ORDER : 1. The issue raised in W.P. (C) Nos. 37048 and 37069 of 2018 filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in O.P. (C) No. 1777 of 2018, which is one filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is whether the judgments of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal constituted under sub-section (2) of Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 can be challenged before this Court invoking the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 or whether it should be challenged in an original petition filed under Article 227, by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction. In order to decide that issue, the question that has to be considered is whether a Judicial Officer, not below the rank of a District Judge or who is qualified to be a Judge of the High Court, appointed in terms of the notification issued by the State Government under sub-section (2) of Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, is exercising powers in the capacity of a civil court or as persona designata. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner in the respective writ petitions/original petition, learned Special Government Pleader for the official respondents and also the respective counsel for the party respondents. 3. In Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon the meaning of "Persona Designata" is given as follows: “Persona Designata: Where a person is indicated in a statute or legal instrument not by name, but either by an official designation or as one of a class, a question sometimes arises whether he ceases to be the person so indicated on losing his official designation or his character as one of the class, or whether the intention was to single him out as a persona designata, that is, as an individual, the designation being merely a further description of him. Designatio personae then, in general, means simply the singling out by description of a party to a deed or contract: or a person taking thereunder such party or person being in turn called persona designata. (Ency. of the Laws of England). When difficulty is found in ascertaining whether a person takes as person a designata, the maxim "Desigrtatio unius est exclusion aftertaste expressum facit cessare tecitum" is applicable ; in other words, if one person is specified, another is excluded on the principle that what is expressed makes what is only understood to give way." 4. of the Laws of England). When difficulty is found in ascertaining whether a person takes as person a designata, the maxim "Desigrtatio unius est exclusion aftertaste expressum facit cessare tecitum" is applicable ; in other words, if one person is specified, another is excluded on the principle that what is expressed makes what is only understood to give way." 4. Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with appeals. As per sub-section (1) of Section 89, any person aggrieved by the orders enumerated in clauses (a) to (g) thereof, may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the State transport Appellate Tribunal constituted under sub-section (2), who shall, after giving such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard, give a decision thereon which shall be final. As per sub-section (2) of Section 89, the State Government shall constitute such number of Transport Appellate Tribunals as it thinks fit and each such Tribunal shall consist of a judicial officer who is not below the rank of a District Judge or who is qualified to be a judge of the High Court and it shall exercise jurisdiction within such area as may be notified by that Government. Section 90 of the Act deals with revision. Ad per Section 90, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may, on an application made to it, call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority against which no order by not against the direction so issued. 5. In exercise of the powers under sub-section (2) of Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 the State Government issued S.R.O. No. 338/2018 appointing Dr. Kauser Edappagath, District and Sessions Judge, Ernakulam as State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam to hear and dispose of appeals under sub-section (1) of Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, in addition to the normal duties as District and Sessions Judge, Ernakulam in the place of Shri N. Anilkumar, with effect from the date on which he assumes charge as such. 6. The Explanatory Note to S.R.O. No. 338/2018, published in the Kerala Gazette vide G.O. (Rt.) No. 338/2018/Home dated 10.05.2018, reads thus: “As part of transfer and postings of judicial Officers in the State Subordinate Judiciary, the High Court of Kerala has proposed the appointment of Dr. 6. The Explanatory Note to S.R.O. No. 338/2018, published in the Kerala Gazette vide G.O. (Rt.) No. 338/2018/Home dated 10.05.2018, reads thus: “As part of transfer and postings of judicial Officers in the State Subordinate Judiciary, the High Court of Kerala has proposed the appointment of Dr. Kauser Edappagath, District and Sessions Judge, Ernakulam as State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam and the Government have accepted the proposal of the High Court and decided to appoint Dr. Kauser Edappagath, District and Sessions Judge, Ernakulam as State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam.” 7. Article 226 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of the High Courts to issue certain writs. Under clause (1) of Article 226 of the Constitution, notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. Going by clause (2) of Article 226, the power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. 8. On the other hand, Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. Clause (2) of Article 227 provides that, without prejudice to the generality of the provisions under clause (1), the High Court may call for returns from such courts; make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts. Going by clause (4), nothing in Article 227 shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. 9. In Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 , the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. 10. In Jai Singh vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (2010) 9 SCC 385 , while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well established principles of law. The High Court is vested with the powers of superintendence and/or judicial revision, even in matters where no revision or appeal lies to the High Court. The jurisdiction under this Article is, in some ways, wider than the power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is, however, well to remember the well known adage that greater the power, greater the care and caution in exercise thereof. The High Court is, therefore, expected to exercise such wide powers with great care, caution and circumspection. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a "bull in a china shop" to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The High Court is, therefore, expected to exercise such wide powers with great care, caution and circumspection. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a "bull in a china shop" to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. 11. In K.V.S. Ram vs. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation, (2015) 12 SCC 39 , the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. On the facts of the said case, the Apex Court held that, when the Labour Court has exercised its discretion keeping in view the facts of the case and the cases of similarly situated workmen, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the Labour Court. 12. In Sobhana Nair K.N. vs. Shaji S.G. Nair, 2016 (1) KHC 1 , a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law. 13. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law. 13. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. 14. In Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 , the Apex Court held that, Article 227 of the Constitution confers on every High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction excepting any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. The jurisdiction under Article 227 can be traced back to Section 15 of High Courts Act, 1861 which gave a power of judicial superintendence to the High Court apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisional jurisdiction on the High Court. Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 and then Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935 were similarly worded and reproduced the predecessor provision. Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 and then Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935 were similarly worded and reproduced the predecessor provision. However, sub-section (2) was added in Section 224 which confined the jurisdiction of the High Court to such judgments of the inferior courts which were not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. That restriction has not been carried forward in Article 227 of the Constitution. 15. In Surya Dev Rai's case (supra) the Apex Court held further that, proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamount to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. 16. The decision of the Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai's case (supra) on the point that the High Court can exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 to interfere with a judicial order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction now stands overruled by the decision of a Three-Judge Bench in Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423 . In Radhey Shyam's case, the Apex Court held that, judicial orders of Civil Courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226 and that the scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. In Radhey Shyam's case, the Apex Court held that, judicial orders of Civil Courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226 and that the scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. Dealing with the submission made on behalf of the respondent that the view in Surya Dev Rai's case stands approved by Larger Benches in Shail vs. Manoj Kumar, (2004) 4 SCC 785 , Mahendra Saree Emporium vs. G.V. Srinivasa Murthy, (2005) 1 SCC 481 and Salem Advocate Bar Association vs. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344 and on that ground correctness of the said view cannot be gone into, the Three-Judge Bench observed that, in Shail, though reference has been made to Surya Dev Rai, the same is only for the purpose of scope of power under Article 227, as is clear from paragraph 3 of the said judgment. There is no discussion on the issue of maintainability of a petition under Article 226. In Mahendra Saree Emporium, reference to Surya Dev Rai is made in paragraph 9 of the judgment only for the proposition that no subordinate legislation can whittle down the jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution. Similarly, in Salem Bar Association in paragraph 40, reference to Surya Dev Rai is for the same purpose. 