Research › Search › Judgment

Tripura High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 62 (TRI)

Golam Hossain v. State of Tripura

2019-12-02

AKIL ABDUL HAMID KURESHI, ARINDAM LODH

body2019
JUDGMENT : ARINDAM LODH, J. 1. By means of filing the present petition in the nature of habeas corpus the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order of detention under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (here-in-after referred to as the PITNDPS Act) issued by the Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Tripura vide Order No. F.15(09)-PD/2018(P-1)/4200 dated 26.12.2018. 2. The facts, which are said to have led to the quashing of the detention order, are briefly summarized here-under: Gulam Hossain alias Gulab alias Golap is a reputed businessman and he used to raise his voice against the illegal activities of the ruling party members and out of political vendetta, he has been falsely implicated in connection with (i) Kakraban P.S. Case No. 2018/KKB/075, dated 20-05-2018 under Sections 120(B) of IPC, read with Sections 20(b)(c)/22(c)/25/29 of the NDPS Act, (ii) Sonamura P.S. Case No. 2018 SNM 066, dated 08.06.2018 under Section 22(c) of the NDPS Act; (iii) Sonamura P.S. Case No. 2018 SNM 086 dated 05.07.2018 under Sections 22(c)/25/29 of the NDPS Act; (iv) Sonamura P.S. Case No. 110/2018, dated 20.10.2017 under Sections 148/149/365/302 of IPC, and accordingly, the petitioner was arrested in connection with KKB PS Case No. 2018/KKB/075 dated 20.05.2018 under Sections 120(B) of IPC read with Sections 20(b)(c)/22(c)/25/29 of the NDPS Act and he has been in detention and the petitioner was not allowed to be released on bail. 3. After his arrest, the investigating agency had raided the residential house of the petitioner and nothing incriminating materials were recovered and further no contraband articles were seized and found in the possession of the petitioner. However, the petitioner was issued with the detention order dated 26.12.2018 as aforestated without any reason and ground with malafide intention [Annexure-1 to the writ petition]. However, the petitioner was issued with the detention order dated 26.12.2018 as aforestated without any reason and ground with malafide intention [Annexure-1 to the writ petition]. It is stated by the petitioner that while passing the detention order the issuing authority had only made reference to all the criminal cases as aforestated and the said detention order was passed on the basis of the proposal of the Director General of Police, Tripura and other supporting documents, but, nothing was brought to the knowledge of the petitioner about the allegations and the grounds and the proposal made by the Director General of Police for such detention, the petitioner was never served with any copy of the documents or proposal signed by the Director General of Police on which the order of detention was made. The petitioner has further stated that the detention order never spoke of anything of the relevant facts or factors that prompted the authority concerned to issue the order of detention, as such, the said order was passed most mechanically and the same is liable to be quashed. No materials were supplied by the detaining authority stating the basic ground for such detention. It is further stated that due to non supply of relevant materials and documents, the petitioner was deprived of making effective representation. However, the petitioner had submitted representation on 18.02.2019 to the Chief Secretary, Government of Tripura through the Superintendent of Jail, Udaipur against the said order of detention dated 26.12.2018 stating inter alia that he was an innocent person and in no way involved with the allegations levelled against him. Further, it was stated that there was no whisper in the order that what type of proposal or what type of supporting documents on the basis of which the authority passed the order of detention and what were those sufficient grounds that prompted the authority concerned to issue the detention order of the petitioner under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of PITNDPS Act. 4. The petitioner has further stated that he filed representation before the competent authority, i.e. the Government of Tripura, on 18.02.2019, but, he was kept in dark about the fate of his representation and the order dated 30th March, 2018 in which though the opinion of the Advisory Board and the decision of the Government were mentioned, but, there was nothing about the consequence of the representation of the petitioner. 5. 5. We have heard Mr. P.K. Biswas, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. P. Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned Advocate General appearing for the State-respondents. 