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2019 DIGILAW 596 (CAL)

Badal Chandra Kundu v. Netai Mahato

2019-05-15

BISWAJIT BASU

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. The present revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is at the instance of the defendants in a suit for specific performance of agreement and is directed against the judgment and order dated September 16, 2017 passed by the 3rd Court of learned Additional District Judge, Purulia, in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 50 of 2016. 2. The opposite parties filed a suit being Title Suit No. 88 of 2016 in the Court of learned Civil Judge(Junior Division), at Purulia for the following reliefs:- "a. A decree for specific performance of the contract dated 21.04.2019 including agreement dated 26.03.1981 for execution and registration of a proper deed of conveyance by the Defendants no. 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiffs being the descendents of Methila Mahatani in respect of the suit property within a time to be fixed by the Ld. Court filing which liberty may be given to the plaintiffs to get the same executed and registered through court, be passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. b. A decree for cost of the suit be passed in favour of the plaintiffs. c. A decree for any other relief or reliefs to which the plaintiffs would be found entitled under the law and equity be also passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants." 3. The plaint case of the said suit in brief is that the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs namely Mithila Mahatani @ Mithila Mahato was the absolute owner of the suit property. She proposed to transfer the suit property to the defendant no. 1 on condition that the defendant no. 1 would retransfer the same to her and the defendant no. 1 accepted the said proposal. The said Mithila Mahatani @ Mithila Mahato then by a registered deed of sale dated March 26, 1981 transferred the suit property to the defendant no. 1 on a consideration price of Rs. 1999/-. The defendant no. 1 by a registered agreement executed on the same date i.e. on March 26, 1981 agreed to retransfer the suit property to said Mithila Mahatani @ Mithila Mahato within seven years from the said date of execution of the said agreement on a consideration price of Rs. 1999/-. The said Mithila Mahatani @ Mithila Mahato on April 21, 1985 corresponding to 10th Chitra, 1351 B.S.' paid the consideration price of Rs. 1999/-. The said Mithila Mahatani @ Mithila Mahato on April 21, 1985 corresponding to 10th Chitra, 1351 B.S.' paid the consideration price of Rs. 1999/- to the defendant no. 1 and demanded execution and registration of proper deed of reconveyance in her favour, in terms of the said agreement dated March 26, 1981 but the defendant no. 1 avoided to do so, instead executed an agreement on April 21, 1985. The defendant no. 1 by the said agreement agreed to retransfer the suit property in favour of said Mithila Mahatani @ Mithila Mahato and acknowledged delivery of possession of the suit property in her favour and also the acceptance of the said consideration price. The said Mithila Mahatani @ Mithila Mahato after coming into the possession started cultivating the suit property and after her death on March 7, 1986 the plaintiffs inherited the suit property being her heirs and legal representatives. The plaintiffs from a notice of a proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, initiated by the defendant no. 2 came to learn that defendant no. 1 taking advantage of non-execution and non-registration of the deed of retransfer of the suit property in terms of the agreement dated April 21, 1985 and March 26, 1981 has transferred the suit property in favour of his son, the defendant no. 2. The plaintiffs under such circumstances sent the notice dated February 15, 2016 demanding execution and registration of proper sale deed in respect of the suit property in their favour in terms of the said agreement dated April 21, 1985 but the defendants denied the existence of the said agreement dated April 21, 1985. Hence the suit. 4. The defendants in the suit filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'said application for injunction' in short). The defendants in the said application for injunction have contended, inter alia, that the defendant no. 2 after obtaining the suit property from his father, the defendant no. 1 applied under O.B.C. category of the Rajib Gandhi LPG Vitrak (R.G.G.L.V.) scheme for distributorship of LPG gas cylinder of the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd citing the suit property as the proposed site for the showroom and godown of the said distributorship. The defendant no. 2 was found eligible for the said distributorship. 1 applied under O.B.C. category of the Rajib Gandhi LPG Vitrak (R.G.G.L.V.) scheme for distributorship of LPG gas cylinder of the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd citing the suit property as the proposed site for the showroom and godown of the said distributorship. The defendant no. 2 was found eligible for the said distributorship. The Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited by a letter dated August 22, 2014 directed the defendant no. 2 to construct the said showroom and said godown within four months from the date of the said letter. The defendant no. 2 after obtaining sanction order on many occasion tried to construct said showroom and godown over the suit property but failed due the resistance of the plaintiffs. The defendants by the said application have prayed for an order of injunction restraining the plaintiffs and their men and agents from disturbing and/or creating any obstruction at time of raising construction of the said showroom and said godown on the land described under the schedule appended to the said application. 