JUDGMENT : Manju Rani Chauhan, J. Heard Sri Rakesh Bahadur, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri S.B.L. Gour, learned counsel for respondent no. 2-United India Insurance Company Ltd., Sri D.K. Tiwari, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents no. 1 and 3 to 5 and perused the record. 2. The petitioner has approached this Court against the order dated 17.10.2013 passed by the District Consumer Protection Forum, Allahabad, the first respondent herein, whereby the complaint of the petitioner has been held as not maintainable at Allahabad and returned for filing the same before appropriate Forum at Lucknow. A further prayer has been made seeking direction to respondents no. 3 to 5 to pay the amount of compensation due to the petitioner and recover the same from the Insurance Company. 3. Brief facts of the present case are that the petitioner's husband late Ghanshyam Das Agarwal was a registered trader with the Trade Tax Department, Allahabad and he was carrying on a business of Confectionery and General Merchandise Goods in the name and style of M/s. M.K. Traders. The husband of the petitioner died in a road accident on 07.05.2009 at Allahabad. 4. According to the petitioner, her husband was covered under a Group Insurance Policy which was entered into between the Trade Tax Department i.e. respondents no. 3 to 5 on the one hand and the Insurance Company i.e. respondent no. 2 on the other, for a period starting from 12.11.2008 and ending at 11.11.2009. One of the conditions mentioned in the terms and conditions of the Agreement entered into between the Trade Tax Department and the Insurance Company as per Clause 17 of the Agreement was that, in case of any dispute relating to payment of Insurance claim, the jurisdiction to decide the same will lie at the Court at Lucknow. 5. According to the terms and conditions of Group Insurance Scheme, as agreed upon between the Trade Tax Department and the Insurance Company, a sum of Rs. 4 lakhs was to be paid by the Insurance Company on recommendation of the Sectional Joint Commissioner (Executive), Trade Tax, to wife/husband of the trader in case of accidental death of such trader registered with the Trade Tax Department occurring in between the Insurance period. The petitioner, being the wife of the registered trader, was entitled to the benefits of Group Insurance Scheme. The petitioner, being the wife of the registered trader, was entitled to the benefits of Group Insurance Scheme. Hence on non-payment of the same, she filed complaint before the District Consumer Forum at Allahabad which was numbered as Case No. 92 of 2012. 6. The respondents appeared and filed their written statement and raised objection regarding jurisdiction but the same was not raised by the respondents no. 3 to 5. The Insurance Company alone had raised the preliminary objection on the point of jurisdiction which was aptly replied by the petitioner. The objection taken by the respondent-Company was that according to Clause No. 17 mentioned in the document, the jurisdiction to decide the dispute relating to the payment of Insurance, was with Forum/Court at Lucknow. 7. The stand taken by the petitioner before the Consumer Forum as well as before this Court was that the petitioner is a widow of trader registered with the Trade Tax Department and thus she is the beneficiary to tender/agreement which was entered into between the Trade Tax Department and the Insurance Company. The petitioner's husband was not a party to the said tender/agreement. The beneficiary, not being a party to the agreement, is not effected by the terms and conditions agreed upon between the contracting parties. It has been stated that the respondents have their Branch Office at Allahabad and are also carrying on business at Allahabad thus, Section 11 (2) (a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (herein after referred to as the 'Act, 1986') comes into play and confers jurisdiction upon the Forum at Allahabad. 8. It is further stated that the cause of action had arisen at Allahabad as the accident admittedly had occurred at Allahabad. The deceased was a registered trader at Allahabad thus, in view of Section 11 (2) (c) of the Act, 1986, the jurisdiction rests of the Forum at Allahabad. 9. It has been further averred that the respondents no. 3 to 5 had not taken any objection with respect to jurisdiction of Consumer Forum at Allahabad as is evident from their written statement. The petitioner, being a widow and dependent for her livelihood had no other option but to file the complaint at Allahabad and rejection of her complaint by the order dated 17.10.2013 passed by respondent no. 1 is in the teeth of the provisions of Act, 1986. 10. The respondent no. The petitioner, being a widow and dependent for her livelihood had no other option but to file the complaint at Allahabad and rejection of her complaint by the order dated 17.10.2013 passed by respondent no. 1 is in the teeth of the provisions of Act, 1986. 10. The respondent no. 1 has relied upon a tender document, the terms and conditions of which would not be binding upon the petitioner as the deceased husband was not a party to the tender. 11. The impugned order dated 17.10.2013 has been passed without properly appreciating the submissions made by the petitioner, hence is under challenge in the present petition. 