6. Mr. Biswas, learned Sr. counsel has questioned the decision of the detaining authority on the ground that all the documents, which had been considered by the detaining authority and found to be relevant in issuing the detention order, were not supplied to the petitioner. Learned Sr. Counsel would contend that there was nothing in the order dated 26th December, 2018 from which it could be gathered what are those sufficient grounds and relevant documents which prompted the detaining authority to pass the detention order. The learned Sr. counsel has strongly argued that mere mentioning that there were sufficient grounds to detain the petitioner would not meet the requirements of law. The learned counsel would contend that the petitioner had a indefeasible right to know the grounds for his detention and the relevant documents on the basis of which the decision for detention was taken by the authority concerned since he was protected under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. 7. Next, Mr. Biswas, learned Sr. Counsel has contended that the representation submitted by the petitioner had to be disposed of expeditiously as possible. The petitioner had filed representation before the competent authority i.e. the Government of Tripura, on 18.02.2019. Even in the order dated 30th March, 2019, wherein the detention order was confirmed taking into account the opinion of the Advisory Board dated 27.03.2019 and there was no mention as to whether the representation of the petitioner which he filed on 18.02.2019 was considered by the State Government. 8. The learned Sr. counsel appearing for the petitioner has strongly argued that inordinate delay in execution of the order of detention had vitiated the order of detention in view of Section 3(3) of the PITNDPS Act and Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Biswas, learned Sr. counsel has placed reliance on the following decisions on this point:- (1) (2008) 17 SCC 348 , Para 22 (2) (1987) 2 SCC 9 , Para 9 to 15 (3) (2007) 1 SCC 297 9. Mr. Biswas, learned Sr. counsel has placed reliance on the following decisions on this point:- (1) (2008) 17 SCC 348 , Para 22 (2) (1987) 2 SCC 9 , Para 9 to 15 (3) (2007) 1 SCC 297 9. Next, our attention was drawn to the inordinate delay caused by the authority concerned to consider the representation of the petitioner and according to him, such inordinate delay had vitiated the order of detention. Mr. Biswas has also placed reliance on the following decisions on this point: (1) AIR 1990 SC 1361 Para 4, 16. (2) The order passed in WP(HC) 04/2018 dated 20.02.2019, Para 76, 78 by the Hon'ble High Court of Tripura. 10. Per contra, learned Advocate General defending the action of the State-respondents would contend that on the basis of evidence surfaced in course of investigation, the petitioner was arrested on 13.10.2018 under Section 120(B) of IPC read with Sections 20(b)/22(c)/25/29 of NDPS Act. Thereafter he was found to be an accused in connection with other cases as mentioned in the order of detention. In order to prevent the petitioner from engaging in the PITNDPS Act, in the interest of society, the State Government had issued the detention order against him. 11. Confronting the submission canvassed on behalf of the petitioner, the learned Advocate General has contended that the grounds of detention was explained to the detenu vide detention order dated 26.12.2018 [Annexure-1 to the writ petition as well as Annexure-R/1 to the counter affidavit], all relevant papers were supplied to him and all reasons and grounds for detention were separately supplied to the detenu on obtaining signature on the copy of acknowledgement of receipt. 12. For convenience, the grounds for detention may be recapitulated here-in-below: "Following are the grounds for detention of Golam Hossain @ Golab @ Golap, S/o. Abdul Gani of Ramnagar, PS-Sonamura, Sepahijala District under PITNDPS Act, 1988 under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit traffic in Narcotic Drug & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988. (1) As per report of Director General of Police, Tripura, the aforesaid Golam Hossain was involved in the following cases:- [I] Kakraban PS case No. 2018 KKB 075 dated 20.05.2018 U/S 120(b) IPC read with Section 20(b)(c) of NDPS and added Section 25 and 29 of NDPS Act. [II] Sonamura PS case No. 2018 SNM066 dated 8.6.2018 U/S 22(c) NDPS Act. [II] Sonamura PS case No. 2018 SNM066 dated 8.6.2018 U/S 22(c) NDPS Act. [III] Sonamura PS case No. 2018 SNM086 dated 5.7.2018 U/S 22(c)/25/29 of NDPS Act. [IV] Sonamura PS case No. 110/2007 dated 20.10.2007 U/S 148/149/365/302 of IPC. (2) From the report of Director General of Police, Tripura, it appears that aforesaid Golam Hossain is engaged in the activities like illicit trafficking of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances which are harmful and pre-judicial to the interest of the society. (3) He is spoiling the future youths in our society and making them drug addicts. It is a social crime. Therefore, his detention under PITNDPS Act is required for eradication of the menace of drugs." 