JUDGMENT : 1. This intra court appeal is about the dispute of mining rights of stone quarries stated to have been settled through an auction on 30th December, 2008 and is confined to the claim in respect of two quarries, one over Block No. 1 and the other over Block No. 2 of Plot No. 789 of Mauza Bodha Chak, District-Gaya. The settlement was concluded through auction under the Bihar Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1972 Rules”). Two lease deeds dated 14th of May, 2009 were executed between the appellant and the Collector of District-Gaya for a period of five years, with effect from 26.05.2009. Apart from the security deposit, Block No. 1 was settled on a royalty of Rs. 1.55 crore and Block No. 2 was settled for Rs. 25.55 lacs. 2. The appellant complains of not having been allowed to commence mining operations in respect of the aforesaid two Blocks due to non-demarcation of the settled area, which, according to the appellant, took place on 8th September, 2011 for the first time. Thus, the first complaint is of not allowing the appellant to quarry the stones as per the terms of the agreement, which was delayed for more than two years from 26.05.2009 to 08.09.2011 on account of the respondents themselves having not demarcated the area resulting in the mining operations having not commenced at all in respect of these two Blocks. It is on 08.09.2011 when for the first time, the appellant commenced his operations on permission of the department itself on the conclusion of demarcation proceedings. 3. The second part of the complaint is that the auction lease of the appellant has been determined by the Collector on erroneous considerations vide order dated 16th of November, 2013, whereafter also, the appellant has been unable to carry out the mining operations, which had to even otherwise continue till 26th of May, 2014, as the lease was for five years. 4. Thus, these two periods, as indicated above, resulted in deprivation of the mining operations and, therefore, a prayer has been made to quash the orders of cancellation of the lease of the appellant and to allow the appellant to commence and continue his mining operations for the entire period he has been wrongfully prevented from availing the benefit of five years of mining arising out of the agreement dated 14.05.2009. 5. 5. The facts that have given rise to the controversy have been indicated in the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 29th June, 2018 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 9562 of 2015, but the facts being spread over in various parts of the pleading on record, we find it necessary to delineate them in a chronological manner so as to gather the genesis of the dispute resulting in the orders impugned passed by the authorities and culminating into the dismissal of the writ petition by the learned Single Judge. 6. Under an advertisement dated 30th December, 2008, bids were invited for auction of stone quarries including the ones that were settled in favour of the appellant. The appellant’s bid having been accepted, the agreement was entered into on 14th of May, 2009 to be effective from 26th May, 2009 for a period of five years that completes the period of five years on 26th of May, 2014. 7. The appellant’s contention is that he was unable to operate the mines in respect of the area of Block Nos. 1 and 2, and in addition thereto, his complaints also indicate of not having been able to mine another area of Block No. 7 in addition to these two Blocks. For this, the appellant has set up a claim that he made written complaints of not having been able to operate the mines over Block Nos. 1, 2 and 7 vide his letters dated 26th June, 2009, 30th of October, 2009, 10th of May, 2010, 22nd July, 2010 and then ultimately on 5th of March, 2011. These documents are said to have been got received in the Mines Office and are alleged to have an endorsement of receipt of the said office. The endorsements are only initials with a date without any indication of as to the name or designation of the said person or any seal of the office indicating receipt of the said documents. Nonetheless, these documents have been filed as a compilation as Annexure-2 stated to be representations in Paragraph 8 of the Writ Petition. The endorsements are only initials with a date without any indication of as to the name or designation of the said person or any seal of the office indicating receipt of the said documents. Nonetheless, these documents have been filed as a compilation as Annexure-2 stated to be representations in Paragraph 8 of the Writ Petition. The said paragraph has been denied in Paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit by stating that the complaints were a clear afterthought and in Paragraph 10 of the counter affidavit, it is stated that a demarcation was carried out on 8th September, 2011 for the satisfaction of all concerned, even though no such demarcation was required, as the demarcated area had been advertised and for the purpose of auction in terms of Rule 52 of the 1972 Rules, the exact location of the mining area is mentioned in the advertisement, and it is only thereafter that the bid took place in which the petitioner participated with open eyes without objection. According to the respondents, this excuse of demarcation is an outcome of the report of the Mines Officer dated 8th September, 2011, which, according to the respondents, is also manipulated. We will deal with this hereinafter. 