JUDGMENT : V.G. Arun, J. Appellants are working as Junior Assistants-Gr.I in the second respondent Rubber Board, a statutory board constituted under and governed by the Rubber Act, 1947 and the Rules made thereunder. According to the appellants, their names have been included in Ext P1 Gradation list, at serial Nos.40, 43, 44 & 45. It is contended that, though the appellants have the requisite experience and qualification for promotion to the next higher post of Assistant and the person up to serial No.39 in Ext P1 Gradation list was promoted, the appellants were not promoted, in spite of vacancies existing in the post of Assistant. The appellants point out that the next higher post of Assistant is that of Section Officer and that further promotion is to the post of Assistant Secretary. It is submitted that 3 posts of Assistant Secretary and 13 posts of Section Officer are lying vacant and if promotions are effected to those vacancies, the petitioners could be promoted to the consequent vacancies arising in the post of Assistant. It is alleged that in spite of Exts P5 to P11 representations being made by the appellants, no promotion was effected to the higher posts of Section Officer and Assistant Secretary, thereby curtailing the chances of promotion of the appellants. The appellants relied on Exts P15 to P21, in an attempt to demonstrate that promotions had been effected in other posts, while at the same time, refusing to consider the claim of the appellants. The appellants had also produced Ext P14 letter issued by the Government of India, interdicting the second respondent Board from filling up any vacant post and effecting promotions, without prior approval of the Department of Commerce, Government of India. It is contended that Ext P14 does not create an absolute embargo in the matter of promotions and the second respondent could have effected promotions after obtaining approval from the Department of Commerce. 2. The Writ Petition was filed seeking a declaration that Ext P14 would not stand in the way of effecting promotion from the post of Assistant to the Post of Section Officer and from the post of Junior Assistant Gr.I to the post of Assistant. The appellants had also sought a direction to the 3rd respondent to effect promotions from the post of Junior Assistant Gr.I to the post of Assistant in accordance with seniority. 3. The appellants had also sought a direction to the 3rd respondent to effect promotions from the post of Junior Assistant Gr.I to the post of Assistant in accordance with seniority. 3. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 2 and 3, it was contended that the Government of India had repeatedly pointed out the increasing administrative expenditure of Commodity Boards, in the context of declining budgetary allocations and had directed to take appropriate steps. Ext R2(a) is an Office Memorandum dated 13.1.2017, directing review of the functioning of autonomous bodies like the second respondent Board. As per Ext R2(c) dated 1.2.2017 the Chairmen of Commodity Boards, were directed to send a report regarding the austerity measures undertaken, in order to curtail expenditure. Ext R2(b) is a communication dated 10.4.2017 of the second respondent Board, submitted in response to Ext R2(c), requesting the Department of Commerce, Government of India to grant permission to abolish 323 posts in the Rubber Board, including 4 posts of Assistant Secretary, 14 posts of Section Officer, and 6 posts of Assistant. 4. In the light of Ext P14, as also Exts R2(a) to R2(c), the essential question which arose for consideration in the Writ Petition was as to whether the petitioners had an indefeasible right to demand that they should be promoted to the next higher post, in spite of implementation of the austerity measures and the embargo on promotions. The learned Single Judge considered the issue and found that there are valid reasons for not effecting promotions and that when the prevailing financial condition of the Board does not permit further appointments and peremptory measures had been suggested by the Government, based on which the respondent Board had found that the existing posts are in excess, the petitioners cannot claim that they should be promoted. The Writ Petition was therefore dismissed with an observation that as and when the second respondent Board attains the suitable financial position, the petitioners will be free to approach the Board for promotion. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant assails the judgment mainly on the ground that denial of promotion amounts to violation of the fundamental rights of the appellants, especially when persons belonging to other categories were given promotion. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant assails the judgment mainly on the ground that denial of promotion amounts to violation of the fundamental rights of the appellants, especially when persons belonging to other categories were given promotion. In order to lend credence to this contention, the learned counsel relied on the decisions in Major General H.M. Singh, VSM v Union of India and another (2014) 3 SCC 670 and Panchraj Tiwari v M.P. State Electricity Board and others (2014)5 SCC 101 . 6. The learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3 countered the contentions on the ground that no employee has an indefeasible right for promotion and therefore, denial of W.A. No. 2393 of 2018 7 promotion does not amount to violation of fundamental rights. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Apex Court in Chuba Jamir and others v State of Nagaland and others ( (2009)15 SCC 169 ) and Hardev Singh v U.O.I. and another ( (2011)10 SCC 121 ). It was further contended that the challenge against Ext P14 was repelled by this court vide its decision in WP(C) No.12474 of 2018, holding that no employee can have a say in the matter of abolishment of a post and the employee does not have any right to insist that a vacancy has to be filled up, contrary to the directions of the Government, issued after analysing the financial status of the Board, which found that if the system is allowed to continue as such there will be no funds for any future payment. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that Smt. Ajitha R., who is ranked 39 in Ext P1 Gradation List, was promoted on 29.12.2016, at a time when 6 Scheduled Caste (SC), 1 Scheduled Tribe(ST) and 3 unreserved (UR) vacancies existed in the cadre of Assistant. That only 1 ST and 3 UR vacancies could be filled up, due to the non-availability of eligible SC candidates. The petitioners do not belong to any Scheduled Caste and therefore, as on 22.2.2017, the date on which Ext P14 was issued, no vacancy in the cadre of Assistant existed, to which the petitioners were entitled to be promoted. 7. That only 1 ST and 3 UR vacancies could be filled up, due to the non-availability of eligible SC candidates. The petitioners do not belong to any Scheduled Caste and therefore, as on 22.2.2017, the date on which Ext P14 was issued, no vacancy in the cadre of Assistant existed, to which the petitioners were entitled to be promoted. 7. In the nature of contentions advanced, the issues that arise for consideration are as to whether (i) mere inclusion in Ext P1 Gradation List, coupled with their eligibility for promotion, confer any indefeasible right on the petitioners, to demand that they should be promoted and whether the refusal to accede to such demand would result in violation of any of the fundamental rights of the petitioners and (ii) whether Ext P14 results in complete negation of the prospects of the petitioners for promotion. 8. The question as to whether promotion is the fundamental right of an employee was considered and answered by the Apex Court in a plethora of decisions. In State of Maharashtra and another v Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni & others ( (1981)4 SCC 130 ) the Supreme Court categorically held that mere chances of promotion are not conditions of service and reduction in the chances of promotion did not tantamount to change in the conditions of service. The right to be considered for promotion is a term of service, but mere chances of promotion, are not. 9. In S.S. Bola and others v V.D. Sardana & others (1997)8 SCC 522 the Apex Court had reiterated the position by declaring that the rule/provision in an Act, merely affecting the chances of promotion, would not be regarded as one varying the conditions of service and that chances of promotion are not conditions of service. 9. In S.S. Bola and others v V.D. Sardana & others (1997)8 SCC 522 the Apex Court had reiterated the position by declaring that the rule/provision in an Act, merely affecting the chances of promotion, would not be regarded as one varying the conditions of service and that chances of promotion are not conditions of service. In Hardev Singh v U.O.I & another ( (2011)10 SCC 121 ) the Supreme Court had in unequivocal terms held as follows: “It cannot be disputed that no employee has the right to get promotion; so the appellant had no right to get promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General but he had the right to be considered for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General and if as per the prevailing policy, he was eligible to be promoted to the said rank, he ought to have been considered.” Way back in the year 1967, the Apex Court in Roshan Lal Tandom and another v Union of India and another ( AIR 1967 SC 1889 ) had held as follows: “It is true that the origin of Government service is contractual. There is an offer and acceptance in every case. But once appointed to his post or office the Government servant acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by consent of both parties, but by statute or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by the Government. In other words, the legal position of a Government servant is more one of status than of contract. The hall mark of status is the attachment of a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by the public law and not by mere agreement of the parties. The emolument of the Government servant and the terms of service are governed by statue or statutory rules which may be unilaterally altered by the government without the consent of the employee. It is true that Art.311 imposes constitutional restrictions upon the power of removal granted to the President and the Governor under Art.310. But it is obvious that the relationship between the Government and its servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirely different something in the nature of status. It is much more than a purely contractual relationship voluntarily entered into between the