17. In Radhey Shyam's case (supra) the Three-Judge Bench held that Article 227 can be invoked by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases, but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration in the larger public interest, whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievances. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline. The object of superintendence under Article 227, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline. The object of superintendence under Article 227, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. 18. The supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited, where interference qua an interlocutory order of a subordinate court or tribunal is concerned. In such matters, the High Court has to consider the question as to whether such an interlocutory order of the subordinate court or tribunal was vitiated due to want of jurisdiction or that the said court or tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction or that the order passed by it had resulted in failure of justice. This view is supported by the decision of the Apex Court in Kokkanda B. Poondacha vs. K.D. Ganapathi, (2011) 12 SCC 600 . 19. Therefore, the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 is administrative as well as judicial and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be exercised suo motu. It is exercised to keep the subordinate courts or tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction. It can be invoked when a subordinate court or tribunal over which the High Court have superintendence has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available has been exercised in a manner which is not permissible by law and a grave failure of justice has occasioned. 20. On the other hand, Article 226 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of the High Courts to issue certain writs. 20. On the other hand, Article 226 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of the High Courts to issue certain writs. Under clause (1) of Article 226 of the Constitution, notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. Going by clause (2) of Article 226, the power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. On the other hand, by virtue of clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. 21. By virtue of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the power under clause (1) of Article 226 to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. However, the language of Article 226 makes it clear that the said Article does not contemplate interference by the High Court with the orders of the subordinate courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which that High Court exercises jurisdiction. However, the language of Article 226 makes it clear that the said Article does not contemplate interference by the High Court with the orders of the subordinate courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which that High Court exercises jurisdiction. The said issue is no more res integra as the position is made clear by a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Radhey Shyam's case (supra) by holding that judicial orders of Civil Courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 22. In Umaji Keshao Meshram vs. Smt.Radhikabai, AIR 1986 SC 1272 , the question that came up for consideration before the Apex Court was whether an appeal lies under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court to a Division Bench of two Judges of that High Court from the judgment of a Single Judge in a petition filed under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. In that case, the 1st Respondent filed an application under sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, read with Section 39 of that Act for possession of three fields situated at Mouza Khed-Makta, Tahsil Brahmapuri, Chandrapura District. The said application was allowed and she took possession of the said fields. The Appellants before the Apex Court filed an application under Section 52 of the Act for restoration of possession of the said fields. The said application was allowed by the Additional Tahsildar, Brahmapuri. The appeal filed by the 1st respondent was allowed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Brahmapuri. The Appellants thereupon went in revision. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal at Nagpur allowed the said revision. Thereupon the 1st respondent filed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the Nagpur Bench of the High Court of Bombay being Special Civil Application No. 1392 of 1974. By reason of the provision of Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, the said petition was heard by a learned single Judge of that High Court, who allowed the petition, set aside the order of the Tribunal and restored the order of the Sub Division Officer. By reason of the provision of Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, the said petition was heard by a learned single Judge of that High Court, who allowed the petition, set aside the order of the Tribunal and restored the order of the Sub Division Officer. Against the said judgment the Appellants filed an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent to the Division Bench, which ended in dismissal as not being competent in view of the decision of a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in Shankar Naroba Salunke vs. Gyanchand Lobhachand Kothari, Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 3, 10, 11, 17 of 1979 and 34 of 1980 decided on 03.09.1980. Against the said order of the Division Bench, the appellants filed Appeal by Special Leave before the Apex Court. 23. In Umaji Keshao Meshram's case (supra) the Apex Court held that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India an order, direction or writ is issued to a person, authority or the State. Under Article 227, however, what comes up before the High Court is the order or judgment of a subordinate court or tribunal for the purpose of ascertaining whether in giving such judgment or order that subordinate court or tribunal has acted within its authority and according to law. A proceeding under Article 227 is not an original proceedings. Therefore, an the court appeal will not lie against the judgment of a single Judge of the Bombay High Court given in a petition under Article 227 by reason of such appeal being expressly barred by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of that High Court. Paragraphs 100 and 102 of the said judgment read thus: “100. Under Article 226 an order, direction or writ is to issue to a person, authority or the State. In a proceeding under that Article the person, authority or State against whom the direction, order or writ is sought is a necessary party. Under Article 227, however, what comes up before the High Court is the order or judgment of a subordinate Court or tribunal for the purpose of ascertaining whether in giving such judgment or order that subordinate Court or tribunal has acted within its authority and according to law. Under Article 227, however, what comes up before the High Court is the order or judgment of a subordinate Court or tribunal for the purpose of ascertaining whether in giving such judgment or order that subordinate Court or tribunal has acted within its authority and according to law. Prior to the commencement of the Constitution, the Chartered High Courts as also the Judicial Committee had held that the power to issue prerogative writs possessed by the Chartered High Courts was an exercise of original jurisdiction. Mahomedalli Allabux vs. Ismailji Abdulali, AIR 1926 Bom 332, Raghunath Keshav Khadilkar vs. Poona Municipality, AIR 1945 Bom 7, Ryots of Garabandho vs. Zamindar of Parlakimedi, AIR 1943 PC 164 and Moulvi Hamid Hasan Nomani vs. Banwarilal Roy, AIR 1947 PC 90 . In the last, mentioned case which dealt with the nature of a writ of quo warranto, the Judicial Committee held: "In their Lordships' opinion any original civil jurisdiction possessed by the High Court and not in express terms conferred by the Letters Patent or later enactments falls within the description of ordinary original civil jurisdiction." By Article 226 the power of issuing prerogative writs possessed by the Chartered High Courts prior to the commencement of the Constitution has been made wider and more extensive and conferred upon every High Court. The nature of the exercise of the power under Article 226, however, remains the same as in the case of the power of issuing prerogative writs possessed by the Chartered High Courts. A series of decisions of this Court has firmly established that a proceeding under Article 226 is an original proceeding and when it concerns civil rights, it is an original civil proceeding. State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, 1963 (1) SCR 1 : AIR 1963 SC 946 , Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay vs. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas, 1966 (1) SCR 190 : AIR 1965 SC 1818 , Ramesh vs. Gendalal Motilal Patni, 1966 (3) SCR 198 : AIR 1966 SC 1445 , Arbind Kumar Singh vs. Nand Kishore Prasad, 1968 (3) SCR 322 : AIR 1968 SC 1227 and Ahmedabad Mfg. and Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. vs. Ramtahel Ramnand, AIR 1972 SC 1598 . 101. and Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. vs. Ramtahel Ramnand, AIR 1972 SC 1598 . 101. Consequently, where a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution is according to the rules of a particular High Court heard by a single Judge, an intra Court appeal will lie from that judgment if such a right of appeal is provided in the Charter of that High Court, whether such Charter be Letters Patent or a Statute. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court gives in such a case a right of intra Court appeal and, therefore, the decision of a single Judge of that High Court given in a petition under Article 226 would be appealable to a Division Bench of that High Court. 102. It is equally well-settled in law that a proceeding under Article 227 is not an original proceeding. In this connection, we need refer to only two decisions of this Court. In Ahmedabad Mfg. and Calico Ptg. Co.'s case this Court said (at pages 193-4) (of 1973(1) SCR 185 : at p. 1603 of AIR 1972 SC 1598 ): "Article 227 of the Constitution no doubt does not confer on the High Court power similar to that of an ordinary Court of appeal. The material part of this Article substantially reproduces the provisions of S. 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, except that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article to Tribunals as well. Section 107 according to preponderance of judicial opinion clothed the High Courts with a power of judicial superintendence apart from and independently of the provisions of the other laws conferring on them revisional jurisdiction. The power under Article 227 of the Constitution is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases, for the purpose of keeping the subordinate Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and, not for correcting mere errors. Waryam Singh vs. Amar Nath, (1954) SCR 565 : AIR 1954 SC 215 . The power under Article 227 of the Constitution is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases, for the purpose of keeping the subordinate Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and, not for correcting mere errors. Waryam Singh vs. Amar Nath, (1954) SCR 565 : AIR 1954 SC 215 . Under Art. 226 of the Constitution it may in this connection be pointed out the High Court does not hear an appeal or a revision: that Court is moved to interfere after bringing before itself the record of a case decided by or pending before a Court, a Tribunal or an authority, within its jurisdiction." The origin and nature of the power of superintendence conferred upon the High Courts by Article 227 was thus stated by this Court in Waryam Singh vs. Amarnath, 1954 SCR 565 : AIR 1954 SC 215 . It reads as follows (at pages 570-1) (of SCR) (at p. 217 of AIR): "The material part of Article 427 substantially reproduces the provisions of, Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, except that the power of superintendence has been extended by the Article also to Tribunals....... The only question raised is as to the nature of the power of superintendence conferred by the Article. Reference is made to Clause (2) of the article in support of the contention that this article only confers on the High Court administrative superintendence over the subordinate Courts and Tribunals. We are unable to accept this contention because Clause (2) is expressed to be without prejudice to the generality of the provisions in Clause (1). Further, the preponderance of judicial opinion in India was that Section 107 which was similar in terms to Section 15 of the High Courts Act, 1861, gave a power of judicial superintendence to the High Court apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisional jurisdiction on the High Court. In this connection it has to be remembered that Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, was reproduced in the Government of India Act, 1935, as Section 224. Section 224 of the 1935 Act, however, introduced sub-section (2), which was new, providing that nothing in the section should be construed as giving the High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior Court which was not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. Section 224 of the 1935 Act, however, introduced sub-section (2), which was new, providing that nothing in the section should be construed as giving the High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior Court which was not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. The idea presumably was to nullify the effect of the decisions of the different High Courts referred to above. Section 224 of the 1935 Act has been reproduced with certain modifications in Article 227 of the Constitution. It is significant to note that sub-section (2) to Section 224 of the 1935 Act has been omitted from Article 227. This significant omission has been regarded by all High Courts in India before whom this question has arisen as having restored to the High Court the power of judicial superintendence it had under Section 15 of the High Courts Act, 1861 and Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915." 24. In Umaji Keshao Meshram's case (supra) the Apex Court, in the context of sub-rule (1) of Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, which provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 1, 4 and 17 of Chapter XVII, applications under Articles 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution (or applications styled as applications under Article 227 of the Constitution read with Article 226 of the Constitution) arising out of the orders passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal under any enactment may be heard and finally disposed of by a Single Judge to be appointed in this behalf by the Chief Justice, held that under Rules 1 and 17, applications under Article 226 and 227 are required to be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench. An intra-court appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge in a petition under Article 226 is not barred while Clause 15 itself bars an intra-court appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge in a petition under Article 227. An intra-court appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge in a petition under Article 226 is not barred while Clause 15 itself bars an intra-court appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge in a petition under Article 227. Where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226 of the Constitution. Paragraphs 103 to 107 of the said judgment read thus: “103. Under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the' Bombay High Court, no intra-Court appeal lay against an "order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act." By the same process of interpretation by reason of which the phrase "pursuant to Section 108 of Government of India Act" in Clause 15 is to be read as "pursuant to Article 225 of the Constitution of India", the phrase "order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act" is to be read as "order passed or made in the exercise of superintendence under the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution". The result is that an intra-Court appeal does not lie against the judgment of a single Judge of the Bombay High Court given in a petition under Article 227 by reason of such appeal being expressly barred by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of that High Court. This is the view also taken by different High Courts. The result is that an intra-Court appeal does not lie against the judgment of a single Judge of the Bombay High Court given in a petition under Article 227 by reason of such appeal being expressly barred by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of that High Court. This is the view also taken by different High Courts. Jagannath Ganbaji Chikhale vs. Gulabrao Raghobaji Bobde, (1965) 67 Bom LR 609, Sukhendu Bikash vs. Hare Krishna De, AIR 1953 Cal 636 , Shrinivasa Reddiar vs. Krishnaswami Reddiar, AIR 1955 Mad 72 , In re V. Tirupuliswamy Naidu, ILR (1955) Mad 1033 (SC) : AIR 1955 Mad 287 , J&K Cooperative Bank vs. Shams-ud-din-Bacha, AIR 1970 J&K 190 and Ishwar Singh vs. Ram Piari, AIR 1978 HP 39 . 104. According to the Full Bench, a right of appeal against the judgment of a single Judge in a petition under Article 226 or 227 is expressly barred by Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "the Appellate Side Rules"). In order to reach this conclusion, the Full Bench relied upon the phrase "finally disposed of" occurring in the said Rule 18. It is not possible to accept the construction placed by the Full Bench upon the said Rule 18. The Bombay High Court possesses both an Original Side and an Appellate Side. The Judges of the High Court have, therefore, framed two sets of rules of Court, one for the Original Side and the other for the Appellate Side. We need not trouble ourselves with the earlier sets of rules but will confine ourselves only to referring to the rules now in force. Under Rule 636(1) of the Rules of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Original Side), 1980, an application for the issue of a direction, order or writ under Article 226 other than an application for a writ of habeas corpus is to be filed on the Original Side if the matter in dispute is or has arisen substantially within Greater Bombay and is to be heard and disposed of by such one of the Judges sitting on the Original Side or any specially constituted Bench as the Chief Justice may appoint. The provision in the earlier Original Side Rules was the same. The provision in the earlier Original Side Rules was the same. Under Chapter XXVIII of the Appellate Side Rules, all applications for writs or orders in the nature of writs of habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution are to be made and heard and disposed of by the Division Bench taking criminal business of the Appellate Side of the High Court. Under Rule 1 of Chapter XVII, of the Appellate Side Rules, every application for the issue of a direction, order or writ under Article 226, if the matter in dispute is or has arisen substantially outside Greater Bombay, is to be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench appointed by the Chief Justice. Rule 4 of Chapter XVII is as follows: "Division Bench to dispose of the application; rule nisi may be granted by a single Judge. Applications under Rule 1 shall be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench; but a single Judge may grant rule nisi, provided that he shall not pass any final order on the application." Under Rule 17 of Chapter XVII, an application invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution or under Article 228 of the Constitution is to be filed on the Appellate Side and to be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench to be appointed by the Chief Justice. The relevant provisions of Rule 18 are as follows: "18. Single Judge's powers to finally dispose of applications under Article 226 or 227. Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 1, 4 and 17 of this Chapter, applications under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution (or applications styled as applications under Article 227 of Constitution read with Article 226 of the Constitution) arising out of:- (1) the orders passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal under any enactment. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx may be heard and finally disposed of by a single Judge to be appointed in this behalf by the Chief Justice. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx” The omitted portion of Rule 18 sets out the orders passed by authorities under various statutes and decrees and orders passed by subordinate Courts in any suit or proceeding, excluding those arising out of the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court, which are to be heard and disposed of by a single Judge. 105. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx” The omitted portion of Rule 18 sets out the orders passed by authorities under various statutes and decrees and orders passed by subordinate Courts in any suit or proceeding, excluding those arising out of the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court, which are to be heard and disposed of by a single Judge. 