JUDGMENT : 1. This second appeal at the instance of the plaintiff is against the judgment and decree dated 16.05.1991 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 4th Court, Midnapore in Title Appeal No. 180 of 1990 affirming those dated 9th April, 1990 passed by the learned Munsif, 3rd Court, Midnapore in Title Suit No. 99 of 1981. Plaintiff/appellants filed a suit for declaration and injunction. According to the plaint case suit plot nos. 597 and 600 originally belonged to Srimanta, Purnananda and Umesh, the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants. One Tara Chand Gantait was predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff who intended to purchase some property adjacent to plot nos. 622 and 601 from Srimanta, Purnananda and Umesh. Srimanta, Purnananda and Umesh transferred 2 decimals of land out of 3 decimal in plot no. 597 on the Eastern side and 4 decimal of land out of 8 decimal in plot no. 600 on the Southern side. The consideration money was Rs.40/-. According to the plaintiffs such transfer was effected on 15th February, 1927 and since then Tara Chand, plaintiffs' predecessor is in possession which has been described in the sketch map of the plaint being the portion as makred as A, B, C, D and in respect of plot no. 597 being marked as E, F, G, H in plot no. 600. Plaint case further disclosed that there is a public road covering 1 decimal in plot no. 597, plot no. 601 and 622 which originally belonged to Tara Chand and by natural devaluation it devolved upon the plaintiffs. Both these two plots are bastu land. In the R.S. Record-of-Rights these two plots were recorded in the name of plaintiff. On the adjacent west of plot no. 622 there is a portion of plot no. 597 which is described in the sketch map as A, B, C, D. The suit plot no. 600 is adjacent to 622 and 601 as shown in the sketch map under E, F, G, H. Tara Chand possesses that portion taking plot no. 601 and 622 together with the suit plot since 15th February, 1927 in presence of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants. According to the plaintiffs they have acquired right, title and interest in respect of the suit property by way of adverse possession. 601 and 622 together with the suit plot since 15th February, 1927 in presence of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants. According to the plaintiffs they have acquired right, title and interest in respect of the suit property by way of adverse possession. According to them after 15th February, 1927 the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants and the present defendant had no right, title, interest and possession over the disputed 'Ka' scheduled property. 2. Defendant contested the suit by filling written statement denying the plaint case. It was denied that the suit property originally belonged to Srimanta, Purnananda and Umesh or that Umesh was predecessor-in- interest of the defendants. According to them Purna Chandra Maity was the grandfather of defendant nos. 1 and 2. One Srimanta Lal Maity was the grandfather of Defendant nos. 3 to 6 and the grandfather of the husband of defendant no.7. According to them there was none known as Srimanta. Plot no. 597 belonged to Umesh and Haraprasad Maity in 8 annas share and Srimanta Lal and Purna Chandra Maity in 8 annas share. Plot no. 600 belonged to Srimanta and Purnananda in equal share. According to the defendant Umesh had no interest in plot no.600. They also denied that Tara Chand was the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs. Keshab was the father of the plaintiffs. Tara Chand was the father of Keshab. Tara Chand had four sons Ghandhari, Bikram, Keshab and Jagat. They are all dead. Ghandhari had four sons Iswar, Khagen, Gour and Niranjan. Iswar is dead. His sons are Palash and Tapan. Bikram and Jagat had no wife or issue. Tara Chand never intended to purchase the adjacent land of plot nos. 622 and 601. In effect there was no plot no. 622 in the C.S. Record-of-Rights and plot no. 601 was never a Bastu land. Plot no. 601 belonged to Thakurmoni Dasi and that was a 'kala' land. Tara Chand used to reside in Mouza Srirampur. The defendants have denied the story of oral sale in favour of Tara Chand, they also denied that there is a public road through plot no. 597. According to the defendants neither Tara Chand nor plaintiffs ever possessed the disputed property and therefore, the story of adverse possession is false. 3. Tara Chand used to reside in Mouza Srirampur. The defendants have denied the story of oral sale in favour of Tara Chand, they also denied that there is a public road through plot no. 597. According to the defendants neither Tara Chand nor plaintiffs ever possessed the disputed property and therefore, the story of adverse possession is false. 3. The trial Court framed as many as five issues of which first two issues were on the question of maintainability and valuation of the suit which has been decided by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiffs. Issue nos. 3 and 4, are the material issues in the suit whether the plaintiffs had any right, title, interest and possession over the suit property or whether they were entitled to decree as prayed for. The trial Court came to a conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to prove their possession over the suit land and therefore, those two issues have been answered in the negative and against the plaintiffs. The last issue is on the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to any other relief or reliefs. Here the Court also answered against the plaintiff. It is important to point out that although, the plaintiffs claimed their title over the suit property by way of adverse possession but no issue has been framed on the same. It is also important to point out that although, such a plea of adverse possession was advanced through the plaint case but there was no issue thereon. Appellant pleads fault on the