4 who was applicant No. 5 before the STA, wherein the STA has observed that in all, the respondent No. 4 has placed on record the NOC pertaining to ten vehicles. Thereafter, it goes on to find that there is one more vehicle, belonging to the applicant (respondent No. 4 herein) which is MP48-P/0768, as is revealed from on oral complaint to that effect. Thereafter, it goes on to find that there is one more vehicle, belonging to the applicant (respondent No. 4 herein) which is MP48-P/0768, as is revealed from on oral complaint to that effect. On the said complaint being examined by the STA, it was discovered that the respondent No. 4 in her affidavit and through her counsel, never made a mention about this vehicle and neither she had mention it anywhere in the affidavit either. The STA is said to have addressed an E-mail to the District Transport Officer, Betul vide letter No. 490/A.P.A./Prasha/18, Gwalior dated 2-2-2019 seeking details relating to the tax default on the aforementioned vehicle belonging to the respondent No. 4. However, till 6-2-2019, the District Transport Officer did not convey the information sought for by the STA. The website of the department was checked by the STA and it was revealed that the respondent No. 4 had deposited an amount of Rs. 1,40,990/-; receipt for which bearing No. 9819486458538 dated 6-2-2019 was issued to the respondent No. 4 at 23.15 hours and thereafter, there was no more dues being reflected with regard to the road tax on the aforementioned vehicle belonging to the respondent No. 4 in the website of the department. On the basis of the said position, the STA arrived at a finding that it was clear that vehicle bearing No. MP48/0768 is registered in the name of respondent No. 4 and on the date of hearing the parties, there was arrears of road tax on the said vehicle. On that basis, the STA observed that the application and the affidavit submitted by the respondent No. 4 and her counsel on 28-9-2018, the fact relating to the arrears of road tax was deliberately concealed by respondent No. 4 in order to mislead the authority. Thus, on the ground of filing of false affidavit and conveying incorrect information, the respondent No. 4 was considered to be an incompetent recipient of permanent permit. 8. Aggrieved by the said decision of the STA, the respondent No. 4 preferred an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (for short the “STAT”), which passed the impugned order. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to the elaborate impugned order, which is marked and annexed to the petition as Annexure P/1. 8. Aggrieved by the said decision of the STA, the respondent No. 4 preferred an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (for short the “STAT”), which passed the impugned order. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to the elaborate impugned order, which is marked and annexed to the petition as Annexure P/1. Assailing the legality of the said order, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the only ground on which the order of the STA was set aside by the impugned order so far as it pertains to the petitioner and the respondent No. 4 are concerned, was on the ground that the petitioner did not file the documents to show that he had paid the road tax with regard to the vehicles owned by him. In order to establish the same, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to the impugned order dated 3-7-2019 (Annex. P/1). Specifically, attention of this Court has been invited to para 17 of the said order passed by the STAT with specific reference to the contents of item No. 7 in the chart given by the STAT in which the STAT has come to the following conclusion – ^^vkosnd }kjk /kkfjr cl Øekad ,eŒihŒ 48@ih@0768 dh tkudkjh ugha nh xbZ rFkk mDr cl ij cdk;k ugha gksus laca/kh Áek.k i= Hkh ÁLrqr ugha fd;k x;kA** In the column on the right hand side, the Tribunal has entered those facts pertaining to the petitioner's application before the STA and observed that – ^^vkosnd }kjk /kkfjr 'ks"k pkj clksa ds laca/k esa dj cdk;k ugha gksus laca/kh Áek.k i= ÁLrqr ugha fd;k x;kA ijarq mu ij eksVj;ku dj cdk;k ugha gksuk crk;k x;k gSA** In other words, the STAT arrived at the finding as regards the respondent No. 4, that bus bearing No. MP48-P/0768 owned by the respondent No. 4, no information relating to the payment of road tax has been given by the respondent No. 4. 9. As regards the petitioner, the Tribunal holds that the four houses owned by the petitioner, there is no certificate given by him with regard to the payment of the road tax. However, in the same breath, the Tribunal held that there is no road tax default on the part of the petitioner herein. 