ORDER : 1. This criminal appeal is preferred against the judgment and order dated 24.3.2004, passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Pilibhit in S.T. No. 340/2001 (Case Crime No. 181/2000), convicting/sentencing the appellants under Section 302/34 IPC with life imprisonment. The case of the prosecution is that the daughter of PW-1, aged about three months was strangulated by her husband-Ved Prakash and mother-in-law/Ramawati on 14.10.2000 at 4 p.m. in which she too sustained injuries, witnessed by Babu Ram (PW-2) and others. On above allegation an FIR as Case Crime No. 181 of 2000, under Sections 323/302 IPC came to be registered against the above two accused at the PS, at a distance of 17 kms. on 14.10.2000 at 11.40 p.m. 2. The Trial Court finding PW-1 and 2 to be wholly reliable, medical evidence compatible with the oral account and DW-1 not reliable, convicted the accused-appellants above. 3. Heard Sri Ajay Kumar Srivastava, holding brief of Sri R.K. Koli for the appellants and Sri A.N. Mulla, the learned A.G.A. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants raised the following submissions: (i) The FIR is highly belated. (ii) Victim died on account of accidental fall. (iii) Highly improbable for a father to kill his first issue. (iv) There are contradictions as to who went to the P.S. to lodge a report. (v) Why would 2 persons strangulate a child to death when one is sufficient? (vi) No independent witnesses examined. 5. Learned AGA opposed the submissions. 6. PW-1 is the mother of the victim. She on the fateful day, like previous occasions, was castigated by accused/appellants her for giving birth to a girl child, the accused persons assaulted her with leg/danda blows, in which she sustained injuries and strangulated her child who lay on a cot to death in presence of her brother-in-law/PW-2. The house of PW-2 and that of the in-laws of PW-1 are near, separated by two houses. PW-1 is so rustic that she does not even know from which direction Sun rises as also the difference between steps and a kose/mile (Kose, a unit of distance of about 3 kms.) as she was alleging that the police station must be 100 kose i.e. 300 kms, which only reflects extent of her ignorance. Against above backdrop, contradictions, if any, are trivial not affecting the basic prosecution case. 7. Against above backdrop, contradictions, if any, are trivial not affecting the basic prosecution case. 7. PW-1 got herself medically examined by PW-5 in respect of her injuries on 15.10.2000 at 1.00 PM, who reported the following injuries: "Abraded contusion & swelling 1 x 1.5 cm on the angle of right mandible. Reddish blue colour. Complain of pain back and abdomen. No visible mark seen." PW-5 opined that injury No. 1 could be attributed to a hard/blunt object, a day old, compatible with the case of prosecution. The accused appellants did not cross-examine PW-5. Thus, injuries of PW-1 in respect of the occurrence not only stands established but also admitted to the accused. 8. PW-2 is the brother-in-law of PW-1/her neighbour who too supported the case of prosecution. He is a natural and a probable witness. Nothing material could be elicited during cross-examination which could doubt his presence at the time of occurrence. 9. PW-4 is the medico who conducted the autopsy (Ex Ka-4) of the deceased on 15.10.2000 at about 5 p.m. He was opining that upon dissection, trachea, larynx and lungs were congested and cause of death was opined "asphyxia" due to suffocation and throttling. He was not ruling out the possibility that the victim may have been strangulated on the date and time as alleged by prosecution. During cross-examination he admitted that it is not necessary that if a child is strangulated to death her eyes and tongue would protrude as such symptoms would only arise when the victim offers resistance which is not possible in case of a 3 month child. He also opined that for a victim, three month old, not much force/ pressure is required to strangulate her to death by hands to produce a visible mark on the neck of the victim. 10. We cannot be oblivious of a general prejudice that unfortunately exists in our society relating to the birth of a female issue even if it is a preciously awaited child after 4 years of marriage, but happens to be girl. 11. There is some contradiction as to who went to lodge the report. The prosecution case is that PW-1 got a report scribed by one Hemraj, who read the same to her, thereafter, she appended her thumb impression and handed over the said report to PW-2 Babu Ram who went to the police station to lodge the FIR. 11. There is some contradiction as to who went to lodge the report. The prosecution case is that PW-1 got a report scribed by one Hemraj, who read the same to her, thereafter, she appended her thumb impression and handed over the said report to PW-2 Babu Ram who went to the police station to lodge the FIR. During cross-examination she admitted that the report was also read over to her at the police station and soon after the occurrence, she went to the police station. Once the report has been written by the scribe as per the instructions of informant (PW-1), the report read over to the informant (PW-1) and lodged at the police station, it is not of much significance as to who went to the police station to lodge the report. 12. We are not impressed with the argument as to why would 2 accused strangulate the victim, a 3 month child to death. Firstly, PW-1, mother of the victim assigned a role of strangulation, at page-19 of the paper book to both the accused who threw the victim on a charpoy. Both the accused were primarily charged under Sections 302/34 and 323/34 IPC. The accused in their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. apart from general denial, false implication in view of local village rivalry, failed to explain the circumstances as to how the victim died and the alleged explanation that she died on account of a fall from the cot is not corroborated with the evidence on record, i.e. the ocular account and the medical evidence. 