8. According to the terms of the agreement and the lease coupled with the provisions of the 1972 Rules, the mining operations have to commence within three months from the date of the execution of the lease, which is evident from Clause 3 of Part-VII of the terms of the agreement. In the event of any boundary dispute, the same has to be reported to the Collector, who has the power to decide the same under Clause 21 of Part VII of the lease. If the lessee is unable to quarry the lease for some reason, he can volunteer to determine the lease under Clause 4 of Part-VIII, wherein liberty to surrender or relinquish is also given by giving notice of not less than six calendar months. We are referring to this provision as the appellant did not exercise any such right in spite of his allegation of the demarcation having not been carried out from 2009 to 2011 for more than 2½ years. 9. We are referring to this provision as the appellant did not exercise any such right in spite of his allegation of the demarcation having not been carried out from 2009 to 2011 for more than 2½ years. 9. In the event of any situation beyond the control of the parties, namely, Force Majeure, the Collector is empowered to take a decision in this regard, which is evident from Clause 5 of Part-VIII of the lease. 10. In a dispute of demarcation, the Collector is empowered to take action in terms of Clause 24 and 25 of Part-VII of the lease. 11. In the event of any breach of the terms of the lease, Rule 24(3) of the 1972 Rules read with Clause 2 and Clause 5 of Part-VI of the agreement, action can be taken by the Collector for determining the lease. This also includes nonpayment of instalments as incorporated in Clause 2 of Part-V of the agreement read with Rule 52(4) of the 1972 Rules. 12. In this background, a show-cause notice was issued to the appellant on 24th of April, 2013 calling upon him to show cause regarding default in installments and further giving him a notice as to why the default clause be not invoked to cancel the leases of Block Nos. 1 and 2 on account of nonpayment of installments as fixed under the agreement. 13. We may mention here that the lease amount was to be paid in instalments and had to be deposited before 31st of January each year during the subsistence of the lease period. The appellant had deposited the first installment, but he defaulted in depositing the second instalment which was to be done by 31st January, 2010. This deposit of the second instalment was made by the appellant on 24th May, 2012 after almost 2 years and 4 months. The third and 4th instalments were also deposited with a heavy delay of 1213 and 482 days respectively. The 5th installment was not deposited. 14. This deposit of the second instalment was made by the appellant on 24th May, 2012 after almost 2 years and 4 months. The third and 4th instalments were also deposited with a heavy delay of 1213 and 482 days respectively. The 5th installment was not deposited. 14. There is nothing on record to indicate as to what immediate reply was given by the appellant in response to the said show-cause except some deposit thereafter, but at the same time, it appears that an inspection by the Mines Officer was carried out on 8th September, 2011 on the basis whereof the appellant has set up his entire claim of commencement of the lease with permission of quarrying. This Inspection Report nowhere indicates of any complaint of demarcation made by the appellant as alleged by him. To the contrary, the said Inspection Report mentions about departmental instructions and complaints by the local public and public representatives, whereupon the demarcation was carried out in the presence of all concerned in respect of Block Nos. 1, 2 3, 4 and Block No. 7. 15. On 29th August, 2013, an intimation was sent to the Collector by the Forest Department that the appellant had carried out unauthorized mining activities beyond the area of his lease and is encroaching upon forest land as well coupled with the fact that he was running a stone crusher, which is also unauthorized and has been installed violating the limits prescribed for the same. For this, four cases by the Forest Department being DPC No. 1, 2 3 and 4 of 2013-14 have been lodged before the competent court. 16. An inspection was also carried out by the Assistant Director, Mines, Gaya who submitted his report dated 20th September, 2013 along with the photographs of the mined area in which it was reported that the appellant has been mining beyond the area of Plot Nos. 1 and 2 and that the boundary marks were not existing. Further, mining was being carried out by encroaching upon forest land and the fifth installment of royalty had also not been paid. During inspection, the Stock Registers, Labour Registers also were not found and, therefore, alleging violation of the terms of the lease in terms of the 1972 Rules a recommendation was made for determining the lease. 17. Further, mining was being carried out by encroaching upon forest land and the fifth installment of royalty had also not been paid. During inspection, the Stock Registers, Labour Registers also were not found and, therefore, alleging violation of the terms of the lease in terms of the 1972 Rules a recommendation was made for determining the lease. 17. The Collector served a second show-cause on 21st/23rd of September, 2013 clearly reminding the appellant of the earlier show-cause dated 24.4.2013 and in addition thereto, three other charges relating to unauthorized mining, the unauthorized running of a crusher in spite of the licence for the same having been cancelled and mining operations having been carried out unauthorizedly over forest land with regard to which certain cases had been registered against the appellant were levelled. 18. The appellant submitted his reply on 30th September, 2013 and it may be mentioned that the appellant has referred to a joint inspection note dated 30th April, 2013 to urge that the said report nowhere indicates any violation of the terms of the lease. 