13. Learned Advocate General contended that following all the statutory provisions the competent authority i.e. the Additional Secretary to the Government of Tripura vide order dated 3rd June, 2019 had rejected the representation of the petitioner. Lastly, the learned Advocate General contended that the Advisory Board after considering the reference and materials placed before it and after hearing the detenu prepared its report specifying in separate paragraphs thereof, its opinion stating that the order of detention cannot be said to be mechanical, rather, it can be said to be based on sufficient reasons/materials and thus conveyed the approval to the detention order passed by the Government of Tripura against the detenu. The Advisory Board had submitted its opinion on 27.03.2019 and as per Section 9(c) of the PITNDPS Act, 1988. The Advisory Board submitted its report within 11(eleven) weeks from the date of detention by a letter dated 27th March, 2019. The report and opinion of the Advisory Board was submitted to the Principal Secretary to the Government of Tripura. Hence, the report of the Advisory Board was submitted within 11(eleven) weeks from the date of detention complying the statutory provisions of Section 9(c) of the PITNDPS Act, 1988. On the basis of opinion of the Advisory Board, the Addl. Secretary to the Government of Tripura by an order dated 30th March, 2019 had ordered that in exercise of the power conferred by Sub-section (f) of Section 9 of PITNDPS Act, the Governor was pleased to confirm the detention order made by the Home Department, Government of Tripura in respect of the petitioner and ordered the detention of the petitioner to continue until the expiration of one year from the date of detention. 14. 14. The principal issue for determination of the subject and dispute as raised by the petitioner in this writ petition may be decided on the question as to whether there is unreasonable delay in serving the detention order upon the petitioner. 15. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submission as canvassed by Mr. Biswas, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner that inordinate delay in execution of the order of detention vitiates the detention order itself in view of Section 3(3) of the PITNDPS Act and Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. 16. After perusal of the records it is apparent, rather admitted, that the order of detention was passed on 26th December 2018 [Annexure-1 to the writ petition], but, the said order of detention was served upon the petitioner on 25.01.2019 and subsequently, on 01.02.2019 as mentioned in the representation submitted by the petitioner [Annexure-2 to the writ petition]. 17. Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India may be reproduced here-in-below, for convenience: "22(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order." 18. For consideration of the consequence of delay in execution of the order of detention, it will be convenient to recapitulate Section 3(3) of PITNDPS Act, which reads as under: "3(3) For the purposes of clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution, the communication to a person detained in pursuance of a detention order of the grounds on which the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention." 19. A bare perusal of Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of PITNDPS Act, it is crystal clear that the grounds of detention order would have to be made "as soon as may be" after the detention, which has further clarified that it should not in any way be later than 5(five) days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than 15(fifteen) days, from the date of such detention. 20. In the case in hand, we find that order of detention was passed on 26th December, 2018. So, the said order had to be passed "as soon as" it was possible, but, not later than 5(five) days. But in the later part of the said provision of Sub-Section (3), two exceptions have been made: (i) if the order of detention cannot be made available to the detenu as soon as his detention, in that circumstance, it has to be provided to the detenu within the period not later than 5(five) days, (ii) it has further provided that in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, the said order has to be made available to the detenu within the period not later than 15 days, from the date of such detention. 21. In the context of the case, we may recapitulate relevant part of the order dated 26.12.2018: "...... Now, therefore, the State Government in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section (3) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic substances Act, 1988 and after careful examination of the proposal of the Director General of Police, Tripura and other supporting documents, found sufficient grounds for detention of Golam Hossain @ Golab and accordingly conveys its approval for detention of Golam Hossain @ Golab @ Golap S/O Lt. Abdul Gani of Rangamatia, Sepahijala, Tripura. It is mentioned that the accused Golam Hossain @ Golab @ Golap S/O Lt. Abdul Gani may submit his representation to the Central/State Government against this order of detention. Such representation may be submitted to the undersigned for onward transmission to the Central/State Government. The accused is to be informed that he will get all reasonable opportunity for making representation against this order to the Central/State Government, he may therefore state to the undersigned what opportunity he needs for the purpose. Such representation may be submitted to the undersigned for onward transmission to the Central/State Government. The accused is to be informed that he will get all reasonable opportunity for making representation against this order to the Central/State Government, he may therefore state to the undersigned what opportunity he needs for the purpose. The accused is to be appraised of his right to make representation before the undersigned against this detention order. The accused is to be informed that he also has a right to be heard before the Advisory Board." 22. In this context, let us have a survey of the law in regard to delayed communication and disposal of the representation of the petitioner by the detaining authority as well as the other statutory authorities. 23. In Usha Agarwal Vrs. Union of India & Ors., (2007) 1 SCC 295 , the Apex Court while interpreting the scope of Clause(5) of Article 22 has observed thus:- "21. The scope of Clause (5) of Article 22 which provides that when any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against such order, has been examined in several decisions. Interpreting the said provision, this Court in Sk. Abdul Karim vs. the State of West Bengal [ AIR 1969 SC 1028 ], held as follows:- "Apart from those enabling and disabling provisions certain procedural rights have been expressly safeguarded by Clause (5) of Article 22. A person detained under a law of preventive detention has a right to obtain information as to the grounds of detention and has also the right to make a representation protesting against an order of preventive detention. Article 22(5) does not expressly say to whom the representation is to be made and how the detaining authority is to deal with the representation. But it is necessarily implicit in the language of Article 22(5) that the State Government to whom the representation is made should properly consider the representation as expeditiously as possible. Article 22(5) does not expressly say to whom the representation is to be made and how the detaining authority is to deal with the representation. But it is necessarily implicit in the language of Article 22(5) that the State Government to whom the representation is made should properly consider the representation as expeditiously as possible. The constitution of an Advisory Board-under Section 8 of the Act does not relieve the State Government from the legal obligation to consider the representation of the detenu as soon as it is received by it. On behalf of the respondent It was said' that there was no express language in Article 22(5) requiring the State Government to consider the representation of the detenu. But it is a necessary implication of the language of Article 22(5) that the State Government should consider the representation made by the detenu as soon as it is made, apply its mind to It and, if necessary, take appropriate action. In our opinion, the constitutional right to make a representation guaranteed by Article 22(5) must be taken to include by necessary implication the constitutional right to a proper consideration of the representation by the authority to whom it is made. The right of representation under Article 22(5) is a valuable constitutional right and is not a mere formality." 22. In Rashid Sk. vs. State of West Bengal [ AIR 1973 SC 824 ], this Court interpreting the words 'as soon as may be' occurring in clause (5) of Article 22, held as follows: "The use of the Words "as soon as may be" is important. It reflects the anxiety on the part of the framers of the Constitution to enable the detenu to know the grounds on which the order of his detention has been made so that he can make an effective representation against it at the earliest. The ultimate objective of this provision can only be the most speedy consideration of his representation by the authorities concerned, for, without its expeditious consideration with a sense of urgency the basic purpose of affording earliest opportunity of making the representation is likely to be defeated. The ultimate objective of this provision can only be the most speedy consideration of his representation by the authorities concerned, for, without its expeditious consideration with a sense of urgency the basic purpose of affording earliest opportunity of making the representation is likely to be defeated. This right to represent and to have the representation considered at the earliest flows from the constitutional guarantee of the right to personal liberty - the right which is highly cherished in our Republic and its protection against arbitrary and unlawful invasion." Now, whether or not the State Government has in a given case considered the representation made by the detenu as soon as possible, in other words, with reasonable dispatch, must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of that case, it being neither possible nor advisable to lay down any rigid period of time uniformly applicable to all cases. The Court has in each case to consider judicially on the available material if the gap between the receipt of the representation and its consideration by the State Government is so unreasonably long and the explanation for the delay offered by the State Government so unsatisfactory as to render the detention order thereafter illegal" 23. In Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel vs. Union of India [ 1995 (4) SCC 51 ], this Court observed thus:- "Construing the provisions of Article 22(5) we have explained that the right of the person detained to make a representation against the order of detention comprehends the right to make such a representation to the authority which can grant such relief, i.e., the authority which can revoke the order of detention and set him at liberty and since the officer who has made the order of detention is competent to revoke it, the person detained has the right to make a representation to the officer who made the order of detention. The first premises that such right does not flow from Article 22(5) cannot, therefore, be accepted." This Court has also repeatedly held that though there can be no specific or mechanical test for determining whether there has been undue delay, where there is an unexplained delay in either making the order or serving the order, it would vitiate the order of detention." 24. What we find in this case that, though, the detention order was passed on 26.12.2018, it was provided to the petitioner on 25.01.2019 i.e. the day much after the period of 5(five) days as prescribed in Sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the PITNDPS Act and again subsequently on 01.02.2019 i.e. after 31 days. The Legislature in their best wisdom has given some relaxation to the authorities concerned that in exceptional circumstances they may provide the copy of the order of detention within 15(fifteen) days but with a clear and specific rider that in that circumstance the authorities concerned are to justify the exceptional circumstance and in that case the authorities concerned has to record reasons in writing for the delay caused in supplying the copy of the detention order to the detenu. Here, we have noticed that the detaining authority has failed to provide the copy of the detention order as soon as the order of detention was issued against the petitioner and even the detaining authority has failed to provide the copy of the detention order within 5(five) days or within 15(fifteen) days. Further, noticeably, though the detention order was made available to the petitioner first on 25.01.2019 and subsequently on 01.02.2019, the said copy did not reflect the reasons for such inordinate delay in violation of the provisions of Sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of PITNDPS Act. 25. Again, it appears that the petitioner had submitted representation on 18.02.2019 after the receipt of the detention order of the detaining authority as well as the Advisory Board constituted for this purpose. From the order dated 30th March, 2019, it is found that the Advisory Board had taken its decision on 27.03.2019 but there is nothing to reveal that the said order was communicated to the petitioner. Having found no response in regard to the consequence of submitting representation, the petitioner had filed the instant writ petition on 24.06.2019. After filing of the writ petition, the State-respondents had filed their affidavit-in-opposition and in the said affidavit, the State-respondents have enclosed order dated 3rd June, 2019 issued by the Additional Secretary to the Government of Tripura wherein the representation of the petitioner is appeared to be rejected. After filing of the writ petition, the State-respondents had filed their affidavit-in-opposition and in the said affidavit, the State-respondents have enclosed order dated 3rd June, 2019 issued by the Additional Secretary to the Government of Tripura wherein the representation of the petitioner is appeared to be rejected. There is specific averment in the writ petition that the order of rejection dated 3rd June, 2019 was never issued to the petitioner before filing of the writ petition and it is the specific assertion of the petitioner that the said order dated 3rd June, 2019 was served upon the petitioner in the middle of August, 2019. To controvert the submission of the learned Sr. counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, there is no record to substantiate that the order dated 3rd June, 2019 was communicated to the petitioner at any point of time before filing of the writ petition. As such, the assertion of learned Sr. counsel that the petitioner was served with the order dated 3rd June, 2019 in the middle of August, 2019 remained uncontroverted. In furtherance thereof, it is explicit that none of the orders issued by the Advisory Board as well as the State-respondents, there is no explanation as to why there was delay in taking decision of the representation of the petitioner. 26. While dealing with the similar question about the impact of non-explanation of the delay caused in deciding of such representation the Apex Court in Adiswar Jain Vrs. Union of India & Anr., (2006) 11 SCC 339 has observed thus:- "14. The question came up for consideration recently in Rajinder Arora v. Union of India and Others [ (2006) 4 SCC 796 ] wherein it has been held: "20. Furthermore no explanation whatsoever has been offered by the Respondent as to why the order of detention has been issued after such a long time. The said question has also not been examined by the authorities before issuing the order of detention. 21. The question as regard delay in issuing the order of detention has been held to be a valid ground for quashing an order of detention by this Court in T.D. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala and others [ AIR 1990 SC 225 ] stating: "10. 21. The question as regard delay in issuing the order of detention has been held to be a valid ground for quashing an order of detention by this Court in T.D. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala and others [ AIR 1990 SC 225 ] stating: "10. The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised thus: The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case. 11. Similarly when there is unsatisfactory and unexplained delay between the date of order of detention and the date of securing the arrest of the detenu, such a delay would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority leading to a legitimate inference that the detaining authority was not really and genuinely satisfied as regards the necessity for detaining the detenu with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner." 22. The delay caused in this case in issuing the order of detention has not been explained. In fact, no reason in that behalf whatsoever has been assigned at all." 27. A Division Bench of this Court while dealing with a similar issue referring to several authorities has observed in the case of Sri Keshab Sarkar Vrs. The State of Tripura & Ors, [WP(C) (HC) No. 04/2018] thus:- "76. In K.M. Abdulla Kunhi and B.L. Abdul Khader Vrs. Union of India & Ors. A Division Bench of this Court while dealing with a similar issue referring to several authorities has observed in the case of Sri Keshab Sarkar Vrs. The State of Tripura & Ors, [WP(C) (HC) No. 04/2018] thus:- "76. In K.M. Abdulla Kunhi and B.L. Abdul Khader Vrs. Union of India & Ors. (1991) 1 SCC 476 , as we have noticed, any unexplained delay in the disposal of representation would be breach of the constitutional imperative, rendering the detention to be impermissible and illegal. Referring to the said decision in the given facts, the Court in Usha Agarwal (supra) held the order of detention to be illegal. 77. Prior thereto, the Apex Court in Kundanbhai Dulabhai Shaikh vs. Distt. Magistrate, Ahmedabad and others, (1996) 3 SCC 194 observed that: "21. In spite of law laid down above by this Court repeatedly over the past three decades, the Executive, namely, the State Government and its officers continue to behave in their old, lethargic fashion and like all other files rusting in the Secretariat for various reasons including red-tapism, the representation made by a person deprived of his liberty, continue to be dealt with in the same fashion. The Government and its officers will not give up their habit of maintaining a consistent attitude of lethargy. So also, this Court will not hesitate in quashing the order of detention to restore the "liberty and freedom" to the person whose detention is allowed to become bad by the Government itself on account of his representation not being disposed of at the earlier." (emphasis supplied) 28. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the object of the Act that the provisions of the NDPS Act have been stringent to strengthen the existing control over drug abuse and to prevent the menace of illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the more stringent is the law, more strict construction thereof would be necessary. As such, according to us Sub-Section (3) of Section 3 is mandatory in nature. As we said earlier, there are three phases of the said provision that the grounds of detention has to be communicated to a detenu within 5(five) days of his detention. As such, according to us Sub-Section (3) of Section 3 is mandatory in nature. As we said earlier, there are three phases of the said provision that the grounds of detention has to be communicated to a detenu within 5(five) days of his detention. However, some exceptions are provided in the provision itself that if it is not possible to provide copy along with grounds of detention within the period of 5(five) days then the detaining authority may provide the copy after expiry of said 5(five) days but with a rider that in the circumstance, the detaining authority has to assign reasons in writing and again another rider has been given that it also must be within 15 (fifteen) days, from the date of detention. 29. In our opinion, the legislature while enacting the Act was well aware of the fact that in all cases it might not be possible to make the copy along with the grounds available to a detenu within 5(five) days and with that object and view they permitted discretionary power upon such authority to provide such copy after the expiry of 15(fifteen) days, in that case the authority had to record its reasons in writing and it also must be within 15(fifteen) days, from the date of such detention. Keeping the provision as stringent, the legislatures in their own wisdom had made further rider that, in that case too, the communication had to be made not later than 15 days, from the date of such detention. 