5. The plaintiffs contested the said application by filing written objection. The plaintiffs in their said written objection have denied that the defendants are in possession of the suit property and have claimed that they are cultivating the suit property being in actual possession of it. 6. The learned Trial Judge by the Order No. 9 dated September 29, 2016 allowed the said application for injunction by restraining the plaintiffs from creating any obstruction at the time of rising construction by the defendants over the properties described under the schedule of the said application. 7. The plaintiffs being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order of the learned Trial Judge preferred the Miscellaneous Appeal No. 50 of 2016. The appeal Court below by the order impugned has allowed the said appeal by setting aside the order of the learned Trial Judge and by directing the parties to the suit to maintain status quo in respect of nature and character of the suit property as on the date of the said order till disposal of the of the suit. 8. Mr. 8. Mr. Rwitendra Banerjee, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the plaintiffs in the suit are seeking decree of specific performance of an agreement for execution and registration of a proper deed of conveyance in respect of the suit property by the defendants as such the title of the defendants over the suit property is not in dispute. He submits that the plaintiffs are although claiming possession over the suit property but did not substantiate the said claim by producing any evidence. On the contrary the defendants in course of the adjudication of the said application have filed several documents to substantiate their claim of having possession over the suit property. The said documents are the mutation certificate in the name of defendant no. 2 in respect of the suit property, the permission granted by the concerned panchayet to the defendant no. 2 for executing construction work on the suit property, tax receipts of the suit property and certificate of conversion of the suit property. He by referring to the mutation certificate of the suit property submits that the suit property has been mutated in the name of defendant no. 2 after following the procedures laid down under provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 and the rules framed thereunder. He further submits that it is mandatory under the Rule 59 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Manual, 1991 that the revenue authority on receipt of an application for mutation shall verify the physical possession of the applicant over the property in respect of which the mutation has been applied for. The name of defendant no. 2 has been mutated in respect of the suit property after complying said mandatory provision. He submits that the learned Trial Judge upon consideration of the said documents came to a finding that the prima facie possession of the suit property is with the defendants but the learned Judge of the appeal Court below has erroneously discarded the said documents simply on the ground that those have been created after the year 2014 when there is no challenge to the genuinity of those documents from the side of the plaintiffs. 9. Mr. Banerjee, further submits that construction of showroom and godown is the condition precedent to the grant of the said distributorship. In the event the defendant no. 9. Mr. Banerjee, further submits that construction of showroom and godown is the condition precedent to the grant of the said distributorship. In the event the defendant no. 2 is unable to construct the said showroom and godown, the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited would not allot the said distributorship to the defendant no. 2. The learned Trial Judge considering the said circumstances allowed the said application for injunction holding that the balance of convenience and inconvenience are in favour of the defendants in granting the order of injunction as prayed for. The appeal Court below reversed the order of the learned Trial Judge without adverting to the said finding of the learned Trial Judge. He concludes his argument by submitting that although the defendants have claimed that Muruli Mahato the son of said Mithila Mahatani @ Mithila Mahato on January 31, 1983 executed a deed of release of the suit property in favour of the defendant no. 1 but the defendants are not relying on the said document in support of their said application for injunction but the appeal Court below giving unnecessary importance to the veracity of the said document has reversed the order of the learned Trial Judge, therefore, has acted with material irregularity. 