JUDGMENT : Prasanta Kumar Deka, J. Heard Mr. B. D. Deka and Mr. A. Sahewalla, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. M. Nath, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The petitioner as the plaintiff filed T. S. Nos. 100/2015, 101/2015, 103/2015 and 104/2015 in the court of learned Munsiff No.2, Dibrugarh against the tenants respectively. Late Atindra Chandra Das (since deceased), Sri Ratan Chandra Majumdar, Late Bishnapada Dutta(since deceased) and late Subhendra Chandra Das(since deceased) as defendants for their ejectment and recovery of arrear rent. The respective tenanted premises are described in the plaint and the monthly rent are Rs. 180/- in T. S. Nos. 100/2015, 102/2015 and Rs. 300/- in T.S. Nos. 101/2015 and 103/2015. The deceased tenant defendants are substituted by their respective legal heirs. All the suits were dismissed by the trial court holding that the suits were bad for non-joinder of Dibrugarh Municipal Board as the necessary party. Though the findings in all the issues framed by the trial court were common but the judgments were passed individually in each suit. Title Appeal Nos. 9/2015, 10/2015, 11/2015 and 12/2015 were filed in the court of learned Civil Judge, Dibrugarh and the same were also dismissed by separate judgments and decrees all dated 9.5.2017 upholding the findings of the trial court in all the issues. 3. The judgments and decrees passed in Title Appeal Nos. 9/2015, 10/2015, 11/2015 and 12/2015 are challenged in the CRP Nos. 218/2017, 216/2017, 217/2017 and CRP 215/2017 respectively and the same are taken up for disposal at this admission stage as consented by the learned counsel of the parties to the revision petitions. 4. The present petitioner as the plaintiff filed the suits for ejectment of the respective defendants respondents from the suit premises and recovery of arrear rent. The plaintiff petitioner was a registered partnership firm and Maliram Ajitsaria and Phulchand Ajitsaria were the partners who died in the year 1981 and on 20.11.2004 respectively. Phulchand Ajitsaria died leaving behind the present plaintiff petitioner as his son and six daughters all married. On the death of the two partners the plaintiff firm was converted to a sole proprietorial concern with the plaintiff as it is sole proprietor. The great grandfather of the plaintiff petitioner constructed C.I sheet two storied Assam Type house on the land leased out by the Dibrugarh Municipal Board against two municipal holdings i.e. holding Nos. On the death of the two partners the plaintiff firm was converted to a sole proprietorial concern with the plaintiff as it is sole proprietor. The great grandfather of the plaintiff petitioner constructed C.I sheet two storied Assam Type house on the land leased out by the Dibrugarh Municipal Board against two municipal holdings i.e. holding Nos. 278 and 279 of ward No. 11. The holding No. 279 consists of plaintiff's own house and his shop. On the other hand, the house included in holding No.278 consists of six shops which are let out to different tenants on rent. The defendants respondents occupied the schedule premises under the plaintiff petitioner as his tenant at a rent of Rs. 180/- and Rs.300/- as hereinabove stated per month agreeing to pay the same at the end of each month according to the English calendar month without any default and also agreed to hand over the vacant possession whenever he would be called upon to do so by the plaintiff. The defendants respondents defaulted in paying the monthly rent of the schedule premises from February, 2010/November 2009 and as such liable to be evicted. It is also claimed that the suit premises are required bonafide by the plaintiff petitioner. 5. On receipt of the summons the defendants respondents in all the suits appeared and filed written statement setting up common defence. Disclaiming the plaintiff petitioner as the landlord it is pleaded that the suit is bad for non-joinder of Dibrugarh Municipal Board which is a necessary party to the suit. It is denied that great grandfather of the plaintiff petitioner constructed the shops. The suit premises are situated outside the shops of the plaintiff petitioner on the road side attached to the road on the eastern side belonged to municipal area and as the premises are attached on the western side with the residential premises of M/s Maliram Phulchand it took rent for the use of the common wall. The suit premises are situated outside the shops of the plaintiff petitioner on the road side attached to the road on the eastern side belonged to municipal area and as the premises are attached on the western side with the residential premises of M/s Maliram Phulchand it took rent for the use of the common wall. The defendants respondents had all along been paying the rent to the partnership firm and further submitted that the rent were paid up to April, 2011 and no receipts were issued to the defendants respondents with an oblique intention to make them defaulters and when the plaintiff petitioner refused to receive the rent for the month of May,2011 the defendants respondents started to make the payment of the rent by depositing the same in the court of the Rent Controller at Dibrugarh. The Dibrugarh Municipal Board vide notice No. BM/789 dated 26.7.1994 asked the defendants respondents not to pay any rent to the original lease holder M/s Maliram Phulchand. As such they sought for dismissal of the suit. On the basis of the pleadings following issues were framed: "(i). Whether the suit is bad for the non joinder of necessary party, especially for non joinder of Dibrugarh Municipality? (i). Whether the plaintiff has right to sue? (ii). Whether the defendant is a defaulter in payment of rent for month of February 2010 to July 2012? (iii). Whether suit premise is required bonafide by the plaintiff? (iv). Whether plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs as claimed for in the suit? (v). To what reliefs plaintiff is entitled to?" 6. The plaintiff petitioner examined himself as the lone witness and on the other hand the defendants respondents examined themselves as DW1, DW 2, DW 3, DW 4 and another witness who is an official of Dibrugarh Municipal Board as DW 5 alongwith documents exhibited. 7. Learned trial court decided that the plaintiff petitioner has right to sue and further held that the defendants respondents defaulted in payment of rent to the plaintiff petitioner from February, 2010 to May, 2011. The issue of bonafide requirement was also decided in favour of the plaintiff petitioner. However, the suits were held to be bad for non joinder of Dibrugarh Municipal Board as party to the suit. 8. The issue of bonafide requirement was also decided in favour of the plaintiff petitioner. However, the suits were held to be bad for non joinder of Dibrugarh Municipal Board as party to the suit. 8. The learned trial court while deciding issue No. 1 in respect of the issue of non-joinder of necessary party, appreciated the evidence on record by holding that the rent was paid to M/s Maliram Phulchand of which the plaintiff petitioner claims to be the sole proprietor. Accordingly it made an observation that neither the Dibrugarh Municipal Board was privy to the tenancy between the plaintiff petitioner and the defendants respondents nor does the dispute relate to the lease agreement between the Dibrugarh Municipal Board and the plaintiff petitioner. Considering the same the learned trial court in order to determine the said issue took note of the evidence of DW 1, DW 2, DW 3 and DW 4 and observed that the Dibrugarh Municipal Board asked the said witnesses not to pay rent to the plaintiff petitioner as it was in violation of the terms of lease agreement with the plaintiff petitioner. It also considered the evidence of DW 5, the Assistant Engineer, Dibrugarh Municipal Board who testified that under the Municipal lease agreement there is no provision for sub-letting the leased out premises. Ext. D (37) was considered which is a notice sent by the Dibrugarh Municipal Board to the defendants respondents directing them not to pay rent to the plaintiff petitioner. It also considered Ext.D(27) the representation submitted by the defendants respondents to the Dibrugarh Municipal for allotment of the suit premises under their respective occupation in their respective names. On the other hand, the plaintiff petitioner in his cross-examination stated that he filed a suit against the Dibrugarh Municipal Board on the ground that the said Board contemplated to hand over the suit premises to the defendants respondents. Accordingly it came to the conclusion that the Dibrugarh Municipal Board being the original lessor and the sub-lease being created with the defendants respondents by the plaintiff petitioner in violation of the term of the original lease agreement, in absence of said Municipal Board no effective decree could be passed as it would interfere with the decree. Accordingly the suits were decided against the plaintiff petitioner resulting dismissal of the suits. 9. Accordingly the suits were decided against the plaintiff petitioner resulting dismissal of the suits. 9. The said judgment and decree of the trial court dated 26.8.2015 passed in all the Title Suits were put under challenge by the plaintiff petitioner in the aforesaid Title Appeals which were dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 9.5.2017. The present bunch of revision petitions are filed challenging the said judgment and decree of the first appellate court passed in said Title Appeals. 10. Mr. Deka submits that the learned court below made a jurisdictional error in not granting the decree only on the ground that the suit is bad for non-joinder of Dibrugarh Municipal a party to the suit. The case of the plaintiff petitioner is not of denial of the title of the Dibrugarh Municipal Board over the tenanted premises which forms a part of the total lease hold property over which the great grandfather of the plaintiff petitioner entered possession and constructed the houses covered by both the holdings. The agreement entered into by the plaintiff petitioner and each of the defendants respondents are valid one under the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972. Accordingly, the plaintiff petitioner is the landlord and the defendants respondents are the tenants and there is no dispute with regard to the landlord tenant relationship between the parties to the suit. Under such circumstances if there is any violation of the tenancy terms the plaintiff petitioner as the landlord has the right to take recourse under Section 5 of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972. Under no circumstances the Dibrugarh Municipal Board is required to be a party in the suit for ejectment of tenants, the relationship of landlord tenant arising out of an agreement of tenancy where the Dibrugarh Municipal Board is not at all a party/signatory. Further the tenants are also stopped from denying the title of the landlord under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 11. Mr. Nath wanted to project his case on a different footing by submitting that admittedly the tenancy agreements were entered into by the respective defendant respondent with a registered partnership firm. On the other hand, it is the pleading of the plaintiff petitioner that the original partnership firm was changed to a sole proprietorial firm and the plaintiff petitioner is the proprietor of the said firm. On the other hand, it is the pleading of the plaintiff petitioner that the original partnership firm was changed to a sole proprietorial firm and the plaintiff petitioner is the proprietor of the said firm. Accordingly the plaintiff petitioner is the agent for collecting rent on behalf of the landlord partnership firm, M/s Maliram Phulchand. He accordingly disputes the maintainability of the suit and reliefs claimed therein. It is also submitted that it was proved as pleaded by the defendants respondents in their written statement that there is a bar in sub letting the tenanted premises by the lessee of the lessor Dibrugarh Municipality who is none other than the predecessor-in-interest of the present plaintiff petitioner. The said fact is also proved by a competent official of Dibrugarh Municipal Board and the finding in the issue of non joinder of necessary parties cannot be interfered inasmuch as there is a specific violation of the terms of the original lease between the partnership firm and Dibrugarh Municipal Board. The decree if passed, the same cannot be executed because of the absence of Dibrugarh Municipal. Relying in Mumbai International Airport Private Limited Vs. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited & Others, (2010) 7 SCC 417 and Anil Kumar Singh Vs. Shivnath Mishra, 1995 SCC 147 , Mr. Nath submits that it is pleaded in the written statement about the lease the plaintiff petitioner entered with the Dibrugarh Municipal Board and the issue of non joinder of necessary party but even then as there was no move on the part of the plaintiff petitioner to implead the said Municipal Board as such the findings of the court below cannot be interfered. 12. Due consideration is given to the submissions of learned counsel. From the point of view of the Dibrugarh Municipal Board, the partnership firm and thereafter the present plaintiff petitioner is enjoying the lease hold right over the total demised property including the suit premises annexed with certain terms and conditions. The plaintiff petitioner never disputed the paramount title of Dibrugarh Municipal Board over the lease hold property. On the other hand the plaintiff petitioner and defendants respondents respectively entered individually in the tenancy agreements in respect of a part of the total lease hold property by the plaintiff petitioner under the lessor Dibrugarh Municipal Board. The plaintiff petitioner never disputed the paramount title of Dibrugarh Municipal Board over the lease hold property. On the other hand the plaintiff petitioner and defendants respondents respectively entered individually in the tenancy agreements in respect of a part of the total lease hold property by the plaintiff petitioner under the lessor Dibrugarh Municipal Board. The said agreements are valid and conclusive one so far the plaintiff petitioner and the defendants respondents are concerned. Specific terms of the tenancy are also stipulated which is pleaded by the plaintiff petitioner that the defendants respondents must pay the monthly rent at the end of each month according to English calendar month regularly month to month without any default. The said fact is not disputed by the defendants respondents, rather it is the pleading of the defendants respondents in the written statements that the rent was paid up to April, 2011 but the plaintiff petitioner did not issue receipts to them with the intention of making them defaulters. When the plaintiff petitioner refused to receive rent for the month of April, 2011, the defendants respondents started to deposit the same in the court of the Rent Controller and that too with due permission of the court. While deciding the issue in respect of default in payment of rent i.e issue No.3, the courts below took note of Ext. D (37) dated 26.7.1994 issued by the Dibrugarh Municipal Board asking the defendants respondents not to pay rent to the plaintiff petitioner as it was irregular as per the terms of lease agreement between the plaintiff petitioner and the Dibrugarh Municipal Board. It is also observed by the courts below that in spite of the said letter from the Dibrugarh Municipal Board the defendants respondents had all along been paying rent to the plaintiff petitioner. It is also observed by the courts below that in spite of the said letter from the Dibrugarh Municipal Board the defendants respondents had all along been paying rent to the plaintiff petitioner. Finally in the said issue the courts below held that it cannot be said that the defendants respondents had stopped paying rent to the plaintiff petitioner in compliance of the direction of the Dibrugarh Municipal Board inasmuch as, it is the case of the plaintiff petitioner that the defendants respondents defaulted in paying the rent from February, 2010 and on the other hand it is the defence of the defendants respondents that the rent was paid to the plaintiff petitioner till April, 2011 and only on refusal to accept the rent in the month of May, 2011, the defendants respondents started depositing the rent in the Court. 13. Aforesaid findings of the court below is sufficient to hold that leaving aside the lease agreement between the Dibrugarh Municipal and the plaintiff petitioner, there are independent agreements of tenancy between the plaintiff petitioner and the defendants respondents. The said tenancy agreement stipulates terms and condition of the tenancy and these itself indicate that the defendants respondents accepted the plaintiff petitioner as the landlord and carried out the required performance of the tenancy agreements by paying the rent to the plaintiff petitioner. The said act of paying the rent is sufficient to hold that the plaintiff petitioner falls within the definition of landlord as stipulated under Section 2(c) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 (Act, 1972). If there is any violation of the terms of tenancy the plaintiff petitioner as the landlord, has the right under the said Act, 1972 to move the court as required u/s 5 of the said Act 1972 and after showing that there is a violation of the proviso (e) to Sub-Section 1 of Section 5 of the Act 1972 seek for an ejectment decree of the defendants respondents from the court. For enforcement of the said right by the plaintiff petitioner it is not required to make the Dibrugarh Municipal Board a party that too as necessary party in the suit inasmuch as the plaintiff petitioner is seeking his relief u/s 5 of the Act 1972 for violation of the stipulations in the tenancy agreement between the plaintiff petitioner and the defendants respondents who are having the jural relationship as landlord tenant and which too was also held by the learned trial court that the said tenancy agreements exist between the plaintiff petitioner and the individual respondents defendants. 14. Section 5 sub-Section 1 Proviso (a) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 is reproduced here-in-below: "5. Bar against passing and execution of decree and orders for ejection.- (1) No order or decree for the recovery of possession of any house shall be made or executed by any Court so long as the tenant pays rent to the full extent allowable under this Act and performs the conditions of the tenancy: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply in a suit or proceedings for eviction of the tenant from the house :- (a) Where the tenant has done anything contrary to the provision of clause (m), clause (o) or clause (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Central Act 4 of 1882) or to the spirit of the aforesaid clause in areas where the said Act does not apply;" Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (T.P.Act) stipulates various rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee. The said rights are classified as (A) rights and liabilities of lessor and (B) rights and liabilities of lessee. Under classification (B) of Section 108 of T.P. Act sub-Section (m) stipulates that the lessee is bound to keep and on the termination of the lease, the lessee to restore the property in as good condition as it was in at the time when he was put in possession and sub-section (q) stipulates that on the determination of the lease the lessee is bound to put the lessor into possession of the property. The said proviso (a) of the Act, 1972 mentioned hereinabove also prescribes the applicability of the spirit of the Transfer of Property Act where the same has no applicability. 15. The said proviso (a) of the Act, 1972 mentioned hereinabove also prescribes the applicability of the spirit of the Transfer of Property Act where the same has no applicability. 15. From the aforesaid provision the tenant has an obligation on the termination of the lease to restore back the property in as good condition as it was in at the time he was put in possession of the tenanted premises to the lessor/landlord. Section 116 of Indian Evidence Act provides no tenant of immovable property or person claiming through such tenant shall during the continuance of the tenancy be permitted to deny that the landlord had at the beginning of tenancy a title to such immovable property. Thus a tenant is estopped from denying the title of the landlord with respect to the premises which is immovable in nature during the subsistence of the tenancy. This estoppel continues to operate till the tenant restore back the possession to the landlord by way of surrender or once the tenant is evicted. But the said obligation can also be satisfied by proving that the landlord's title is extinguished because of eviction by a paramount title holder. In order to prove that the landlord's title is extinguished by the paramount title holder the same has to be proved by the party who sets up the said defence. 