9. As regards the petitioner, the Tribunal holds that the four houses owned by the petitioner, there is no certificate given by him with regard to the payment of the road tax. However, in the same breath, the Tribunal held that there is no road tax default on the part of the petitioner herein. Thereafter, the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to para 20 of the order passed by the Tribunal, which reads as follows : – ^^LFkk;h vuqKk Ánk; fd;s tkus laca/kh vkosnu i=ksa ij fopkj djrs le; vihykFkhZ@vkosfndk }kjk Lo;a rFkk vius ifjokj ds lnL;ksa }kjk /kkfjr lHkh 10 okguksa ds laca/k esa ¼cl Øekad ,eŒihŒ 48@ih@0768 dks NksM+dj½ dj cdk;k ugha gksus laca/kh Áek.k i= ÁLrqr fd;k x;k gSA ijarq mRrjoknh Øekad&03 uhjsUæ flag pkSgku }kjk /kkfjr ikap clksa esa ls rhu clksa ds laca/k esa dj cdk;k ugha gksus laca/kh Áek.k i= dks ÁLrqr ugha fd;k x;k gSA tcfd ^^dj cdk;k ugha gksus laca/kh Áek.k&i=** vuqKk Ánk; djus laca/kh vkosnu i=ksa ij fopkj djus ds iwoZ ÁLrqr fd;k tkuk vko';d gSA bl laca/k esa fd'ku fo:} LVsV vkWQ e/; Áns'k o vU;] 2008 ¼1½ ,eŒihŒtsŒvkjŒ 87 esa Áfrikfnr fl}kar voyksdu gSA** In this paragraph, the Tribunal has commented that out of the 5 buses being plied by the petitioner, the petitioner has not given any certificate with regard to 3 of those buses to show that there was no road tax pending on the said buses. It further goes to give a finding on the said buses. It further goes to give a finding that the certificate relating to no dues is essential before the grant of permit which was to be provided by the party before his application was decided. The Tribunal has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Kisan vs. State of M. P. and another, reported in 2008(1) MPJR 87 . This Court shall deal with the aforesaid case at the appropriate stage. Thus, the only ground on which the permanent license/permit granted to the petitioner herein by the STA was set aside by the Tribunal, was on account of what has been observed herein above. 10. This Court shall deal with the aforesaid case at the appropriate stage. Thus, the only ground on which the permanent license/permit granted to the petitioner herein by the STA was set aside by the Tribunal, was on account of what has been observed herein above. 10. In paragraph 24 of impugned order, the learned Tribunal has held that there is no dispute of the fact that the appellant did not give any details with regard to the bus bearing No. MP48-P/0768 and neither did she give any details with regard to the default of payment of the road tax on the said date. Thus, in the eyes of the learned Tribunal also, there was no dispute with regard to the fact that tax on the offending vehicle was not paid by the respondent No. 4 on the date on which her application for permanent permit was being considered by the STA. Likewise, as stated earlier hereinabove, the learned Tribunal has also found in paragraph 17 at S. No. 7 (the chart made therein), that there were no dues of road tax owed by the petitioner to the authority. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 has however argued that the learned counsel for the petitioner has conveniently omitted reading out paragraph 28, 29 and 30 of the Tribunal’s order, which according to the learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 is in favour of his client. The sum and substance of the contents of those three paragraphs viz., paras 28, 29 and 30, are to the effect that the respondent No. 4 could not be blamed for not having paid the road tax on the vehicle bearing No. MP48-P/0768, as the dues fixed on the said vehicle maintained by the authority in its digital record was erroneous. The finding of the learned Tribunal in favour of the respondent No. 4 was that when the dues were checked on 2-2-2019, the web-site of the authority reflected that the amount due towards the road tax was Rs. 22,35,981/- Whereas, subsequently on 6-2-2019, the same was corrected by the authority to Rs. 1,40,990/-, and on the same day itself, the respondent No. 4 had paid off the dues. 22,35,981/- Whereas, subsequently on 6-2-2019, the same was corrected by the authority to Rs. 1,40,990/-, and on the same day itself, the respondent No. 4 had paid off the dues. Under the circumstances, the respondent No. 4 was not to be faulted, as the delay in payment of the road tax was on account of the erroneous maintenance of the digital records by the authority, which initially reflected that the dues were Rs. 22,35,981/-. 