10. Mr. Asish Sanyal, learned advocate for the opposite parties refuting the argument of Mr. Banerjee submits that the defendant no. 1 purchased the suit property on condition of retransfer of it to his vendor i.e. the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs and agreed to such retransfer of the suit property by a registered agreement. The said predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs upon payment of the agreed consideration price when demanded retransfer of the suit property in her favour the defendant no. 1 avoided to execute and register proper deed of conveyance, instead executed a further agreement on April 21, 1981. He submits that defendant no. 1 by the said agreement not only agreed to retransfer the suit property but also acknowledged receipt of the consideration price for said retransfer and delivery of possession of the suit property in favour of the said predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs but the defendant no. 1 instead of performing his part of obligation under the said agreements has illegally transferred the suit property in favour of his son i.e. defendant no. 2. 1 instead of performing his part of obligation under the said agreements has illegally transferred the suit property in favour of his son i.e. defendant no. 2. He submits that the documents produced by the defendants are of no consequence since those have been created on the basis of the illegal transfer by the defendant no. 1 in favour of defendant no. 2. Mr. Sanyal further contends that a defendant cannot resort to the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code to get an order of injunction against the plaintiff unless the relief of injunction sought for by the defendant is based on the cause of action of the suit or incidental to it. Mr. Sanyal, to substantiate his said argument places reliance on the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of DR. ASHIS RANJAN DAS Vs. RAJENDRA NATH MULLICK, (1982) AIR Calcutta 529 and the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Chhattisgarh High Court in the case of SMT. SANJU DEVI KASHYAP AND OTHERS Vs. SMT. UMA BAI AND OTHERS, 2019 AIR Chh. 56. He submits that in the present case the relief of injunction which the defendants are seeking against the plaintiffs since is not based on the cause of action of the suit or incidental to it the said application for injunction is not maintainable. 11. Mr. Banerjee, responding to the argument of Mr. Sanyal submits that the defendant no. 1 transferred the suit property in favour of defendant no. 2 as full owner thereof and the plaintiffs in the suit by seeking a decree for execution and registration of appropriate deed of conveyance in respect of the suit property in their favour are acknowledging the absolute title of the defendants over the suit property, therefore, the plaintiffs cannot allege that the transfer in favour of the defendant no. 2 by the defendant no. 1 is illegal. 12. Mr. Banerjee, contends that according to the oxford dictionary the meaning of the term "incidental" is "occurring by chance in connection with something else" or "happening as a minor accompaniment to something else". 2 by the defendant no. 1 is illegal. 12. Mr. Banerjee, contends that according to the oxford dictionary the meaning of the term "incidental" is "occurring by chance in connection with something else" or "happening as a minor accompaniment to something else". and in the present suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale where prima facie possession is with the defendants the prayer for an appropriate order of injunction against the plaintiffs is only available minor accompaniment to the cause of action of the suit as such the defendants can very well resort to the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code to get the relief as sought for by the said application for injunction since the said relief is incidental to the cause of action of the suit. 13. Mr. Banerjee, alternatively argues that even if it is assumed that the defendants are not entitled to resort to the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code to get an order of injunction in the suit against the plaintiffs but the defendants are entitled to make such prayer under Section 94(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure as the said provision being a supplemental proceeding, recourse of it can be taken when an exigency arises therefor. He finally submits that nonetheless the Court has always inherent power under Section 151 of the Code to pass an appropriate order of injunction at the instance of either of the parties to the suit where circumstance do not fall under any of the rules prescribed in the Code. In support of his such contention he places reliance on the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of MANOHAR LAL CHOPRA Vs. RAI BAHADUR RAO RAJA SETH HIRALAL, (1962) AIR SC 527 and in the case of VAREED JACOB Vs. SOSAMMA GEEVARGHESE AND OTHERS, (2004) 6 SCC 378 and also in the case of K.K. VELUSAMY Vs. N. PALANISAMY, (2011) 11 SCC 275 . He also relies on the Hon'ble Division Bench decisions of this Court in the case of CHINESE TANNERY OWNERS ASSOCIATION AND OTHERS Vs. MAKHAN LALA AND OTHERS, (1952) AIR Calcutta 560 and in the case of ABL INTERNATIONAL PVT. LTD. Vs. SUNITA RAMCHAND SADARANGANI & ORS., (2009) 1 CalHN 56. 