part of the trial Court to frame any issue on adverse possession. However, if the plaintiff claims title adverse to the defendant's right over the suit plot it is the onus of the plaintiff to prove his case. In order to establish possession over the suit plot the plaintiffs relied on the fact that there had been an oral sale in their favour in 1927 but such oral sale could neither be proved by either any document or by any oral evidence. On the contrary record reveals that learned advocate appearing for the plaintiffs submitted that he was not pressing the claim of the plaintiff as regards oral sale. On the contrary record reveals that learned advocate appearing for the plaintiffs submitted that he was not pressing the claim of the plaintiff as regards oral sale. The learned advocate for the plaintiff also conceded to the argument of the learned advocate for the defendants that Exbt.1 and Exbt.2 being the reports of the Junior Land Reforms Officer could not be proved for lack of examination of the author of the said reports. Whole case of the plaintiffs that they used to possess the property for more than 60 years is based on their averments that there had been oral sale for Rs.40/- in favour of Tara Chand from the predecessor in interest of the defendants could not be proved by any means. Therefore, the story of possession and possession for a longer period than 12 years maturing to adverse possession could not be proved. In such a situation the learned Court below rightly held that the plaintiffs could not prove their case to get a decree as prayed for. The trial Court held that the documentary evidence of possession namely the Record-of-Rights and rent receipts are all in favour of the defendants. The only document which was placed by the plaintiffs for consideration in support of their possession is a report of Junior Land Reforms Officer which shows that the maker of the said document was not examined as a result whereof the Court could not rely on the said document as it has got no evidentiary value. It was further held by the learned trial Court that when documentary evidence failed the plaintiff sought to rely on the oral evidence and even it was noticed that the oral evidence contradicts the documentary evidence and if such be the case definitely the documentary evidence will prevail over the oral evidence and which exactly has been done by the learned trial Court. The plaintiff relied on the learned Advocate's Commission report where plot no. 600 reflected existence of Doba but in the R.S. ROR plot no. 600 has been shown to be a paddy land and plot no. 597 is a danga land. Admittedly, no objection was filed against such recording, although, it is claimed by the plaintiff that the R.S. ROR was wrongly prepared. But there is also no prayer in the plaint that such Record-of-Rights are erroneous. 600 has been shown to be a paddy land and plot no. 597 is a danga land. Admittedly, no objection was filed against such recording, although, it is claimed by the plaintiff that the R.S. ROR was wrongly prepared. But there is also no prayer in the plaint that such Record-of-Rights are erroneous. In absence of such prayer, in my view, the learned Court below has rightly refused to grant a decree for declaration in respect of the suit land and also the grant of permanent injunction against the defendant. Record-of-Rights, no doubt neither creates nor extinguishes title but has got a presumptive value. Such presumption is a rebuttable presumption. Unless cogent evidence is adduced that such recording was erroneous and more so when no such prayer is made in the plaint can Court pass a decree for declaration without declaring that the Record-of-Rights so prepared were erroneous. Therefore, it does not appear to this Court that the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court can at all be interfered with. In appeal against the said judgment and decree the learned Appellate Court below has found no wrong which appears to be justifiably correct and has not interfered with the said judgment of the trial Court. It was argued before the Appellate Court that the trial Court's judgment and decree was liable to be set aside in view of the fact that no issue of adverse possession was framed, although, the plaintiff pleaded the same. The Appellate Court below held that non-framing of issue is not fatal when the Court has substantially justified non-grant of relief of adverse possession in the judgment of the trial Court and therefore, affirmed the same. In second appeal, although, no substantial question of law was framed the only question was taken into consideration in this appeal whether the Courts below committed any illegality in not granting declaration in favour of the plaintiffs over the suit land when according to Local Investigation Commissioner's report reflects possession of plaintiffs in respect of a Doba on a part of the suit plot and whether the trial Court was justified in refusing grant of permanent injunction. 4. Mr. Bagchi in support of his submission relied on two decisions in the case of * Ram Chandra Sil and Ors. -Vs. - Ramanmani Dasi and Ora. reported in XX CWN 773; * State of West Bengal -Vs. 4. Mr. Bagchi in support of his submission relied on two decisions in the case of * Ram Chandra Sil and Ors. -Vs. - Ramanmani Dasi and Ora. reported in XX CWN 773; * State of West Bengal -Vs. - The Dalhousie Institute Society reported in AIR 1970 SC 1778 5. The first decision relied on by Mr. Bagchi to argue that plaintiff may be allowed to succeed on a title of adverse possession pleaded even for the first time in the Court of Appeal provided such a case arose on the facts stated in the plaint and the defendant is not taken by surprise. Although, Mr. Bagchi is right in making this proposition on the said decision but there are other principles to be considered for a Court to come to a conclusion that plaintiff has acquired title by adverse