JUDGMENT : Heard on the question of admission. This Second Appeal under section 100 of Civil Procedure Code has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 30-11-2017 passed by 14th Additional District Judge, Gwalior in First Appeal No. 13-A/2014, thereby affirming the judgment and decree dated 15-7-2014 passed by Third Civil Judge, Class-II, Gwalior in Civil Suit No. 23-A/2013, by which the suit filed by the respondents No. 1 to 6/plaintiffs was decreed and the counterclaim filed by the appellants/defendants was dismissed. 2. The necessary facts for disposal of the present appeal in short are that a suit was filed by respondents No. 1 to 6 for declaration of title and permanent injunction pleading inter alia that Late Halkeram was the owner of the property in dispute, who died on 14-6-2009 and the plaintiff No. 5-Smt. Shyamabai is the widow of Late Halkeram, plaintiff No. 6-Smt. Geeta is the daughter, plaintiff No. 1-Smt. Laxmi Rajoriya is the daughter-in-law of Late Halkeram, whereas plaintiffs No. 2, 3 and 4, namely, Dharmendra Rajoriya, Rajendra Rajoriya and Kailash Rajoriya are the grandsons of Late Halkeram. It was the case of the plaintiffs that Halkeram had one sister, namely, Sagunabai, who was married to Sarman and Narayan had born out of the wedlock of Sagunabai and Sarman. It was further pleaded that the appellants/defendants No. 1 to 4 are the wife and children of one Rana. Halkeram during his lifetime had also executed a Will on 28-11-2007 in favour of plaintiffs No. 1 to 4. It was further pleaded that Halkeram was neither married to Divlobai nor Narayan is his son. In fact, Narayan is the nephew of Halkeram, who was residing with Halkeram and was sharing his burden in agricultural activities. Sarman was the resident of Bavan Paiga, Nai Sadak, Gwalior and at this place only Narayan had expired. It was further pleaded that the defendant No. 1/appellant No. 1 was married to Narayan, but thereafter she left Narayan and married another person, namely, Rana and defendants No. 2 to 4 were born out of the wedlock of Rana and defendant No. 1. It was further pleaded that in connivance with the Patwari, defendants No. 1 to 4/appellants have fraudulently got their names recorded over 1/4th part of the property in dispute. It was further pleaded that in connivance with the Patwari, defendants No. 1 to 4/appellants have fraudulently got their names recorded over 1/4th part of the property in dispute. Forged ration card and other documents have also been prepared by defendants No. 1 to 4/appellants and thereafter, defendants No. 1 to 4/appellants have executed a sale deed in respect of a part of the property in dispute to defendant No. 7. The plaintiffs/respondents No. 1 to 6 had filed an appeal against the order of mutation, which has been accepted and the order of mutation has been set aside. The defendant No. 7 is a property dealer and he has purchased the property after the death of Halkeram in a clandestine and fraudulent manner. As a result of execution of sale deed, the rights of the plaintiffs have come under a cloud, therefore, the suit was filed for declaration of title, declaration that the sale deed dated 13-8-2009 is null and void as well as for permanent injunction. 3. The defendants No. 1 to 4/appellants and defendant No. 7 (appellant in Second Appeal No. 14/2018) filed their separate written statement and pleaded that the plaintiffs have disclosed wrong pedigree of Late Halkeram. It was pleaded that Halkeram was married to one Divlobai and Narayan had born out of the wedlock of Narayan and Divlobai and during his lifetime he was residing along with his father Halkeram. Narayan is the husband of defendant No. 1 and father of defendants No. 2 to 4. After the death of Divlobai, Halkeram had kept the plaintiff No. 5-Smt. Shyamabai as his keep, however, marriage was not performed. Out of the illicit relations of Halkeram and Shyamabai, Jagdish and plaintiff No. 6-Smt. Geeta were born, but they are the illegitimate children of Halkeram. It was denied that Smt. Vidyabai had married Rana, but it was claimed that the plaintiffs have wrongly called Narayan as Rana. It was pleaded that the defendants No. 1 to 4 are the legal representatives of Halkeram and only because of that, their names were mutated in the revenue records. The plaintiffs have filed the suit on incorrect grounds. It was denied that Smt. Vidyabai had married Rana, but it was claimed that the plaintiffs have wrongly called Narayan as Rana. It was pleaded that the defendants No. 1 to 4 are the legal representatives of Halkeram and only because of that, their names were mutated in the revenue records. The plaintiffs have filed the suit on incorrect grounds. Since the defendant No. 1 is an illiterate and household lady and she is the wife of deceased Narayan, therefore, the Sarpanch of the village had prepared a Panchnama after the death of Halkeram, which was given to the Patwari and on the basis of said Panchnama, the names of defendants No. 1 to 4 were mutated in the revenue records. It was further pleaded that the defendants No. 1 to 4 have validly executed a sale deed in favour of defendant No. 7 and the suit has not been properly valued and insufficient Court fee has been paid. 4. The defendants No. 1 to 4 also filed a counterclaim to the effect that the defendant No. 1 is the wife of Late Narayan, whereas defendants No. 2 to 4 are the children of Narayan and Narayan was the son of Halkeram. 