ORDER : KRISHNA S.DIXIT, J. The appellants, in this intra-court appeal, have laid a challenge to the judgment and order of the learned single Judge (which is yet to be made available), whereby their writ petition challenging the initiation of ‘No-Confidence Motion’ in question has been negatived at the stage of Preliminary Hearing. 2. Learned counsel for the appellants, Sri H.M.Dharigond, vehemently contends that the impugned ‘No-Confidence Motion’ has an error apparent on the face of the record inasmuch as, the text of the ‘No-Confidence Motion’ notice contains allegations of, inter alia, ‘misuse of power’ which expression is employed in Section 49(2) of the Karnataka Gram Swaraj and Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’, for short), and therefore, the case falls within the ambit of Section 49(2) as interpreted by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Lakshmamma Vs. The State of Karnataka and Others reported in 2019(1) KCCR 161 , on which one of us [KSDJ] was a Member. 3. Learned counsel banking upon the said decision further contends that the Co-ordinate Bench has restrained taking up of such ‘No-Confidence Motions’ which fall within the frame of Section 49(2) of the Act till after the Government promulgates the Rules and the Rules having not been promulgated as yet, the Motion is unsustainable. He loudly reads para 47 of the judgment which is as follows: “47. For what has been discussed hereinabove, we are clearly of the view that these intra-court appeals deserve to be dismissed and the orders impugned, as passed by the learned Single Judge, deserve to be upheld except the observations occurring in paragraph 37(V) of the order dated 28.02.2018, where the learned Single Judge has observed that the motion of no-confidence under sub-section (2) of Section 49 would remain subject to mode and method for its consideration as per sub-section (1). Such mode and method would only relate to the requirement of the number of members for moving the motion and for adopting the resolution on that basis. However, the procedure and method for consideration of the motion under sub-section (2) of Section 49 shall have to be provided by separately promulgated Rules and any such motion under sub-section (2) of Section 49 of the Act of 1993 cannot be proceeded under the Rules of 1994, even as amended by the notification dated 21.08.2018.” 4. However, the procedure and method for consideration of the motion under sub-section (2) of Section 49 shall have to be provided by separately promulgated Rules and any such motion under sub-section (2) of Section 49 of the Act of 1993 cannot be proceeded under the Rules of 1994, even as amended by the notification dated 21.08.2018.” 4. Learned counsel for the appellants, secondly, argues that the requisition for the ‘No-Confidence Motion’ notice was not accompanied by the notice of allegations levelled by the signatories to the proposed ‘No-Confidence Motion’, contrary to the requirement of law, and therefore, the notice itself being incompetent, the proposed ‘Motion’ should not be permitted to be moved, in contravention of law. 5. Learned Additional Government Advocate, Sri Ravi V. Hosamani, on request having accepted notice for the Respondent-State, per contra, contends that Section 49(1) is founded on the principles of democracy; if the majority of the members do not want the petitioner to continue at the helm of the affairs of the Gram Panchayat, graciously, he should yield place to the new aspirants, consistent with the intent and content of the said provision; if the Notice of No-Confidence Motion otherwise falls under Section 49(1), the allegations contained in such Motion notwithstanding, one need not travel to sub-section (2) at all, inasmuch as there is a statutory prohibition against having discussions in the Meeting with regard to the allegations contained in such notice; it is only in cases that do not fall into Section 49(1) of the Act, one has to travel to Section 49(2) and not otherwise, since the later is an exception to the general rule enacted in the former. 6. Sri. Hosamani, further contends that the requirement as to the requisition for ‘No-Confidence Motion’ being accompanied by a copy of the notice of allegations having been held directory by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Laxmavva Vs. State of Karnataka and Others reported in 2007(3) Kar.L.J. 45 , the said ground is not available to the appellants for invalidating the ‘No-Confidence Motion’ in question. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the Appellants and the learned Additional Government Advocate for the Respondent-State. State of Karnataka and Others reported in 2007(3) Kar.L.J. 45 , the said ground is not available to the appellants for invalidating the ‘No-Confidence Motion’ in question. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the Appellants and the learned Additional Government Advocate for the Respondent-State. We do not feel that notice should be issued to the other parties as well inasmuch as, the matter lies in a very narrow compass of settled position of law since no prejudice is being caused to them. We have perused the writ appeal papers although we do not have the benefit of the views of the learned single Judge whose order is impugned herein, the same having not been released as yet. However, the counsel for the Appellants narrated the substance of its contents, which the other side has not disputed. 8. The learned counsel brought to the notice of this Court para 19 of the judgment of another learned single Judge made in W.P. No.50210/2018 between Smt. Poornima Sudhin and The State of Karnataka and Others which reads as under: “19. Hence, it is clear that a motion of no-confidence if sought to be moved with allegations cannot be resorted to till Rules are framed providing for the procedure to be followed as regards motion of no-confidence under Section 49(2) of the Act.” 9. Learned counsel for the appellants placing his own construction of this paragraph submits that in the absence of promulgation of Rules by the Government, Section 49(2) is not invocable when the notice of intention to make the motion contains the allegations as contemplated under this sub-section. We are a little in disagreement with such a construction. A judgment cannot be understood just by reading one single paragraph as if it is a stand alone part. The intent of the judgment should be gathered by reading at least all the relevant paragraphs therein if not in entirety; the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs. Dr. Karan Singh and Others, reported in 1993 Supp (4) SCC 500 has observed: “The basic rules of interpreting Court judgments are the same as those of construing other documents. Dr. Karan Singh and Others, reported in 1993 Supp (4) SCC 500 has observed: “The basic rules of interpreting Court judgments are the same as those of construing other documents. The only difference is that the Judges are presumed to know the tendency of parties concerned to interpret the language in the judgments differently to suit their purposes and the consequent importance that the words have to be chosen very carefully so as not to give room for controversy. The principle is that if the language in a judgment is plain and unambiguous and can be reasonably interpreted in only one way it has to be understood in that sense, and any involved principle of artificial construction has to be avoided. Further, if there be any doubt about the decision, the entire judgment has to be considered, and a stray sentence or a casual remark cannot be treated as a decision.” Even otherwise also, views expressed by the learned single Judge do not prevent us from having our own, in variance. Therefore, this contention too fails. 10. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the ‘No-Confidence Motion’ in question is preceded by a requisition which contains certain allegations of misuse of power by the appellants and therefore, the same falls within the ambit of Section 49(2) of the Act and consequently, the said Motion needs to be invalidated in the absence of Rules to be made by the Government for giving effect to Section 49(2) of the Act, does not impress us. The requisition containing the allegations otherwise also can satisfy the requirement of Section 49(1) if the ‘No-Confidence Motion’ is being moved after a period of thirty months, and not less than one-half of the total number of the members of the Gram Panchayat are the signatories to the said requisition. These two constraints/conditions that are inbuilt within the provisions of Section 49(1) of the Act are otherwise also satisfied in this case. Therefore, the first contention does not merit acceptance. 11. As already observed above, Section 49(2) of the Act is in the nature of an exception to Section 49(1) of the Act. If the case otherwise falls under Section 49(1), regardless of invocability of Section 49(2), no grievance can be made against such ‘No-Confidence Motion’. Therefore, the first contention does not merit acceptance. 11. As already observed above, Section 49(2) of the Act is in the nature of an exception to Section 49(1) of the Act. If the case otherwise falls under Section 49(1), regardless of invocability of Section 49(2), no grievance can be made against such ‘No-Confidence Motion’. It is a matter of common knowledge that almost, invariably, ‘No-Confidence Motions’ are founded on some or the other allegations. Merely because there are some allegations, the case, automatically, does not travel to the premises of Section 49(2), two more conditions precedents being the requirement of law viz., expiry of moratorium period of thirty days and one-half of the total number of the Members of the Panchayat proposing the ‘No-Confidence Motion’. If all these three ingredients are cumulatively present, only then, the case falls within Section 49(2) of the Act and not otherwise. This, our view, is supported by the provisions of Rule 3 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj (Motion of No-confidence against Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of Grama Panchayat) Rules, 1994, which prohibits any discussion on the allegations contained in the notice. Thus, the very making of the allegations is not prohibited, but what is prohibited is the discussion taking place thereon in the meeting convened for ‘No-Confidence Motion’. 12. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the proposed ‘No-Confidence Motion’ is bad in law since the notice copy had not accompanied the requisition, again, is difficult to accept in the absence of any prejudice caused thereby being pleaded and proved, more particularly, when it is not their case that they did not know of the allegations contained in the notice. In fact, the pleadings show that the appellants have structured their case on the basis of the allegations only, gist of which is in the requisition. A Co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Laxmavva Vs. State of Karnataka and Others reported in 2007(3) Kar.L.J.45, at paragraphs 9 and 10, has observed as under: “9. Smt. Vidya, learned Government Advocate, has made available the notice. This is in Kannada. Apart from mentioning and complying with the requirements, the members have also mentioned therein, their proposal of the no-confidence motion and the reasons for the same also. State of Karnataka and Others reported in 2007(3) Kar.L.J.45, at paragraphs 9 and 10, has observed as under: “9. Smt. Vidya, learned Government Advocate, has made available the notice. This is in Kannada. Apart from mentioning and complying with the requirements, the members have also mentioned therein, their proposal of the no-confidence motion and the reasons for the same also. The Panchayat members, instead of resorting to issuing notice accompanying the proposed motion, have complied both the requirements together in the application or notice of intention given to the Assistant Commissioner. The object of this notice and the accompaniment of the proposed motion is only to make aware the Authority viz., Assistant Commissioner and the person (Adyaksha/Upadhyaksha), the intention of these members of making no-confidence motion). 10. On perusal of the records, especially the written notice, we find that there is substantial compliance of Rule 3(1) of the Rules. In such case, mere attaching the copy of the proposed motion would be duplicity of the work and that by itself cannot be a ground to set at not the democratic exercise of the members in functioning of these local Governments. When the notice of the majority members makes it clear their intention, mere non-enclosing the proposal would be only an irregularity and in our view does not cause any prejudice to the other side.” These observations militate against the contention of the appellants. 13. Otherwise also, the pleadings of the parties and the material placed on record do not warrant the grant of any relief to the appellants, in the facts and circumstances of the case. In view of the above, these writ appeals being devoid of merits fail, and accordingly they are dismissed. In view of disposal of the main matter, the question of considering the I.As., does not arise.