ORDER : ASHOK MENON, J. 1. A Division Bench of this Court vide the order of reference dated 27.6.2016 raised the following questions in order to remove the vagueness in the matter of awarding costs by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (MACT), especially with regard to the question of granting proportionate costs, including Advocates' fee. The following are the four questions referred to us: “1. Whether the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals must follow the mandate of Rules 195 and 196 of the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice, 1971? 2. Whether the scales of fees prescribed under 'Rules Regarding Fees Payable to Advocates' apply to Advocates in Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals? 3. Whether Rules 6 and 16 of the Advocates' Fee Rules, 1969 are applicable to claim petitions in the light of Rule 381(2) of the Motor Vehicles Rules? 4. Whether the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals are empowered to award proportionate costs?” 2. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (MACT) generally deal in matters arising from law of torts and also the provisions of Fatal Accidents Act. In the absence of constitution of Claims Tribunal, compensation has to be sought from the appropriate Civil Court and the procedure to be followed by such Courts and appellate Courts shall be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) and many Rules applicable to such Courts. 3. Considering the powers of an Industrial Tribunal, the Honourable Supreme Court in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd. [ AIR 1950 SC 188 ] held as thus: "While the powers of the Industrial Tribunal in some respects are different from those of an ordinary Civil Court and it has jurisdiction and powers to give reliefs which a Civil Court administrating the law of the land (for instance ordering the reinstatement of a workman) does not possess in the discharge of its duties it is essentially working as a juridical body. Having considered all the provisions of the Act, it seems to be clear that the Tribunal is discharging functions very near those of a Court, although it is not a court in the technical sense of the word”. 4. In Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala [AIR 1961 SC 1669], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as thus : "All tribunals are not Courts, though all Courts are tribunals. 4. In Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala [AIR 1961 SC 1669], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as thus : "All tribunals are not Courts, though all Courts are tribunals. The word 'Courts' is used to designate those tribunals which are set up in an organised State for the administration of justice. By administration of justice is meant the exercise of juridical power of the State to maintain and uphold rights and to punish wrongs. Whenever there is an infringement of a right or an injury, the Courts are there to restore the Vinculam juris, which is disturbed. xxx xxx xxx With the growth of civilization and the problems of modern life, a large number of administrative tribunals have come into existence. These tribunals have the authority of law to pronounce upon valuable rights; the act in a judicial manner and even on evidence of both, but they are not part of the ordinary Courts, of Civil judicature. They share the exercise of the judicial power of the State, but they are brought into existence to implement some administrative policy or to determine controversies arising out of some administrative law. They are very similar to Courts, but are not Courts. By 'Courts' is meant Courts of Civil judicature and by 'tribunals', those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. xxx xxx xxx Their procedures may differ, but the functions are not essentially different. What distinguishes them has never been successfully established. Lord Stamp said that the real distinction is that courts have 'an air of detachment'. xxx xxx xxx The word 'tribunal' is the word of wide import, and the words 'Court' and 'tribunal' embrace within them the exercise of judicial power in all its forms." 5. In Associated Cements Ltd. v. P.N.Sharma [ AIR 1965 SC 1595 ], the Apex Court held as thus: "It would be noticed that Article 136(1) refers to tribunal as distinguished from a Court. The expression 'Court' in the context denotes a tribunal constituted by the State as a part of the ordinary hierarchy of Courts which are invested with the States' inherent judicial powers. A sovereign State discharges legislative, executive and judicial functions and can legitimately claim corresponding powers which are described as legislative, executive and judicial powers. The expression 'Court' in the context denotes a tribunal constituted by the State as a part of the ordinary hierarchy of Courts which are invested with the States' inherent judicial powers. A sovereign State discharges legislative, executive and judicial functions and can legitimately claim corresponding powers which are described as legislative, executive and judicial powers. Under our Constitution, the judicial functions and powers of the State are primarily conferred on the ordinary Courts which have been constituted under its relevant provisions. The Constitution recognized a hierarchy of Courts and to where adjudication are normally entrusted all disputes between citizens and citizens as well as between the citizens and the State. These Courts can be described as ordinary Courts of Civil judicature. They are governed by their prescribed rules of procedure and they deal with questions of fact and law raised before them by adopting a process which is described as judicial process. The powers which these Courts exercise, are judicial powers, the functions they discharge are judicial functions and the decisions they reach and pronounce are judicial decisions. xxx xxx xxx Tribunals which fall within the purview of Article 136(1) occupy a special position of their own under the scheme of our Constitution. Special matters and questions are entrusted to them for their decision and in that sense, they share with the courts (1) common characteristic; both the Courts and the tribunals are constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions." 6. From the above decisions, it can be ordinarily understood that MACTs, though it has some trappings of a 'Court', is not a 'Court', and therefore, its constitution is not governed by any legislation applicable to Civil Courts. The intention behind the constitution of a separate Tribunal to adjudicate claims coming under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which provides for the procedure is that, the Tribunal is entitled to follow such summary procedure as it may think fit, subject to the Rules that is prescribed. 7. The intention behind the constitution of a separate Tribunal to adjudicate claims coming under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which provides for the procedure is that, the Tribunal is entitled to follow such summary procedure as it may think fit, subject to the Rules that is prescribed. 7. Section 158(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, makes it incumbent on the part of a police officer to forward any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury of any person in the form of a report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction within 30 days from the date of recording of such information and Section 166(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 directs the Claims Tribunal to treat such a report as an application for compensation under that Act. This provision would indicate that the claimant need not even file an application for the purpose of raising a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. That is the reason why elaborate procedures as required in a civil suit is not necessary in adjudicating matters before a Claims Tribunal. 8. The question that arises for determination before us is whether in the matter of awarding costs, the procedure and rules framed under the Constitution, CPC and the Rules made thereunder, for 'Courts', could be resorted to by the Claims Tribunal which is apparently, not a 'Court'. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant Insurance Company would argue for the proposition that even Courts have no inherent power to award costs, which can only be granted in any case proceeding by virtue of express statutory authority [Re Brown, (1928) 3 DLR 243 para 4]. The learned counsel drew our attention to Bouvier John's Law Dictionary [Boston Book Company, 1987) page 447-448, wherein it is stated thus: "A party can in no case recover costs from his adversary unless he can show some statute which gives him the right”. He also relied on Meade v. French [4 Wn. 11, 29 P. 833], of the US supreme Court wherein it was held; “costs are purely statutory, and can only be awarded where the statute gives them”. 10. The word 'costs' has been defined in the American jurisprudence [2nd edn., Vol. XX p 5] as under: “'Costs' are statutory allowance to a party to an action for his expenses incurred in the action. 10. The word 'costs' has been defined in the American jurisprudence [2nd edn., Vol. XX p 5] as under: “'Costs' are statutory allowance to a party to an action for his expenses incurred in the action. They are in the nature of incidental damages allowed to the successful party to indemnify him against the expenses of asserting his rights in court, when the necessity for so doing was caused by the other's breach of legal duty . Other wise denied, costs are the sums prescribed by law as charges for the services enumerated in the fee bill. They have reference only to the parties and the amounts paid by them, and only those expenditures which are by statute taxable and to be included in the judgment fall within the term costs.” 11. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, a person is entitled to get a relief, as of right, only when substantial law provides for that. In India, the Courts are empowered to award costs in civil suits under Section 35 of the CPC and Order XXA CPC specifically states, which are the items to be counted for the tabulation of costs. According to the learned counsel, even Order XXA of the CPC does not include the Advocates' fee as part of the costs. 