19. At this stage, we may mention that the entire reply of the appellant nowhere refers to the report dated 8th September, 2011, which is alleged to be in favour of the appellant. The said document which has been filed as Annexure 2 to the writ petition also bears the signature of the appellant. This would be significant, inasmuch as, the appellant has made this report as a sheet anchor of his defence in relation to the demarcation proceedings having not been carried out resulting in the delayed commencement of the operations of mining with permission for quarrying from that date. It is not understood as to why the reply of the appellant dated 30.09.2013 has not referred to this report dated 8th September, 2011 in spite of its content being relied on by the appellant. This reply nowhere alleges about any period of delayed commencement of mining or the date of commencement as 08.09.2011. 20. On submission of the reply, the appellant also took a defence that in order to substantiate that he has not carried out any mining operations the monthly returns which are required to be filed under the agreement informing the Mines Department about the extent of operations having been carried out, were nil in respect of Block Nos. 1 and 2. On submission of the reply, the appellant also took a defence that in order to substantiate that he has not carried out any mining operations the monthly returns which are required to be filed under the agreement informing the Mines Department about the extent of operations having been carried out, were nil in respect of Block Nos. 1 and 2. These documents, namely, monthly reports between the period of 2009 to 8th September, 2011 have been brought on record to contend that no mining operations had been carried out over these two Blocks. There is, however, another return in respect of Block No. 7 which deserves mention and is dated 14th August, 2009 where the appellant has admitted having carried out the mining operations. These facts have to be read along with the averments made in Paragraph 5 and Paragraph 14 of the additional rejoinder affidavit filed by the appellant dated 22nd May, 2017 which shall be dealt with hereinafter. 21. The Collector after having considered the reply, passed an order dated 16th of November, 2013 determining and cancelling the auction lease of the appellant on four grounds. The first that the appellant was found having indulged in mining operations over forest land with regard to which a report had been submitted by the Forest Department and cases had been registered against the appellant in this regard. The second ground taken is that the licence of the appellant by the Pollution Control Board to set up the crusher stood cancelled as the crusher had been installed quite close to forest land that was impermissible. The third ground on which the impugned order has been passed is of unauthorized mining operations on the other side of the mining hill, with regard to which a criminal case had been registered on 20th September, 2013 against the father of the appellant. The 4th ground taken is of not having deposited the instalments timely resulting in violation of the terms of the lease. Consequently, in exercise of the powers under Section 24(3) of the 1972 Rules, the lease was determined and accordingly cancelled. 22. The appellant preferred a revision under Rule 45 of the 1972 Rules, on which orders were passed under Rule 46 thereof on 19th of May, 2015 affirming the order of the Collector and rejecting the Revision Application. Consequently, in exercise of the powers under Section 24(3) of the 1972 Rules, the lease was determined and accordingly cancelled. 22. The appellant preferred a revision under Rule 45 of the 1972 Rules, on which orders were passed under Rule 46 thereof on 19th of May, 2015 affirming the order of the Collector and rejecting the Revision Application. These two orders were challenged in the Writ Petition giving rise to the present appeal praying for quashing of the same and for a further direction to allow the appellant to operate the mining lease for the period he was prevented by the respondents from carrying out the mining operations as already referred to hereinabove. 23. The learned Single Judge after having assessed the entire facts, came to the conclusion that the appellant with open eyes had participated in the auction and, therefore, he was fully aware of the exact mining area of Block Nos. 1 and 2. This stand taken in the counter affidavit having not been controverted by the appellant, the learned Single Judge concluded that the appellant cannot complain of not having operated the mines due to any such deficiency in demarcation of the area in question. For this, the learned Single Judge has relied on Rule 52(1)(i) of the 1972 Rules. The second reasoning given by the learned Single Judge is that in view of Rule 25(2) of the 1972 Rules, date of commencement of a mining lease is the date on which the agreement is entered into and the lessee will be obliged and liable to pay the royalty from the date of the mining lease. The learned Single Judge held that the demarcation on 8th September, 2011 may have been carried out once again for any other reason, but the same cannot be an excuse to exonerate himself from the liability of payment, inasmuch as, the appellant never approached this Court or any Court complaining of any inaction on the part of the respondents for more than 2½ years. 