possession. It is settled law that plea of adverse possession cannot be taken as a sword but it can be used only as a shield. Be that as it may, even if the ratio of the said judgment is considered, without any hesitation, I can hold that defendants in this case cannot argue for considering his submission on adverse possession at the Appellate forum for the simple reason that plaintiffs have not made out any case for adverse possession. In this case even if Appellate Court had any desire to consider the case of adverse possession it could not have been done because the plaintiff has not made out a case for adverse possession. Even assuming that the Appellate Court could have re-cast the issue on adverse possession but the same was unnecessary inasmuch as the trial Court on appreciation of both documentary and oral evidence came to a conclusion that plaintiff failed to prove his case. Although, no issue on adverse possession was framed by the trial Court but it discussed threadbare the subject and as such I do not find it to be justified to remand the matter on this ground of non-framing of issue of adverse possession. When documentary evidence apparently does not support the plea of adverse possession and even the oral evidence does not suggest corroboration the Appellate Court cannot help much in support of the plea of adverse possession raised by the plaintiffs before the First Appellate Court. When documentary evidence apparently does not support the plea of adverse possession and even the oral evidence does not suggest corroboration the Appellate Court cannot help much in support of the plea of adverse possession raised by the plaintiffs before the First Appellate Court. Therefore, the judgment does not help getting a decree for declaration even on re-casting an issue of adverse possession. That apart the judgment itself clearly lays down the principle that to establish a title of adverse possession, the plaintiff must prove enjoyment possessing the characteristics as are necessary for presumption of a lost grant. It is settled law that mere possession is not adverse possession howsoever longer is it and cannot be an adverse possession unless such possession is proved to be hostile against the true owner. In the present case admittedly R.S. Record-of-Rights which was prepared after Estates Acquisition Act came into force in 1953 cannot be thrown away unless proved erroneous by cogent evidence. Plaintiffs did not make any effort to make even any objection to the appropriate authority alleging incorrectness of the Record-of-Rights and perhaps for this reasons, the plaintiffs did not make any prayer for declaration that those Record-of-Rights are erroneous and not binding upon them. The other decision in The Dalhousie Institute Society (supra) is distinguishable on fact where dispute between the parties relates to title to the compensation amount awarded for the land acquisition proceeding for Dalhousie Institute. In that case the appellant/State claimed the entire amount of compensation payable to it whereas the Dalhousie Institute Society also claimed for the same. The said appeal however, failed and was dismissed. In the said decision it was found by the Court that the Society was entitled to the compensation inasmuch as it was in open continuous and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the site for over 60 years. On such fact the Society was held to be entitled for the compensation. In the said decision it was held that when somebody is in possession on the basis of an illegal grant and such possession qualifies the period for holding adverse possession it becomes an adverse possession. It acquires the right to possess the property adversely. In that case the possession was held to be over 70 years against the corporation. Therefore, possession under the grant was an undisputed fact and such possession was accepted to be an adverse possession. 6. Mr. It acquires the right to possess the property adversely. In that case the possession was held to be over 70 years against the corporation. Therefore, possession under the grant was an undisputed fact and such possession was accepted to be an adverse possession. 6. Mr. Ghosh appearing for the appellant submitted that there is nothing to interfere with the judgment of the learned Courts below. He has pointed out the same which has already been discussed by the learned Trial Court. In addition, he has pointed out before this Court that there is no reason for the Second Appellate Court to interfere with the concurrent findings on fact. In this case no ground has been formulated which can be said to be a substantial question of law which is apparently absent in the present case. Mr. Ghosh submitted that in the instant case both the Courts below on the basis of documentary evidence namely C.S. and R.S Record-of-Rights and other registered deeds of conveyance showing several transactions in respect of the suit properties held that the defendants/respondents are all along in actual physical possession of the suit property. He added that Purna Chandra one of the so-called vendors of the alleged oral sale died in 1330 BS corresponding to 1923 A.D., that is, much before the date of sale on 15th February, 1927. According to Mr. Ghosh this fact has not been denied by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, during cross-examination of the defence witnesses also did not venture to prove that Prunachandra did not pass away before the execution of the alleged oral sale. 7. In view of the discussion hereinbefore, there is no substantial question of law involved in this case. 8. The appeal fails and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. Judgments of the Courts below are, hereby, affirmed. 9. There will be no order as to costs. 10. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be delivered to the learned advocates for the respective parties upon compliance of all usual formalities.