ORDER : K. Vinod Chandran, J. These Leave Petitions are filed seeking leave to file review from the common judgment dated 19.12.2018 in ITA No. 6 & 60 of 2012 and 162 & 163 of 2015, on the ground that the partner who was representing the firm expired before the appeal was heard. 2. At the outset we have to notice that the common judgment was passed in a total of eight appeals, four of which were by the assessee and four by the Revenue. Out of these two each, filed by the assessee and Revenue, were from a block assessment for the period 01.04.1987 to 05.09.1997 and two each from regular assessments of the year 1995-96 and 1996-97. We notice this since regular assessments were finalised only on account of the proceedings for block assessment pending, with a stay, before this Court and the limitation for completing the regular assessments was fast approaching. If the proceeding for block assessments were set aside, then there could not have been any regular assessment carried out for reason only of limitation having worked out; which was successfully thwarted. We in the common judgment upheld both since in the block assessment, completed later, while computing the additions, what was already assessed in the regular assessments were reduced. We see no leave applied for to review the judgment in the said appeals and if we review the judgment in the appeals which are now before us, it would create a situation of the similar contentions in the other appeals, including the status of the assessee as an Association of Persons (AOP], remaining upheld in those other appeals. 3. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the review petitioners, who are the legal heirs of the person who was representing the assessee, an AOP, takes us through Section 260A(7) of Chapter XX of the Income Tax Act (I.T. Act), 1961 to specifically point out that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is applicable to the appeals to the High Court under that section. In such circumstances, the appeal under Section 260A would be an appeal under the CPC and hence when a judgment is passed where the respondent is no more, it would be non-est in law, is the argument. The learned Senior Counsel relies on the judgments of the Apex Court reported in 2019 (2) KHC 472 (SC)[Sunkara Lakshminarasamma (d) by Lrs. In such circumstances, the appeal under Section 260A would be an appeal under the CPC and hence when a judgment is passed where the respondent is no more, it would be non-est in law, is the argument. The learned Senior Counsel relies on the judgments of the Apex Court reported in 2019 (2) KHC 472 (SC)[Sunkara Lakshminarasamma (d) by Lrs. Vs. Sagi Subba Raju and Others] and 2019 (3) SCC 520 [Vijay A. Mittal and others Vs. Kulwant Rai (dead) through Legal Representatives and another]. It is argued that the person representing the firm and who had executed the vakkalath was not alive when the matter was heard and hence the judgment has to be reviewed. 4. The learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Income Tax Department however submits that the firm had engaged a lawyer before this Court in the appeal and that despite the death of one partner the status of the firm continues and hence there could be no contention raised that judgment itself is non est in law. It is also pointed out that the assessee who asserted to be a partnership firm was not registered as such under the Income Tax Act, for reason of which it was treated as an AOP. An AOP; as is the situation with a Partnership firm also, is an assessable entity, under the I T Act as distinguished from the members or partners. 5. As we noticed at the outset there is no leave sought from four set of appeals, two by the revenue and two by the assessee, which too went against the very same assessee. Hence these applications are not maintainable going by the decision in Sunkara Lakshminarasamma There the subject matter was the validity of two wills, which were, consistently and concurrently held to be proved, and this had acquired finality against the defendants, who were deleted and as regards those who were dead, whose legal heirs were not impleaded. The Hon'ble Supreme Court found that there could not be two contradictory decrees in the same subject matter and dismissed the appeals filed as against only some of the defendants. 6. Further we are in agreement with the contention raised by the Department. The Hon'ble Supreme Court found that there could not be two contradictory decrees in the same subject matter and dismissed the appeals filed as against only some of the defendants. 6. Further we are in agreement with the contention raised by the Department. Section 4 of the IT Act create charge of income tax on the total income of every person and section 5 delineates the scope of total income, of a person who is a resident. Section 6 speaks of Residence in India and sub-section (2) deems every HUF, firm or other association of persons to be a resident in India. An AOP has not been defined in the Act and we refer to C.I.T Vs. Indira Balakrishna (1960) 39 ITR 546 (SC); which considered the issue as it existed in IT Act, 1922. It was held that AOP has to be read, ejusdem generis with the immediately preceding word viz: firm; which is the case in the present statute too. As to what an AOP is, it was held: 9. It is enough for our purpose to refer to three decisions: In re. B.N. Elias [1935] 3 ITR 408, CIT V. Laxmidas Devidas [1937] 5 ITR 548; and In re. Dwaraknath Harishchandra Pitale [1937] 5 ITR 716. In B.N. Elias Derbyshire, C.J. rightly pointed out that the word "associate" means, according to the Oxford dictionary, "to join in common purpose, or to join in an action". Therefore, an association of persons must be one in which two or more persons join in a common purpose or common action, and as the words occur in a section which imposes a tax on income, the association must be one the object of which is to produce income profits or gains. This was the view expressed by Beaumont, C.J. in CIT v. Laxmidas Devidas at p. 589 and also in Re. Dwaraknath Harishchandra Pitale. In re. B.N. Elias Costello, J. put the test in more forceful language. He said: It may well be that the intention of the legislature was to hit combinations of individuals who were engaged together in some joint enterprise but did not in law constitute partnership When we find that there is a combination of persons formed for the promotion of a joint enterprise then I think no difficulty arise in the way of saying that these persons did constitute an association " 10. We think that the aforesaid decisions correctly lay down the crucial test for determining what is an association of persons within the meaning of Section 3 of the Income Tax Act, and they have been accepted and followed in a number of later decisions of different High Courts to all of which it is unnecessary to call attention. It is, however, necessary to add some words of caution here. There is no formula of universal application as to what facts, how many of them and of what nature, are necessary to come to a conclusion that there is an association of persons within the meaning of Section 3; it must depend on the particular facts and circumstances of each case as to whether the conclusion can be drawn or not. 7. As to a partnership firm, though under the partnership Act, the firm does not have the status of a legal entity as distinguished from its partners; it is otherwise under the Income Tax Act. A firm as also an AOP is treated as a unit of assessment and is a distinct assessable entity under the I.T. Act [ (1966) 2 SCR 457 (State of Punjab Vs. Jullunder Vegetables Syndicate]. A firm has a separate identity under the I.T. Act, whose income is subject to assessment; as distinguished from its partners, who are separately assessed as individuals [(1991) Supp (1) SCC 402 (M/s Mahabir Cold Storage Vs. C.I.T., Patna). 8. Section 260A of the I.T Act specifically indicates that the Code of Civil Procedure would apply in the case of appeals under the section, only as far as may be; which indicates that if there is a contrary indication under the statute then only that would have application. 9. Here, the AOP was represented by one of the members, who was alive at the time when the vakalath was executed, and the lawyer engaged has argued the matter for the AOP, before this Court at the time of hearing the appeal. It is stated by the learned Senior Counsel for review petitioners that there was no effective representation by the counsel engaged since he was not properly instructed. We are unable to accept the same especially since it is the legal heirs of one of the members of the AOP who has come before us and the AOP has no objection as such. We are unable to accept the same especially since it is the legal heirs of one of the members of the AOP who has come before us and the AOP has no objection as such. It was the AOP which was represented before us in the appeals filed by the AOP and the Revenue. We do not think the death of one of the members, even the very person who represented the AOP before this Court, would render non est a judgment of this Court in which the AOP and not the individual was a party, leave petitions are rejected. Accordingly, the leave petition are rejected.