24. The second ground taken for upholding the impugned orders is that in terms of Rule 52(4) of the 1972 Rules, which mandates payment of instalments on yearly basis coupled with the terms of the lease, the appellant had failed to make the deposits as envisaged therein and, therefore, this was a clear violation of the terms of lease. 25. 24. The second ground taken for upholding the impugned orders is that in terms of Rule 52(4) of the 1972 Rules, which mandates payment of instalments on yearly basis coupled with the terms of the lease, the appellant had failed to make the deposits as envisaged therein and, therefore, this was a clear violation of the terms of lease. 25. On the issue of illegal mining over forest area and the setting up of a crusher, the Collector after physical verification through the officials came to the conclusion that in view of the terms of the Pollution Control Licence dated 25th May, 2013, since the appellant had been found illegally carrying out mining operations over forest area and a case was filed against him, the order of the Pollution Control Board stood revoked and, therefore, the appellant could not install or run the crusher. There was, therefore, a clear violation of the terms of the lease in this regard as well. 26. On the issue of providing a reasonable opportunity, the Collector found that a fair opportunity had been given before determining the lease and, therefore, neither the order of the Collector nor of the Revisional Authority required any interference. 27. Shri Y.V. Giri, learned Senior counsel for the appellant contends that there is a clear violation of principles of natural justice, inasmuch as, no material was provided along with the show-cause notice to the appellant in support of the allegations relating to unauthorized mining, mining operations over forest land and the unlicensed running of a crusher. With regard to the order of the Pollution Control Board, it is submitted that it was never cancelled or revoked by any order and, therefore, the assumption of automatic cancellation is without any basis. He also contends that the reply given by the appellant in this regard has not been dealt with and no appropriate reasons have been recorded to discard the reply given by the appellant, hence, the impugned order is clearly in violation of principles of natural justice. 28. He then contends that it is evident that demarcation had been delayed and the appellant had been prevented from carrying out any mining operations for which the appellant had filed zero returns in respect of Block Nos. 1 and 2 that were never objected to by the respondents. 28. He then contends that it is evident that demarcation had been delayed and the appellant had been prevented from carrying out any mining operations for which the appellant had filed zero returns in respect of Block Nos. 1 and 2 that were never objected to by the respondents. He contends that no response was ever given to the appellant to the appellant’s claim of not having operated the mines in respect of these two Blocks and to the contrary, it is only after the demarcation proceedings were carried out on 8th September, 2011 that the appellant was given permission to mine. He, therefore, submits that this was a situation practically of Force Majeure where the appellant was helpless, and if the appellant was not allowed to carry out the mining operations, in the said circumstances, the impugned orders of determination could not have been passed on the pretext of delayed deposit. The appellant is entitled to operate the mines for the period for which he has been wrongfully prevented from carrying out the mining operations. For this, learned counsel has relied on a Division Bench order in C.W.J.C. No. 507 of 1985 [Jamunadas Sarda Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors., decided on 6th of August, 1985]. 29. He submits that neither the show-cause indicated the entire material on the basis whereof the determination of lease was proposed nor the manner of consideration of the reply submitted is in conformity with law. For this, Shri. Giri has relied on the ratio of the decision in the case of Oryx Fisheries Private Limited. Vs. Union of India and others, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 427 urging that the show-cause must state the charges specifically and there is a duty to give reasons while passing the order. As to what should be the contents specified in a show-cause, Shri. Giri has also relied on the ratio of a judgment in a contract service matter in the case of Gorkha Security Services Vs. Government (NCT of Delhi) and others, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 105 . 30. He further submits that the appellant deserves to be restituted for the period he was not allowed to mine either by way of refund or by way of extension of period of the mining operations proportionately. The judgment in the case of Beg Raj Singh Vs. Government (NCT of Delhi) and others, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 105 . 30. He further submits that the appellant deserves to be restituted for the period he was not allowed to mine either by way of refund or by way of extension of period of the mining operations proportionately. The judgment in the case of Beg Raj Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in (2003) 1 SCC 726 has also been noticed by the Court on which Shri Giri contends that the same should be read in favour of the appellant. 31. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, Shri Giri also contends that for the purpose of determining a lease, a proper notice along with the entire material ought to have been given three months prior to the determination, which is a requirement under the agreement and that having not been done, the process of determination is invalid. He further submits that the appellant has acted upon the agreement and has carried out the mining operations after the demarcation and the respondents have accepted the consideration in return thereof, as such, they cannot be permitted now to determine the lease or take any action pursuant thereto. Hence, the impugned judgment and the orders impugned in the Writ Petition, all deserve to be set aside. 32. For the Mining Department, Shri Dikshit has advanced his submissions controverting the contentions to urge that all the grounds taken for cancellation and determination of the lease are clearly established on the basis of evidence on record and the appellant having breached the said conditions, he cannot complain of violation of principles of natural justice, or otherwise in order to seek any relief before this Court. Shri Dikshit has invited the attention of the Court to the averments made in the counter affidavit, particularly with regard to the Inspection Memo dated 8th September, 2011, which he contends that it is clearly manipulated and the last line of the said report appears to have been added as an afterthought which contradicts the earlier contents of the said report. He submits that the said document cannot be relied on for the purpose of setting up of any claim of demarcation, inasmuch as, demarcation under Rule 15 of the 1972 Rules is in respect of leases granted under the 1972 Rules, whereas, in the present case, it is a lease by way of auction and not by way of settlement. He, therefore, submits that demarcation is not a sine qua non where mining operations are settled by way of auction for the reason that the advertisement itself describes the specific area of mining and all bidders have full knowledge of the existence of such mining area at the time of auction itself. As a matter of fact, the area is well known to the bidder and he raises his bid according to the availability of such area. He, therefore, submits that any excuse of demarcation is only to avoid the terms of the lease, the breach whereof has been committed by the appellant. Hence, the orders do not call for any interference and the conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any infirmity. 33. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, at the very outset, we may observe that mining is an operation, whereby any substance is obtained through a process of excavation. In the instant case, we have been called upon through our legal apparatus to haul out the facts like a minesweeper in order to locate the correct facts on the presentation of the affidavits by gathering them together and then analyzing them in a chronological order. Minerals are usually not simple elements even though they appear to be lifeless, but, like in the present case, they give rise to complex problems which gets multiplied on account of manipulations when it comes to mining through a lease from the Government. 34. The agreement dated 14th of May, 2009 spells out that the timing from when the lease will commence operating shall be within three months of the date of the agreement. Clause 3 of Part-VII of the agreement is extracted herein-below:- “3. 34. The agreement dated 14th of May, 2009 spells out that the timing from when the lease will commence operating shall be within three months of the date of the agreement. Clause 3 of Part-VII of the agreement is extracted herein-below:- “3. To commence operations within three months and work in a workmanlike manner.-Unless the Collector for good cause permits otherwise, the lessee shall commence operation within three months from the date of execution of the lease and shall thereafter at all times during the continuance of this lease for, win, work and develop the said minerals without voluntary intermission in a skillful and workmanlike manner and in accordance with any Central of State Act and Rules and Regulations made thereunder for the purpose and for the time being in force without doing or permitting to be done any unnecessary or avoidable damage to the surface of the said lands or the crops, buildings, structures of other property thereon. The Collector shall be fully competent in whatever manner and by whatever agency it likes to determine, whether the work is carried on properly and skillfully and in accordance with any Central or State Act and Rules and Regulations made thereunder for the purpose and for the time being in force or whether the work was commenced within three months from the date of execution of the lease.” 35. The royalty to be paid in respect of Block No. 1 is contained in Clause 2 of Part-VI. The said Rule is extracted herein-under:- “2. Mode of computation of royality.-The total royality for the entire lease period of five years has been fixed at Rupees 1,55,00,000.00 (Rupees One Crore fifty five Lacs Only) through auction, however the lessee shall keep a correct account of the mineral/minerals in stock in the process of dispatch may be checked by any officer authorised by the Collector.” Similar is the condition in respect of the separate lease of Block No. 2 with a lesser amount of royalty. 36. The mode of payment is provided for under Clause 2 of Part-V. The said clause is extracted herein-under:- “2. Rate and mode of payment of auctioned amount-The lessee shall pay the total auctioned lease amount of Rs. 1,55,00,000.00 (Rupees One Crore Fifty Five lacs Only) for Five years. The lessee shall pay 20% of the auctioned amount by 31st January every year. Rate and mode of payment of auctioned amount-The lessee shall pay the total auctioned lease amount of Rs. 1,55,00,000.00 (Rupees One Crore Fifty Five lacs Only) for Five years. The lessee shall pay 20% of the auctioned amount by 31st January every year. The lessee has already paid the 1st installment i.e. 20% of the auctioned lease amount Rs. 31,00,000 (Rupees Thirty one Lacs Only).” The same condition is referred to in respect of the lease of Block No. 2 with lesser amounts. 