105. The non obstante clause in Rule 18, namely, "Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 1, 4 and 17 of this Chapter" makes it abundantly clear why that rule uses the words "finally disposed of." As seen above, under Rules 1 and 17, applications under Article 226 and 227 are required to be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench. Rule 4 however, gives power to a single Judge to issue rule nisi in an application under Article 226 but precludes him from passing any final order on such application. It is because a single Judge has no power under Rules 1, 4 and 17 to hear and dispose of a petition under Article 226 or 227 that the non obstante clause has been introduced in Rule 18. The use of the words "be heard and finally disposed of by a single Judge" in Rule 18 merely clarifies the position that in such cases the power of the single Judge is not confined merely to issuing a rule nisi. These words were not intended to bar a right of appeal. To say that the words "finally disposed or, mean finally disposed of so far as the High Court is concerned is illogical because Rules 1, 4 and 17 use the words "be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench" and were the reasoning of the Full Bench correct, it would mean that so far as the High Court is concerned, when a single Judge hears a matter and disposes it of, it is finally disposed of and when a Division Bench disposes it of, it is not finally disposed of. The right of appeal against the judgment of a single Judge is given by the Letters Patent which have been continued in force by Article 225 of the Constitution. If under the rules of the High Court, a matter is heard and disposed of by a single Judge, an appeal lies against his judgment unless it is barred either under the Letters Patent or some other enactment. If under the rules of the High Court, a matter is heard and disposed of by a single Judge, an appeal lies against his judgment unless it is barred either under the Letters Patent or some other enactment. The word "finally" used in Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Appellate Side Rules does not and cannot possibly have the effect of barring a right of appeal conferred by the Letters Patent. As we have seen above, an intra Court appeal against the judgment of a single Judge in a petition under Article 226 is not barred while Clause 15 itself bars an intra Court appeal against the judgment of a single Judge in a petition under Article 227. 106. Petitions are at times filed both under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The case of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, 1955 (1) SCR 1104 : AIR 1955 SC 233 before this Court was of such a type. Rule 18 provides that where such petitions are filed against orders of the tribunals or authorities specified in Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Appellate Side Rules or against decrees or orders of Courts specified in that Rule, they shall be heard and finally disposed of by a single Judge. The question is whether an appeal would lie from the decision of the single Judge in such a case. In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Such was the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Aidal Singh vs. Karan Singh, AIR 1957 All 414 (FB) and by the Punjab High Court in Raj Kishan Jain vs. Tulsi Dass, AIR 1959 Punj 291 and Barham Dutt vs. Peoples' Cooperative Transport Society Ltd. AIR 1961 Punj 24 and we are in agreement with it. 107. For the reasons aforesaid it must be held that the Full Bench case of Shankar Naroba Salunke vs. Gyanchand Lobhachand Kothari was wrongly decided except for the conclusion reached by the Full Bench that no appeal lies under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court against the judgment of a single Judge of that High Court in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution but not the reasons given by the Full Bench for reaching this particular conclusion. Accordingly, the said Full Bench decision is hereby overruled to the extent mentioned above and the view taken by the Special Bench in State of Maharashtra vs. Kusum Charudutt Bharme Upadhya, (1981) 83 Bom LR 75 is approved.” 25. As already noticed, the law laid down by the Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai's case (supra) that the High Court can exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 to interfere with a judicial order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction now stands overruled by the decision of a Three- Judge Bench in Radhey Shyam's case (supra), wherein the Apex Court held that, judicial orders of Civil Courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226 and that the scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. In Ram Kishan Fauji vs. State of Haryana, (2017) 5 SCC 533 a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court followed the law laid down in Radhey Shyam's case (supra) while holding that, a writ petition which assails the order of a civil court in the High Court has to be understood, in all circumstances, to be a challenge under Article 227 of the Constitution and determination by the High Court under the said Article. 26. 26. In Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Nandini J. Shah and Others, AIR 2018 SC 1197 , the question that came up for consideration before a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court was whether the order passed by the City Civil Court in exercise of the powers under Section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, as an Appellate Officer, is in the capacity of a Civil Court or persona designata. Sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the said Act reads thus: “9. Appeals - (1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the estate officer made in respect of any public premises under Section 5 or Section 5B or Section 5C or Section 7 to an appellate officer who shall be the district judge of the district in which the public premises are situate or such other judicial officer in that district of not less than ten years standing as the district judge may designate in this behalf.” The appellant contended that, the interplay of Section 9 of the 1971 Act read with the other provisions in the said Act, such as Sections 3, 8 and 10, makes it amply clear that the jurisdiction exercised by the Appellate Officer, namely the City Civil Court Judge, in an appeal under Section 9 of the Act, is in his capacity as a Civil Court and not persona designata. If so, the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India alone could be availed in the fact situation of the present case and not under Article 226, for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari. Per contra, the respondents contended that the District Judge/Appellate Officer exercises power under Section 9 of the 1971 Act as persona designata and not as a Civil Court. The respondents contended that, when a special statute creates an Appellate Officer and where it refers to the Presiding Judge and not to the Court to be such Appellate Officer, then it can be said that the reference has been made to the Judge as persona designata. The Apex Court held that, sub-section (1) of Section 9 postulates that an appeal shall lie from every order of the Estate Officer, passed under the Act, to an Appellate Officer. As to who shall be the Appellate Officer, has also been specified in the same provision. The Apex Court held that, sub-section (1) of Section 9 postulates that an appeal shall lie from every order of the Estate Officer, passed under the Act, to an Appellate Officer. As to who shall be the Appellate Officer, has also been specified in the same provision. The first part of the provision does suggest that the appeal shall lie to an Appellate Officer, however, it does not follow therefrom that the Appellate Officer is persona designata. Something more is required to hold so. Had it been a case of designating a person by name as an Appellate Officer, the concomitant would be entirely different. However, when the Appellate Officer is either the District Judge of the district or any another judicial officer in that district possessing necessary qualification who could be designated by the District Judge, the question of such investiture of power of an appellate authority in the District Judge or Designated Judge would by no standards acquire the colour or for that matter trappings of persona designata. In the first place, the power to be exercised by the Appellate Officer in terms of Section 9 is a judicial power of the State which is quite distinct from the executive power of the State. Secondly, the District Judge or designated judicial officer exercises judicial authority within his jurisdiction. Thirdly, as the Act predicates the Appellate Officer is to be a District Judge or judicial officer, it is indicative of the fact of a pre existing authority exercising judicial power of the State. Fourthly, District Judge is the creature of Section 5 of the Maharashtra Civil Courts Act, 1869, who presides over a District Court invariably consisting of more than one Judge in the concerned district. After referring to the provisions under the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948 the Apex Court held that, the District Judge or Principal Judge of the City Civil Court is the officer presiding over the Court and derives his description from the nomenclature of the Court. Even if the District Judge/Principal Judge of the City Civil Court might retire or get transferred, his successor-in-office can pick up the thread of the proceedings under Section 9 of the 1971 Act from the stage where it was left by his predecessor and can function as an appellate authority. Even if the District Judge/Principal Judge of the City Civil Court might retire or get transferred, his successor-in-office can pick up the thread of the proceedings under Section 9 of the 1971 Act from the stage where it was left by his predecessor and can function as an appellate authority. The District Judge/Principal Judge of the City Civil Court and other judicial officers of these Courts possessing necessary qualifications constitute a class and cannot be considered as persona designata. The Appellate Officer, therefore, has to function as a Court and his decision is final in terms of Section 10 of 1971 Act. The legislative intent behind providing an appeal under Section 9 before the Appellate Officer to be the District Judge of the concerned District Court in which the public premises are situated or such other judicial officer in that district possessing necessary qualification to be designated by the District Judge for that purpose, is indicative of the fact that the power to be exercised by the Appellate Officer is not in his capacity as persona designata but as a judicial officer of the pre existing Court. The thrust of sub-section (1) of Section 9 of 1971 Act is to provide for remedy of an appeal against the order of the Estate Officer before the District Judge who, undeniably, is a pre existing authority and head of the judiciary within the district, discharging judicial power of the State including power to condone the delay in filing of the appeal and to grant interim relief during the pendency of the appeal. Though described as an Appellate Officer, the District Judge, for deciding an appeal under Section 9, can and is expected to exercise the powers of the civil court. In the case of Thakur Das (supra), in paragraph 9, while analysing the cleavage of opinion of the High Courts, it is noticed that the expression judicial authority would comprehend the Additional Sessions Judge or the Sessions Judge could transfer such appeal pending before him to Additional Sessions Judge which was a pointer to the fact that he was not a persona designata. Even in respect of the appeal under Section 9 of the 1971 Act, the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court or District Judge is competent to hear the appeal himself or designate some other judicial