12. Advocates' fees can be tabulated as an item for calculation of costs only as per Rule 195 of the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice. The specific argument of the learned counsel for the Insurance Company is that Civil Rules of Practice is not applicable to Tribunals. There are four types of costs mentioned in the CPC. They are litigation costs as stated in Section 35, compensatory costs as stated in Section 35-A and costs for causing delay as stated in Section 35-B. Section 95 of the CPC also provides for compensation for obtaining arrest, attachment or injunction on insufficient grounds. Costs are also mentioned under Order XII Rule 9 on production of documents and under Order XXI Rule 46A. Costs of an indigent application under Order XXXIII Rule 16 is also provided in the CPC. The only costs that is provided in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is one under Section 172, and that is compensatory costs. 13. Section 172 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 reads thus: "172. Costs of an indigent application under Order XXXIII Rule 16 is also provided in the CPC. The only costs that is provided in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is one under Section 172, and that is compensatory costs. 13. Section 172 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 reads thus: "172. Award of compensatory costs in certain cases.— (1) Any Claims Tribunal adjudicating upon any claim for compensation under this Act, may in any case where it is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by it in writing that— (a) the policy of insurance is void on the ground that it was obtained by representation of fact which was false in any material particular, or (b) any party or insurer has put forward a false or vexatious claim or defence, such Tribunal may make an order for the payment, by the party who is guilty of misrepresentation or by whom such claim or defence has been put forward of special costs by way of compensation to the insurer or, as the case may be, to the party against whom such claim or defence has been put forward. (2) No Claims Tribunal shall pass an order for special costs under sub-section (1) for any amount exceeding one thousand rupees. (3) No person or insurer against whom an order has been made under this section shall, by reason thereof be exempted from any criminal liability in respect of such mis-representation, claim or defence as is referred to in sub-section (1). (4) Any amount awarded by way of compensation under this section in respect of any misrepresentation, claim or defence, shall be taken into account in any subsequent suit for damages for compensation in respect of such misrepresentation, claim or defence." 14. The learned counsel draws our attention to Rule 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 ('Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989', for short) which is analogous to Rule 21 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1977 (Kerala) and reads thus : "395. The learned counsel draws our attention to Rule 395 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 ('Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989', for short) which is analogous to Rule 21 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1977 (Kerala) and reads thus : "395. Code of Civil Procedure to apply in certain cases.-The provisions of Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30 of Order V, Rules 16 to 18 of Order VI, Order IX, Rules 3 to 10 of Order XIII, Rules 1 to 21 of Order XVI, Rules 1 to 3 of Order XXIII and Order XXVI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall, so far as may be, apply to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal." 15. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that Section 35 of the CPC is not made applicable to the Claims Tribunal, and therefore, the said provision enabling awarding of costs by a Civil Court is applicable only to 'Courts' and not to 'Tribunals'. 16. Our attention is drawn to Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which pertains to award of the Claims Tribunals and states regarding the contents of the award to be made by a Tribunal, but this Section also does not state anything about the litigation costs. According to the learned counsel, payment of litigation costs has been deliberately avoided because, a Claims Tribunal has to take cognizance of an application for claims pertaining to a person involved in an accident suo motu on receipt of a report under Section 158(6) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 treating the report as an application for compensation under Section 166(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Hence, there is total lack of jurisdiction to award litigation costs by a Claims Tribunal and this omission, according to the learned counsel, was purposeful. The only provision of costs is that of payment of compensatory costs under Section 172, which, is intended to avoid a vexatious claim and defence. 17. The earliest decision of this Court pertaining to the payment of costs by the Claims Tribunal was delivered by a Single Bench in United India Insurance Co. The only provision of costs is that of payment of compensatory costs under Section 172, which, is intended to avoid a vexatious claim and defence. 