16. In order to constitute eviction by the title paramount for extinguishment of the landlord's title in order to get the tenant relieved from the estoppel u/s 116 of Evidence Act it would be proper to refer a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vashu Deo Vs. Bal Kishan, (2002) AIR SC 569. In the said decision the shop which was the suit property was owned by a trust. The trust leased out the shop to the tenant. The tenant later on inducted a sub-tenant who fell into arrears of rent. Suit was filed for recovery of arrears and for eviction against the sub-tenant. The trust also filed a suit for eviction against the tenant on the ground of illegal sub letting. The trust leased out the shop to the tenant. The tenant later on inducted a sub-tenant who fell into arrears of rent. Suit was filed for recovery of arrears and for eviction against the sub-tenant. The trust also filed a suit for eviction against the tenant on the ground of illegal sub letting. Therein the suit, filed by the tenant against the sub-tenant a plea was raised by the sub tenant that subsequent to the institution of the suit by the trust against the tenant, the sub tenant directly attorned in favour of the trust and entered into a direct tenancy agreement and as such the right of the tenant to recover rent after date of attornment and eviction of the sub tenant came to an end. It was held that during the subsistence of the sub-lease and without vacating the tenanted premises the sub tenant could not have attorned to the trust which is paramount title holder merely because of the trust had filed eviction suit against the tenant. Therein it was held as follows: "12. To constitute eviction by title paramount so as to discharge the obligation of the tenant to put his lessor into possession of the leased premises three conditions must be satisfied: (i) the party evicting must have a good and present title to the property; (ii) the tenant must have quitted or directly attorned to the paramount title holder against his will; (iii) either the landlord must be willing or be a consenting party to such direct attornment by his tenant to the paramount title holder or there must be an event, such as a change in law or passing of decree by a competent Court, which would dispense with the need of consent or willingness on the part of the landlord and so bind him as would enable the tenant handing over possession or attorning in favour of the paramount title holder directly; or, in other words, the paramount title holder must be armed with such legal process for eviction as cannot be lawfully resisted. The burden of raising such a plea and substantiating the same, so as to make out a clear case of eviction by paramount title holder, lies on the party relying on such defence. " 17. The burden of raising such a plea and substantiating the same, so as to make out a clear case of eviction by paramount title holder, lies on the party relying on such defence. " 17. Now coming back to the present case in hand it would be proper to apply the said ratio inasmuch as the defence of non-joinder of necessary parties cannot be taken by the defendant respondent. This is in view of the estoppel which binds the tenant u/s 116 of Evidence Act. If the defendant respondent would have been successful to show and prove before the courts below that Dibrugarh Municipal Board as the paramount title holder is armed with any legal process for eviction which cannot be lawfully resisted by his landlord(petitioner) then the question of non-joinder of necessary party would have come into play inasmuch as even if a decree is in favour of paramount title holder which is yet to be executed that itself is sufficient to hold that the plaintiff petitioner's lease hold right over the tenanted premises extinguished but that is not the case here. The learned court below wrongly applied its jurisdiction by holding that the suit is bad for non-joinder of Dibrugarh Municipal Board inasmuch as the decree of eviction of the defendant petitioner can be passed in absence of Dibrugarh Municipal Board moreso in absence of a defence plea mentioned hereinabove not to speak of proving the same by defendants respondents. 18. In view of the said discussion and observation, I am constrained to hold that the suits are maintainable and the findings in issue No. 1 in respect of non maintainability of the suit for non joinder of necessary party are liable to be set aside. The suits are maintainable and the plaintiff petitioner is entitled for the decree of ejectment against the defendants respondents from the suit premises described in the respective schedule of each plaint and for the arrear rent as per the findings of the courts below in the issues referred herein. The bunch of revision petitions are allowed accordingly. 19. No costs. Interim order if any passed earlier stands vacated.