37. The aforesaid has to be read in consonance with Rule 52 (4) of the 1972 Rules. The entire Rule is extracted herein-under which relates to settlement by way of auction: “52(4) Payment of bid amount-The bid amount shall be deposited in yearly basis in equal instalments and each instalment shall be deposited before 31st January.” 38. Thus, it is evident that it is by 31st of January each year that the installment have to be paid. The fact of delayed payments of instalments and non-payment of the 5th instalment has been factually found to be correct and about which we do not find any explanation from the appellant. The finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in this regard in Paragraph 12 of the impugned judgment has our complete approval, which is extracted herein-below:- “12. In the present case, the respondents have categorically stated in their counter-affidavit that the second instalment had to be deposited before 31st January, 2010 but the petitioner deposited the same in respect of block nos. 1 and 2 on 24.05.2012, i.e. after almost two years and four months and third and forth installments were also deposited after delay of 1213 and 482 days respectively and in both the cases, the petitioner failed to deposit the fifth installment. The said contention of the respondents has also not been controverted by the petitioner. Thus, it would be evident that the petitioner failed to deposit the installment before 31st January of every calendar year and has failed to abide by the rules prescribed under BMMC Rules, 1972 and the terms and conditions of the lease deed.” 39. The argument advanced is that it was a situation of Force Majeure where no demarcation had been carried out which resulted in delayed commencement of the mining operations that was clearly attributable to the respondents. The argument advanced is that it was a situation of Force Majeure where no demarcation had been carried out which resulted in delayed commencement of the mining operations that was clearly attributable to the respondents. We entirely disagree with this submission as on facts we find the stand taken by the respondents that the report dated 8th September, 2011 appears to be manipulated is correct. For this, we may reproduce the said report dated 08.09.2011, which is contained at Page 96 of the paper-book:- ^^ekih Áfrosnu foHkkxh; funs'k] LFkkuh; turk ,oa tuÁfrfuf/k ds f'kdk;r ds vkyksd esa iwoZ ls fu/kkZfjr frfFk fnukad 31-08-2011 ,oa 08-09-2011 dks othjxat Fkkuk o vapy vUrxZr ekStk ckS/kpd fLFkr iV~Vk CykSd 01] 02] 03] 04 ,oa 07 dk lhekadu iV~Vk/kkfj;ksa@iV~Vk/kkfj;ksa ds Áfrfuf/k o deZpkfj;ksa ,oa LFkkuh; O;fDr;ksa ds le{k lhekadu dj tsŒlhŒohŒ e'khu ls xM~ jfoUæ Álkn okLrs ,DyC; LVksu ekbal ÁkŒ fyŒ x;kA gŒ vLi"V [kku fujh{kd 8-9-2011 Lkarks"k dqekjA** Suraj Baba @ Suraj Deo Singh 8.9.2011 Block No. 1, 2, 7” 40. A close scrutiny of the photostat copy, which has been appended as Annexure-2 to the writ petition would demonstrate that it has not emanated on any complaint of the appellant regarding demarcation. There is not even a single sentence in the entire report about any complaint of non-commencement of operation made by the appellant which is alleged to have been lodged with the respondents between 26.06.2009 and 05.03.2011. The report is based on some departmental instruction, and the complaint of the local public and their representatives. The fact which is evident, and for which there is no explanation, that the reply given by the petitioner to the show-cause, which is Annexure-6 to the writ petition dated 30.09.2013, nowhere refers to any such defence on the basis of this report dated 08.09.2011 nor is there any prayer for extension of lease on this ground nor any request for proportionate reduction of royalty. If this report was in existence or was being relied upon by the appellant, he was obliged to have disclosed it as a material in his support in the reply to the show-cause notice aforesaid. This was all the more necessary as the appellant has endorsed his signature on the said report, which is evident from a photostat copy of the same. This was all the more necessary as the appellant has endorsed his signature on the said report, which is evident from a photostat copy of the same. Thus, if the appellant had knowledge about any such report, and he wanted to take a defence on the issue of demarcation, it was his duty to have disclosed the same in his show-cause which he has not done. 41. Thirdly, the said report appears to be a boundary mark report by the Mines Officer and countersigned by the appellant in respect of Block Nos. 1, 2 and 7. The last line of the said report endorses that the demarcation had not been conducted with regard to Block Nos. 1, 2 and 7. The appellant was being given permission from that day onwards to operate the mines over the said Blocks. It is this sentence which has been stated by the respondents in their counter to be manipulated along with the entire report creating a doubt about the same with which we agree as the Department itself has doubted the same. The reason is two fold. 42. Firstly, the report itself says that the demarcation had been earlier carried out. Thus, this was not a demarcation for the first time. The contention of the appellant that demarcation had not been done is, therefore, false. 