17. The earliest decision of this Court pertaining to the payment of costs by the Claims Tribunal was delivered by a Single Bench in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Padmini Amma [ 1986 KLT 581 ], wherein, it was held that Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is not a 'Court' and that it is not a court subordinate to the High Courts either, (relying on Beeran v. Rajappan [ 1980 KLT 210 ]). It is also observed in Padmini Amma (supra), that the Rules regarding Fees Payable to Advocates framed by the High Court implemented on 7.3.1969 relates to fees payable to legal practitioners in the High Court and in the Subordinate Courts only and so will not apply to Tribunals, as such. It is only by way of analogy and rule of guidance, the provisions of the said Rules are perhaps referred to and relied on broadly for the purpose of awarding Advocates' fees by the Tribunals. Award of costs is discretionary and the power to award costs is incidental and ancillary to the proceedings, and therefore, this Court refused to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India stating that such exercise of discretionary power by a Tribunal is not ordinarily open to review by the High Court unless it is shown that the exercise of discretion is perverse or arbitrary or no reasonable man would have awarded the costs decreed. The reference to the Advocates' Fees Rules provided for suits in Civil Rules of Practice was only by way of analogy and guidance and to fix the quantum and not due to the reason that the said Rule, ipso facto applies to the award of fees by the tribunal, this Court held. 18. The decision of the Single Bench in Padmini Amma (supra) was referred to by a Division Bench of this Court in New India Assurance Co. 18. The decision of the Single Bench in Padmini Amma (supra) was referred to by a Division Bench of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Koyammu [ 1991 (1) KLT 320 ] and it was held thus: “.......Since the enquiry to be made is substantially in the nature of an ordinal suit after framing issues, we are of the opinion that the Advocate's fee fixed in Rule 16 of the Advocates Fees Rules cannot be taken as a guidance for determining advocates' fees payable in petition before the Claims Tribunal. Till suitable rules are framed in this connection, it is for the Tribunal itself to award a reasonable amount by way of advocate's fee after taking into account the amount of the claim, the nature of the contentions raised, the nature of the evidence adduced and other relevant factors. We hope that the Claims Tribunal will consider these aspects and then award a reasonable amount as advocate's fee." 19. The decisions in Padmini Amma (supra) and Koyammu (supra) were followed by another Division Bench of this court in K.J.Abraham and Others v. National Insurance Company Ltd. and others [MACA No.2525/2010 dated 23.6.2010 -an unreported decision], wherein it was observed that in view of introduction of sub-Section(2) of Section 381 the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 the provisions of Civil Rules of Practice regarding the calculation of costs can be adopted in the proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 also. This Court held that Civil Rules of Practice prescribes Form No.35 to prepare a cost memo in a suit. The same can be adopted in the case of claim petitions filed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Rule 195 of the Civil Rules of Practice prescribes items to be included in tabulation of costs in the case of suits. Similar item can be included in preparation of cost memo in the claim petition filed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Rule 6 of the Advocates' Fees Rules, 1969 apply to claim petitions also, in view of sub-Rule (2) of Rule 381 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, held this Court. 20. Similar item can be included in preparation of cost memo in the claim petition filed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Rule 6 of the Advocates' Fees Rules, 1969 apply to claim petitions also, in view of sub-Rule (2) of Rule 381 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, held this Court. 20. Thereafter, a Division Bench of this Court had an opportunity to consider this question once again in Jeena v. Satheesh Babu K ( 2011 (3) KLT 943 ), wherein it was specifically held thus: “We are satisfied that the following directions can be issued in the matter: (i) The MACT has jurisdictional competence to award costs and claims under Section 163A and 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. (ii) The jurisdiction to direct costs is purely discretionary; but tribunals must apply their mind on the question in all cases. There must be a direction in every case either to award costs or not to award costs after such application of mind. The award must reflect that such application of mind has taken place. Ordinarily, unless there are reasons, there must be a direction to pay proportionate costs to the successful claimant. We repeat that this observation is without prejudice to the wide discretion which the tribunals have in the matter. (iii) Taxable costs must be ascertained by reference to the principles under Rule 195 of the Civil Rules of Practice. The procedure prescribed under Rule 196 of the Civil Rules of Practice must be followed by the tribunals though the Civil Rules of Practice is not specifically applicable to proceedings before a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. (iv) Advocate fee as stipulate under the Advocate Fees Rules must be included in the costs certified by the tribunal. In ascertaining Advocate fees payable, Rule 6(2) and 9 of the relevant rules shall be followed by the tribunal. (v) free Costs shall be certified and appended to the copy of the award (and certified copies) issued to the parties under Section 168(2) of the MV Act.” 21. In the decision of Jeena (supra), the Bench noted that the Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 had come into force by 2001 and that the Bench in Koyammu (supra) had not specifically adverted to the amended Rule 381(2). 