JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The sole appellant is aggrieved of the judgment of his conviction under section 376 IPC and the order of sentence, both dated 04.06.1993 in Sessions Trial No. 476 of 1989/73 of 1989 passed by the 1st Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi. 2. The appellant was released on bail vide order dated 09.07.1993. 3. After the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed in Kanke P.S Case No. 69 of 1989 which was registered on 04.06.1989 for the offence under section 376 IPC against the appellant. Charge against the appellant was framed on 22.08.1989 for the offence under section 376 IPC. During the trial, the prosecution has examined eight witnesses; the prosecutrix has been examined as P.W 1, her mother is P.W 2 and the investigating officer is P.W. 8. The doctor who has examined the prosecutrix has not been examined during the trial, however, the medical report has been admitted in evidence without objection. 4. The prosecutrix who has been examined as P.W.1 has stated that she was about 15/16 years of age whereas the court has assessed her age at about 18-19 years. 5. The learned Additional Judicial Commissioner on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution in Sessions Trial No. 476 of 1989/73 of 1989 has held that minor contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses shall not affect the prosecution’s case. Moreover, evidence of the victim-P.W 1 is corroborated through the evidence of P.W. 2, P.W 3 and P.W. 4 which inspires confidence. 6. The sole accused was convicted for the offence under section 376 IPC and he has been sentenced to undergo R.I for life. 7. Mr. A. K. Kashyap, the learned Senior counsel for the appellant has raised three-fold contentions; (i) statement of the prosecutrix is not like a gospel truth, it is like evidence of any other witness which has to be tested on the same parameters, (ii) evidence of the prosecutrix read as a whole when seen in the context of the contradictions in the prosecution’s evidence particularly evidence of the prosecutrix herself would not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant has committed rape upon her, and (iii) non-examination of the appellant as mandated under section 53 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 would substantially erode the prosecution’s case. 8. 8. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant has referred to the decisions in “A. Kamaraju Patro Vs. State of Orissa” reported in 1991 Cri.L.J. 2009, “Premiya Alias Prem Prakash Vs. State of Rajasthan” reported in (2008) 10 SCC 81 and (iii) “Raju and Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh” reported in (2008) 15 SCC 133 , to fortify the aforesaid contentions. 9. As against the above, Mr. Ram Prakash Singh, the learned A.P.P contended that considering the tradition in the Indian society which would forbid a woman to falsely allege commission of rape upon herself and the well-settled proposition that evidence of the victim alone is sufficient to hold an accused guilty for an offence under section 376 IPC, once it is found that evidence of the victim-P.W.1 is corroborated on all material aspects by the evidence of P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.4 the irresistible conclusion which arrives is that the appellant has committed rape upon the victim. 10. The learned A.P.P has relied on the decisions in “Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai Vs. State of Gujarat” reported in AIR 1983 SC 753 and “State of M.P Vs. Dayal Sahu” reported in (2005) 8 SCC 122 , to contend that non-examination of the doctor or non-production of the medical report would not materially affect the prosecution’s case. 11. Section 53 Cr.P.C mandates that when a person is arrested on a charge of committing an offence for which it would be reasonable to believe that examination of his person will afford evidence as to the commission of the offence, such person shall be examined by a registered medical practitioner acting at the request of a police officer not below the rank of sub-inspector. In “A. Kamaraju Patro”, on non-examination of an accused by a medical practitioner as indicated under section 53 Cr.P.C, it has been observed, thus; “6. In this case the petitioner has not been admittedly examined by any doctor. The evidence on record shows that P.W.6 the medical officer had only examined the victim woman (P.W. 3). Relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. S. P. Kohli v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, AIR 1978 SC 1753 : (1978 Cri LJ 1804), it is contended by Mr. The evidence on record shows that P.W.6 the medical officer had only examined the victim woman (P.W. 3). Relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. S. P. Kohli v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, AIR 1978 SC 1753 : (1978 Cri LJ 1804), it is contended by Mr. Misra that non-examination of the accused charged with offence of rape is fatal for the prosecution in as much as the smegma test of the accused is a sure and infallible test to determine whether the male agent in the offence of rape had actually committed sexual intercourse or not and in the absence of such a test for want of medical examination of the petitioner, it is submitted that the petitioner cannot be said to have committed the offence of rape, especially when some other persons are also alleged to have committed rape along with the petitioner. On a perusal of the evidence on record and the aforecited decision of the Supreme Court, I am of the view that non-examination of the petitioner by the doctor supports the defence theory of non-participation of the petitioner in the offence of rape.” 12. On the basis of fardbeyan of the victim namely, Kanti Kumari which was recorded on 04.06.1989 at about 8.30 p.m. in her house, a first information report vide Kanke P.S Case No. 69 of 1989 was registered against the appellant on the allegation that he has committed rape upon her and when the villagers assembled there he threatened them but finally he was caught and beaten by the villagers. The victim has stated that on the fateful day at about 1.30 p.m. the appellant came to her house and asked about whereabouts of her mother and brothers. When she told him that she was alone in the house he dragged her inside the room and closed the doors. When she tried to raise cry the appellant pressed her mouth and thrashed her on the floor. He thereafter sexually assaulted her and committed rape. The prosecutrix has claimed that she could not raise cries because the appellant had thrusted clothes in her mouth. The villagers called her mother but before they could report the matter to the police station, the police came there and recorded her fardbeyan. He thereafter sexually assaulted her and committed rape. The prosecutrix has claimed that she could not raise cries because the appellant had thrusted clothes in her mouth. The villagers called her mother but before they could report the matter to the police station, the police came there and recorded her fardbeyan. She has further claimed that father of the accused had arrived at the place of occurrence and he was also assaulted by the villagers. 13. By now it is well-settled that evidence of the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence, alone is sufficient to convict a person accused of committing rape upon her and non-examination of the doctor or non-production of the medical report would not be fatal for the prosecution’s case. It is sufficient if her evidence is unimpeachable, but then, as has been observed by the Supreme Court it is not that statement of the prosecutrix has to be accepted as gospel truth. In “Tameezuddin Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)” reported in (2009) 15 SCC 566 , the Supreme Court has observed, thus; “9. It is true that in a case of rape the evidence of the prosecutrix must be given predominant consideration, but to hold that this evidence has to be accepted even if the story is improbable and belies logic, would be doing violence to the very principles which govern the appreciation of evidence in a criminal matter.” 14. During her examination in the court, the prosecutrix has reiterated her statement about the appellant making queries about her mother and her brothers. In her examination-in-chief, she has stated that the appellant thrashed her on the floor and removed her saari, threw the towel he was wearing and lifted her thigh on his shoulder. Till that point, her evidence is clear but what happened next is not clear from her evidence. It is not at all clear whether the appellant had tried a penetrative sexual assault upon her. The accused has committed rape upon her is not her statement in the court. She has stated that the appellant was doing ‘Badmasi’. This expression in the popular sense is not construed as rape. What is relevant for the purpose of examining truthfulness of the statement of prosecutrix is that contrary to a specific allegation in her fardbeyan on commission of rape, the prosecutrix has not spoken about rape in her examination-in-chief in the court. This expression in the popular sense is not construed as rape. What is relevant for the purpose of examining truthfulness of the statement of prosecutrix is that contrary to a specific allegation in her fardbeyan on commission of rape, the prosecutrix has not spoken about rape in her examination-in-chief in the court. What she says appears to be an attempt to commit rape. 15. The appellant has stated in his examination under section 313 Cr.P.C that he was thrashed by the prosecution witnesses for committing theft from the mango tree in the house of the prosecutrix. 16. The victim as well as her mother-P.W. 2 have admitted that father of the appellant had come there and he had gone to call the police. 17. It was contended by the defence that the fact that father of the accused had called the police probablises the defence story that when the accused was beaten up by the prosecution witnesses on the suspicion of theft of mango his father tried to save him and had gone to call the police. 18. In the above state of evidence, what is required is to examine the testimony of the victim girl. 19. The learned A.P.P has heavily relied on the decision in “State of M.P Vs. Dayal Sahu”, wherein it has been held: “14. A plethora of decisions by this Court as referred to above would show that once the statement of the prosecutrix inspires confidence and is accepted by the courts as such, conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the courts for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition for judicial reliance is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. It is also noticed that minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Non-examination of doctor and non-production of doctor’s report would not be fatal to the prosecution case, if the statements of the prosecutrix and other prosecution witnesses inspire confidence.” 20. During her cross-examination, the victim has admitted that there were litigations between her uncle-P.W 3 and the family of the appellant. The victim has also admitted that there were atleast ten cases pending between the parties. During her cross-examination, the victim has admitted that there were litigations between her uncle-P.W 3 and the family of the appellant. The victim has also admitted that there were atleast ten cases pending between the parties. P.W.2 is mother of the prosecutrix, P.W.3 is her uncle and P.W.4 is her maternal uncle. They are highly interested witnesses. The villagers – P.W. 5, P.W. 6 and P.W. 7 – all have turned hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution. It has been brought on record that there are several houses adjoining the house of the victim and the villagers had locked the room in which the alleged incident took place from outside but none of the villagers has deposed anything on the commission of rape on the victim and, in fact, it is not claimed by the victim that she has informed the villagers assembled there about the appellant sexually ravishing her. She has not even named the villagers who had assembled there at the place of occurrence and beaten up the appellant. The victim was medically examined by Dr. Reeta Rani Jha the next day of the occurrence. The victim has stated that she was thrashed on the floor by the appellant and undressed by him, but no mark of physical violence was found on her body. She has not alleged that the appellant was holding any weapon under the threat of which she did not put resistance. The medical report produced by the prosecution does not disclose any sign of violence or sexual assault upon the victim. The appellant was not medically examined and no report on seized under-garments of the victim was produced by the prosecution. 21. No doubt, contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, more particularly, evidence of the prosecutrix herself may seem minor when seen independently, however, when these contradictions are looked together the effect is that these substantially erode the prosecution story of the appellant committing rape upon the informant-Kanti Kumari. All that the prosecution has been able to prove is that the appellant has dragged the prosecutrix inside the room and he has attempted to sexually assault her. It is a cardinal principle in criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution must establish its case beyond all shadows of reasonable doubt. If the overall circumstances in a case throw a doubt on the prosecution’s case, benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused. It is a cardinal principle in criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution must establish its case beyond all shadows of reasonable doubt. If the overall circumstances in a case throw a doubt on the prosecution’s case, benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused. Evidence of the prosecutrix in her examination-in-chief, in our opinion, is not specific as to commission of offence under section 376 IPC. It just constitutes an offence under section 376 IPC read with section 511 IPC. In “Narendra Kumar Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)” reported in (2012) 7 SCC 171 , the Supreme Court has observed as under : “28. The courts while trying an accused on the charge of rape, must deal with the case with utmost sensitivity, examining the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses which are not of a substantial character. 29. However, even in a case of rape, the onus is always on the prosecution to prove, affirmatively each ingredient of the offence it seeks to establish and such onus never shifts. It is no part of the duty of the defence to explain as to how and why in a rape case the victim and other witnesses have falsely implicated the accused. The prosecution case has to stand on its own legs and cannot take support from the weakness of the case of defence. However great the suspicion against the accused and however strong the moral belief and conviction of the court, unless the offence of the accused is established beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of legal evidence and material on the record, he cannot be convicted for an offence. There is an initial presumption of innocence of the accused and the prosecution has to bring home the offence against the accused by reliable evidence. The accused is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt. (Vide Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra and Uday v. State of Karnataka.)” 22. Having scrutinized the materials on record, we are of the opinion that conviction of the appellant for the offence under section 376 IPC in Sessions Trial No. 476 of 1989/73 of 1989 is not sustainable and accordingly, it is set-aside. Consequently, the sentence of R.I for life awarded to the appellant is also set-aside. Having scrutinized the materials on record, we are of the opinion that conviction of the appellant for the offence under section 376 IPC in Sessions Trial No. 476 of 1989/73 of 1989 is not sustainable and accordingly, it is set-aside. Consequently, the sentence of R.I for life awarded to the appellant is also set-aside. However, in view of the prosecution evidence the appellant is convicted for the offence under section 376 IPC read with section 511 IPC [refer, “Pandharinath Vs. State of Maharashtra” reported in (2009) 14 SCC 537 ]. On the question of sentence, we find that under section 511 IPC the accused may be awarded imprisonment or fine or both. Taking overall circumstance of the case and that the offence was committed about 30 years back, the appellant is awarded punishment of R.I for six months with fine of Rs.10000/-. In default of payment of fine which shall be deposited by the appellant in the Nazarat of the court within four weeks a certified copy of the order is made available to him, he shall undergo R.I for one month. 23. We have been informed that the appellant has already undergone R.I for more than six months. 24. Accordingly, the appellant would stand discharged of liability of the bail-bonds after he deposits the fine, however, if he fails to deposit the fine within the prescribed period his bail-bonds shall be cancelled and he shall be taken into custody to serve imprisonment. 25. Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 100 of 1993 (R) is allowed, in the aforesaid terms.