ORDER : This writ petition is for assailing the order dated 12.10.2017 passed by the District Commissioner, Garhwa, whereby and whereunder, the power conferred upon the petitioner of Mukhiya has been handed over to Deputy Mukhiya along with the financial power. 2. The ground taken by the petitioner in assailing the aforesaid order is that without providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, the final order has been passed against the petitioner. It has been urged by referring to the provision of Section 30 of the Panchayati Raj Act, 2001, whereby and whereunder, the power has been conferred upon the State Government to remove the Mukhiya from the post, having not done so, since herein, the order has been passed by Deputy Commissioner, Garhwa and as such, the same is without jurisdiction, accordingly, is not sustainable in the eye of law. It has further been urged that procedure of providing due opportunity of hearing has not been given and therefore, the said decision is in violation to the principle of natural justice. 3. Mr. Atanu Banerjee, learned Govt. Advocate appearing for the State, on the strength of the counter affidavit has submitted that the contention raised by the petitioner is not worth to be considered for the reason that the procedure as stipulated in the instruction dated 04.07.2017 issued by the State of Jharkhand has strictly been followed before seizure of power and handing over it to Deputy Mukiya of the concerned block. 4. He further submits that Section 30 of the Panchayati Raj Act, 2001 is not applicable at the moment, since the stage has not yet come i.e., the decision has not yet been taken for removal of the petitioner and as such the contention raised by the petitioner that it is only the State Government who can take decision regarding removal of the service is having no force at this stage. 5. He further submits that whenever the stage of taking final decision in terms of the provision of Section 30 would come, the same would be taken care of. He has also submitted that the order of seizing the power will not affect so far as final decision which is to be taken by authority in terms of provision of Section 30 of the Panchayati Raj Act, 2001. 6. He has also submitted that the order of seizing the power will not affect so far as final decision which is to be taken by authority in terms of provision of Section 30 of the Panchayati Raj Act, 2001. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after appreciating their rival submissions, the factual aspect which is not in dispute in this case is that the petitioner has been elected as Mukhiya of the concerned block. She while discharging her duty of Mukhiya has been alleged with certain irregularities i.e. in the nature of financial irregularities, therefore, show cause has been issued to her for suspension of the power vide order dated 12.10.2017(annexure-6), the same is under challenge in this writ petition on the ground as aforesaid. 7. This Court has appreciated the ground raised by the petitioner by going through the provision of Section 30 of the Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2001 which stipulates that the power to remove Mukhiya vests upon the State Government. Admittedly, here the petitioner is still Mukhiya having not been taken any decision regarding her removal from it, as such, stage of Section 30 has not yet been reached. 8. It is further evident from the provision of Section 30, which stipulates about suspension, removal or any penal action but so far as question of suspension is concerned which is to be governed under provision of Section 64 of the Act which contains the provision that only in case of institution of FIR, the same can be done. 9. Admittedly, the petitioner has not been suspended, for the reason that suspension means deactivated the incumbent from discharging duty but admittedly by going through the context of order dated 12.10.2017 from which it is evident that the petitioner has not been suspended rather her power has been seized and handed it over to Deputy Mukhiya. 10. The learned Govt. Advocate has tried to impress upon the Court by reverting the argument advanced on behalf of learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no provision to seize the financial power and as such, if any wrong has been committed that for the intervening period i.e. till the decision is to be taken either under Sections 30 or 64 of the Act, the Govt. has come out with notification dated 04.07.2017 and following the procedure contained there in the impugned decision has been taken. 11. has come out with notification dated 04.07.2017 and following the procedure contained there in the impugned decision has been taken. 11. This Court has examined the aforesaid order and has found that in order to fill up the gap in between the decision to be taken in terms of the provision of Section 30 or Section 64 of the Jharkhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2001, in case of commission of any financial irregularities by any Mukhiya, the State Government has come out with the aforesaid circular for seizing of the power but before doing that, an opportunity of hearing, which has been required to be given by giving a notice to the concerned Mukhiya within a period of seven days to provide an opportunity of hearing to rebut the allegation as would be evident from column no.3 of the aforesaid circular. 12. It is further evident that under the condition no.(V) of the aforesaid circular, the power of post holder is to be suspended in case of the dissatisfaction with the reply submitted by the concerned post holder, in terms of reply submitted by her, in view of condition no.(III) of the aforesaid circular dated 04.07.2017. 13. This Court is of the view that when the statutory provision has been made by way of Legislation or Parliament, if there is any gap, the government either Central or the State Government, has got power to come out with executive instruction and on such the State has come out with the order dated 04.07.2017 by order of the Governor of the State and hence, the same is binding, unless questioned or reversed by any Court of Law. 14. Admittedly, the circular dated 04.07.2017 has not been questioned by the petitioner and it has also not the case for the Said circular, is not applicable. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner at this juncture has submitted by placing reliance upon order passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.224 of 2017 in the case of Gita Devi Vrs. State of Jharkhand and Ors., wherein, this Court, after taking into consideration the factual aspect involved therein, has quashed the impugned order by which, the financial power of the petitioner being a Mukhiya has been seized. 16. State of Jharkhand and Ors., wherein, this Court, after taking into consideration the factual aspect involved therein, has quashed the impugned order by which, the financial power of the petitioner being a Mukhiya has been seized. 16. This Court after going across the order dated 12.10.2017 has found that the petitioner has received a show cause while asking him to reply in terms thereof, she has submitted her reply which is found to be unsatisfactory, and the allegation as has been levelled against her has been found to be true, therefore, exercising the jurisdiction conferred in view of the order dated 04.07.2017 as contained in annexure-7, the decision has been taken for seizure of power of the petitioner by handing it over to Deputy Mukhiya. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to impress upon this Court regarding applicability of the clause as contained in annexure-7 dated 04.07.2017, this Court after going across the aforesaid condition has found that the same pertains to the suspension/removal or any other disciplinary action which is to be taken with the prior permission of the competent authority, this Court after appreciating the aforesaid argument is of the view that the petitioner has not yet been suspended rather her power has been seized, therefore, the stage as stipulated under condition no.(VI) has not yet come. 18. The question arises here in the difference between suspension of power and the suspension of post holder, the same needs to be clarified by giving a literal meaning of suspension which stipulates that if a post holder is suspended, he will be said to be in the de-active from discharging the active duty but when the power of the post holder is being seized, he will not be seized to be suspended within the meaning of the suspension and therefore, there is difference in between suspension and the suspension of power of the post holder. 19. 19. It also needs to refer herein that if Mukhiya or any post holder in the block under the Gram Panchayat found to have committed any financial irregularities only due to lacuna of law, he cannot be allowed to discharge duty, since it is the question of involvement of public money and after amendment of the constitution by way of 73rd Amendment by which Section 243(g) has been inserted under the Constitution of India that making the local bodies more responsible, therefore, it is expected from the local bodies to perform their duty with utmost integrity, so that maximum can be achieved. 20. The authority, if found that any illegality is being committed which pertains to the integrity and if any action is taken, it cannot be said to suffer from any infirmity. 21. In the instant case, the State Government has in abundant precaution has come out with the circular dated 04.07.2017 conferring power upon the district authorities to seize the power of erring person by following the procedure as laid down in the circular dated 04.07.2017 which admittedly has been followed. 22. Therefore, I find no reason to interfere in the action of the authority by which the power of the petitioner has been suspended. 23. So far as the reliance placed by the petitioner upon the order passed by this Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.244 of 2017, from perusal of the aforesaid order, which has been passed without reference of circular dated 04.07.2017 and therefore, the said judgment is not binding upon this Court, for the reason that when the Government has issued with a circular, conferring power to deal with its employee/post holder, which has to be given strict compliance so long it exists. 24. In view of the aforesaid circumstance, there is no reason to interfere with the impugned order, accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. 25. However, it is made clear that in case of final decision either of suspension or removal or any adverse decision, the process as required under the statue needs to be followed and the authority while taking final decision will take the same without being prejudice by any of the observation made in this writ petition. 26. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. 27. I.A. No.8719 of 2017 stands disposed of. Petition dismissed.