12. Shri Rakesh Bahadur, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that Shri Ghanshyam Das Agarwal, husband of the petitioner was a trader dealing with Confectionery and General Merchandise Goods in the name and style of M/s. M.K. Traders. He was registered with the Trade Tax Department and, therefore, was fully covered by the Group Insurance Scheme. The husband of the petitioner died in a road accident on 07.05.2009 at Allahabad. The death had occurred during continuation of the Insurance Scheme. The insurance agreement was signed between the respondent no. 2 on one hand and respondents no. 3 to 5, Trade Tax Department, on the other. According to the tender/agreement a sum of Rs. 4 lakhs was to be paid to the surviving spouse by the Insurance Company in case of death of the registered trader thus, the petitioner being widow of deceased registered trader namely Ghanshyam Das Dubey, had rightly filed the complaint/claim for the insurance amount. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the claim was maintainable before the Consumer Forum at Allahabad in view of relevant provisions of the Act, 1986 and also because the petitioner is the beneficiary and was not a party to the agreement which was entered into between the Trade Tax Department and the Insurance Company, hence she was not bound by the terms and conditions of the tender/agreement. Clause 17 of the Agreement was binding upon the respondents and not upon the beneficiary who is the petitioner in the present petition. 13. The Trade Tax Department did not raise any objection on the point of jurisdiction which was in fact only raised by the Insurance Company. It has been finally submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent no. 13. The Trade Tax Department did not raise any objection on the point of jurisdiction which was in fact only raised by the Insurance Company. It has been finally submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent no. 1 did not properly appreciate the facts and the legal position and, therefore, the order passed by the respondent no. 1 needs to be interfered by this Court and is liable to be set-aside. 14. Considering the facts that the petitioner is a widow residing at Allahabad, facing financial crisis, the order passed by the respondent no. 1 rejecting the complaint and directing the petitioner for filing the same is fallacious. 15. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondent no. 2, nothing has been pointed out regarding jurisdiction to file the complaint but it has only been stated that the respondents no. 3 to 5 had to submit documentary evidence that the trader was duly registered with the Trade Tax Department. 16. In the counter affidavit filed by respondents no. 3 to 5 they have accepted that the firm of petitioner's husband was duly registered under the Commercial Trade Tax Act and the same was registered in the department sine 08.11.2002 and was valid up to 07.05.2009, the date on which the trader expired hence, he was entitled for the benefit of the scheme. Though, the learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the petition stating that the order passed by the respondent no. 1 is just and proper and calls for no interference in view of Clause 17 of the tender/agreement to contend that jurisdiction to decide the case of the petitioner regarding payment of insurance lies at Lucknow alone but in the counter affidavit nothing of the sought have been stated. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Delhi in the case of Paras Mal versus Roshan Freight Carriers reported in, (1993) 2 CPR 265 of the, Consumer Protection Reporter wherein in a judgment of the Apex Court in Patel Roadways Ltd. vs. Prasad Trading Company reported in,1992 1 AJR 704 (S.C.), it has been held that parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court which has no jurisdiction to try the suit and consequently, the agreement between the parties conferring exclusive jurisdiction on such Courts is of no avail. He has relied upom another jurisdiction of the Division Bench of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in the case of Z.S. Traders vs. Director, Siemens Ltd., New Delhi reported in, (2000) AIR(J&K) 13. Paragraph nos. 13 and 14 of the said judgment are quoted herein below :- "13. Section 3 of the Act clearly provides that the provisions of the Act ' shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. 14. Section 3 authorizes the Forum provided in the Act to deal with a complaint in accordance with the provisions of the Act rather than to proceed with the matters in accordance with terms of contract or provisions of other law in force. The reason appears to be to promote and to secure economical, inexpensive and expeditious consumer redressal mechanism. The Act provides an additional remedy to be pursued and establishes an adjudicatory, forms for resolution/settlement of consumer complaints in the manner and mode provided by the Act consistent with the purpose sought to be achieved by the Act." 18. Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. vs. N.K. Modi reported in, (1997) AIR SC 533. Relevant portion of paragraph no. 15 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted herein below :- "15. ..........we hold that though the District Forum, State Commission and National Commission are judicial authorities, for the purpose of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, in view of the object of the Act and by operation of Section 3 thereof, we are of the considered view that it would be appropriate that these forums created under the Act are at liberty to proceed with the matters in accordance with the provisions of the Act rather than relegating the parties to an arbitration proceedings pursuant to a contract entered into between the parties. The reason is that Act intends to relieve the consumers of the cumbersome arbitration proceedings or civil action unless the forums on their own and on their own and on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the particular case, come to the conclusion that the appropriate forum for adjudication of the disputes would be otherwise those given in the Act." 19. Counsel for the respondents have supported the impugned order dated 17.10.2013 passed by the respondent no. 1 in view of Clause 17 of the Agreement in which the jurisdiction to hear the complaint lies with the Forum at Lucknow, considering which the petition is liable to be dismissed. 