JUDGMENT : K.S. JHAVERI, J. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 26.05.2006 under Annexure-9 and the consequential notice dated 03.07.2006 under Annexure-10 issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Cuttack II Range, Cuttack-opposite party No.2 under Rule 16 of the Central Sales Tax (Orissa) Rules, 1957 and prays for a direction to the opposite parties to refund Rs.15,00,000/-. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in view of the White Paper on State-Level Value Added Tax issued by the Government of Orissa at Annexure-12, the State Government assured the industries that payment of Orissa Value Added Tax will be given set off for which he has relied upon Section 21 of the VAT Act which came into force with effect from 01.04.2005 and has remained in force up to 30.06.2005. However, the State Government with effect from 01.07.2005 amended Section 21 (1) of the OVAT Act which reads as under: “S.21(1) If the input tax credit of a registered dealer other than an exporter selling goods outside the territory of India determined under Section 20 for any tax period exceeds the tax liability for that period, the excess credit shall be set off against any “[outstanding tax, interest and penalty under this Act or under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (74 of 1956) and the rules made thereunder, against that dealer].” Section 21 (1) of the OVAT Act was further substituted on 01.06.2008 which reads as under: “S.21(1) If the input tax credit of a registered dealer other than an exporter selling goods outside the territory of India determined under Section 20 for any tax period exceeds the tax liability for that period, the excess input tax credit shall be set off against the tax payable under the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (74 of 1956) for that period at the first instance and if any balance input tax credit is still available, the same shall be carried forward for being set off against the tax payable for subsequent tax period or periods by that dealer.” 3. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax relying on the law, on 26.05.2006 (Annexure-9) passed an order rejecting the claim of the petitioner holding that it is not entitled to avail the input tax credit. Consequently, notice under Annexure-10 was issued. Therefore, the petitioner has challenged the order before this Court. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax relying on the law, on 26.05.2006 (Annexure-9) passed an order rejecting the claim of the petitioner holding that it is not entitled to avail the input tax credit. Consequently, notice under Annexure-10 was issued. Therefore, the petitioner has challenged the order before this Court. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strongly relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Kumar Rana v. State of Haryana and others, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 628 , paragraphs 3, 7 and 8 of which read as under: “3. The factual basis, which provided the ground for his disqualification and consequent rejection of the nomination, is that at the time of filing his nomination, the appellant had four children and that of the said four children, two were born after the coming into force of the Haryana Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Haryana Act 15 of 1994), the actual date of birth of them, twins, being 11-5-1995, as per the municipal records. The stand of the appellant was and even now before us is that the relevant date for determining the disqualification is the coming into force of the Haryana Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Haryana Act 15 of 1994) viz. 4-10-1994, the date of publication of the Amendment Act in the Government Gazette and not 5-4-1994, the date of coming into force of the Haryana Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Haryana Act 3 of 1994). The High Court was of the view that the disqualification will operate after 5-4-1995 — on the expiry of the period of one year from 5-4-1994, the date of coming into force of Amendment Act 3 of 1994. Per contra, the claim of the appellant was that the disqualification will be attracted only after 4-10-1995, the expiry of one year from the date of coming into force of Amendment Act 15 of 1994. 7. On a careful consideration of the relevant statutory provisions and the submissions of the learned counsel on either side, we are of the view that the High Court could not be said to have erred in the construction adopted, which not only accords with the intention of the legislature but avoids uncertainty and friction as well repugnance, which otherwise would result in accepting the stand of the appellant. The main part of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 13-A in unmistakable terms introduced a disqualification for being chosen as and for being a member of the municipality of a person who has more than two living children. The mandate of the legislature is clear and specific and purports to be in public interest. At the same time, in order to protect, apparently cases where a child could have by then been conceived, a reasonable period to relax from the rigour of the disqualification seems to have been thought of and keeping in view perhaps the normal gestation period, a proviso in the form of a deeming clause also appears to have been enacted enjoining at the same time that “a person having more than two children on or after the expiry of one year of the commencement of this Act, shall not be deemed to be disqualified”. (emphasis supplied) 8. The legislative intent thus to compute the period of one year from the “commencement of this Act”, meaning thereby Haryana Act 3 of 1994 is equally explicit and clear. There is, therefore, no rhyme or reason or justification in the claim on behalf of the appellant that the one-year period has to be calculated from the date of coming into force of Haryana Act 15 of 1994, which merely substituted the word “after” by the word “upto”. The result of substitution, as we could see, was to read the provision as amended by the word, ordered to be substituted. The legislature seems to have realized the need for substitution on becoming aware of the anomalies and absurdities to which the provision without such substitution may lead to, even resulting, at times, in repugnancy with the