parties. But it is obvious that the relationship between the Government and its servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirely different something in the nature of status. It is much more than a purely contractual relationship voluntarily entered into between the parties. The duties of status are fixed by the law and in the enforcement of these duties society has an interest. In the language of jurisprudence status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned.” 10. In the light of the above pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it would be appropriate to consider the ratio of the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellants. In Major General H.M. Singh's case (2014) 3 SCC 670 the challenge was against denial of promotion to the appellant therein to the post of Lieutenant General, in spite of the Selection Board having found the appellant eligible for promotion. The promotion was denied to the appellant by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions), Department of Personnel and Training without assigning any valid reason for such denial. In that context, it was held as follows:- “The question that arises for consideration is, whether the non-consideration of the claim of the appellant would violate the fundamental rights vested in him under Art.14 and Art.16 of the Constitution of India. The answer to the aforesaid query would be in the affirmative, subject to the condition, that the respondents were desirous of filling the vacancy of Lieutenant General, when it became available on 1.1.2007. The factual position depicted in the counter affidavit reveals, that the respondents indeed were desirous of filling up the said vacancy. In the above view of the matter, if the appellant was the senior most serving Major General eligible for consideration (which he undoubtedly was), he most definitely had the fundamental right of being considered against the above vacancy, and also the fundamental right of being promoted if he was adjudged suitable. Failing which, he would be deprived of his fundamental right of equality before the law, and equal protection of the laws, extended by Art.14 of the Constitution of India. Failing which, he would be deprived of his fundamental right of equality before the law, and equal protection of the laws, extended by Art.14 of the Constitution of India. We are of the view, that it was in order to extend the benefit of the fundamental right enshrined under Art. 14 of the Constitution of India, that he was allowed extension in service on two occasions, firstly by the Presidential order dated 29.2.2008, and thereafter, by a further Presidential order dated 30.5.2008. The above orders clearly depict, that the aforesaid extension in service was granted to the appellant for a period of three months (and for a further period of one month), or till the approval of the ACC, whichever is earlier. By the aforesaid orders, the respondents desired to treat the appellant justly, so as to enable him to acquire the honour of promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, (in case the recommendation made in his favour by the Selection Board was approved by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet), stands affirmed. The action of the authorities in depriving the appellant due consideration for promotion to the rank of the Lieutenant General, would have resulted in violation of his fundamental right under Art.14 of the Constitution of India. Such an action at the hands of the respondents would unquestionably have been arbitrary.” Therefore, it is evident that it was a case where the official respondents were desirous of filling up the vacancy, in spite of which the appellant was denied promotion by the Appointments Committee, that too without assigning any reason. It was in that factual background the Apex Court proceeded to hold that the appellant definitely had the fundamental right of being considered against the vacancy, and also the fundamental right of being promoted if he was adjudged suitably. 11. Pancharaj Tiwari's (2014)5 SCC 101 was a case in which there was complete denial of promotion to the appellant therein, on merger of the Rural Electricity Co-operative Society, Rewa, in which the appellant was working, with the Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board (M.P.S.E.B). In that context it was observed that when one service is merged with another service, the merged service gets its birth in the integrated service and loses its original identity. In that context it was observed that when one service is merged with another service, the merged service gets its birth in the integrated service and loses its original identity. It was also observed that the M.P.S.E.B having absorbed the appellant and other employees, cannot maintain a stand that even after absorption they will retain a distinct identity in the equated cadre without any promotion as enjoyed by their compeers in the parent service. This was held to be a plain infraction of the equity clause guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, it was held by the Apex Court that even though chances of promotion are not conditions of service, negation of even the chance of promotion certainly amounts to variation in the conditions of service attracting infraction of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. After careful scrutiny of the decisions referred above, we are of the opinion that the ratio of those decisions cannot be made applicable in the instant case, since the decisions in Major General H.M. Singh's case and Pancharaj Tiwari's were rendered under entirely different circumstances. 