22. In the decision of Jeena (supra), the Bench noted that the Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 had come into force by 2001 and that the Bench in Koyammu (supra) had not specifically adverted to the amended Rule 381(2). 22. Another Division Bench of this Court had opportunity to consider the question of awarding of proportionate costs by the MACT in the New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Lettish Remy [ 2015 (1) KLJ 76 : 2015(1) KHC 60 ] : 2015 ACJ 2760 : MANEW-KE- 1780-2014], wherein it was held thus: “We find that only proportionate costs have been allowed by the tribunal. Going by Rule 10 of the Rules regarding Fees Payable to Advocates shall be one half in contested and one third in uncontested cases of the allowable on the amount or value of the relief. In that view of the matter, we do not find any reason to reduce the cost awarded. xxx xxx xxx The tribunal has exercised its discretion and unless there is a legal issue involved, we will not be justified in varying the cost portion of the award.” 23. Under Section 169(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a civil court while holding an enquiry under Section 168. In Velunni v. Vellakutty ( 1989 (2) KLT 227 ) and Asmath Khan v. Chandrahasa Bangara and others 2006 KHC 1494, this Court had while considering the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to review, held that in order to do justice for which it has been constituted, the Tribunal would have power to apply the principles underlining the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, even though not rendered specifically applicable. The Court also considered the fact that the Claims Tribunal is having all attributes and trapping of a civil court and it is deemed to be a civil court as specifically mentioned in Section 169(2). The Tribunal has been impliedly vested with power to review its own order to achieve the object of the Act and to avoid manifest injustice if circumstances as mentioned in Order XLVII CPC exists. 24. Discussing the intention behind awarding of costs, the Honorable Supreme Court in Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj and Another [ (2010) 8 SCC 1 ] held thus: "48. 24. Discussing the intention behind awarding of costs, the Honorable Supreme Court in Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj and Another [ (2010) 8 SCC 1 ] held thus: "48. The provisions for costs is intended to achieve the following goals: (a) It should act as a deterrent to vexatious, frivolous and speculative litigations or defences. The spectre of being made liable to pay actual costs should be such, as to make every litigant think twice before putting forth a vexatious, frivolous or speculative claim or defence. (b) Costs should ensure that the provisions of the Code, the Evidence Act and other laws governing procedure are scrupulously and strictly complied with and that parties do not adopt delaying tactics or mislead the court. (c) Costs should provide adequate indemnity to the successful litigant for the expenditure incurred by him for the litigation. This necessitates the award of actual costs of litigation as contrasted from nominal or fixed or unrealistic costs. (d) The provision for costs should be an incentive for each litigant to adopt alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes and arrive at a settlement before the trial commences in most of the cases. In many other jurisdictions, in view of the existence of appropriate and adequate provisions for costs, the litigants are persuaded to settle nearly 90% of the civil suits before they come up for trial. (e) The provisions relating to costs should not however obstruct access to courts and justice. Under no circumstances the costs should be a deterrent, to a citizen with the genuine or bona fide claim, or to any person belonging to the weaker sections whose rights have been affected, from approaching the courts. At present these goals are sought to be achieved mainly by Sections 35, 35-A and 35-B read with the relevant civil rules of practice relating to taxing of costs.” 25. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that there is no 'litigation costs' before a Claims Tribunal. This we do not agree. Even though the Court Fees Act as applicable to a civil suit for money, damages or compensation, is not applicable to a claim, court fee is payable in a claim petition before a Tribunal, which, in deserving cases, can be exempted by the Tribunal. This we do not agree. Even though the Court Fees Act as applicable to a civil suit for money, damages or compensation, is not applicable to a claim, court fee is payable in a claim petition before a Tribunal, which, in deserving cases, can be exempted by the Tribunal. Rule 23 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1977 (Kerala) prescribes payment of “an advalorem” fee to be charged as the aggregate of the special and general damages claimed, on the scales mentioned therein. The litigation expenses incurred by a claimant, also would include Advocates' fees and other expenses because there is provision enabling a claimant to engage a legal practitioner. In view of the observations made by the Honourable Supreme Court in Vinod Seth (supra), the litigation expenses can be considerably reduced when the parties come to a settlement as provided under Section 89 of the CPC. In Vinod Seth (supra), it is further held as follows: “53. The lack of appropriate provisions relating to costs has resulted in a steady increase in malicious, vexatious, false, frivolous and speculative suits, apart from rendering Section 89 of the Code ineffective. Any attempt to reduce the pendency or encourage alternative dispute resolution processes or to streamline the civil justice system will fail in the absence of appropriate provisions relating to costs. There is therefore an urgent need for the legislature and the Law Commission of India to revisit the provisions relating to costs and compensatory costs contained in Sections 35 and 35-A of the Code." 26. Pursuant to the observations made by the Honourable Supreme Court in Vinod Seth (supra) and two other cases, a report was filed by the Law Commission of India as report No.240 on 9.5.2012. Rules of various High Courts governing taxation of costs and Advocates fees have been perused by the Commission and recommendations made keeping in view the triple goals of (i) ensuring realistic and reasonable costs to the successful party, (ii) curbing false and frivolous litigation and (iii) discouraging unnecessary adjournments. 27. The aforesaid report of the Law Commission also states that the award of costs is generally not considered to be a penalty but a method used to reimburse the other party the expenses of the litigation. However, the costs imposed on a party for indulging in frivolous or vexatious litigation stand on a different footing. 27. The aforesaid report of the Law Commission also states that the award of costs is generally not considered to be a penalty but a method used to reimburse the other party the expenses of the litigation. However, the costs imposed on a party for indulging in frivolous or vexatious litigation stand on a different footing. The general rule is that the unsuccessful party would be ordered to pay costs to the successful party. Thus, the rule has been coined to “costs follows the event”, which means that court will usually order that the loser of the litigation pays the winners' costs. There is an element of discretion in awarding costs. The Law Commission Report also refers to Halsbury's Laws of England para 15, vol.10, 4th edn. (Reissue) which states thus: “This discretion must be exercised judicially; it must not be exercised arbitrarily, but in accordance with reasons and justice”. 28. The decision in Vinod Seth (supra) and the report of the Law Commission are concerned about litigation in civil courts. But the principles stated therein applies equally to Tribunals. A Full Bench of this Court in Jacob Thomas v. Pandian [2005 KHC 1509 : 2005(4) KLT 545 ] has while considering the power of the Claims Tribunal to dismiss the petition for default of appearance of petitioner, held thus: “We are of the opinion that a harmonious interpretation is necessary in this matter. It has been repeatedly held by the Apex Court that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal are constituted under the Act so as to advance speedy remedy to the injured as well as legal heirs of the deceased and the Tribunal is bound to mitigate the hardship of the injured. In N.K.V. Brothers (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal ( AIR 1980 SC 1354 ) the Supreme Court held that the Court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. The above case was followed by the Division Bench of this Court in Sharlet Augustine v. Raveendran ( 1992 (1) KLT 795 ) and held that in interpreting a social welfare legislation, the Court will normally adopt an interpretation which would favour persons sought to be benefited by the legislation. Claims Tribunals are constituted under S.165 of the Vehicles Act. It is true that the Tribunal can call for the records and collect evidence. Claims Tribunals are constituted under S.165 of the Vehicles Act. It is true that the Tribunal can call for the records and collect evidence. When the claim is taken on file and notices are issued to respondents even in the absence of parties, the Tribunal can pass award on merits in view of the clear provisions of the Rules (See R.378 (5)). It is also true that under R.395, certain provisions of CPC including O.9 is also adopted only 'so far as may be'. We are of the opinion that the words 'so far as may be' gives a wide discretion to the Tribunal. After framing issues the Tribunal has got power either to collect evidence and proceed to settle the claim under R.378(5) and can dispose of the case on merits or can dismiss the case for default under O.9 R.8 if the claimant is absent and defendants are present and they are not admitting any part of the claim made by