JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner and the opposite party no. 1 are represented through their learned counsel. Service upon the opposite party no. 2 is dispensed with. The present challenge has been preferred against an order, whereby the appellate court reversed an order of preemption passed by the trial court on the sole ground that the appellant, Rekha, who is the present opposite party no. 1 (preemptee) was a co-sharer upon the death of the original opposite party no. 2, Dulal, who was her father, and as such, no preemption lay under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that Dulal died on February 6, 2008. Even if it is taken that Rekha, the preemptee, became a co-sharer in respect of the property-in-question on that date, the transaction sought to be preempted occurred on January 2, 2003, at which point of time Rekha was not yet a co-sharer, since her father was still alive. 3. Learned counsel for the preemptee/opposite party no. 1 argues that as on the date of passing of the trial court’s order of preemption, Dulal had already died and as such, the order passed by the trial court was a nullity, being passed against a dead person. 4. It is further argued that in such view of the matter, the conclusion reached by the appellate court in setting aside the trial court’s order was correct. 5. However, a perusal of the impugned judgment of the appeal court reveals that the sole consideration on which the appeal was allowed was that Rekha was a co-sharer and as such, under Section 8 of the said Act of 1955, no preemption application was maintainable at the behest of the present petitioner. 6. Such finding was patently erroneous on point of law, since the aforesaid provision envisages that if a property is transferred to a co-sharer, meaning thereby that the person had to be a co-sharer on the date of such transfer, only then no preemption could be maintainable against her/him. 7. Therefore, the relevant point of time is the date on which the transaction sought to be preempted took place. 8. 7. Therefore, the relevant point of time is the date on which the transaction sought to be preempted took place. 8. In the present case, the transaction took place much before Rekha became a co-sharer on the death of her father and as such, there was no bar operative against the present petitioner to file the preemption application in respect of such transaction. Thus the preemption application was maintainable. 9. Since the appellate court did not go into the other points involved in the appeal and allowed the appeal only on such erroneous premise, this Court is not inclined to usurp the jurisdiction of the appellate court as the last fact-finding forum. 10. Accordingly, C. O. No. 22 of 2019 is disposed of by setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated September 25, 2018 passed by the Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court-1, Howrah, in L. R. Miscellaneous Appeal No. 23 of 2010 and sending the matter on remand for the appellate court to decide the same afresh on merits. 11. It is made clear that all points, except the point decided in the present revisional application, will be kept open for the parties to be canvassed before the appeal court and the appeal court will decide the appeal on its own merits. 12. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 13. However, in view of long pendency of the matter, the appellate court is requested to dispose of the appeal, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within one year from the date of communication of this order to the said court. 14. Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.