20. We have heard the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records. 21. The issue which arises for our consideration is as to whether the interpretation of terms and conditions of the tender/agreement, more specifically Clause 17 of the Agreement, have been correctly done by the District Consumer Forum, Allahabad keeping in view of the object and purpose of Act, 1986 as well as the beneficial nature of scheme of the Agreement itself. 22. Before entering into the facts of the case, it is necessary to look into the terms and conditions of the tender/agreement as the same forms the very basis of the dispute which is before us. 23. Admittedly, the Agreement takes place between the Trade Tax Department of U.P. and the Insurance Company. Clause 2 of the Agreement narrates that in case of death of registered trader and on the recommendation of Sambhagiya Joint Commissioner (Executive), Trade Tax, the Insurance Company would pay Rs. 4 lakhs to the surviving spouse. Clause 1 and 3 of the Agreement shows that a large number of traders in U.P. who are registered with the Trade Tax Department, were covered in the Group Insurance Scheme. 24. From these clauses, it is evident that large number of traders registered in U.P. were entitled to the benefit of Group Insurance Scheme and in case of death of any registered trader, a fixed financial assistance was to be provided by the Insurance Company to the surviving spouse. This indicates that the Agreement had a beneficial intent and was meant to provide beneficial assistance to the surviving spouse of the deceased registered trader. 25. Clause 17 of the Agreement stipulates that if any dispute regarding payment of insurance arises, the same would be decided by the Court at Lucknow. This indicates that the Agreement had a beneficial intent and was meant to provide beneficial assistance to the surviving spouse of the deceased registered trader. 25. Clause 17 of the Agreement stipulates that if any dispute regarding payment of insurance arises, the same would be decided by the Court at Lucknow. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding Clause 17 of the Agreement is that it was binding upon the parties to the Agreement and not upon the petitioner as the husband of the petitioner was not a party to the said Agreement and further that the petitioner being the beneficiary is not bound by the terms and conditions of the Agreement. The petitioner had further contended that the order passed by the respondent no. 1 is in the teeth of the provisions of the Act, 1968. In view of the aforesaid it become relevant to quote the provision of Section 11 of the Act, 1968 which reads as follows :- "11. Jurisdiction of the District Forum. - (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the District Forum shall have jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the value of the goods or services and the compensation, if any, claimed [does not exceed rupees twenty lakhs]. (2) A complaint shall be instituted in a District Forum within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, - (a) the opposite party or each of the opposite parties, where they are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides or [carries on business or has a branch office or] personally works for gain, or (b) any of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides or [carries on business or has a branch office], or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the permission of the District Forum is given, or the opposite parties who do not reside, or [carry on business or have a branch office], or personally work for gain, as the case may be, acquiesce in such institution; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises." 26. A bare perusal of Section 11 (2) (a) shows that a complaint shall be instituted in a District Forum within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the opposite party at the time of institution of complaint actually voluntarily resides or carry on business or has a branch office or personally works for gain. Sub section (c) provides that that complaint shall be instituted where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. 