30. The riders inserted in Sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the PITNDPS Act, in our considered view, clearly mandates that the authorities concerned must follow and observe each and every mandates expressed unequivocally therein and any violation of such mandates would vitiate the entire process keeping in view the constitutional mandate of right to life and personal liberty as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 31. Here, we may profitably refer the anxiety of their Lordships of the Apex Court while taking into account the importance of personal liberty and individual freedom and had observed in Union of India Vrs. Ranu Bhandari, (2008) 17 SCC 348 , that :(SCC p. 355, Para 25) "25. 31. Here, we may profitably refer the anxiety of their Lordships of the Apex Court while taking into account the importance of personal liberty and individual freedom and had observed in Union of India Vrs. Ranu Bhandari, (2008) 17 SCC 348 , that :(SCC p. 355, Para 25) "25. Keeping in mind the fact that of all human rights the right to personal liberty and individual freedom is probably the most cherished, we can now proceed to examine the contention advanced on behalf of the parties in the facts and circumstances of this case. But before we proceed to do so, it would be apposite to reproduce herein below a verse from a song which was introduced in the cinematographic version of Joy Adamson's memorable classic 'Born Free', which in a few simple words encapsulate the essence of personal liberty and individual freedom and runs as follows: "Born free, as free as the wind blows, As free as the grass grows, Born free to follow your heart. Born free and beauty surrounds you, The world still astounds you, Each time you look at a star. Stay free, with no walls to hide you, You're as free as the roving tide, So there's no need to hide. Born free and life is worth living, It's only worth living, if you're born free." The aforesaid words aptly describe the concept of personal liberty and individual freedom which may, however, be curtailed by preventive detention laws, which could be used to consign an individual to the confines of jail without any trial, on the basis of the satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority on the basis of material placed before him. The Courts which are empowered to issue prerogative writs have, therefore, to be extremely cautious in examining the manner in which a detention order is passed in respect of an individual so that his right to personal liberty and individual freedom is not arbitrarily taken away from him even temporarily without following the procedure prescribed by law. 32. The phraseology "not later than 15 days", according to us, has wider amplitude and should not be construed narrowly. The legislatures with well-thought mind consciously had phrased the sentence as "not later than 15 days". The framers would have easily phrased it as "within 15 days" instead of designing the same "not later than 15 days". 32. The phraseology "not later than 15 days", according to us, has wider amplitude and should not be construed narrowly. The legislatures with well-thought mind consciously had phrased the sentence as "not later than 15 days". The framers would have easily phrased it as "within 15 days" instead of designing the same "not later than 15 days". In our thoughtful consideration, the language of the provision was so crafted that the legislature with a view to achieve a distinct object wanted to bind the authorities concerned with the bounden liability to communicate their decision within the period "not later than 15 days", if not within 5 days and this exhortation is aimed to extend supplementary benefit to the detenu. 33. In the instant case, as we have already held that the decision of the State Government to detain the petitioner vide order dated 26.12.2018 was not communicated to the petitioner within 5(five) days and it was made available to him on a much later date even beyond the period of 15 (fifteen) days and without having taken care of the mandate, that in that circumstance, the detaining authority must record its own reasons with such explanation in support of causing delay. The detaining authority was also under mandatory obligation to justify the exceptional circumstances, which prevented them to make such communication within the mandatory period. What appears more shocking to us, in the context of the case, is that the detaining authority being the appropriate authority i.e. the State-respondents, after the receipt of representation dated 18.02.2019 submitted by the petitioner, had passed the order of detention on 3rd June, 2019, the copy of which was supplied to the petitioner only in the middle of the month of August, 2019. The State-respondents have failed to justify showing any cogent reasons from the available records of such inordinate delay to pass order of rejection of the representation of the petitioner. It is utter violation of the mandate as discussed here-in-above. 34. Situated thus, we have no other alternative, but, to hold that the detention of the petitioner is absolutely illegal and arbitrary and hence, the petitioner be released forthwith. 35. Ordered accordingly. 36. The petition accordingly stands disposed.