13. The Apex Court in Vijendra Singh vs. State of U.P. (2017) 11 SCC 129 , after referring various decisions on the law, regarding common intention under Section 34 IPC held as under: "The aforesaid authorities make it absolutely clear that each case has to rest on its own facts. Whether the crime is committed in furtherance of common intention or not, will depend upon the material brought on record and the appreciation thereof in proper perspective. Facts of two cases cannot be regarded as similar. Common intention can be gathered from the circumstances that are brought on record by the prosecution. Common intention can be conceived immediately or at the time of offence. Thus, the applicability of Section 34 IPC is a question of fact and is to be ascertained from the evidence brought on record. Facts of two cases cannot be regarded as similar. Common intention can be gathered from the circumstances that are brought on record by the prosecution. Common intention can be conceived immediately or at the time of offence. Thus, the applicability of Section 34 IPC is a question of fact and is to be ascertained from the evidence brought on record. The common intention to bring about a particular result may well develop on the spot as between a number of persons, with reference to the fact of the case and circumstances of the situation. Whether in a proved situation all the individuals concerned therein have developed only simultaneous and independent intentions or whether a simultaneous consensus of their minds to bring about a particular result can be said to have been developed and thereby intended by all of them, is a question that has to be determined on the facts. Kirpal and Bhopal vs. State of U.P. In Bharwad Mepa Dana and Another vs. State of Bombay, it has been held that Section 34 IPC is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish the acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. The principle which the Section embodies is participation in some action with the common intention of committing a crime; once such participation is established, Section 34 is at once attracted." 14. In the case in hand, PW-1 mother of the victim stated that both the accused first castigated her for giving birth to a girl child, then assaulted her with leg/fist/danda blows, resulting in injuries to her. The accused persons in the same transaction also strangulated the child victim to death and thereafter threw her on the cot. Participation of both the accused is established in achieving the common intention, i.e. to eliminate a girl child once for all. Section 34 IPC has been rightly invoked and established. 15. The explanation of DW-1 that even the birth of the victim, a girl child was celebrated with fanfare and celebrations. On the fateful day, the father/accused Ved Prakash had taken his daughter/victim to DW-1 for treatment. She had opined that the victim had cold and developed pneumonia symptoms which is not acceptable as she was deposing for the first time. The explanation of DW-1 that even the birth of the victim, a girl child was celebrated with fanfare and celebrations. On the fateful day, the father/accused Ved Prakash had taken his daughter/victim to DW-1 for treatment. She had opined that the victim had cold and developed pneumonia symptoms which is not acceptable as she was deposing for the first time. Moreover, this fact is also not corroborated with the evidence on record. 16. It is well settled that ordinarily independent witnesses are rarely forthcoming to testify an occurrence as otherwise they may have to face wrath of taking sides with one faction or the other more so in a rural scenario. PW-2 is the brother-in-law of PW-1 who lives in the neighbourhood. He arrived upon hearing the commotion to witness the occurrence. Against this backdrop, non-examination of an independent witness, does not vitiate the conviction, which otherwise stands established. 17. Before parting, we feel it apposite to quote the following observation of the Apex Court in Smt. Shamim vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 10 SCC 507: "In a criminal trial, normally the evidence of the wife, husband, son or daughter of the deceased, is given great weightage on the principle that there is no reason for them not to speak the truth and shield the real culprit. We see no reason to the same principle cannot be applied when such a witness deposes against a closely related accused. According to normal human behavior and conduct, a witness would tend to shield and protect a closely related accused. It would require great courage of conviction and moral strength for a daughter to depose against her own mother who is an accused. There is no reason why the same reverse weightage shall not be given to the credibility of such a witness." 18. There is no reason why the above observation would not apply on the facts of the present case. PW-1 is mother of the victim. She is nominating her husband and mother-in-law as accused, responsible for the death of her 3 month daughter. This would not have been possible unless she mustered the courage and conviction to depose against her very close relatives. 19. We in the ultimate analysis find that prosecution has established its' case beyond reasonable doubt, appeal is bereft of merit, liable to be dismissed. 20. The appeal is dismissed. This would not have been possible unless she mustered the courage and conviction to depose against her very close relatives. 19. We in the ultimate analysis find that prosecution has established its' case beyond reasonable doubt, appeal is bereft of merit, liable to be dismissed. 20. The appeal is dismissed. Appellant No. 1/Ved Prakash is in jail. Appellant No. 2/ Ramawati is on bail. Her bail stands cancelled. She is directed to surrender before the court concerned within 6 weeks, to serve out the remainder sentence. 21. Office is directed to forthwith communicate this order to the Sessions Judge concerned for compliance. Compliance report be submitted to this Court within a month.