27. In the present case the parties to the Agreement namely the Trade Tax Department and the Insurance Company, both have their branch offices at Allahabad. The cause of action too had arisen at Allahabad. Since the deceased was doing his business at Allahabad, was registered with the Trade Tax Department at Allahabad and died in the accident which occurred at Allahabad. The complainant, who is the widow of the deceased also resides at Allahabad. All these factors lead to an inevitable conclusion that provision of Section 11 of the Act, 1986 are attracted in the facts of the present case. Jurisdiction of the Court at Allahabad cannot be ousted merely because of an agreement entered into between the parties. Neither of them is a complainant as the claim in the present case has been presented by the widow of the deceased registered trader. Moreover, the law is also settled that the terms and conditions of the Agreement are binding upon the parties. In the present case the trader who died was registered with the Trade Tax Department and the Insurance Company had provided insurance, covered under a Group Insurance Scheme, the benefit of which was extended to all traders who were registered with the Trade Tax Department. Merely by inclusion of the word "Beema Payment" in Clause 17 of the Agreement, the interpretation of the same cannot be enlarged to bind a third party or a beneficiary also. 28. We may further take into account Section 3 of the Act, 1986 which says that the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The purpose of Act, 1986 is beneficial in nature as the Act provides for better protection of the interest of the consumers. 29. The purpose of Act, 1986 is beneficial in nature as the Act provides for better protection of the interest of the consumers. 29. If the order of the District Consumer Forum, Allahabad is allowed to sustain and the petitioner is made to approach the Court/Forum at Lucknow then that would be against the beneficial nature of the Act, 1986 and also against the beneficial intent of the tender/agreement and would be against the public policy. 30. The corresponding legal provisions also need to be seen and the same are stipulated in Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Section 3 of the Act, 1986 categorically provides that provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. Keeping in view the intent of the Act, 1986 and also the language used in Section 3 of the Act, it becomes important to take care of the provisions of Section 20 of the C.P.C. which also deals with the jurisdiction of the Court. Section 20 of the C.P.C. is being quoted here below :- "20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises -Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction-- (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises." 31. The interest of the claimant/beneficiary has to be given due consideration in the present case. The interest of the claimant/beneficiary has to be given due consideration in the present case. The complainant/petitioner before this Court is a widow of the deceased trader who resides at Allahabad, therefore, it would be convenient for her in case her claim is taken up before the Courts at Allahabad rather than her being sent to Court at Lucknow wherein she would have to travel from Allahabad to Lucknow on different dates. 32. The claim has been made under Act, 1986, therefore, the provisions made in Section 11 of the said Act would prevail and according to the same the claim can be instituted at a place where the respondents carry on their business or have a branch office or where the cause of action has arisen. 33. In the present case both the respondents have got their branch office at Allahabad and the cause of action has also arisen at Allahabad. The provision of the Act cannot be superceded by the parties by entering into an agreement and incorporating a clause which is different and in-contravention with the provisions of the Act. 34. Moreover, no prejudice is caused to the respondents as they have their offices both at Allahabad and Lucknow as such they can contest the claim at Allahabad too. On the other hand if the petitioner is compelled to approach the Forum at Lucknow for a cause which can easily be contested and dealt with by a competent Forum at Allahabad then in that circumstances prejudice would be caused to the petitioner who is a widow and is facing crisis because of death of her husband. The Apex Court in the case of ABC Laminart (P) Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies reported in, (1989) 2 SCC 163 discuss Sections 23 and 28 of the Contract Act, 1872. The Apex Court expressed its opinion regarding jurisdiction in paragraph nos. 9, 10 & 11 and partly in paragraph 15. The relevant paragraphs are quoted herein below :- "09. Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 provides that every agreement by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his fights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in t he ordinary tribunal, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his fights, is void to that extent. Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 provides that every agreement by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his fights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in t he ordinary tribunal, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his fights, is void to that extent. This is subject to exceptions, namely, (1) contract to refer to arbitration and to abide by its award, (2) as a matter of commercial law and practice to submit disputes on or in respect of the contract to agreed proper jurisdiction and not other jurisdictions though proper. The principle of Private International Law that the parties should be bound by the jurisdiction clause to which they have agreed unless there is some reason to contrary is being applied to municipal contracts. In Lee v. Showmen s Guild, 1952 1 AllER 1175 at 1181 Lord Denning said: "Parties cannot by contract oust the ordinary courts from their jurisdiction. They can, of course, agree to leave questions of law, as well as questions of fact, to t he decision of the domestic tribunal. They can, indeed, make the tribunal the final arbiter on questions of fact, but they cannot make it the final arbiter on questions of law. They cannot prevent its decisions being examined by the courts. If parties should seek, by agreement, to take the law out of the hands of the courts and put it into the hands of a private tribunal, without any recourse at all to t he courts in cases of error of law, then the agreement is to that extent contrary to public policy and void." 10. Under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless it is opposed to public policy. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. Hence there can be no doubt that an agreement to oust absolutely the jurisdiction of the Court will be unlawful and void being against the public policy. Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. If, therefore, it is found in this case that Clause 11 has absolutely ousted the jurisdiction of the Court it would be against public policy. Hence there can be no doubt that an agreement to oust absolutely the jurisdiction of the Court will be unlawful and void being against the public policy. Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. If, therefore, it is found in this case that Clause 11 has absolutely ousted the jurisdiction of the Court it would be against public policy. However, such will be the result only if it can be shown that the jurisdiction to which the parties have agreed to submit had nothing to do with the contract. If on the other hand it is found that the jurisdiction agreed would also be a proper jurisdiction in the matter of the contract it could not be said that it ousted the jurisdiction of the Court. This leads to the question in the facts of this case as to whether Kaira would be proper jurisdiction in the matter of this contract. It would also be relevant to examine if so me other courts than that of Kaira would also have had jurisdiction in the absence of Clause 11 and whether that would amount to ouster of jurisdiction of those courts and would thereby affect the validity of the clause. 11. The jurisdiction of the Court in matter of a contract will depend on the situs of the contract and the cause of action arising through connecting factors. 15. In the matter of a contract there may arise causes of action of various kinds. In a suit for damages for breach of contract the cause of action consists of the making of t he contract, and of its breach, so that the suit may be filed either at the place where the contract was made or at t he place where it should have been performed and the breach occurred. The making of the contract is part of the cause of action. A suit on a contract, therefore, can be filed at t he place where it was made. The determination of the place where the contract was made is part of the Law of Contract. But making of an offer on a particular place does not form cause of action in a suit for damages for breach of contract. Ordinarily, acceptance of an offer and its intimation result in a contract and hence a suit can be filed in a court within whose jurisdiction the acceptance was communicated. But making of an offer on a particular place does not form cause of action in a suit for damages for breach of contract. Ordinarily, acceptance of an offer and its intimation result in a contract and hence a suit can be filed in a court within whose jurisdiction the acceptance was communicated. The performance of a contract is part of cause of action and a suit in respect of the breach can always be filed at the place where the contract should have perform ed or its performance completed. If the contract is to be performed at the place where it is made, the suit on t he contract is to be filed there and nowhere else. In suits f or agency actions the cause of action arises at the place where the contract of agency was made or the place where actio ns are to be rendered and payment is to be made by the agent. Part of cause of action arises where money is expressly or impliedly payable under a contract. In cases of repudiation of a contract, the place where repudiation is received is the place where the suit would lie. If a contract is plead ed as part of the cause of action giving jurisdiction to t he Court where the suit is filed and that contract is found to be invalid, such part of cause of the action disappears T he above are some of the connecting factors." 35. The judgment in ABC Laminart (P) Ltd. (Supra) was followed in Interglobe Aviation Ltd. vs. N. Satchidanand reported in, (2011) 7 SCC 463 . Paragraph 22 of the said judgment is quoted herein below :- "22. As per the principle laid down in ABC Laminart, any clause which ousts the jurisdiction of all courts having jurisdiction and conferring jurisdiction on a court not otherwise having jurisdiction would be invalid. It is now well settled that the parties cannot by agreement confer jurisdiction on a court which does not have jurisdiction; and that only where two or more courts have the jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding, an agreement that the disputes shall be tried in one of such courts is not contrary to public policy. The ouster of jurisdiction of some courts is permissible so long as the court on which exclusive jurisdiction is conferred, had jurisdiction. The ouster of jurisdiction of some courts is permissible so long as the court on which exclusive jurisdiction is conferred, had jurisdiction. If the clause had been made to apply only where a part of cause of action accrued in Delhi, it would have been valid. But as the clause provides that irrespective of the place of cause of action, only courts at Delhi would have jurisdiction, the said clause is invalid in law, having regard to the principle laid down in ABC Laminart. The fact that in this case, the place of embarkation happened to be Delhi, would not validate a clause, which is invalid." 