14. N. PALANISAMY, (2011) 11 SCC 275 . He also relies on the Hon'ble Division Bench decisions of this Court in the case of CHINESE TANNERY OWNERS ASSOCIATION AND OTHERS Vs. MAKHAN LALA AND OTHERS, (1952) AIR Calcutta 560 and in the case of ABL INTERNATIONAL PVT. LTD. Vs. SUNITA RAMCHAND SADARANGANI & ORS., (2009) 1 CalHN 56. 14. On consideration of the materials on record and the arguments advanced by the learned advocate for the parties it appears that the issue which emerges for consideration in the present revisional application is whether the petitioners being the defendants are entitled to get an order of injunction against the plaintiffs under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code and if not then whether they are entitled to such an order of injunction under Section 94(c) of the Code or under Section 151 of the Code. 15. Order 39 Rule 1 of the Code deals with the cases in which temporary injunction may be granted. In any suit where it is proved by affidavit or otherwise that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, the Court at the instance either party to the suit under clause (a) of Order 39 Rule 1 of the Code may grant an order of temporary injunction to restrain such Act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property but under clauses (b) and (c) thereof an order of injunction can only be granted at the instance of the plaintiff of the suit if the circumstances fall under the aforesaid clauses of the Code. Under Rule 2 of Order 39 in any suit for restraining the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind only the plaintiff may apply to the Court for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendants from committing the breach of contract of injury complained of. 16. The plaintiffs in the present suit have prayed for the relief of specific performance of the agreements whereby the defendant no. 1 allegedly agreed to transfer the suit property in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs. The cause of action of the suit arose when the defendant no. 16. The plaintiffs in the present suit have prayed for the relief of specific performance of the agreements whereby the defendant no. 1 allegedly agreed to transfer the suit property in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs. The cause of action of the suit arose when the defendant no. 1 refused to perform his obligation under the said agreements. The defendants, pending such suit is praying for the relief of injunction restraining the plaintiffs from causing any disturbance to the defendants at the time of execution of construction work on the suit property. The said relief as sought for by the defendants in the said application since no way is connected with the cause of action of the suit or incidental to it, the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1 of the Code cannot come to the service of the defendants as has been held by the learned Single Judge of this Court in AIR 1982 CALCUTTA 529 (supra). The learned Single Judge of Chhattisgarh High Court in the decision relied on by Mr. Sanyal reported in AIR 2019 CHHATTISGARH 56 (supra) has held that only the plaintiff alone is entitled to file an application for temporary injunction in a situation covered under clause (c) of Order 39 Rule 1 of the Code. There is no dispute with regard to the said proposition of law. However in the context of the issue under discussion the said decision has no relevance. 17. Let me now consider the next argument of Mr. Banerjee, that even if the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1 of the Code do not come to the service of the defendants to get an appropriate order of injunction in the suit against the plaintiffs, the provision of Section 94(c) of the Code being a supplemental proceedings under the Code can be resorted to by the defendants to get such an order. 18. S.B. SINHA, J. while delivering the minority judgment in the Three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex in the case of VAREED JACOB Vs. SOSAMMA GEEVARGHESE AND OTHERS, (2004) 6 SCC 378 has dealt with the scope of "supplemental proceedings" under Part. VI vis- -vis "incidental proceedings" under Part. 18. S.B. SINHA, J. while delivering the minority judgment in the Three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex in the case of VAREED JACOB Vs. SOSAMMA GEEVARGHESE AND OTHERS, (2004) 6 SCC 378 has dealt with the scope of "supplemental proceedings" under Part. VI vis- -vis "incidental proceedings" under Part. III of the Code and has held that the statutory scheme therefor is that supplemental proceeding should be taken recourse to only when the interest-of-justice is required to be sub-served, although interlocutory order may not have anything to do with the ultimate decision of the Court. The observations of S.B. SINHA, J. in the said judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court are quoted below:- "54. Parliament consciously used two different expressions "incidental proceedings" and "supplemental proceedings" which obviously would carry two different meanings. 55. The expression "ancillary" means aiding; auxiliary; subordinate; attendant upon; that which aids or promotes a proceeding regarded as the principal. 56. The expression "supplementary proceeding" on the other hand, would mean a separate proceeding in an original action, in which the court where the action is pending is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction in the interest of justice. 57. The expression "incidental" may mean differently in different contexts. While dealing with procedural law, it may mean proceedings which are procedural in nature but when it is used in relation to an agreement or delegated legislation, it may mean something more; but the distinction between an incidental proceeding and a supplemental proceeding being obvious cannot be ignored. 58. Indisputably, the effect of an order passed under different provisions of Section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be different. They have been so legislated keeping in view different exigencies of circumstances but it must not be forgotten that the power thereunder is to be exercised in the interest of justice. The statutory scheme therefor is that supplemental proceeding should be taken recourse to only when the interest of justice is required to be subserved, although the interlocutory order may not have anything to do with the ultimate decision of the Court." The above quoted observations of S.B. SINHA, J. in the said decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court does not suggest that the Court has two sources of power to grant an order of injunction i.e. one under Section 94(c) of the Code and another under Order 39 Rules. 1 and 2 of the Code. 1 and 2 of the Code. 19. The Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of JAGJIT SINGH KHANNA Vs. RAKHAL DAS MULLICK AND ANOTHER, (1988) AIR Calcutta 95 has held that Section 94(c) shows that a Court may grant a temporary injunction thereunder only "if it is so prescribed". The expression "prescribed" in Section 94(c) of the Code would mean as defined in Section 2(16) of the Code "prescribed by Rules." The rules which prescribe grant of temporary injunction are Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39. Therefore, a temporary injunction may be granted under Section 94(c) only if a case satisfying the requirement of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 is made out. Thus, it is not correct to say that the Court has two sources of power to grant temporary injunction, one under Section 94(c) and the other under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 and may resort to one or the other as and when necessary. Under the Civil Procedure Code a temporary injunction can be granted only under one set of provisions namely, under Section 94(c) read with Order 39 Rules 1 and 2. The Court can grant temporary injunction in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 151 also but there it does not grant it under any power conferred by the Civil Procedure Code but under powers inhering in its very constitution which are saved by and under Section 151. 20. V.N. KHARE, C.J. AND S.H. KAPADIA, J. while delivering the majority judgment in the said Three Judges Bench decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2004) 6 SUPREME COURT CASES 378 (supra) approved the view expressed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in AIR 1988 CALCUTTA 95 (supra) and have held that when a matter comes before the Court, the Court has to examine the facts of each case and ascertain whether the ingredients of Section 94 read with the rules in an order are satisfied and accordingly grant an appropriate relief. The Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said report needs to be recorded as such quoted below:- "10. In the case of Jagjit Singh Khanna v. Dr. Rakhal Das Mullick it has been held that a temporary injunction may be granted under Section 94(c) only if a case satisfies Order 39 Rule1 and Rule 2. The Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said report needs to be recorded as such quoted below:- "10. In the case of Jagjit Singh Khanna v. Dr. Rakhal Das Mullick it has been held that a temporary injunction may be granted under Section 94(c) only if a case satisfies Order 39 Rule1 and Rule 2. It is not correct to say that the court has two powers, one to grant temporary injunction under Section 94(c) and the other under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2. That Section 94(c) CPC shows that the court may grant a temporary injunction thereunder, only if it is so prescribed by Rule 1 and Rule 2 of Order 39. The Court can also grant temporary injunction in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 151, but in that case, it does not grant temporary injunction under any of the powers conferred by CPC, but under powers inherent in the constitution of the Court, which is saved by Section 151 CPC. 11. The above discussion shows that the source of power of the court to grant interim relief is under Section 94. However, exercise of that power can only be done if the circumstances of the case fall under the rules. Therefore, when a matter comes before the court, the court has to examine the facts of each case and ascertain whether the ingredients of Section 94 read with the rules in an order are satisfied and accordingly grant an appropriate relief. It is only in cases where circumstances do not fall under any of the rules prescribed that the court can invoke its inherent power under Section 151 CPC. Accordingly, the courts have to grant relief of attachment before judgment, if the circumstances fall under Order 38 CPC. Similarly, courts will grant temporary injunction if the case satisfies Order 39. So depending on the circumstances falling in the prescribed rules, the power of the court to grant specified reliefs would vary. Therefore, one cannot equate rules of temporary injunction with rules of attachment before judgment although all are broadly termed as interlocutory orders." 21. The above discussion makes it clear that Section 94(c) of the Code is not an independent source of the power of the Court to grant of an order of injunction. The argument of Mr. Banerjee, on this point, therefore, fails. 22. The above discussion makes it clear that Section 94(c) of the Code is not an independent source of the power of the Court to grant of an order of injunction. The argument of Mr. Banerjee, on this point, therefore, fails. 22. The next question falls for consideration whether the Court in exercise of it's inherent power under Section 151 of the Code can grant an appropriate order of injunction in cases where circumstances do not fall under Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of MANOHAR LAL CHOPRA Vs. RAI BAHADUR RAO RAJA SETH HIRALAL, (1962) AIR SC 527 has recognized such power of the Court. The paragraph no. 18 of the said report being relevant is quoted below:- "18. There is difference of opinion between the High Courts on this point, One view is that a Court cannot issue an order of temporary injunction if the circumstances do not fall within the provisions of Order 39 of the Code: Varadacharlu v. Narsimha Charlu; Govindarajulu v. Imperial Bank of India Karuppayya v. Ponnuswami; Murugesa Mudali v. Angamuthu Mudali and Subramanian v. Seetarama. The other view is that a Court can issue an interim injunction under circumstances which are not covered by Order 39 of the Code, if the Court is of opinion that the interests of justice require the issue of such interim injunction: Dhaneshwar Nath v. Ghanshyam Dhar ; Firm Bichchha Ram v. firm Baldeo Sahai; Bhagat Singh v. Jagbir Sawhney and Chinese Tannery Owners' Association v. Makhan Lal. We are of opinion that the latter view is correct and that the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order 39 CPC. There is no such expression in Section 94 which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order 39 or by any rules made under the Code. It is well settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. It is well settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. The effect of the expression "if it is so prescribed" is only this that when the rules prescribe the circumstances in which the temporary injunction can be issued, ordinarily the Court is not to use its inherent powers to make the necessary orders in the interests of justice, but is merely to see whether the circumstances of the case bring it within the prescribed rule. If the provisions of Section 94 were not there in the Code, the Court could still issue temporary injunctions, but it could do that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. No party has a right to insist on the Court's exercising that jurisdiction and the Court exercises its inherent jurisdiction only when it considers it absolutely necessary for the ends of justice to do so. It is in the incidence of the exercise of the power of the Court to issue temporary injunction that the provisions of Section 94 of the Code have their effect and not in taking away the right of the Court to exercise its inherent power." 23. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision reported in (2011) 11 SUPREME COURT CASES 275 (supra) while summarising the scope of Section 151 of the Code at paragraph 12(d) held as under:- "12. (a)...............(b)...............(c)...................... (d) The inherent powers of the Court being complimentary to the powers specifically conferred, a Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the matter is not covered by any specific provision in the Code and exercise of those powers would not in any way be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or be against the intention of the legislature. (e).................(f)................................" 24. The Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in AIR 1952 CAL 560 (supra) has also recognized the power of the Court to grant an order of injunction under Section 151 of the Code although the provision of Order 39 of the Code may not give such authority to the Court. The paragraph 4 of the said report deserves to be quoted:- "4. The paragraph 4 of the said report deserves to be quoted:- "4. Notice must also be taken of an observation by MOOKERJEE, J. in the case of 'Nirode Barani Debi v. Chamatkarini Devya' 19 Cal W.N. 205. While it is true that the Court was not, in this case, directly dealing with the point whether an injunction could be granted and the observation therein might be considered obiter there can be no doubt as to what the learned Judges thought in the matter. Their view clearly was that in a suitable case the Court could give an order of injunction in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 151 of the CPC even though the provisions of Order 39 of the CPC might not give it any authority to do so."(Emphasis supplied by me). 25. The another Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in (2009) 1 CHN 56 (supra) has also expressed the similar view paragraph 33 of the said report being relevant to the issue is reproduced below: "33. Part IV of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with supplemental proceedings and section 94 contained in that part of the Code is the substantive provision of the Code which gives power to a Court to grant interim relief principally in order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated. While clauses (a) and (b) thereof deal with the situations where the relief should be granted only to the plaintiff, the power conferred under the other three clauses viz. (c), (d) and (e) can be exercised at the instances of both the plaintiff and the defendant. Correspondingly, Order 38 to Order 40 mentioned in the First Schedule of the Code, are the procedural parts of section 94. Although the provisions contained in Order 38 are intended to benefit the plaintiff alone, Order 39 Rule 1(a) can be availed of by both the plaintiff and the defendant. Similarly the power conferred under Order 40 can be invoked at the instance of both the plaintiff and the defendant. Although the provisions contained in Order 38 are intended to benefit the plaintiff alone, Order 39 Rule 1(a) can be availed of by both the plaintiff and the defendant. Similarly the power conferred under Order 40 can be invoked at the instance of both the plaintiff and the defendant. The law is equally settled that even in a case where a particular situation does not come with the purview of Order 39 of the Code, the Court, in exercise of its inherent power, can pass such other form of injunction as may be necessary to complete justice between the parties and such power can be invoked also at the instance of the defendant of a suit." (Emphasis supplied by me). 26. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that Court can in exercise of it's inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code can pass an appropriate order of injunction at the instance of either of the parties to the suit if the situation is not covered under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code but such power can only be exercised under exceptional circumstances and for the interest-of-justice. 27. Let me now consider whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case the defendants are entitled to get an order of injunction as prayed for under Section 151 of the Code. 28. The nature of the suit and the prayer of the plaintiffs for an appropriate decree of execution and registration of deed of conveyance by the defendants conveying the title of the suit property in their favour clearly signify admission of the plaintiffs of the right, title and interests of the defendants over the suit property. The defendant no. 2 is entitled to enjoy the suit property as the full owner thereof so long his said ownership subsists but the plaintiffs since are disputing the possession of the defendants over the suit property it is required to be investigated as to whether the learned Trial Judge was justified in holding that the prima facie possession the suit property is with the defendants. 29. The prescribed authority under Section 50 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 on the basis of an application of the defendant no. 2 has recorded his name in the record of rights of the suit property and has issued a mutation certificate to the said effect. The defendant no. 29. The prescribed authority under Section 50 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 on the basis of an application of the defendant no. 2 has recorded his name in the record of rights of the suit property and has issued a mutation certificate to the said effect. The defendant no. 2 in support of his claim of having possession over the suit property has filed the said mutation certificate in course of hearing of the said application for injunction. 30. The West Bengal Land and Land Reforms Manual, 1991 covers more or less whole spectrum of activities of officials and functionaries at various levels of land and land reforms administration of West Bengal. Chapter IV of the said manual prescribes procedure for mutation of names in the record-of-rights of the lands. The prescribed authority under Rule 59 thereof is obliged to verify the physical possession of the applicant over the land in respect of which the mutation has been applied for. The said Rule 59 of West Bengal Land and Land Reforms Manual, 1991 is quoted below for ready reference:- "59. Enquiry and verification.- (i) In respect of every application for mutation, the R.I. will start a case and hold an enquiry with previous notice to the petitioner praying for mutation. (ii) During such enquiry, the R.I. should- (a) verify physical possession of the applicant; (b) examine the registered transfer-deeds; and (c) where mutation has been claimed on ground of inheritance, collect necessary evidence in support of such inheritance from the locality. (iii) The R.I. will verify if the plot in respect of which mutation has been prayed is vested or if it is a patta land. Such verification should also include examination of the copy of the R-O-R available with him. If such copy is not available with him, he will collect necessary information from the Office of the B.L.L.R.O. (iv) The R.I. will submit the report to the B.L.L.R.O." 31. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of GURUNATH MANOHAR PAVASKAR & ORS. Vs. NAGESH SIDDAPPA NAVALGUND & ORS., (2008) AIR SC 901 has held that revenue record raises a presumption in regard to possession. Paragraph 12 of the said report is quoted below:- "12. A revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession. Vs. NAGESH SIDDAPPA NAVALGUND & ORS., (2008) AIR SC 901 has held that revenue record raises a presumption in regard to possession. Paragraph 12 of the said report is quoted below:- "12. A revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession. Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof both forward and backward can also be raised under Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Courts below, were, therefore, required to appreciate the evidence keeping in view the correct legal principles in mind." 32. The defendants apart from the aforesaid mutation certificate also filed the permission of the concerned Grampanchayat accorded in favour of the defendant no. 2 to erect structure/building over the suit property. On the other hand the plaintiffs are claiming that on April 21, 1985 the defendant no. 1 executed an agreement in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs agreeing to retransfer the suit property and on acceptance the consideration price of Rs. 1999/- delivered the possession of the suit property to the said predecessor-in-interest of the opposite parties. The said claim of the plaintiffs has been heavily disputed by the defendants. The plaintiffs have failed to produce any scintilla of evidence to substantiate their said claim. On the other hand the documents filed by the defendants, particularly the mutation certificate of the suit property support the claim of the defendants of having possession over the suit property. That apart the presumption of the doctrine that possession follows the title favours the defendant no. 2 to hold that he is in possession of the suit property being the owner. 33. The learned Trial Judge on consideration of the documents filed by the defendants came to a finding that the prima facie possession of the suit property is with the defendants. The appeal Court below should not have reversed the said finding of the learned Trial Judge, discarding the said documents simply on the ground that those have been created after 2014 particularly in the absence of any challenge to the veracity of those documents from the side of the plaintiffs. 34. It is, therefore, clear from the above discussion that the title and prima facie possession of the suit property both are with the defendants. The defendant no. 34. It is, therefore, clear from the above discussion that the title and prima facie possession of the suit property both are with the defendants. The defendant no. 2 has been found eligible for LPG distributorship of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited and as a condition precedent to the grant of licence for the said distributorship he has to construct showroom and godown. In the event the defendant no. 2 fails to construct the said showroom and godown, the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited shall not issue licence of the said distributorship to the defendant no. 2 and in the said event the defendant no. 2 would suffer loss which cannot be compensated by money. The learned Trial Judge considering the said aspect of the matter rightly held that the balance of convenience and inconvenience are in favour of the defendants in granting the order of injunction as prayed for. 35. The deed of release allegedly executed by Muruli Mahato son of Mithila Mahatani @ Mithila Mahato on January 31, 1983 in favour of the defendant no. 1 is not a document relevant for the purpose of adjudication of the said application, particularly when the defendants are not relying on the said document to get the order of injunction as prayed for in the said application. Moreover, the finding of the learned Judge of the appeal Court below in the order impugned that execution of deed of reconveyance speaks about existence of a loan transaction in substance is perverse inasmuch as no such case has been made out by the plaintiff in the pliant of the suit. 36. The said application has been captioned as an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code and the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed above covers a situation warranting grant of an appropriate order of injunction in favour of the defendants under Section 151 of the Code. In view of the discussion made above the order dated September 16, 2017 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 3rd Court, Purulia in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 50 of 2016 is set aside and the Order No. 9 dated September 29, 2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Purulia in Title Suit No. 88 of 2016 is restored. In view of the discussion made above the order dated September 16, 2017 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 3rd Court, Purulia in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 50 of 2016 is set aside and the Order No. 9 dated September 29, 2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Purulia in Title Suit No. 88 of 2016 is restored. However, it is made clear that the defendants shall not be entitled to claim any equity for executing the construction of said showroom and godown on the land described under the schedule appended to the said application for injunction. With the above C.O. 3813 of 2017 is allowed. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.