12. The only issue before this Court is whether the order passed by the STA by which the permit of the respondent No. 4 was declined and was granted to the petitioner herein on the grounds of concealment of material facts by the respondents No. 4 in relation to vehicle No. MP48-P/0768 by non-disclosure of the fact that the said vehicle was also owned by the petitioner and there was dues towards the road tax on the said vehicle, is correct in the eyes of law. The STA had rejected the application of the respondent No. 4 for grant of permanent permit on account of the false affidavit sworn by her giving incorrect details. Whereby she had concealed the existence of vehicle No. MP48-P/0768 and the road tax due upon it. It is pertinent to mention here that the existence of this vehicle (MP48-P/0768) and the road tax payable on the said vehicle was a fact which was brought out by the petitioner in his complaint against the respondent No. 4. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 has argued that it is mandatory to disclose material things regarding all the vehicles. He further stated that the respondent No. 4 had applied for a regular permit on 25-6-2010 and that the same was kept pending by the STA and that the application of the petitioner for grant of regular permit came much later. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 has been plying the vehicle on the routes from Betul to Nagpur since 30-6-2010 on temporary permit. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 has been plying the vehicle on the routes from Betul to Nagpur since 30-6-2010 on temporary permit. He has further submitted by drawing the attention of this Court to page 76 of the petition, which is a letter written to the Taxation Officer of District Transport Office at Betul by the respondent No. 4 has also submitted that the respondent No. 4 by which, the respondent No. 4 had prayed that the road tax as reflected in the computer relating to the vehicle in question had been deleted from the records. This letter was written on 17-8-2016. This Court shall deal with the relevance of this at a later stage. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also drawn the attention of this Court to page No. 78 of the petition, which bears the order dated 24-7-2017 passed by this Court in W. P. No. 10417/2017 whereby, this Court had given a direction to the petitioner to re-submit a representation to the District Transport Officer, Betul, who was directed to consider and decide the same in accordance with law within a period of 45 days, by a reasoned order and communicate the outcome to the petitioner Undisputedly, this petition was moved by the respondent No. 4 before this Court, who was petitioner No. 2 in the said case in relation to the road tax accruing on the aforementioned bus which was not disclosed by the respondent No. 4 while seeking a permanent permit. Once again, this Court shall come back to the relevance of the aforesaid order at a later stage. 15. The next argument put forth by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 was that the digital-records maintained by the I. T. section of the RTO Office was defective, as on 2-2-2019, the default on road tax on the aforementioned vehicle was shown as Rs. 22,35,980/-. Subsequently, he says that the same was corrected on 6-2-2019 and the amount shown was Rs. 1,40,990/-, Which undisputedly was paid on the same day by the respondent No. 4 to the authority. It has also been submitted that there has not been any deliberate concealment by the respondent No. 4 of the aforementioned fact. 16. 22,35,980/-. Subsequently, he says that the same was corrected on 6-2-2019 and the amount shown was Rs. 1,40,990/-, Which undisputedly was paid on the same day by the respondent No. 4 to the authority. It has also been submitted that there has not been any deliberate concealment by the respondent No. 4 of the aforementioned fact. 16. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents filed with the petition, the reply of the respondent No. 4 and the documents filed therewith and the judgments placed before this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner. This Court is of the opinion that this petition deserves to be allowed for the reasons enumerated hereinafter. 