36. The Apex Court in the case of Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Association of India & Others reported in, (2011) 14 SCC 337 laid down the law in paragraph nos. 19, 20 & 21 which are quoted herein below :- "19. Prior to the 1986 Act, the consumers were required to approach the civil court for securing justice for the wrong done to them and it is a known fact that the decision of the litigation instituted in the civil court could take several years. Under the 1986 Act, the consumers are provided with an alternative, efficacious and speedy remedy before the Consumer Forums at district, State and national level. 20. In Fair Air Engineers (P) Ltd. vs. N.K.Modi this Court referred to the judgment in LDA v. M.K.Gupta and observed : (N.K. Modi case, SCC para 15) :- 15. Accordingly, it must be held that the provisions of the Act are to be construed widely to give effect to the object and purpose of the Act. It is seen that Section 3 envisages that the provisions of the Act are in addition to and are not in derogation of any other law in force. It is true, as rightly contended by Shri Suri, that the words 'in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force' would be given proper meaning and effect and if the complaint is not stayed and the parties are not relegated to the arbitration, the Act purports to operate in derogation of the provisions of the Arbitration Act. Prima facie, the contention appears to be plausible but on construction and conspectus of the provisions of the Act we think that the contention is not well founded. Prima facie, the contention appears to be plausible but on construction and conspectus of the provisions of the Act we think that the contention is not well founded. Parliament is aware of the provisions of the Arbitration Act and the Contract Act, 1872 and the consequential remedy available under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure i.e. to avail of right of civil action in a competent court of civil jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Act provides the additional remedy. 21. In Charan Singh vs. Healing Touch Hospital this Court observed :- "11. The Consumer Protection Act is one of the benevolent pieces of legislation intended to protect a large body of consumers from exploitation. The Act provides for an alternative system of consumer justice by summary trial. The authorities under the Act exercise quasi-judicial powers for redressal of consumer disputes and it is one of the postulates of such a body that it should arrive at a conclusion based on reason. The necessity to provide reasons, howsoever, brief in support of its conclusion by such a forum, is too obvious to be reiterated and needs no emphasizing. Obligation to give reasons not only introduces clarity but it also excludes, or at any rate minimises, the chances of arbitrariness and the higher forum can test the correctness of those reasons. Unfortunately we have not been able to find from the impugned order any reason in support of the conclusion that the claim of the appellant is 'unrealistic' or 'exaggerated' or 'excessive'. Loss of salary is not the sole factor which was required to be taken into consideration. 12. While quantifying damages, consumer forums are required to make an attempt to serve ends of justice so that compensation is awarded, in an established case, which not only serve the purpose of re-compensating the individual, but which also at the same time, aims to bring about a qualitative change in the attitude of the service provider. Indeed, calculation of damages depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down for universal application. While awarding compensation, a Consumer Forum has to take into account all relevant factors and assess compensation on the basis of accepted legal principles, on moderation. Indeed, calculation of damages depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down for universal application. While awarding compensation, a Consumer Forum has to take into account all relevant factors and assess compensation on the basis of accepted legal principles, on moderation. It is for the Consumer Forum to grant compensation to the extent it finds it reasonable, fair and proper in the facts and circumstances of a given case according to the established judicial standards where the claimant is able to establish his charge." 37. In view of the facts and circumstances as well as law discussed in the judgments of the Apex Court, we are of the considered opinion that the proper course would be to remit the case back to the District Consumer Forum at Allahabad. Therefore, we set aside the impugned order dated 17.10.2013 passed by the respondent no. 1 (District Consumer Protection Forum, Allahabad) and remand back the case to the District Consumer Protection Forum, Allahabad to decide the case afresh strictly in accordance with law, keeping in view of the observations made herein above preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order is filed before it. It is made clear that nothing said in this judgment is to be construed as having accepted or rejected any of the claim on merits. 38. With the aforesaid observations/directions, the present writ petition is allowed.