JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('MV Act' for short) emanates from the judgment and award dated 28.01.2005 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Auxi) Gandhinagar in M.A.C.P. No. 191 of 1990. The Tribunal, under the impugned award, held the appellant, who was arraigned as the owner of the offending vehicle and respondent No.10-insurance company of the offending vehicle, to satisfy the award jointly and severally. The Tribunal has, by the impugned judgment, directed respondent No.10-insurance company to pay the compensation to the claimants and then recover the same from the appellant after instituting appropriate proceeding before the appropriate executing Court. 2. Facts giving rise to the present appeal emanating from para No.2 of the impugned judgment are as under: The deceased Madhavji on 26.03.1989 was travelling with his goods on hire in truck No. GRN-5463 and the truck driver was driving his truck in rash and negligent manner and he was driving the truck in excessive speed and, therefore, when the truck was going on Gandhinagar-Sarkhej Road and reached near Khoraj village at that time he lost control over the steering and truck over-turned and thereby the deceased sustained serious injuries and ultimately succumbed to the injuries. It is also averred in the claim petition that when the accident took place, the deceased was doing the business keeping the shop at his native place and also doing the agriculture work and thereby he was earning Rs. 3000/- to Rs. 4000/- per month. It is also stated that when the accident took place deceased was aged about 42 years. The truck was owned by the opponent No.2 and it was insured with the opponent No.3-The Oriental Insurance Company when the accident took place, therefore, in these circumstances under the various heads, the claimants have asked the compensation of Rs. 4,00,000/- from the opponents jointly and severally with interest. 3. The Tribunal, after conclusion of the trial of the claim petition, partly allowed the claim petition and claimants were entitled to receive Rs. 3,32,000/- as compensation with 9% interest and proportionate cost from the date of application till realization. Respondent No.10-insurance company was directed to pay the awarded compensation and then recover the same from the appellant by initiating proceedings before the concerned executing court. 4. 3,32,000/- as compensation with 9% interest and proportionate cost from the date of application till realization. Respondent No.10-insurance company was directed to pay the awarded compensation and then recover the same from the appellant by initiating proceedings before the concerned executing court. 4. It needs to be noted at the threshold that, before the claim petition was set down for the trial, necessary formalities of serving the concerned respondents including the appellant herein were completed. The appellant, despite service of notice of the claim petition, chose to remain absent and did not participate in the proceedings of the trial of the claim petition. 5. By way of present appeal, the appellant, who happens to be the owner as per the record of the registering authority, has preferred this appeal, disowning his liability much before the occurrence of the accident. 6. I have heard Mr. J.V.Japee, learned advocate for the appellant. He has strongly urged that much before the accident, the offending vehicle was sold to Mr. Madhavji Patel of village Narniya, Dist. Dungarpur, Rajasthan and Mr. Magupati K. Patel of village Ajmeriya, Dist. Dungarpur, Rajasthan on 04.12.1988. According to his submission, as the offending vehicle was already transferred in favour of the aforesaid two gentlemen, the Tribunal ought not to have fasten the liability of payment of compensation under the award on the appellant. In this regard, he has placed reliance on ground no. 4.5 of his appeal memo which reads as under: “4.5 That the Tribunal has failed to appreciate that the actual owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident had n ot brought to the notice of the Tribunal that the offending vehicle was already sold by the appellant to one Madhavji Gulabji Patel of village Naraniya and Magupati K. Patel of village, Ajmeria on 4.12.88 i.e. prior to the date of the accident which had taken place on 26.3.89. It is submitted that after 4.12.88, the appellant was neither the owner nor occupier of the vehicle. The vehicle was in possession of the said purchasers in the capacity of owners who had purchased the said vehicle from the appellant on 4.12.88. Therefore, on and after 4.12.88, the appellant was not responsible for any liability arising out of any accident. It was also clearly provided in the document of sale that after 4.12.88, all the liabilities regarding the accident, insurance, passing, memos etc. Therefore, on and after 4.12.88, the appellant was not responsible for any liability arising out of any accident. It was also clearly provided in the document of sale that after 4.12.88, all the liabilities regarding the accident, insurance, passing, memos etc. will remain on purchaser of the vehicle. It was also clearly provided that if the vehicle is involved in any accident and the compensation is payable, shall be payable by the purchaser of the vehicle. It was provided that after the completion of the loan of the vehicle, the appellant will give necessary signatures for transfer of the vehicle. Therefore, the appellant was not responsible to pay any amount of compensation after 4.12.88.” 