43. Secondly, this report refers to Block Nos. 1, 2 and 7. We have noted earlier that the monthly returns filed by the appellant in respect of the mining operations do refer to a zero mining operation schedule for Block Nos. 1 and 2, but the monthly reports in respect of Block No. 7 indicate mining operations having been carried out to an extent indicated therein. In this regard, as noted above, we may refer to Annexure-A to the counter affidavit of the respondents, which is the monthly return for Block No. 7 and bears the date 14.08.2009. In addition thereto, we may refer to Paragraph 5 and Paragraph 14 of the additional rejoinder filed by the appellant to the counter affidavit of the State which in effect is an admission of the document in relation to Block No. 7. In addition thereto, we may refer to Paragraph 5 and Paragraph 14 of the additional rejoinder filed by the appellant to the counter affidavit of the State which in effect is an admission of the document in relation to Block No. 7. This document, therefore, clearly falsifies the contents of the report dated 08.09.2011, inasmuch as, Block No. 7 had been mined and operated upon according to the appellant himself and, therefore, there was no occasion for the report to mention that no demarcation had been carried out in respect of Block No. 7 and more particularly, if the mining operations were in respect of Block No. 7, as admitted by the appellant himself, then there was no need for the report to mention that the appellant will now commence operations henceforth i.e. from 08.09.2011. Thus, clearly the mines were being operated prior to 08.09.2011 with a clear admission about Block No. 7 by the appellant himself which was sought to be tagged with Block Nos. 1 and 2. 44. We may reiterate that the show-cause reply given by the petitioner on 30.09.2013 never indicated of any delayed operations or default on the part of the department for setting up a claim of extension of period or refund due to any such loss. 45. The report dated 08.09.2011 is, therefore, a manipulated document with the connivance of the Mines Officer, Gaya and the Assistant Director who appears to have counter signed the same. This, in our opinion, calls for a direct inquiry by the Collector on these two officials who were then posted as Mines Officer and Assistant Director to explain as to how did they choose to put their signatures on such a document which the appellant himself failed to refer to in his show-cause reply in spite of the fact that he is heavily relying on the same. 46. Thus, in view of all the findings recorded by us hereinabove in respect of the document dated 08.09.2011, we are convinced that the appellant did operate the mines, but in order to take undue benefit has set up the story of the plot allotted to him having not been demarcated. We also agree with the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge and the stand taken in the counter affidavit that this being an auction lease, the advertisement itself indicated the entire area with clarity. We also agree with the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge and the stand taken in the counter affidavit that this being an auction lease, the advertisement itself indicated the entire area with clarity. The appellant nowhere states that the advertisement was unclear or there was a cloud over the exact area of mining operations. This was set up for the first time by the appellant in the petition with the aid of the document dated 08.09.2011. 47. Clause 3 of Part VII also binds the appellant which obligates the operation to commence within three months. It is evident that the lease mandates the commencement and the excuse of demarcation delaying the same has not been established. The appellant’s explanation is not only unconvincing but clearly unsubstantiated. 48. The appellant has then relied on the joint Inspection Report dated 30th April, 2013, which is at Page 105 of the paper-book. The said report is also worth extracting herein-under:- ^^la;qDr ukih Áfrosnu lekgRrkZ] x;k ds funs'kkuqlkj ,oa ou Áe.My inkf/kdkjh] x;k ds Kkikad 1921 fnukad 27-4-2013 ds vkyksd esa vkt fnukad 30-4-2013 dks mi&funs'kd x;k] [kku losZ{kd x;k] ouksa ds {ks= inkf/kdkjh xqjik ou Á{ks= Jh /kusljkuUn feJk] ouiky othjxat] ou Á[k.Myh; vehu Jh vthr dqekj pkS/kjh vapykf/kdkjh] othjxat ,oa iqfyl inkf/kdkjh Jh njksxk pkS/kjh othjxat ds le{k othjxat vapy o FkkukUrxZr ekStk & cks/kpd] CykSd uaEcj 1] 2 esa Øe'k% 1-30 ,dM+ ,oa 1-30 ,dM+ dk nks iRFkj [kuu lqjt ckck mQZ lqjt Álkn flag ds uke ij Lohd`r gSA mDr iV~Vk ekStk cks/kpd ds ,d Nksj ij gS tks ekStk dkWok[kksg ds lVs gh vkSj ekStk dkSvk[kksg ou foHkkx varxZr vofLFkr gSA iV~Vk/kjh }kjk ou Hkwfe esa voS/k [kuu dh f'kdk;r vkyksd esa la;qDr tkap fujh{k.k o ukih djok dj ou lhek dks ou Áe.Myh; vehu Jh pkS/kjh }kjk fu/kkZfjr dj fpfUgr dj fn;k x;kA lkFk gh iV~Vk/kkjh dk Hkh lhek LrEHk iqu% cM+k ,oa etcwr djus ,oa ou lhek ls nl ¼10½ ehVj gVdj gh [kuu dk;Z djus dk funs'k fd;k x;kA** 49. A perusal of this report establishes that there was some complaint of unauthorized mining over forest land upon which the forest area was demarcated with pillars erected in order to avoid any further disturbance and the appellant had been instructed to continue with mining operations 10 metres away from the forest boundary. This report, therefore, establishes that excavation was being carried out. This report, therefore, establishes that excavation was being carried out. The appellant contends that the report does not mention that there was any unauthorized mining. We are unable to accept this contention, inasmuch as, the need for this demarcation arose on account of the report of the Forest Department that the appellant was encroaching upon forest land. This encroachment continued in spite of this demarcation, which is evident from the intimation