the claimants in view of R.395. The words 'as the case may be' used in R.395 shows that a harmonious construction is possible and wide judicial discretion is given to the Tribunal in this matter. Even though O.9 R.8 uses the word 'shall' rigor in the Rule is reduced because it is adapted by R. 395 only 'as the case may be'. But, the judicial discretion vested in the Tribunal shall be used in such a way so as to mitigate the hardship of claimants considering the object of the Act. It is the duty of the court to avoid 'a head on clash' between the provisions of the same Act or Rules. As held by the Apex Court in Raj Krushna v. Binod Kanungo ( AIR 1954 SC 202 at page 203), "whenever it is possible to do so to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise". Such construction shall be adopted unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. It was observed by the Supreme Court in Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore ( AIR 1958 SC 255 at page 268) as follows: "The rule of construction is well settled that when there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is what is known as the rule of harmonious construction." 29. Rule 10 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1977 (Kerala) states that any party may appear in person or through a legal practitioner before a Claims Tribunal. Nothing prevents an Advocate and a client from entering into a contract regarding the advocates fees to be paid, though demanding advocate fee based on the result of the litigation or charging of professional fees with reference to percentage of the decretal amount is professional misconduct. Some advocates in conducting matters before Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals flagrantly violate this professional ethics. That may have been one of the reasons for incorporating Section 381 to the Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989. The 'advocates fees' referred to in Rule 381 of the Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989, pertains to advocates fee that can be claimed as costs from the adversary by the litigant in whose favour the litigation goes. Rule 381(1) refers to the appearance of legal practitioner and Rule 381(2) refers to the scale of fees contemplated in the Rules regarding the Fees Payable to Advocates in respect of original suits to be made applicable (emphasis supplied) to the claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The word 'Rules' referred to above undoubtedly intends application of the Rules pertaining to the Payment of Advocates' Fees, as also to the Civil Rules of Practice, as applicable to litigation before the civil courts. It is true that Advocates' Fees Rules is framed by the High Court regarding fees payable to advocates in exercise of powers under Articles 225 and 227 of the Constitution of India for the High Courts and courts subordinate to High Courts. There is no dispute that a Claims Tribunal is not a 'Court subordinate to the High Court'. Yet, the purpose in bringing about Rule 381(2) into the statute book is definitely with the intention to make it clear that advocates' fees payable as costs in respect of motor accidents claims must be as in the case of original suits. Meaning thereby, that proportionate costs in the form of advocates fees can as well be claimed in motor accidents petitions as in original suits stipulated in the Advocates' Fees Rules, 1969. 30. Meaning thereby, that proportionate costs in the form of advocates fees can as well be claimed in motor accidents petitions as in original suits stipulated in the Advocates' Fees Rules, 1969. 30. It is under Rules 195 and 196 of the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice that provision is made for claiming costs, including advocate's fee, and Rules 6 and 16 of the Advocates' Fees Rules, 1969 give the rates at which such fees has to be claimed. There are no specific rules in the Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989, analogous to the Rules for payment of costs prescribed under the CPC, Civil Rules of Practice and the Advocates' Fees Rules, 1969 and therefore, there is nothing wrong in drawing the analogy while following the mandates of Rules 195 and 196 of the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice, 1971 as well as Rules 6 and 16 of the Advocates' Fees Rules, 1969 in the light of Rule 381(2) of the Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 to claim proportionate costs in proceedings before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals. 31. The upshot of the discussions above is thus: (1) Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals must follow the mandate of Rules 195 and 196 of the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice, 1971. (2) The scales of fees prescribed under 'Rules Regarding Fees Payable to Advocates' apply to Advocates in Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals. (3) Rules 6 and 16 of the Advocates' Fee Rules, 1969 are applicable to claim petitions in the light of Rule 381(2) of Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989. (4) Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals are empowered to award proportionate costs. The reference is answered as above. The Appeal is sent back to the Division Bench for further consideration.