officer within his jurisdiction possessing requisite qualification. Even in respect of the appeal under Section 9 of the 1971 Act, the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court or District Judge is competent to hear the appeal himself or designate some other judicial officer within his jurisdiction possessing requisite qualification. It is implicit in Section 9 read with the provisions of the Acts constituting the District Judiciary that the head of the district judiciary is the District Judge or Principal Judge of the City Civil Court and Section 9 of the 1971 Act makes it explicit, by investing authority in the District Judge or Principal Judge of the City Civil Court, to designate any other judicial officer within his jurisdiction possessing essential qualifications, to hear such appeals. This is a clear departure from the appointment of a District Judge as a persona designata. The Additional District Judge or judicial officer possessing essential qualification, therefore, is not an inferior appellate officer within the meaning of Section 9 of the 1971 Act. The Apex Court opined that, there is enough indication in Section 9 of the 1971 Act to spell out the legislative intent that the remedy of appeal before the appellate officer is not before a persona designata but a pre-existing judicial authority in the district concerned. Applying the principles underlying the decisions of Three-Judge Bench in Thakur Das (supra), Asnew Drums Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Maharashtra State Financial Corporation (supra), Ram Chander Aggarwal (supra) and Mukri Gopalan (supra), the Apex Court concluded that the Appellate Officer referred to in Section 9 of the 1971 Act, is not a persona designata but acts as a civil court. T he Appellate Officer while exercising power under Section 9 of the 1971 Act, does not act as a persona designata but in his capacity as a pre existing judicial authority in the district (being a District Judge or judicial officer possessing essential qualification designated by the District Judge). Being part of the district judiciary, the Judge acts as a Court and the order passed by him will be an order of the Subordinate Court against which remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be availed on the matters delineated for exercise of such jurisdiction. Paragraphs 29 to 31, 35 to 42, and 48 to 55 of the decision in Life Insurance Corporation of India's case AIR 2018 SC 1197 read thus: “29. Paragraphs 29 to 31, 35 to 42, and 48 to 55 of the decision in Life Insurance Corporation of India's case AIR 2018 SC 1197 read thus: “29. The avowed purpose for enacting the 1971 Act was to provide for a speedy remedy for taking possession of the public premises which were in unauthorized occupation. For achieving the said goal, an Estate Officer is appointed under Section 3 of the Act who has been given powers to issue notice of show cause and initiate proceedings for eviction and recovery of outstanding rental dues and damages in respect of public premises. Section 8 empowers the Estate Officer to exercise the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. We are not called upon to consider the question as to whether the Estate Officer, while exercising powers invested in him, acts as a court or has the trappings of a court. The only question that we have attempted to answer is whether the appointment of the appellate officer referred to in Section 9 of the Act before whom an appeal shall lie, is in the capacity of persona designata or as a court. 30. Sub-section (1) of Section 9 is the core provision to be kept in mind for answering the point in issue. It postulates that an appeal shall lie from every order of the estate Officer, passed under the Act, to an Appellate Officer. As to who shall be the Appellate Officer, has also been specified in the same provision. It predicates the District Judge of the district in which the public premises are situated or such other judicial officer in that district of not less than 10 years standing as the District Judge to be designated for that purpose. The first part of the provision does suggest that the appeal shall lie to an Appellate Officer, however, it does not follow therefrom that the Appellate Officer is persona designata. Something more is required to hold so. Had it been a case of designating a person by name as an Appellate Officer, the concomitant would be entirely different. The first part of the provision does suggest that the appeal shall lie to an Appellate Officer, however, it does not follow therefrom that the Appellate Officer is persona designata. Something more is required to hold so. Had it been a case of designating a person by name as an Appellate Officer, the concomitant would be entirely different. However, when the Appellate Officer is either the District Judge of the district or any another judicial officer in that district possessing necessary qualification who could be designated by the District Judge, the question of such investiture of power of an appellate authority in the District Judge or Designated Judge would by no standards acquire the colour or for that matter trappings of persona designata. In the first place, the power to be exercised by the Appellate Officer in terms of Section 9 is a judicial power of the State which is quite distinct from the executive power of the State. Secondly, the District Judge or designated judicial officer exercises judicial authority within his jurisdiction. Thirdly, as the Act predicates the Appellate Officer is to be a District Judge or judicial officer, it is indicative of the fact of a pre existing authority exercising judicial power of the State. Fourthly, District Judge is the creature of Section 5 of the Maharashtra Civil Courts Act, 1869, who presides over a District Court invariably consisting of more than one Judge in the concerned district. The District Court exercises original and appellate jurisdiction by virtue of Section 7 and Section 8 respectively, of the 1869 Act and is the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in the district within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code, as per Section 7 of that Act. As per Section 8 of the Act of 1869, the District Court is the Court of appeal from all decrees and orders passed by the subordinate Courts from which an appeal lies under any law for the time being in force. As per Section 16 of that Act, the District Judge can refer to any Additional District Judges subordinate to him, any original suits and proceedings of a civil nature, applications or references under Special Acts and miscellaneous applications. The Additional District Judges have jurisdiction to try such suits and to dispose of such applications or references. As per Section 16 of that Act, the District Judge can refer to any Additional District Judges subordinate to him, any original suits and proceedings of a civil nature, applications or references under Special Acts and miscellaneous applications. The Additional District Judges have jurisdiction to try such suits and to dispose of such applications or references. Section 17 of that Act envisages that an Additional District Judge shall have jurisdiction to try the appeals as may be referred to him by the District Judge. Section 19 of that Act, is a provision to invest power on the Additional District Judges, with powers of District Judge. The hierarchy of judicial officers of the District Court can be culled out from the 1869 Act. On the similar lines, the Bombay City Civil Court has been constituted under Section 3 of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948, with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature arising within the Greater Bombay except a suit or proceedings which are cognizable by the High Court referred to therein and by Small Causes Court. Section 7 of this Act envisages that when the City Civil Court consists of more than one Judge, each of the Judges may exercise all or any of the powers conferred on the Court by the said Act or any other law for the time being in force. Clause (b) of Section 7 stipulates that the State Government may appoint any one of the Judges to be the Principal Judge and any two other Judges to be called the Additional Principal Judges. The Principal Judge has been given authority to make such arrangements as he may think fit for the distribution of the business of the Court among the various Judges thereof. In other words, the District Judge or Principal Judge exercises judicial power of the State and is an authority having its own hierarchy of superior and inferior Courts, the law of procedure according to which it would dispose of matters coming before it depending on its nature and jurisdiction exercised by it, acting in judicial manner. The District Judge or Principal Judge of the City Civil Court is the officer presiding over the Court and derives his description from the nomenclature of the Court. The District Judge or Principal Judge of the City Civil Court is the officer presiding over the Court and derives his description from the nomenclature of the Court. Even if the District Judge / Principal Judge of the City Civil Court might retire or get transferred, his successor - in - office can pick up the thread of the proceedings under Section 9 of the 1971 Act from the stage where it was left by his predecessor and can function as an appellate authority. The District Judge/Principal Judge of the City Civil Court and other judicial officers of these Courts possessing necessary qualifications constitute a class and cannot be considered as persona designata. The Appellate Officer, therefore, has to function as a Court and his decision is final in terms of Section 10 of 1971 Act. The legislative intent behind providing an appeal under Section 9 before the Appellate Officer to be the District Judge of the concerned District Court in which the public premises are situated or such other judicial officer in that district possessing necessary qualification to be designated by the District Judge for that purpose, is indicative of the fact that the power to be exercised by the Appellate Officer is not in his capacity as persona designata but as a judicial officer of the pre existing Court. The historical background of the 1971 Act would make no difference to the aforementioned analysis. 