17. The undisputable facts in this case is that on 28-9-2018 when the respondent No. 2 held the meeting and heard all the applicants for grant of permanent permit on the routes from Betul to Nagpur, the respondent No. 4 had not disclosed the existence of vehicle bearing No. MP48-P/0768 or the tax that was due on the said vehicle to the STA. It is also undisputed that on 6-2-2019, i.e. almost 5 months after the meeting was held by the respondent No. 2 where, he had heard all the applicants for grant of permanent permit, the respondent No. 4 had deposited the tax of Rs. 1,40,990/- with the respondent No. 3 as tax due on vehicle bearing No. MP48-P/0768. All that has to be seen by this Court is whether the non-disclosure of the vehicle No. MP48-P/0768 and the payment of the tax due on the said vehicle 5 months after the application for grant of permanent permit on the routes in question was considered, was sufficient enough to hold good the order passed by the STA and set aside the impugned order? The order passed by the STA granted permanent permit to the petitioner while rejecting the application of respondent No. 4. The STA gave its reasons for the rejecting the application of the respondent No. 4 as misrepresentation to the authority by the respondent No. 4 at the time of hearing the application for permanent permit on 28-9-2018. The order passed by the STA granted permanent permit to the petitioner while rejecting the application of respondent No. 4. The STA gave its reasons for the rejecting the application of the respondent No. 4 as misrepresentation to the authority by the respondent No. 4 at the time of hearing the application for permanent permit on 28-9-2018. The paragraph 28, 29 and 30 of the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal gives the reasoning as to why despite the non-disclosure of the dues by the respondent No. 4 before the STA on 28-9-2018, the tribunal felt it necessary to set aside the order of the STA and holding in favour of the respondent No. 4 while doing so, the tribunal that the respondent No. 4 was not to be faulted for the late payment of the road tax due, on account of improper digital records maintained by the authority which gave a wrong figure of over Rs. 22 Lakhs on 2-2-2019 and which subsequently was reduced to Rs. 1,40,990/- on 6-2-2019 and the payment of the said amount by the respondent No. 4 on the same day. 18. The question here is whether the respondent No. 4 ought to have disclosed the existence of vehicle bearing No. MP48-P/0768 and the dues of road tax accruing on it on 28-9-2018 when all the 11 applicants were present before the respondent No. 2 for the hearing of their applications for grant of permanent permit on the routes in question. Before adverting to the same, the Court feels it necessary to deal with that part of the impugned order whereby the permanent permit granted to the petitioner was rejected by the appellate Tribunal. The learned Tribunal held that the petitioner has only submitted no-dues certificate of road tax with regard to only 2 of the buses and that he has not provided any certificate of no-dues of the remaining 3 buses. The learned appellate Tribunal has held that no-dues certificate pertaining to each bus was an essential requirement to be placed before the authority at a stage prior to the consideration of applications seeking grant of permanent permit. The learned Tribunal has apparently drawn inspiration from the judgment of this Court in the case of Kishan (supra). 19. The learned appellate Tribunal has held that no-dues certificate pertaining to each bus was an essential requirement to be placed before the authority at a stage prior to the consideration of applications seeking grant of permanent permit. The learned Tribunal has apparently drawn inspiration from the judgment of this Court in the case of Kishan (supra). 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed the said judgment before this Court and has stated that the interpretation put forth by the learned Tribunal is incorrect and that the judgment, actually is in favour of the petitioner. The said judgment has been passed by the learned Division Bench of this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has straight away drawn the attention to paragraph 12 of the said judgment where, relying upon another Division Bench’s Judgment of this Court in the case of M. P. State Road Transport Corporation, Gwalior vs. Ram Prasad Purohit and others, 2001(3) M.P.L.J. 339 , wherein, the Court held that the rule of giving no-due certificate issued by the Regional Transport Authority is not a mandatory rule. Holding thus, the learned Division Bench of this Court affirmed the finding of the learned Single Judge that it was not essential on the part of the appellant to submit a certificate of no-dues along with the application for permit. It further went on to hold that the said observation does not necessarily mean that the appellant who is in arrears of dues, would become entitled for permit and that in a situation where a no-dues certificate is not accompanying the application for permit, the permit cannot be thrown over the board on that ground alone. The certificate of no dues would be required when an issue is raised that a candidate is in arrears of dues and the authority concerned is under an obligation to scrutinize the same. 20. Thus, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that undisputedly, as regards the application of the petitioner for grant of permanent permit, there was never any dispute raised either by the authority or by any of the other 10 applicants that there were dues of the road tax pending on the petitioner’s vehicle. 20. Thus, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that undisputedly, as regards the application of the petitioner for grant of permanent permit, there was never any dispute raised either by the authority or by any of the other 10 applicants that there were dues of the road tax pending on the petitioner’s vehicle. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the reliance placed on the Kisan Singh’s case by the learned Tribunal was completely mis-placed wherein, the learned Tribunal has failed to appreciate that the question of application of the petitioner being bad in law on account of non-supply of the non-dues certificate with relation to three of his buses, was incorrect in law as the same was only required where a dispute was raised with regard to the payment of the road tax on any of the 5 vehicles owned by the petitioner. Where such was not the situation, the reliance on Kisan Singh’s case by the learned Tribunal was incorrect. This Court is in complete agreement with the preposition postulated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, as the law laid down by the learned Division Bench of this Court in Kisan Singh’s case (supra) is crystal clear that the production of the no-due certificate with regard to the payment of road tax was not mandatory and the same was only required to be produced before the authority upon a dispute relating to the payment of the road tax being raised and not otherwise. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed before this Court the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1994 SC 853 , S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. vs. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. and others. In that case, the Supreme Court held that where there is a fraud by a litigant by withholding of a document relevant to the litigation, it is fraud on the Court. The observation of the Supreme Court in paragraph 8 is relevant and deserves to be quoted : – “..................... ..A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side, then he would be guilty of playing - fraud on the Court as well on the opposite party.” 22. ..A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side, then he would be guilty of playing - fraud on the Court as well on the opposite party.” 22. In this case, it is relevant to refer to Annexure R/6 at page 113 of the reply filed by the respondent No. 4 it is copy of an application filed by the respondent No. 4 before the STA, Gwalior, to accept her application for grant of permanent permit. It is dated 28-9-2018. It is supported by an affidavit. In the said application, in para 5, the respondent No. 4 categorically, affirmatively and unequivocally states that – ^^;g fd] esjh fdlh Hkh okgu ij vkt fnukad rd dksbZ VSDl cdk;k ugha vkSj uk gh esjs ifr fQjkst [kku ,oa esjs iq= Qk:[k [kku ds uke tks Hkh okgu gS mu ij Hkh dksbZ VSDl cdk;k ugha gSA bruk gh ugha esa fo"k;d ekxZ esa iMus okys VfeuhZ eqyrkbZ dh LFkk;h fuoklh gawA esjs uke 6 okgu gS rFkk esjs ifr ds uke 3 okgu rFkk iq= ds uke 1 okgu gS ftudh VSDl ,uvkslh layXu gSA In this paragraph, the respondent No. 4 has categorically informed the STA that she has no road tax due on any of her vehicles. She further states that she has six vehicles running in her name, three in her husband’s name and one in her son’s name. In all, she disclosed 10 vehicles to be belonging to her. There has been a conscious and deliberate move by the respondent for not disclosing the ownership of the 11th vehicle, which bears the No. MP48-P/0768 on which, admittedly, there was no payment of the road tax on the date on which the affidavit was submitted before the STA by the respondent No. 4. 23. The learned Tribunal has fallen in grave error in not appreciating that this was not a case where the respondent No. 4 could not be held liable for not having paid the road tax on account of a confusion that existed with regard to its quantum. 