5. Defendant No. 7 also filed his separate written statement with the same pleadings. 6. Plaintiffs filed their written statement to the counterclaim filed by defendants No. 1 to 4. 7. It appears that the defendants No. 2 to 4 had also filed one more written statement thereby admitting the claim of the plaintiffs/respondents No. 1 to 6, however, it appears that by order dated 3-2-2010 the trial Court rejected the said written statement. It was pleaded by defendants No. 2 to 4 that the earlier written statement, which was filed on their behalf, was not read over to them and they had not engaged any Lawyer and thus, it was prayed that by rejecting the first written statement, the Court may take the subsequent written statement filed by defendants No. 2 to 4 on record. However, the said prayer was rejected and the subsequent written statement filed by defendants No. 2 to 4 was not taken on record by the trial Court. 8. However, the said prayer was rejected and the subsequent written statement filed by defendants No. 2 to 4 was not taken on record by the trial Court. 8. The trial Court by judgment and decree dated 15-7-2014 decreed the suit and dismissed the counterclaim filed by the appellants/defendants No. 1 to 4 and it was held that the defendants No. 1 to 4 had merely sought declaration to the effect that they are the legal representatives of Narayan, but the consequential reliefs were not sought, therefore, it was held that the counterclaim filed by defendants No. 1 to 4 is not maintainable in the light of section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and further the counterclaim is not sufficiently stamped. Thus, it was declared that the plaintiffs/respondents No. 1 to 6 are the owners and in possession of the disputed property, i.e. Survey No. 20/1 area 0.303 hectare and Survey No. 22 area 0.439 hectare, total area 0.742 hectare situated in village Piproli, Tahsil and District Gwalior and it was further declared that the sale deed executed by defendants No. 1 to 4 in favour of defendant No. 7 on 13-8-2009 is null and void and the defendants were restrained from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs as well as they were also restrained from alienating any part of the property in dispute and it was further directed that the decree would become effective only after payment of remaining Court fee of Rs. 20/-. 9. It appears that being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, only the defendant No. 7 filed an appeal and the appellants did not file any appeal. It appears that the appellants/defendants No. 1 to 4 filed a cross-objection thereby challenging the decree passed against them. An application under Order 41, Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code was also filed by appellants/ defendants No. 1 to 4. The Appellate Court by order dated 26-6-2015 allowed the application filed under Order 41, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and remanded the matter back to the trial Court for deciding afresh after permitting the parties to lead additional evidence. 10. The Appellate Court by order dated 26-6-2015 allowed the application filed under Order 41, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and remanded the matter back to the trial Court for deciding afresh after permitting the parties to lead additional evidence. 10. Against the order dated 26-6-2015 passed by the Appellate Court, the respondents No. 1 to 6 filed a Miscellaneous Appeal before the High Court, which was registered as M. A. No. 676/2015 and the said Miscellaneous Appeal was allowed by this Court by order dated 11-5-2017 and the order dated 26-6- 2015 was set aside and the Appellate Court was directed to decide the application filed under Order 41, Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code afresh after giving due opportunity of hearing to respondents No. 1 to 6 and then to decide the appeal on merits. 11. The Appellate Court by impugned judgment and decree dated 30-11- 2017 passed in Civil Appeal No. 13-A/2014 has dismissed the appeal filed by the defendant No. 7/appellant in Second Appeal No. 14/2018 as well as also dismissed the cross-objection filed by the appellants/defendants No. 1 to 4 and the application under Order 41, Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code were also dismissed. 12. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 30-11-2017 passed by the Appellate Court, the appellants/defendants No. 1 to 4 have filed the present appeal, whereas the defendant No. 7/respondent No. 7 has filed Second Appeal No. 14/2018. 13. Challenging the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below, it is submitted by the counsel for the appellants that the Appellate Court has wrongly rejected the applications filed under Order 41, Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code. The plaintiff No. 5-Smt. Shyamabai, who claimed herself to be the legally wedded wife of Halkeram, was alive, but she could not dare to enter in the witness-box and since the plaintiffs have suppressed the best evidence available with them, therefore, an adverse inference should be drawn against them. The plaintiff No. 5-Smt. Shyamabai, who claimed herself to be the legally wedded wife of Halkeram, was alive, but she could not dare to enter in the witness-box and since the plaintiffs have suppressed the best evidence available with them, therefore, an adverse inference should be drawn against them. It is further submitted that Narayan was the son of Halkeram and the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court have misconstrued the documentary evidence led by the parties and the Courts below have wrongly relied upon the death certificate of Narayan, Ex.P/42-C, to hold that the name of father of Narayan was mentioned as Sarman in the death certificate, however, death certificate Ex.P/42-C is in relation of some other Narayan and not the husband of defendant No. 1. 14. Per contra, it is submitted by the counsel for the respondents No. 1 to 6 that after the dismissal of the counterclaim, the appellants did not file an appeal and the cross-objection filed by the appellants was not maintainable. Further, it is clear from the documentary evidence that Narayan was son of Sarnam and not Halkeram and it is well established principle of law that the concurrent findings of facts cannot be reversed in second appeal under section 100 of Civil Procedure Code unless and until the findings are said to be perverse. 15. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 16. The undisputed fact is that after the dismissal of the counterclaim, the appellants neither filed an appeal against the decree by which the suit filed by respondents No. 1 to 6 was decreed nor they filed an appeal against the dismissal of their counterclaim. It is well established principle of law that the counterclaim is also a suit and dismissal of counterclaim amounts to decree. In the present case, the appeal was filed by respondent No. 7 and the appellants filed their cross-objection under Order 41, Rule 22 of Civil Procedure Code. 17. It is submitted by the counsel for the appellants that the cross-objection filed by the appellants was maintainable and this objection was never raised by the respondents No. 1 to 6 and the cross-objection has not been dismissed on the ground of maintainability. Under these circumstances, the respondents No. 1 to 6 may not be permitted to raise the question of maintainability of cross-objection for the first time in this appeal. 18. Under these circumstances, the respondents No. 1 to 6 may not be permitted to raise the question of maintainability of cross-objection for the first time in this appeal. 18. Considered the submissions made by the counsel for the appellants as well as the counsel for respondents No. 1 to 6 on the question of maintainability of cross-objection filed by the appellants before the first Appellate Court. 19. Order 41, Rule 22 of Civil Procedure Code reads as under:— 22. Upon hearing respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred a separate appeal. - (1) Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree [but may also state that the finding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour; and may also take any cross-objection] to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal provided he has filed such objection in the Appellant Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow. Explanation. - A respondent aggrieved by a finding of the Court in the judgment on which the decree appealed against is based may, under this rule, file cross-objection in respect of the decree in so far as it is based on that finding, notwithstanding that by reason of the decision of the Court on any other finding which is sufficient for the decision of the suit, the decree, is, wholly or in part, in favour of that respondent. (2) Form of objection and provisions applicable thereto - Such cross-objection shall be in the form of a memorandum, and the provisions of rule 1, so far as they relate to the form and contents of the memorandum