31. Indeed, the expression used in Section 9 is Appellate Officer and not Appellate Authority as has been used in Section 6C of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Thakur Das AIR 1978 SC 1 (supra). That, however, would neither make any difference nor undermine the status of the District Judge or the designated judicial officer so as to reckon their appointment as persona designata. The thrust of Section 9(1) is to provide for remedy of an appeal against the order of the Estate Officer before the District Judge who, undeniably, is a pre existing authority and head of the judiciary within the district, discharging judicial power of the State including power to condone the delay in filing of the appeal and to grant interim relief during the pendency of the appeal. Though described as an Appellate Officer, the District Judge, for deciding an appeal under Section 9, can and is expected to exercise the powers of the civil court. xxx xxx xxx 35. We may now turn to the decision of the Delhi High Court in N.P. Berry 1979 DLT 108 , on which reliance has been placed by the Bombay High Court in Nusli Neville Wadia's case 2010 (4) Bom. CR. 807. The main point considered by the Delhi High Court was about the distinction between a "Judge" acting as a persona designata and that as a "Court" in the context of an order passed by an additional district judge of Delhi acting as an Appellate Officer under Section 9 of 1971 Act. 36. We may reiterate that, in the present case, we are not concerned with the question as to whether the Estate Officer functions as a Court whilst exercising powers under the 1971 Act, an issue which was also considered by the Delhi High Court. It also dealt with the question as to whether the Appellate Officer defined in Section 9 of the 1971 Act, acts as a persona designata and not as a Court. The Delhi High Court opined that the mere fact that the Appellate Officer is a District Judge is not conclusive to hold that he has to act as a Court. It went on to observe that if that had been the intention of the legislature, Section 9 would have empowered either the Court of a District Judge or at any rate, the District Judge as such to hear the appeals. This view expressed by the Delhi High Court, in our opinion, is untenable, keeping in mind the exposition in the case of Thakur Das (1978) 1 SCC 27 and Mukri Gopalan (1995) 5 SCC 5 in particular. 37. Indeed, the Delhi High Court could not have noticed the aforementioned decisions of this Court, wherein it has been observed that a persona designata is a person who is pointed out or described as an individual as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character. 37. Indeed, the Delhi High Court could not have noticed the aforementioned decisions of this Court, wherein it has been observed that a persona designata is a person who is pointed out or described as an individual as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character. We are conscious of the fact that the decision in Thakur Das (supra) was in relation to the purport of Section 6C of the Essential Commodities Act and the decision in Mukri Gopalan (supra) was in respect of Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1955. As noted earlier, Section 6C of the Essential Commodities Act refers to the judicial authority appointed by the State Government concerned and Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act refers to such officers and authorities not below the rank of Subordinate Judge to exercise the powers of the appellate authority. However, the principle underlying these enunciations will apply on all fours to the dispensation stipulated in the 1971 Act. For, it predicates that the Appellate Officer shall be the District Judge of the district in which the premises are situated or such other judicial officer designated by the District Judge. 38. The Bombay High Court in Nusli Neville Wadia's case largely relied upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in N.P. Berry's case. We are bound by the dictum in the case of Thakur Das (supra) decided by a three-Judge Bench of this Court wherein it is observed that the expression "judicial" qualifying the "authority" clearly indicates that that authority alone can be appointed to intervene and hear the appeals on which was conferred the judicial powers of the State. By a reference to judicial authority, it is indicative of the fact that the appellate authority must be one such pre-existing authority which was exercising judicial powers of the State and if any authority as persona designata was to be constituted, there was no purpose in qualifying the word "authority" by the specific adjective "judicial". By a reference to judicial authority, it is indicative of the fact that the appellate authority must be one such pre-existing authority which was exercising judicial powers of the State and if any authority as persona designata was to be constituted, there was no purpose in qualifying the word "authority" by the specific adjective "judicial". The thrust of the exposition is that the "judicial authority" which is a pre-existing authority exercising judicial power of the State, is a strong indication of legislative intent to depart from the dispensation of persona designata when a person is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character. That view has been reiterated even in Mukri Gopalan (supra). 39. Notably, the expression “appellate officer” has not been defined in the 1971 Act, unlike the definition of “estate officer” contained in Section 2(1)(b) of that Act. The appellate officer cannot be considered as a statutory authority, as defined in the dictionary clause in Section 2(1)(fa) of the 1971 Act. In the case of Thakur Das (supra), in paragraph 9, while analysing the cleavage of opinion of the High Courts, it is noticed that the expression 'judicial authority' would comprehend the Additional Sessions Judge or the Sessions Judge could transfer such appeal pending before him to Additional Sessions Judge which was a pointer to the fact that he was not a persona designata. Even in respect of the appeal under Section 9 of the 1971 Act, the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court or District Judge is competent to hear the appeal himself or designate some other judicial officer within his jurisdiction possessing requisite qualification. It will be useful to advert to Section 7 of the City Civil Courts Act and Section 3, Section 5 & Section 7 of the Maharashtra Civil Courts Act. It is implicit in Section 9 read with the provisions of the Acts constituting the District Judiciary that the head of the district judiciary is the District Judge or Principal Judge of the City Civil Court and Section 9 of the 1971 Act makes it explicit, by investing authority in the District Judge or Principal Judge of the City Civil Court, to designate any other judicial officer within his jurisdiction possessing essential qualifications, to hear such appeals. This is a clear departure from the appointment of a District Judge as a persona designata. The Additional District Judge or judicial officer possessing essential qualification, therefore, is not an inferior appellate officer within the meaning of Section 9 of the 1971 Act. In our opinion, there is enough indication in Section 9 of the 1971 Act to spell out the legislative intent that the remedy of appeal before the appellate officer is not before a persona designata but a pre-existing judicial authority in the district concerned. 40. The Delhi High Court also considered the question as to whether the power exercised by the appellate officer is in his capacity of a Court or otherwise. Relying on Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure, 13th Edition Volume I, Page 500, it has been observed that where the word used in the enactment giving the special jurisdiction is not "Court" but "judge" the entire enactment is to be looked into to find out whether the matter is to be decided by him as a Court or in his personal capacity. It went on to observe that no authority is forthcoming to show that when the word "Court" is not used at all, the District Judge or a Subordinate Judge functioning under a statute is held to be a Court even when the statute itself shows that he is to function as an appellate officer or with some designation other than that of a Court, and further when CPC has not been applied as a procedure to be followed by the judge and when there is no indication that the judge is to function as a Court. It then observed that the Court is a creation of a statute either under CPC or Punjab Courts Act. In the final analysis, the Delhi High Court concluded that the appellate officer cannot be regarded as a Court and must, therefore, be regarded as a persona designata. 41. The fact that there is no express indication in the 1971 Act about the procedure to be adopted or followed by the appellate officer, it would not follow therefrom that the District Judge or designated judicial officer who hears the appeals under Section 9, does so not as a Court but as a persona designata. 41. The fact that there is no express indication in the 1971 Act about the procedure to be adopted or followed by the appellate officer, it would not follow therefrom that the District Judge or designated judicial officer who hears the appeals under Section 9, does so not as a Court but as a persona designata. For the reasons already alluded to we have no hesitation in holding that the remedy of appeal under Section 9 before the Appellate Officer is not as a persona designata but to a pre-existing judicial authority. In that case, the procedure for hearing of the appeals will be governed by the provisions under the 1971 Act and Rules framed thereunder and including the enactment under which the judicial authority has been created, such as Maharashtra Civil Courts Act and City Civil Courts Act. [See para 26 of Maharashtra State Financial Corporation, ( 1991 (2) SCC 637 ] reproduced in earlier part of this judgment in para 26]. Such a pre-existing judicial authority, by implication, would be bound to follow the procedure underlying the said enactments and also observe the doctrine of fairness in affording opportunity. Since the edifice on which the conclusions reached by the Delhi High Court, that an appellate officer is persona designata and not a Court, cannot be countenanced in law, the Bombay High Court decisions in Nusli Neville Wadia's case (supra) and also Prakash Securities Pvt. Ltd. 2012 (4) Bom. CR. 1, cannot hold the field to that extent for the same logic. 