main provision and virtually defeating the intention of the legislature. The modification of the provision, as carried out by the substitution ordered, when found to be needed and necessitated to implement effectively the legislative intention and to prevent a social mischief against which the provision is directed, a purposive construction is a must and the only inevitable solution. The right to contest to an office of a member of a municipal body is the creature of statute and not a constitutional or fundamental right. The right to contest to an office of a member of a municipal body is the creature of statute and not a constitutional or fundamental right. Viewed, thus also, we are convinced that the interpretation placed by the High Court on the provisions concerned is neither arbitrary, nor unreasonable nor unjust to call for our interference.” (emphasis supplied) 5. He has again relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Zile Singh v. State of Haryana and others, reported in (2004) 8 SCC 1 paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of which read as under: “14. The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes…. In determining, therefore, the nature of the Act, regard must be had to the substance rather than to the form. If a new Act is “to explain” an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospectively. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended…. An amending Act may be purely declaratory to clear a meaning of a provision of the principal Act which was already implicit. A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect (ibid., pp. 468-69). 15. Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed and rather there is presumption against retrospectivity, according to Craies (Statute Law, 7th Edn.), it is open for the legislature to enact laws having retrospective operation. This can be achieved by express enactment or by necessary implication from the language employed. If it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective operation, the courts will give it such an operation. In the absence of a retrospective operation having been expressly given, the courts may be called upon to construe the provisions and answer the question whether the legislature had sufficiently expressed that intention giving the statute retrospectivity. Four factors are suggested as relevant: (i) general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what it was the legislature contemplated. Four factors are suggested as relevant: (i) general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what it was the legislature contemplated. (p. 388) The rule against retrospectivity does not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal, a privilege which did not amount to accrued right. (p. 392) 16. Where a statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former statute or to “explain” a former statute, the subsequent statute has relation back to the time when the prior Act was passed. The rule against retrospectivity is inapplicable to such legislations as are explanatory and declaratory in nature. A classic illustration is the case of Attorney General v. Pougett [(1816) 2 Price 381 : 146 ER 130] (Price at p. 392). By a Customs Act of 1873 (53 Geo. 3, c. 33) a duty was imposed upon hides of 9s 4d, but the Act omitted to state that it was to be 9s 4d per cwt., and to remedy this omission another Customs Act (53 Geo. 3, c. 105) was passed later in the same year. Between the passing of these two Acts some hides were exported, and it was contended that they were not liable to pay the duty of 9s 4d per cwt., but Thomson, C.B., in giving judgment for the Attorney General, said: (ER p. 134) “The duty in this instance was, in fact, imposed by the first Act; but the gross mistake of the omission of the weight, for which the sum expressed was to have been payable, occasioned the amendment made by the subsequent Act: but that had reference to the former statute as soon as it passed, and they must be taken together as if they were one and the same Act;” (Price at p. 392)” 6. He has further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of India and others v. Indian Tobacco Association, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 396 , paragraphs 16, 17, 22, 31 and 34 of which read as under: “16. By reason of the aforementioned amendment no substantive right has been taken away nor any penal consequence has been imposed. Only an obvious mistake was sought to be removed thereby. 17. By reason of the aforementioned amendment no substantive right has been taken away nor any penal consequence has been imposed. Only an obvious mistake was sought to be removed thereby. 17. There cannot furthermore be any doubt whatsoever that when a person is held to be eligible to obtain the benefits of an exemption notification, the same should be liberally construed. 22. Had the intention of the Government of India been only to extend the said benefit only to the exporters from any other seaport, airport or inland container depot, recourse to the proviso appended to sub-clause (iv) of clause (2) of the notification dated 7-4-1997 could have been taken. But by reason of the notification dated 27-11-1997, one “seaport” and “six inland container depots” have been added. The last two words in the category of seaport, namely, “Tuticorin and Vishakhapatnam” had been substituted by the words “Tuticorin, Vishakhapatnam and Kakinada”. Similarly the last two words, namely, “Ludhiana and Hyderabad” in the category of inland container depot had been substituted by the words “Ludhiana, Hyderabad, Nagpur, Agra, Faridabad, Jaipur, Guntur and Varanasi”. It, therefore, cannot be said to be a case where some other seaports or inland container depots have been added for the purpose of extension of the benefit but the newly added seaports or inland container depots had been made a part of the original notification. The Union of India while making a subordinate legislation had advisedly used the word “substitution” in place of the word “addition”. The object and purport of the subsequent notification issued by the Union of India was, thus, to grant the same benefit which had been granted to the exporters who were registered at the other seaports, airports or inland container depots as specified in the notification dated 7-4-1997 but also to those exporters, who had been exporting from such seaports or inland container depots as specified in the amended notification dated 27-11-1997. 