7. Mr. Japee further submitted that after service of notice of the claim petition, the appellant had approached the purchasers of the offending vehicle who had assured that they would take appropriate steps to contest/defend the claim petition. Appellant therefore was under a bona fide belief that necessary care would be taken to see that no liability is fastened on the appellant for the accident. He has placed heavy reliance on the agreement of sale of offending vehicle wherein the purchasers have assumed all the liability including the liability arising from any accident and therefore, the appellant is not liable to pay the compensation. Mr. Japee urged that the matter may be remanded to the Tribunal so that the appellant may get an opportunity to bring on record that he is not the owner of the offending vehicle. In support of this contention, he has placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in case of Olga Tellis and ors vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and ors reported in AIR 1986 SC 180 more particularly, on head-note G to contend that the request for remand should not be declined only on the ground that the same would not serve any useful purpose. He therefore urged that the appeal may be allowed and the matter may be remanded to the Tribunal for affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant. 8. Ms. He therefore urged that the appeal may be allowed and the matter may be remanded to the Tribunal for affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant. 8. Ms. Patel, learned advocate for respondent No. 1,2,6 and 8 has supported the impugned judgment and award relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Naveen Kumar vs. Vijay Kumar and ors reported in (2018) 3 SCC 1 to submit that in view of the definition of the expression “owner” in section 2(30) of the MV Act, it is the person in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered who, for the purposes of the Act, would be treated as the “owner”. She therefore, submitted that the Tribunal has rightly mulcted the liability of the payment of compensation on the appellant jointly and severally with respondent No.10-insurance company. She submitted that the impugned judgment and award of the Tribunal does not suffer from any legal infirmity or perversity requiring interference in this appeal. 9. Mr. Vibhuti Nanavati learned advocate for respondent No.10- insurance company has also supported the impugned judgment. Relying upon the decision of this Court in case of United India Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Shilpa Jigishbhai @ Jignesh Patel & Ors reported in 2005 (2) GLR 1784 submitted that the appellant being the registered owner of the vehicle did not participate in the proceedings of the claim petition cannot challenge the award on merits by filing present appeal. He therefore urged that the appeal may be dismissed. He also urged that the appropriate observations may be made so that respondent No.10 can recover the amount from the security which the appellant has furnished in the Trial Court pursuant to the order dated 22.11.2004. 10. Mr. J.V.Japee, learned advocate for the appellant has vehemently tried to convince and persuade this Court submitting that much before the occurrence of the accident, giving rise to the claim petition, the offending vehicle was transferred in favour of two gentlemen on 04.12.1988. He has placed heavy reliance on Annexure B, the sale agreement and has led special emphasis on the recital that post 12:00 noon of 04.12.1984, all the liability in respect of the offending vehicle including any liability arising from an accident would be of the purchaser. It is difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Japee in light of the decision of Supreme Court in case of Naveen Kumar (supra). It is difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Japee in light of the decision of Supreme Court in case of Naveen Kumar (supra). In this decision in paras 7 and 13, the Supreme Court has made following observations: as regards the definition of “owner” as appearing in section 2(30) of the MV Act. “7. Evidently, Parliament while enacting the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 made a specific change by recasting the earlier definition. Section 2(19) of the earlier Act stipulated that where a person in possession of a motor vehicle is a minor the guardian of the minor would be the owner and where the motor vehicle was subject to a hire purchase agreement, the person in possession of the vehicle under the agreement would be the owner. The Act of 1988 has provided in the first part of Section 2(30) that the owner would be the person in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered. Where such a person is a minor the guardian of the minor would be the owner. In relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of an agreement of hire purchase, lease or hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement would be the owner. The latter part of the definition is in the nature of an exception which applies where the motor vehicle is the subject of a hire purchase agreement or of an agreement of lease or hypothecation. Otherwise the definition stipulates that for the purposes of the Act, the person in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered is treated as the owner. 13. The consistent thread of reasoning which emerges from the above decisions is that in view of the definition of the expression ‘owner’ in Section 2(30), it is the person in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered who, for the purposes of the Act, would be treated as the ‘owner’. However, where a person is a minor, the guardian of the minor would be treated as the owner. Where a motor vehicle is subject to an agreement of hire purchase, lease or hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement is treated as the owner. However, where a person is a minor, the guardian of the minor would be treated as the owner. Where a motor vehicle is subject to an agreement of hire purchase, lease or hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement is treated as the owner. In a situation such as the present where the registered owner has purported to transfer the vehicle but continues to be reflected in the records of the registering authority as the owner of the vehicle, he would not stand absolved of liability. Parliament has consciously introduced the definition of the expression ‘owner’ in Section 2(30), making a departure from the provisions of Section 2(19) in the earlier Act of 1939. The principle underlying the provisions of Section 2(30) is that the victim of a motor accident or, in the case of a death, the legal heirs of the deceased victim should not be left in a state of uncertainty. A claimant for compensation ought not to be burdened with following a trail of successive transfers, which are not registered with the registering authority. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the salutary object and purpose of the Act. Hence, the interpretation to be placed must facilitate the fulfilment of the object of the law. In the present case, the First respondent was the ‘owner’ of the vehicle involved in the accident within the meaning of Section 2(30). The liability to pay compensation stands fastened upon him. Admittedly, the vehicle was uninsured. The High Court has proceeded upon a misconstruction of the judgments of this Court in Reshma and Purnya Kala Devi.” 11. It is thus eminently clear from the above observations that as long as the name of a person remains in the records of the registering authority as the owner of the vehicle, his liability continues as the owner irrespective of the transfer of the vehicle by him and I am therefore of the opinion that the Tribunal has not committed any error in fastening the liability of payment of the compensation on the appellant being the owner of the offending vehicle. 12. The request of Mr. Japee to remand the matter to the Tribunal to afford an opportunity of hearing of the appellant cannot be acceded to. The reason is simple and obvious. 12. The request of Mr. Japee to remand the matter to the Tribunal to afford an opportunity of hearing of the appellant cannot be acceded to. The reason is simple and obvious. Upon remanding the only contention, which the appellant can raise, is that he had transferred the vehicle on 04.12.1988 which is prior to the occurrence of the accident and therefore, he cannot be considered as the owner of the offending vehicle since the Supreme Court in case of Naveen Kumar (supra) has already hold to rest this issue and in clear terms held that a person whose name is appearing in the record of the registering authority as on the date of the accident is to be treated as the owner of the vehicle, no fruitful purpose would be served by remanding the matter to the Tribunal. As far as the decision of Supreme Court in case of Olga Tellis and ors (supra) is concerned, I am of the considered view that the observations made therein in paras 44 to 47 as regards giving of the opportunity of hearing are of no avail to the appellants. In this case, the Supreme Court has held that the notice to the affected party cannot be dispensed with; that such a notice would not serve any fruitful purpose. In case on hand, it is undisputed fact that notice of the claim petition was duly served on the appellant. He chose not to enter his appearance in the proceedings of the claim petition either by himself or by a duly instructed advocate to contest the claim petition. The reason put-forth by Mr. Japee learned advocate for the appellant, that new purchaser of the vehicle were approached by the appellant who was given assurance by them that they would take necessary steps to defend the claim petition and therefore, the appellant did not enter his appearance, cannot help the appellant. The fact remains that the appellant was afforded an opportunity to contest the claim petition but he, instead of relying upon the Tribunal, had more faith in purchasers of the vehicle which faith, it appears is, betrayed by them. The fact remains that the appellant was afforded an opportunity to contest the claim petition but he, instead of relying upon the Tribunal, had more faith in purchasers of the vehicle which faith, it appears is, betrayed by them. Thus, it is eminently clear that it is not a case of the appellant that he was not afforded an opportunity of hearing in as much as the process of the claim petition was duly served upon the appellant to show cause against the claim of the claimants. Be as it may, in view of the settled legal position that the person whose name is there in the record of the registering authority is to be treated as the owner of the vehicle under section 2(30) of the MV Act for the purposes of the Motor Vehicles Act, the remand of the matter therefore would be mechanical exercise. Therefore, when the appellant was afforded an opportunity of hearing by the Tribunal, the matter cannot be remanded to the Tribunal for affording one more opportunity of hearing without there being any ground made out by the appellant for the same. 13. This can be viewed from another facet as well so far as the claimants are concerned. Though the claimants have received substantial portion of the compensation from the amount deposited by respondent No. 10-insurance company, they will once again have to undergo the gamut of the trial entailing hardship and legal expenses. The avowed object of the beneficial provision of the MV Act of mitigating the financial hardship of the claimants on account of premature death of their breadwinner in road traffic accident would be rendered nugatory. 14. I am therefore of the view that the appeal lacks merit and deserves to be dismissed. Therefore, for the forgoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed. The Tribunal has reserved opportunity in favour of respondent No.10 to recover the amount of compensation from appellant by instituting appropriate executing court. Respondent No. 10-Insurance company shall be at liberty to recover the amount of compensation from the appellant by instituting the appropriate proceedings in terms of the award including from the security, if any, furnished by the appellant in the Tribunal in compliance of the order dated 02.03.2007. 15. It appears from the record that the substantial amount is disbursed in favour of the claimants from the amount deposited by respondent No.10-insurance company. 15. It appears from the record that the substantial amount is disbursed in favour of the claimants from the amount deposited by respondent No.10-insurance company. The balance amount shall also be disbursed by the Tribunal in favour of the claimants in terms of the award. 16. In facts of the case, parties are left to bear their own cost. R & P to transmitted to the Tribunal.