42. Our attention was invited to yet another decision in the case of State of Mysore vs. P. Shankaranarayana Rao, 1975 (2) Kar. L.J. 280. The learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court examined the question under consideration as to whether the District Judge who is constituted as an appellate officer under Section 10 of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1961, acts as a Court or as a persona designata? The decision in Virindar Kumar Satyawadi vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153 was referred to, wherein it was observed that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi - judicial authority is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare rights of parties in a definitive judgment. The decision in Virindar Kumar Satyawadi vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153 was referred to, wherein it was observed that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi - judicial authority is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in support of it. Further, it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. The distinction between the Court and quasi-judicial tribunal has to be decided having regard to the provisions of the Act and if it possesses all the attributes of a Court. Referring to Section 10 of the Karnataka Act, which provides that an appeal shall lie from every order of the competent officer made in respect of any public premises, to an appellate officer who shall be only the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area, the Court eventually concluded that the intention of enacting the term appellate officer in Section 10 is indicative of the fact that the District Judge must act as appellate officer with limited jurisdiction to dispose of the appeal in the manner set out by the provisions of Section 10 itself, which means that he cannot exercise the general powers of the District Court. It went on to observe that a finality is attached to the order of the District Judge in terms of Section 11 of the Karnataka Act is a further indication that a judge must act only as a persona designata and not as a Court. In the 1971 Act, however, the appeal under Section 9 can be heard and decided not only by the District Judge himself but by any other judicial officer of the District Court possessing requisite qualifications designated for that purpose. xxx xxx xxx 48. In the 1971 Act, however, the appeal under Section 9 can be heard and decided not only by the District Judge himself but by any other judicial officer of the District Court possessing requisite qualifications designated for that purpose. xxx xxx xxx 48. Even though the respondents have invited our attention to other decisions of High Courts and also of Supreme Court which have analysed the provisions of other legislations, it is unnecessary to dilate on those decisions as we intend to apply the principles underlying the decisions of Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Thakur Das (supra), Asnew Drums Pvt. Ltd. (1971) 3 SCC 602 , Maharashtra State Financial Corporation (supra), Ram Chander Aggarwal, 1966 Supp. SCR 393 and Mukri Gopalan (supra), in particular, to conclude that the Appellate Officer referred to in Section 9 of the 1971 Act, is not a persona designata but acts as a civil court. 49. In other words, the Appellate Officer while exercising power under Section 9 of the 1971 Act, does not act as a persona designata but in his capacity as a pre existing judicial authority in the district (being a District Judge or judicial officer possessing essential qualification designated by the District Judge). Being part of the district judiciary, the judge acts as a Court and the order passed by him will be an order of the Subordinate Court against which remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be availed on the matters delineated for exercise of such jurisdiction. 50. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the respondents had resorted to remedy of writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In view of our conclusion that the order passed by the District Judge (in this case, Judge, Bombay City Civil Court at Mumbai) as an Appellate Officer is an order of the Subordinate Court, the challenge thereto must ordinarily proceed only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and not under Article 226. In view of our conclusion that the order passed by the District Judge (in this case, Judge, Bombay City Civil Court at Mumbai) as an Appellate Officer is an order of the Subordinate Court, the challenge thereto must ordinarily proceed only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and not under Article 226. Moreover, on a close scrutiny of the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court dated 14.08.2012 we have no hesitation in taking the view that the true nature and substance of the order of the learned Single Judge was to exercise power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; and there is no indication of Court having exercised powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as such. Indeed, the learned Single Judge has opened the judgment by fairly noting the fact that the writ petition filed by the respondents was under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. However, keeping in mind the exposition of this Court in the case of Ram Kishan Fauji (supra) wherein it has been explicated that in determining whether an order of learned Single Judge is in exercise of powers under Article 226 or 227 the vital factor is the nature of jurisdiction invoked by a party and the true nature and character of the order passed and the directions issued by the learned Single Judge. In paragraph 40 of the reported decision, the Court adverting to its earlier decision observed thus: “40. xxx xxx xxx Whether the learned Single Judge has exercised the jurisdiction Under Article 226 or Under Article 227 or both, would depend upon various aspects. There can be orders passed by the learned Single Judge which can be construed as an order under both the articles in a composite manner, for they can co-exist, coincide and imbricate. It was reiterated that it would depend upon the nature, contour and character of the order and it will be the obligation of the Division Bench hearing the letters patent appeal to discern and decide whether the order has been passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction Under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution or both. It was reiterated that it would depend upon the nature, contour and character of the order and it will be the obligation of the Division Bench hearing the letters patent appeal to discern and decide whether the order has been passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction Under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution or both. The two-Judge Bench further clarified that the Division Bench would also be required to scrutinise whether the facts of the case justify the assertions made in the petition to invoke the jurisdiction under both the articles and the relief prayed on that foundation. The delineation with regard to necessary party not being relevant in the present case, the said aspect need not be adverted to. Again in paragraphs 41 and 42, which may be useful for answering the matter in issue, the Court observed thus: “41. We have referred to these decisions only to highlight that it is beyond any shadow of doubt that the order of civil court can only be challenged Under Article 227 of the Constitution and from such challenge, no intra court appeal would lie and in other cases, it will depend upon the other factors as have been enumerated therein. 42. At this stage, it is extremely necessary to cull out the conclusions which are deducible from the aforesaid pronouncements. They are: 42.1 An appeal shall lie from the judgment of a Single Judge to a Division Bench of the High Court if it is so permitted within the ambit and sweep of the Letters Patent. 42.2 The power conferred on the High Court by the Letters Patent can be abolished or curtailed by the competent legislature by bringing appropriate legislation. 42.3 A writ petition which assails the order of a civil court in the High Court has to be understood, in all circumstances, to be a challenge Under Article 227 of the Constitution and determination by the High Court under the said Article and, hence, no intra-court appeal is entertainable. 42.4 The tenability of intra-court appeal will depend upon the Bench adjudicating the lis as to how it understands and appreciates the order passed by the learned Single Judge. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for the same.” (Emphasis supplied) 51. 42.4 The tenability of intra-court appeal will depend upon the Bench adjudicating the lis as to how it understands and appreciates the order passed by the learned Single Judge. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for the same.” (Emphasis supplied) 51. In the case of Radhey Shyam (supra) decided by a Three-Judge Bench, this Court after analysing all the earlier decisions on the point, restated the legal position that in cases where judicial order violated the fundamental right, the challenge thereto would lie by way of an appeal or revision or under Article 227, and not by way of writ under Article 226 and Article 32. The dictum in paragraphs 25, 27 and 29 of this decision is instructive. The same read thus: “25. It is true that this Court has laid down that technicalities associated with the prerogative writs in England have no role to play under our constitutional scheme. There is no parallel system of King's Court in India and of all other courts having limited jurisdiction subject to supervision of King's Court. Courts are set up under the Constitution or the laws. All courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to it and subject to its control and supervision Under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally conferred on all High Courts. Broad principles of writ jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to India and a writ of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of Tribunals or authorities or courts other than judicial courts. There are no precedents in India for the High Courts to issue writs to subordinate courts. Control of working of subordinate courts in dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of appellate or revisional powers or power of superintendence Under Article 227. Orders of civil court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts. While appellate or revisional jurisdiction is regulated by statutes, power of superintendence Under Article 227 is constitutional. The expression "inferior court" is not referable to judicial courts, as rightly observed in the referring order in paras 26 and 27 quoted above. 26. xxx xxx xxx 27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari Under Article 226. The expression "inferior court" is not referable to judicial courts, as rightly observed in the referring order in paras 26 and 27 quoted above. 26. xxx xxx xxx 27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari Under Article 226. We are also in agreement with the view of the referring Bench that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. 28. xxx xxx xxx 29. Accordingly, we answer the question referred as follows: 29.1 Judicial orders of civil court are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 29.2 Jurisdiction Under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction Under Article 226. 