31. The learned Additional Solicitor General relied upon CCE v. Parle Exports (P) Ltd. [ (1989) 1 SCC 345 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 84] for raising the contention that the interpretation of the executive should receive due consideration. It is not a case where the doctrine of “contemporanea expositio” can be invoked. The order relied upon by the learned counsel has been impugned by the respondents by filing the writ petition. It is not a case where the doctrine of “contemporanea expositio” can be invoked. The order relied upon by the learned counsel has been impugned by the respondents by filing the writ petition. It, therefore, cannot be said that by reason thereof the notification had been constructed on administrative side. 34. Furthermore, registration at the inland container depot was to remain valid for a period of 12 months only and in that view of the matter too, it cannot be said that the Central Government intended to deprive the respondents herein who were agriculturists from the benefit of the aforementioned notification dated 7-4-1997 only for a limited period viz. between 7-4-1997 and 27-11-1997. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court cannot be said to have committed any error in arriving at the aforementioned conclusion.” 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gottumukkala Venkata Krishamraju v. Union of India, reported in 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1386, paragraphs 9 and 22 of which read as under: “9. The endeavour of the petitioners is to demonstrate that they would be governed by Section 6 as amended and, therefore, they have right to continue upto the age of 65 years or till the time they complete five years tenure before they have attained the age of 65 years. The submission which are paraphrased by the petitioners in support of their aforesaid plea are the following: (a) By the Amendment Act, new Section 6 stands ‘substituted’ with the old Section 6. The legislature has used the expression ‘substituted’ with a definite purpose, namely, making this provision applicable also to those Presiding Officers who were holding the post as on September 1, 2016 when the amendment was brought into force. It was argued that the very expression ‘substituted’ would mean that the old Section 6 stands obliterated. (b) Purpose behind the amendment was to reduce the burden of pendency by enhancing the age of the Presiding Officers. This is categorically mentioned in the report of the Lok Sabha, Joint Committee and also in the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the amendment. (b) Purpose behind the amendment was to reduce the burden of pendency by enhancing the age of the Presiding Officers. This is categorically mentioned in the report of the Lok Sabha, Joint Committee and also in the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the amendment. (c) The provision needs to be given purposive interpretation and keeping in view the purpose and object behind the amendment, the said purpose would be sub-served only if it is applied to the incumbents in the service as well as on the date of the application. Reference is made to the judgment of this Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. 22. We are, thus, of the opinion that while carrying out the aforesaid amendment with the intention to substitute the amended provision with that of unamended, the Parliament desired that the benefit of this provision extended even to those who are serving as Presiding Officers on the date when the amendment became enforceable. This seems to be just, reasonable and sensible outcome.” Therefore, he contended that in view of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the word ‘substituted’ is to be given with retrospective effect. 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the Revenue-opposite parties. Learned counsel for the Revenue contended that the word ‘substitute’ in a declaratory legislation is not intended to give effect retrospectively. Taking into consideration the intention of the legislation on the date of the Act came into force, it was very clear that the refund or the set off was to be given only for a limited period to the registered dealer other than an exporter, if it fulfilled the requirement under Section 21 of the said Act. However, subsequently the legislation thought it fit to substitute the word with effect from 01.07.2005. In our considered opinion, when the Act is amended in a taxing statute, it is implemented with prospective effect. 9. The case law of the Constitutional Bench, which is sought to be relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Zile Singh v. State of Haryana and others, reported in (2004) 8 SCC 1 to interpret the effect of the word ‘substituted’ was to be given effect to retrospectively, failing which it would take away the fundamental right which was conferred. 10. 10. But in our considered opinion, in a tax statute, the word ‘substitute’ is to be interpreted strictly as per the legislative intention. It cannot be given the retrospective effect unless expressly provided or intention to that effect is manifest from a bare reading of the provision. If an ordinary interpretation is made as per the case law relied by the petitioner, then if any tax is increased, it cannot be realized retrospectively, which can never be the intention of such ‘substitution’. Therefore, amending provision will have prospective effect. 11. In that view of the matter, every word in a tax statute should be interpreted strictly as it stood on the date the taxing event exists or it occurs. Thus, the argument canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is devoid of any merit, is required to be rejected and is rejected. 12. Pursuant to the assessment order under Annexure-9 and notice issued under Annexure-10, if there is any excess payment made by the petitioner, it will be open for him to apply before the Assessing Officer for refund. The Assessing Officer will look into the matter and will pass appropriate order and take appropriate step within four months from the date of the application made by the petitioner. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.