of appeal, shall apply thereto. (3) * * * * * (4) Where, in any case in which any respondent has under this rule filed a memorandum of objection, the original appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, the objection so filed may nevertheless be heard and determined after such notice to the other parties as the Court thinks fit. (3) * * * * * (4) Where, in any case in which any respondent has under this rule filed a memorandum of objection, the original appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, the objection so filed may nevertheless be heard and determined after such notice to the other parties as the Court thinks fit. (5) The provisions relating to appeals by indigent persons shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to an objection under this rule.” 20. From the plain reading of Order 41, Rule 22, Civil Procedure Code, it is clear that in order to maintain the cross-objection, a party may not only support the decree, but may also state that the findings against him in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour. In the present case, the entire decree was against the appellants. The decree was not in their favour and they had not challenged any findings recorded by the trial Court, but in fact the entire decree was challenged by filing the cross-objection in an appeal filed by codefendant/ respondent No. 7. 21. By referring to the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi and ors. vs. Intnl. Security and Intelligence Agency Ltd., reported in (2004) 3 SCC 250, it is submitted by the counsel for the appellants that the cross-objection is like an appeal and is an exercise of substantive right of appeal conferred by a statute and the available grounds of challenge against the judgment and decree or order impugned remains the same whether it is an appeal or cross-objection. In the case of Intnl. Security and Intelligence Agency Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court has held as under :— “15. Right to prefer cross-objection per-takes of the right to prefer an appeal. When the impugned decree or order is partly in favour of one party and partly in favour of the other, one party may rest contended by his partial success with a jew to giving a quietus to the litigation.......” 22. Right to prefer cross-objection per-takes of the right to prefer an appeal. When the impugned decree or order is partly in favour of one party and partly in favour of the other, one party may rest contended by his partial success with a jew to giving a quietus to the litigation.......” 22. Thus, it is clear that the cross-objection can be filed by a party when the impugned decree is partially in his favour and partially in favour of appellant, however, when the entire decree in toto is against a party, then he has no option but to file an appeal and he cannot maintain the cross-objection in an appeal filed by co-defendant. Further, in the case of H. P. State Forest Corporation vs. Kahan Singh and ors., reported in ILR 2016, 6 HP 1137 the High Court of Himachal Pradesh has held as under :— “22. …..........As the adjudication on the suit filed by the plaintiff- Corporation and adjudication on the counter claim filed by the defendant assumed the status of two distinct decrees, they were required to be challenged by way of separate appeals by paying the requisite Court fee on each of them. Defendant having failed to do so he could not have been granted the relief which was granted by learned Appellate Court in one single appeal which was filed by defendant against the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff-Corporation by learned trial Court as well as against the dismissal of his counter claim. Learned Appellate Court failed to appreciate that in the absence of two appeals, one appeal so filed was not maintainable, as the findings returned on plaint and counter claim acted as res judicata vis-à-vis each other which necessitated the filing of two appeals. Learned Appellate Court also failed to appreciate that non-filing of two distinct and separate appeals amounted to having the same effect where no appeal was filed from a decree in connected case and the effect of non filing of appeal against judgment or decree that has become final. In other words because only one appeal was filed, therefore, finality of finding recorded in connected claim on account of non filing of appeal precluded the Court from proceeding with appeal in the other connected claim.” 23. In other words because only one appeal was filed, therefore, finality of finding recorded in connected claim on account of non filing of appeal precluded the Court from proceeding with appeal in the other connected claim.” 23. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that once the suit was decreed against the appellants and their counter-claim was rejected, then they should have filed two separate appeals under section 96 of Civil Procedure Code and they could not have filed a cross-objection in an appeal filed by the co-defendant against the decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs. The cross-objection can be filed by a successful party challenging some of the findings which according to the said party should have been answered in his favour, but the cross-objection cannot be filed challenging the entire decree passed against the party filing the cross-objection. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the cross-objection filed by the appellants before the first Appellate Court was not maintainable. 24. Since the respondent No. 7 has also filed Second Appeal No. 14/2018, therefore, this Court thinks it appropriate to consider the facts of the case also. 25. It is the case of the plaintiffs that Narayan was the son of Sarman, whereas it is the case of defendants No. 1 to 4 that Narayan was son of Halkeram. Both the parties have relied on the voter-list as well as the amendment in the voter-list and other documentary evidence to show that Narayan was the son of Halkeram or he was not the son of Halkeram. However, the plaintiffs have relied upon the death certificate of Narayan Ex.P/42-C in which the name of father of Narayan has been mentioned as Sarman. The defendants No. 1 to 4 have not pleaded that the death certificate, Ex.P/42-C, is not in relation to Narayan, i.e., husband and father of defendants No. 1 to 4, but the same is in relation to some other person. The defendants No. 1 to 4 have admitted that Narayan has expired in the year 2007 and according to the death certificate, Ex.P/42-C, the death of Narayan took place on 18-10-2007. The defendants No. 1 to 4 have not disclosed the date of death of Narayan. The defendants No. 1 to 4 have admitted that Narayan has expired in the year 2007 and according to the death certificate, Ex.P/42-C, the death of Narayan took place on 18-10-2007. The defendants No. 1 to 4 have not disclosed the date of death of Narayan. Even in the cross-objection which was filed before the first Appellate Court the defendants No. 1 to 4 had not taken a stand that the death certificate of Narayan, Ex.P/42-C, is not in relation to Narayan, i.e., husband of defendant No. 1/father of defendants No. 2 to 4. The oral submission made by the counsel for the appellants that the death certificate of Narayan, Ex.P/42-C, is in relation to some other person cannot be accepted in absence of any factual foundation. Both the Courts below have given concurrent findings of facts that Narayan was the son of Sarman and had no share or title in the property belonging to Halkeram. 26. So far as the contention of the counsel for the appellants that the plaintiff No. 5 was the best witness and as she did not enter in the witness-box therefore adverse inference has to be drawn is concerned, it is the claim of defendants No. 1 to 4 themselves that plaintiff No. 6-Geeta and Jagdish (husband of plaintiff No. 1/father of plaintiffs No. 2 to 4) were the legitimate children of Halkeram and the plaintiff No. 5 was his keep. In case if the stand taken by the defendants No. 1 to 4 is accepted, even then it is clear that Jagdish and plaintiff No. 6-Geeta would have their share in the property belonging to Halkeram. Furthermore, defendants No. 1 to 4 have failed to prove that the plaintiff No. 5- Smt. Shyamabai was the keep of Halkeram and Jagdish and plaintiff No. 6-Geeta are his illegitimate children. 27. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Courts below did not commit any mistake in holding that the plaintiffs are the legal representatives of Halkeram being the wife as well as daughter and daughter-in-law and grandsons of Halkeram. It is well established principle of law that this Court in exercise of power under section 100 of Civil Procedure Code cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of facts unless and until the same are shown to be perverse or de hors the material available on record. It is well established principle of law that this Court in exercise of power under section 100 of Civil Procedure Code cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of facts unless and until the same are shown to be perverse or de hors the material available on record. No perversity could be pointed out by the counsel for the appellants. Accordingly, it is held that no substantial question of law arises in this appeal and as a consequence thereof, the judgment and decree dated 30-11-2017 passed by 14th Additional District Judge, Gwalior in First Appeal No. 13-A/2014 and the judgment and decree dated 15-7- 2014 passed by Third Civil Judge, Class-II, Gwalior in Civil Suit No. 23-A/2013 are hereby affirmed. 28. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed.