JUDGMENT : TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN, J. 1. By medium of this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'Code'), the petitioner has sought quashing of FIR No.23/2013, dated 07.02.2013, registered at Police Station, Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P. under Sections 353, 332, 504 and 506 of IPC as well as consequential proceedings i.e. Criminal Case No. 41/2 of 2013 titled 'State of H.P. versus Ravi Shankar', pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was accused of obstructing the complainant/respondent No.2, who while discharging her official duties as a Constable in the H.P. Police was deployed at District Bilaspur on 07.02.2013. Thereafter, on the basis of her statement, an FIR came to be registered and after completion of the investigation, challan was submitted in the Court and the same is pending consideration in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur. 3. It is on the basis of the compromise entered inter se the petitioner and respondent No.2 that the prayer for quashing has been made in this petition. 4. Petitioner and respondent No.2 are present in person and have been identified as such by their respective counsel(s). 5. However, the moot question is whether such a course is available to this Court. 6. To answer this question, certain judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court need to be noticed. In Gian Singh versus State of Punjab and another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 , it was held that power of the High Court in quashing of the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power is distinct and different from the power of a Criminal Court for compounding offences under Section 320 Cr.P.C. While exercising inherent power of quashment under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime and its social impact. It warned the High Court for quashing proceedings in heinous and serious offences of mental depravity, murder, rape, dacoity etc. 7. The Principles laid down in Gian Singh's case (supra) were, in turn, reaffirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh & Ors.
It warned the High Court for quashing proceedings in heinous and serious offences of mental depravity, murder, rape, dacoity etc. 7. The Principles laid down in Gian Singh's case (supra) were, in turn, reaffirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. versus State of Punjab & Anr., (2014) 4 JT 573 SC wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court after summing up the legal position laid down the following guidelines for the High Court in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings, which read thus:- "(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. (II) When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. (III)Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. (IV)On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
(IV)On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. (V)While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. (VI)Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. (VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role.
At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. (VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime." 8.
Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime." 8. The principles in Narinder Singh's case (supra) were thereafter reiterated and reaffirmed in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai and others versus State of Gujarat and another, (2017) 9 SCC 641 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the following broad principles for exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of FIR/criminal complaint, which read thus:- "(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court; (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power; (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated; (vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence.
Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences; (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned; (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute; (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance." 9. Similar issue with regard to exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. came up recently before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh versus Laxmi Narayan and others, 2019 4 Scale 200 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court was required to resolve the apparent conflict between two decisions of the said Court in the cases of Narinder Singh (supra) and State of Rajasthan versus Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149 . After taking into consideration, the majority of decisions, as have already been quoted above along with host of the other judgments on the issue, the legal position was summarized as under:- "13.
After taking into consideration, the majority of decisions, as have already been quoted above along with host of the other judgments on the issue, the legal position was summarized as under:- "13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under: (i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; (ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; (iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender; (iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC.
It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; (v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc." 10. Now, the question to be determined is whether under the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the proceedings can be quashed on the basis of the compromise entered into between the parties where the offence is against a public servant. 11. Noticeably, none of the judgments referred to hereinabove deal with a case where quashing is sought on the basis of the compromise entered into between the parties where the offence is against a public servant, who at the relevant time was discharging his/her official duties. 12. The allegations levelled by respondent No.2 as a public servant for an offence in discharge of her official duty cannot be treated to be in her individual and private capacity. 13.
12. The allegations levelled by respondent No.2 as a public servant for an offence in discharge of her official duty cannot be treated to be in her individual and private capacity. 13. However, taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly the fact that respondent No.2 has sought specific permission from the District Magistrate as also from her department to compromise the matter and the same stands granted in her favour, I find no impediment in allowing this petition. 14. Consequently, in the given facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons afore-stated, the instant petition is allowed. Accordingly, FIR No.23/2013, dated 07.02.2013, registered at Police Station, Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P. under Sections 353, 332, 504 and 506 of IPC as well as consequential proceedings i.e. Criminal Case No. 41/2 of 2013 titled 'State of H.P. versus Ravi Shankar', pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P., are quashed. 15. The petition stands allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.