23. The learned Tribunal has fallen in grave error in not appreciating that this was not a case where the respondent No. 4 could not be held liable for not having paid the road tax on account of a confusion that existed with regard to its quantum. The matter for consideration in this case which the learned Tribunal ought to have seen and considered was whether the STA was correct in rejecting her application on the grounds of suppresio vari and suggestio falsi. Infact, the learned Tribunal has only peripherally dealt with the same and has given on finding why the respondent No. 4 ought to be forgiven for that. As laid down by the Supreme Court in S. P. Chengalvarya Naidu’s case (supra) that a dishonest litigant should not be tolerated by a justice administration system and should be thrown out irrespective of the stage at which the dishonesty of the litigant becomes apparent. That would set a precedent and sent a strong message that litigant approaching the Courts would have to pay a heavy price for their dishonest actions in the course of a litigation. 24. The proceedings before the STA are quasi-judicial in nature. It was incumbent upon the respondent No. 4 to have made a clean breast of her liability on 28-9-2018 itself when the proceeding took place before the STA. However, on the same day, she files an application supported by an affidavit blatantly concealing the fact that there was an 11th vehicle which was owned by her on which there were tax dues. Instead, the respondent No. 4 attempted to hood-wink and mislead the STA where she mentions in para 5 of her affidavit that she has no tax dues’ on any of her vehicles and thereby she conveniently avoids mention of the 11th vehicle belonging to her on which there were tax dues. Under the circumstances, the order passed by the STA could not have been faulted with and there was no question of giving a second chance to the respondent No. 4. Thus, the order dated 28-2-2019 passed by the STA rejecting the respondent No. 4 is application for grant of permanent permit was justified. Under the circumstances, the order passed by the STA could not have been faulted with and there was no question of giving a second chance to the respondent No. 4. Thus, the order dated 28-2-2019 passed by the STA rejecting the respondent No. 4 is application for grant of permanent permit was justified. Under the circumstances, it is apparent that the respondent No. 4 did not avail the Locus poenitentiae or the last available opportunity to repent between 28-9-2018 and 28-2-2019 during which period she could very well have disclosed this omission to the STA and thereby could have established her bona fides, instead, the respondent No. 4 had maintained her silence and secrecy hoping that her indiscretion would go on -noticed or glossed over by the STA and that the same would make no difference to her case. 25. That, as regards the letter dated 17-8-2016 addressed by the respondent No. 4 to the authority informing it that the dues on the offending vehicle has been deleted from the digital records of the authority is concerned, the said letter shows that the respondent No. 4 was aware of the dues of road tax on the offending vehicle from the year 2016 itself and still, opted to remain silent about it when applying to the authority for a permanent permit. 26. It is also relevant to mention here that the respondent No. 4 had approached this Court by way of Writ Petition No. 10417/17 seeking a direction to the authority to assess the road tax dues on the offending vehicle owned by the respondent No. 4. Thus, this reveals yet again that the respondent No. 4 knew about the tax dues on the offending vehicle even in the year 2017 and yet remained silent about the same at the time of applying for the permanent permit. 27. Thus, the reasoning given by the learned Tribunal in paragraph 28, 29 and 30 of the order impugned for following the appeal preferred by the respondent No. 4 and thereby cancelling the permanent permit granted by the STA in favour of the petitioner and granting the permanent permit to the respondent No. 4, in the considered opinion of this Court, was misplaced and therefore bad both in law as also on facts. Ld. Ld. Counsel for the respondent No. 4 has prayed that in the event this Court is inclined to allow the petition, the matter be remanded to the STA for a fresh consideration. This Court is of the opinion that as the respondent No. 4 has indulged in a fraud upon the authority, such indulgence is not called for. 28. Under the circumstances, the impugned order passed by the learned appellate Tribunal dated 3-7-2019 (Annex.P/1) is set aside and the order passed by the STA dated 28-2-2019 by which the permanent permit was granted to the petitioner and the application of the respondent No. 4 was rejected, is restored. Resultantly, the petition succeeds and is hereby allowed.