29.3 Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled.” (Emphasis supplied) 52. Similar view has been expressed in Jogendrasinghji (2015) 9 SCC 1 . In this decision, it has been held that the order passed by the Civil Court is amenable to scrutiny only in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and no intra court appeal is maintainable from the decision of a Single Judge. In paragraph 30 of the reported decision, the Court observed thus: “30. From the aforesaid pronouncements, it is graphically clear that maintainability of a letters patent appeal would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, the nature and character of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the type of directions issued regard being had to the jurisdictional perspectives in the constitutional context. Barring the civil court, from which order as held by the three-Judge Bench in Radhey Shyam (supra) that a writ petition can lie only Under Article 227 of the Constitution, orders from tribunals cannot always be regarded for all purposes to be Under Article 227 of the Constitution. Whether the learned Single Judge has exercised the jurisdiction Under Article 226 or Under Article 227 or both, needless to emphasise, would depend upon various aspects that have been emphasised in the aforestated authorities of this Court. There can be orders passed by the learned Single Judge which can be construed as an order under both the articles in a composite manner, for they can co-exist, coincide and imbricate. There can be orders passed by the learned Single Judge which can be construed as an order under both the articles in a composite manner, for they can co-exist, coincide and imbricate. We reiterate it would depend upon the nature, contour and character of the order and it will be the obligation of the Division Bench hearing the letters patent appeal to discern and decide whether the order has been passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction Under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution or both. The Division Bench would also be required to scrutinize whether the facts of the case justify the assertions made in the petition to invoke the jurisdiction under both the articles and the relief prayed on that foundation. Be it stated, one of the conclusions recorded by the High Court in the impugned judgment pertains to demand and payment of court fees. We do not intend to comment on the same as that would depend upon the rules framed by the High Court.” In the concluding part of the reported judgment in paragraph 44, the Court observed thus: “44. We have stated in the beginning that three issues arise despite the High Court framing number of issues and answering it at various levels. It is to be borne in mind how the jurisdiction under the letters patent appeal is to be exercised cannot exhaustively be stated. It will depend upon the Bench adjudicating the lis how it understands and appreciates the order passed by the learned Single Judge. There cannot be a straight-jacket formula for the same. Needless to say, the High Court while exercising jurisdiction Under Article 227 of the Constitution has to be guided by the parameters laid down by this Court and some of the judgments that have been referred to in Radhey Shyam (supra).” 53. In paragraph 45.2 of the same judgment, the Court authoritatively concluded that an order passed by a Civil Court is amenable to scrutiny of the High Court only in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which is different from Article 226 of the Constitution and as per the pronouncement in Radhey Shyam (supra), no writ can be issued against the order passed by the Civil Court and, therefore, no letters patent appeal would be maintainable. 54. 54. In the impugned judgment, the Division Bench merely went by the decisions of the Delhi High Court and its own Court in Nusli Neville Wadia (supra) and Prakash Securities Pvt. Ltd. (supra). We do not find any other analysis made by the Division Bench to entertain the Letters Patent Appeal, as to in what manner the judgment of the learned Single Judge would come within the purview of exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Absent that analysis, the Division Bench could not have assumed jurisdiction to entertain the Letters Patent Appeal merely by referring to the earlier decisions of the same High Court in Nusli Neville Wadia and Prakash Securities Pvt. Ltd. 55. In other words, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court ought to have dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the respondents as not maintainable. In that event, it was not open to the Division Bench to undertake analysis on the merits of the case as has been done in the impugned judgment. That was impermissible and of no avail, being without jurisdiction. Indeed, that will leave the respondents with an adverse decision of the learned Single Judge dismissing their writ petition No. 4337 of 2012 vide judgment dated 14.08.2012, whereby the eviction order passed by the Estate Officer dated 05.12.2011 and confirmed by the City Civil Court on 03.04.2012 has been upheld.” 27. Subaida vs. Deputy Tahsildar (RR), Thrissur District and Others, 2019 (1) KHC SN 7 this Court, taking note of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India's case (supra) held that an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is appealable before this Court, under Section 173 of the said Act. Therefore, if a person is aggrieved by an award passed by the Tribunal under Section 168 of the Act, he has to challenge the same in an appeal filed under Section 173 of the Act, after complying with the statutory mandate of the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 173, subject to the time limit prescribed in the second proviso to that sub-rule. The challenge to an order passed by the Tribunal (other than an award passed under Section 168) has to be one invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The challenge to such an order of the District Judge, as the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, has to be made under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and not under Article 226. Being part of the district judiciary, the District Judge acts as a court and the order passed by him is an order of the subordinate court against which remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be availed on the matters delineated for exercise of such jurisdiction, which is supervisory in nature. Section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that, where any amount is due from any person under an award, the Claims Tribunal may, on an application made to it by the person entitled to the amount, issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. The order of the Claims Tribunal under Section 174 of the Act, to initiate revenue recovery, based on an application made by the person entitled to the amount as per the award, is also an order against which remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be availed. In an O.P. (MAC) filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner can seek a time bound disposal of any interlocutory applications filed after the award passed by the Claims Tribunal and stay of operation of the order of the Claims Tribunal under Section 174 of the Act and all recovery proceedings initiated pursuant to that order. For seeking such reliefs, it is for the petitioner to file an O.P. (MAC) under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. For seeking such reliefs, it is for the petitioner to file an O.P. (MAC) under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, if a person against whom revenue recovery proceedings are initiated by issuing a demand notice pursuant to the order of the Claims Tribunal under Section 174 of the Act requires only time for payment of the dues in monthly instalments, he can approach this Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, with the person entitled to the amount as per the award and also the revenue officials in the party array. 28. As already noticed, in exercise of the powers under sub-section (2) of Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the State Government constitute State Transport Appellate Tribunal, which consists of a Judicial Officer, not below the rank of a District Judge or who is qualified to be a Judge of the High Court and the Tribunal shall exercise such jurisdiction within such area as may be notified by the State Government. In exercise of the powers under sub-section (2) of Section 89, the State Government is issuing notification appointing a particular Judicial Officer, who is a District Judge and Sessions Judge at Ernakulam, as the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, with effect from the date on which he assumes charge. The provisions under sub-section (2) of Section 89 make it explicitly clear that it is a case of designating a person by name as State Transport Appellate Tribunal and it is not a case in which a Judicial Officer, not below the rank of a District Judge in a district or any other Judicial Officer in that district possessing necessary qualification, exercise the jurisdiction of that Tribunal. Therefore, the Judicial Officer, who exercise the powers of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, exercise such powers as a persona designata, though his normal duties as District and Sessions Judge is in the capacity of a civil court. In that view of the matter, the judgment/order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal cannot be termed as an order of a civil court against which remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be invoked. Such a judgment/order can only be challenged by invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 29. Such a judgment/order can only be challenged by invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 29. In the order of this Court dated 08.01.2016 in W.P. (C) No. 39020 of 2015, it was ordered that, orders other than an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 can be assailed only in original petitions filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Similarly, orders passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal constituted under sub-section (2) of Section 89 of the Act can also be assailed in original petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 30. In the order dated 22.01.2019, in an unnumbered Writ Appeal (F. No. 2820/2019) arising out of the judgment in O.P. (C) No. 2707 of 2018, while considering the question as to whether a Writ Appeal under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 can be entertained against the judgment in that original petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, a Division Bench of this Court held that the directions issued in the impugned judgment can be traceable to the exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 31. A reading of the aforesaid orders would show that the question as to whether a Judicial Officer not below the rank of District Judge who is exercising the jurisdiction of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal constituted under sub-section (2) of Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, is a persona designata or exercising powers in the capacity of a civil court, was not an issue raised before this Court. 32. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India's case (supra), applying the principles underlying the decisions of Three-Judge Bench in Thakur Das (supra), Asnew Drums Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Maharashtra State Financial Corporation (supra), Ram Chander Aggarwal (supra) and Mukri Gopalan (supra), it can be concluded that a Judicial Officer exercising the powers of State Transport Appellate Tribunal, acts as a persona designata, and not in his capacity as a pre-existing Judicial authority in the district, he being a District Judge. Therefore, the judgment/order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal is not a judgment/order of a civil court against which the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be invoked, on the matters delineated for exercise of such jurisdiction. Such judgment/order has to be challenged in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 33. The issue is answered as above.