given by the Forest Department to the District Magistrate on 29.08.2013. An inspection was made by the Forest Department officials on 20th September, 2013 which was forwarded to the Collector indicating that the mining operations were being carried out by the appellant unauthorizedly over forest land, and forest cases had already been registered against him and further a crusher was running unauthorizedly very close to forest area within prohibited limits. It is on the said basis that the show-cause notice was issued to the appellant on 21st September, 2013 for all these additional violations apart from the original violation of non-payment of instalments for which notice had been earlier given on 24.04.2013. Thus, this report dated 30th April, 2013 nowhere establishes that the appellant had not committed any default. To the contrary, it was on the report of default that the aforesaid inspection at the instance of the Forest Department had been carried out and the Forest Department had lodged the cases against the appellant. This report dated 30th April, 2013, therefore, does not in any way aid the appellant so as to give support to his reply to the show-cause. The appellant has been unable to dislodge the fact of forest cases having been filed by him. 50. Coming to the issue relating to the Pollution Control Certificate, the same in Clause 9 clearly states that in the event any case is revealed to have been registered by the Forest Department, the said order shall stand revoked automatically. 51. Clause 9 is reproduced herein-under: “9. That, in the event of revelation of any case filed by the concerned forest department, this consent order shall stand revoked automatically.” 52. The revocation is not dependent on the passing of any formal order, but is automatic upon the registration of a case by the Forest Department. The Forest Department had already registered a case, which is clearly evident from the show-cause notice given to the appellant. The revocation is not dependent on the passing of any formal order, but is automatic upon the registration of a case by the Forest Department. The Forest Department had already registered a case, which is clearly evident from the show-cause notice given to the appellant. The appellant has nowhere denied the registration of those cases, even though he is contesting the correctness of it. The licence from the Pollution Department, therefore, stood automatically revoked. 53. Coming to the most important limb of the breach of the terms of agreement, we clearly find that the Collector has power to determine the lease in terms of Rule 24(3) read with the conditions of the agreement referred to hereinabove. The Collector had no option but to determine the lease once the default was established. We, therefore, find no vagueness or unclarity in the show-cause notice nor do we find any cogent reasons in the reply so as to accept the argument on behalf of the appellant. To the contrary, in view of what has been recorded hereinabove, it is the appellant who set up his claim on the basis of manipulated documents without there being any explanation in that regard. There is no evidence of any Force Majeure or any default on the part of the Department in not identifying the land under the terms of the agreement. To the contrary, the appellant is trying to take an undue advantage of the document dated 08.09.2011 which is clearly a manipulation and which does not establish any default of the department. It was a second round of measurement and not demarcation if at all. The appellant was well within his rights to operate the mines and there was no impediment on the part of the respondent nor any such complaint was made before any Court of law for almost 2½ years and, therefore, the ushering in of letters between 26.06.2009 and 05.03.2011 also does not inspire any confidence. These documents with just endorsements may also have been prepared in connivance with the staff of the Mines Department that did not find mention in the reply of the petitioner to the show-cause. Even otherwise, no provision of the agreement was invoked by moving any application before the Collector who is the competent authority under the lease to carry out demarcation. Even otherwise, no provision of the agreement was invoked by moving any application before the Collector who is the competent authority under the lease to carry out demarcation. These letters are addressed only to the Assistant Director of Mines and not to the Collector. This also, therefore, raises a clear doubt about the correctness of the approach of the appellant who has clearly set up his entire claim on the basis of such manipulation, which is evident on record. Apart from this, as recorded above Clause 3 of Part VII of the lease clinches the commencement period. 54. The appellant never challenged the action of the respondents as resulting in any prejudice to him so long as the lease had not been determined. It is only after the determination of the lease, that the appellant has raked up this entire claim which does not appear to be genuine at all. The claim of the appellant, therefore, to extend the period of lease or grant any restitution in the background aforesaid does not arise as the lease has been determined for clear breach of the agreement which stands established on record. The judgments, therefore, relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, are of no avail nor can the appellant claim any consequential benefits. 55. For all the aforesaid reasons, the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge does not require any interference and the same is hereby upheld. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.