JUDGMENT : VIVEK SINGH THAKUR, J. 1. This application, seeking leave to appeal to assail the judgment dated 5.1.2017 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Manali dismissing the complaint preferred by the applicant/appellant under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the NI Act’) preferred by applicant/appellant, is vehemently opposed by the respondent/accused. 2. The Trial Court has dismissed the complaint on the ground that complainant has neither furnished any income tax return reflecting the advancing of loan of Rs. 1 lac in cash, which was more than Rs. 20,000/- nor placed on record any document like pronote or agreement executed between the parties, at the time of alleged advancing of Rs. 1 lacs to the respondent/accused by complainant and also that complainant was not possessing any money lender’s licence for advancing loan to public at large, as the respondent/accused, for proving documents Ext. D1 and Ext. D2 as evidence with respect to numerous cases filed by complainant under Section 138 of NI Act against different persons, has proved that complainant was in business of money lending and therefore, has contended that loan alleged to have been advanced by complainant to the respondent/accused, was not legally recoverable debt and therefore the complainant was legally debarred from recovering the same from the respondent. 3. Referring Section 3 of the H.P. Registration of Money Lenders Act, 1976, it has been contended that being an unregistered money lenders, the complaint filed by the appellant/applicant has rightly been dismissed by the Trial Court as the same was barred under the Money Lenders Act. Reliance has also been placed on judgment passed by Punjab and Haryana High Court in case Narsi Dass vs. Surender, (2015) 2 BC 249 (P&H) : 2015 (1) Civil Court Cases 489 (P&H) wherein a complaint against the dishonour of cheque was dismissed for want of registration of complainant under Money Lenders Act as complainant was found for lending the money to public at large without money lender’s licence. 4. 4. Learned Counsel for the respondent has also referred explanation to Section 138 of NI Act, wherein it is provided that for the purposes of this section “debt or other liability” means a legal enforceable debt or other liability with further submissions that as the complainant was debarred under the Money Lenders Act from recovering the alleged loan advanced to the respondent, therefore, the debt or liability alleged against the respondent is not legally enforceable. Referring M.S. Narayana Menon vs. State of Kerala and Another, (2006) 5 SLT 252 : (2006) 3 CCR 76 (SC) : (2006) 3 BC 433 (SC) : (2006) 6 SCC 39 and Sanjay Mishra vs. Ms. Kanishka Kapoor @ Nikki, (2009) 4 BC 223 : AIR 2009 (NOC) 2327 (Bom) : 2009 (3) Civil Court Cases 563 (Bom) and S.K. Jain vs. Vijay Kalra, (2014) 208 DLT 503 : 2014 (2) Criminal Court Cases 370 (Delhi) it is also contended that for want of evidence with respect to reflection of amount in book of accounts or income tax returns which is alleged to have been advanced as a loan to the respondent, and also for want of evidence with respect to income of complainant, there is no material on record with respect to advancing the alleged loan to respondent and also source of income of complainant and further that respondent has discharged his burden of proof to rebut the presumption of Sections 118 and 139 of NI Act by means of oral evidence and also by proving the admitted documents Ext. D1 and Ext. D2 on record and therefore, there is no evidence available so as to entitling the applicant/appellant to assail the impugned judgment and therefore dismissal of this application has been prayed. 5. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the applicant has relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in Gajnan and Others vs. Seth Brindaban, 1970 (SLT Soft) 536 : (1970) 2 SCC 360 wherein it was held that isolated individual transaction of lending the money has not been declared to be void and the suit for recovery by money lenders, in a case of loan advanced in district for which the said money lender was not registered, was held to be maintainable. Reliance has also been placed on judgment of Delhi High Court dated 8.4.2011 passed in Cr. Reliance has also been placed on judgment of Delhi High Court dated 8.4.2011 passed in Cr. L.P. No. 491 of 2011 titled Virender Singh vs. Deepak Bhatia, (2013) 2 DLT (Cri) 672, along with other connected matters wherein it was held that for issuance of cheque against the advanced loan, restriction to recover the advanced loan under Money Lenders Act is not applicable for exclusion of such advance from applicability of Money Lenders’ Act under the provisions of this Act itself. 6. Learned Counsel for the applicant/appellant has referred Section 2 of Money Lenders Act wherein loan has been defined as an advance whether secured or unsecured of money or in kind at interest inclusive of any transaction which the Court finds to be in substance a loan, but shall not include certain transaction mentioned therein including the transaction, mentioned in Clause (g) wherein it is provided that an advance made on the basis of negotiable instrument as defined in Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881, but other than a promissory note shall not be included in the definition of loan under the Money Lenders’ Act. 7. It is also submitted that as per Section 6 of NI Act, a cheque is a ‘Bill of exchange.’ Bill of exchange defined under Section 5 of NI Act is different from a ‘Promissory Note’ defined under Section 4 of NI Act. Any transaction on the basis of ‘Promissory Note’ has been included in the definition of loan under Money Lenders Act but ‘Cheque’ and ‘Bill of exchange’ have not been included therein. 8. Applicant/appellant is claiming benefit of exclusion clause in Section 2(8) defining the ‘loan’ in Money Lenders Act, whereas respondent is putting his claim forward on the basis of provisions of Section 3 of Money Lenders Act. Learned Counsel of both sides have referred competing case law to substantiate their respected claims. 9. From the rival contentions of parties and case law referred by them, it is apparent that there are certain important legal issues which require adjudication in detail for determining the correctness of rival contentions of parties and also evaluate the findings returned by the Trial Court in the impugned judgment and such adjudication is not warranted at this stage as all the above stated contentions may be raised and adjudicated at the time of admission of appeal or at the time of, final hearing. 10. 10. Therefore, without commenting upon the merits of rival contentions of parties, at this stage, I am of considered opinion that leave to appeal, as prayed, deserves to be granted. 11. Accordingly leave to appeal is granted. Application stands disposed of.