12. The ratio of the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3 are to the following effect. In Chuba Jamir's case (2009)15 SCC 169 it was held that the mere fact that a decision to encadre a single isolated post and to accommodate a person in that post, thereby diminishing the chance of promotion of existing members, would not give rise to a valid grievance, especially when the notification effecting the en-cadrement of the post was not squarely challenged. In Hardev Singh's case ( (2011)10 SCC 121 ), the challenge was against the change of promotion policy, while the process of selection of the appellant was ongoing. It was contended that the change of promotion policy had adversely effected the appellants' promotion prospects. The issue was answered by the Apex Court by holding that it is always open to an employer to change its policy in relation to giving promotion to the employees and that the court would normally not interfere in such policy decisions. The learned counsel for the respondents also drew our attention to the judgment in WP(C) No.12474 of 2018 whereby, the learned Single Judge of this Court had repelled the challenge against Ext P14. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents also drew our attention to the judgment in WP(C) No.12474 of 2018 whereby, the learned Single Judge of this Court had repelled the challenge against Ext P14. 13. After a careful consideration of the factual contentions, we are of the opinion that the undisputed factual aspects can be encapsulated as under:- i. The Union of India had valid reasons for issuing Ext P14, requiring respondents 2 and 3 to desist from filling up vacant posts and effecting promotions without its prior approval. Respondents 2 and 3 are bound to act in terms of Ext P14. No promotion was effected by respondents 2 and 3 after receipt of Ext P14. The challenge against Ext P14 was rejected. ii. The chances of promotion of the petitioners are not completely curtailed by Ext P14. Ext P14 being an austerity measure introduced in the light of mounting administrative expenditure, can be withdrawn if the situation improves. In the impugned judgment the learned Single Judge has granted liberty to the appellants to approach the second respondent Board for promotion, as and when the Board attains the suitable financial position. 14. In the above factual background the first question, i.e., as to whether mere inclusion in Ext P1 Gradation List, coupled with their eligibility for promotion, confer any indefeasible right on the petitioners, to demand that they should be promoted and whether refusal to accede to such demand would result in violation of any of the fundamental rights of the petitioner can only be answered in the negative. To arrive at such a conclusion we are guided by the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni's case ( (1981)4 SCC 130 ) and S.S. Bola's case (1997)8 SCC 522 . Though inclusion of the petitioners in the Gradation List provide them with a chance of promotion, mere chances of promotion not being condition of service, reduction of the petitioner's chance of promotion, on the basis of Ext P14, does not tantamount to change in the conditions of their service, warranting judicial interference. As has been held by the Apex Court in Roshan Lal Tandom's case ( AIR 1967 SC 1889 ), the emolument of Government servants and their terms of service are governed by statute or statutory rules which may be unilaterally altered by the Government without the consent of the employee. As has been held by the Apex Court in Roshan Lal Tandom's case ( AIR 1967 SC 1889 ), the emolument of Government servants and their terms of service are governed by statute or statutory rules which may be unilaterally altered by the Government without the consent of the employee. This position has been reiterated in Hardev Singh's case (2011)10 SCC 121 , wherein it was held that it was always open to an employer to change its policy in relation to grant of promotion to the employees and that the court would normally not interfere in such policy decision. Ext P14 being a communication issued to all commodity Boards, in implementation of the Governments Policy, the appellants cannot seek promotion, by side lining the policy. 15. As regards the second question also, as to whether Ext P14 creates an absolute embargo on the promotion prospects of the appellants, the answer is in the negative. In Ext P14 itself, provision has been made for effecting promotion, if necessary, after obtaining prior approval from the Department. Further Ext P14 was issued, in the light of the debilitating the financial position of the Board and therefore, it is always open for the Government to lift the prohibition, once the financial position improves. Further, this position has been made clear in the impugned judgment also. In the above circumstances, the learned Single Judge was fully justified in dismissing the Writ Petition. Therefore, we do not find any reason for interfering with the impugned judgment and consequently the Writ Appeal is dismissed.