Research › Search › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 645 (KER)

Lijo Thomas, S/o. Thomas v. Beena Charley, D/o. Charly

2019-08-08

ANNIE JOHN, K.HARILAL

body2019
JUDGMENT : K. HARILAL, J 1. The petitioner herein is the petitioner in I.A.No.455/2017 in O.P.No.959/2013 and this original petition has been filed challenging Ext.P6 order dated 12.04.2017 passed by the Family Court, Attingal. The petitioner and the first respondent are divorced husband and wife. The dispute involved in the aforesaid I.A concerns to the custody of the minor child by name Libin Liju. After the dissolution of marriage, the petitioner filed O.P.(G&W) No.959/2013 seeking permanent custody of the minor child Libin Liju under the provisions of Guardian and Wards Act. The dispute between the parties in respect of the custody of the minor child has been settled and filed a compromise agreement. A decree has been passed by the family court in accordance with the compromise agreement. According to the petitioner, the respondent has wilfully violated the terms of the compromise by denying the opportunity of the petitioner, to get custody of the child, in violation of the terms of the compromise agreement. As per the terms of compromise, the permanent custody of the child is given to the respondent, but interim custody was given to the petitioner as and when required. As per clause (ii) of the compromise agreement, the petitioner was given interim custody of the child from 4.30 p.m. on every 2nd Friday till 9.30 a.m. on ensuing Monday. So also he was given interim custody in every vacations on the application to be filed before the family court and the order to be passed by the family court on that application. When the first respondent violated the terms of the compromise agreement, the petitioner has filed E.P.No.19/2014, which was dismissed by the family court on a finding that the compromise decree is not an executable one. During the pendency of E.P.No.19/2014, the petitioner filed a petition seeking interim custody of the child during the pendency of the execution petition and the same was denied by the family court. During the pendency of E.P.No.19/2014, the petitioner filed a petition seeking interim custody of the child during the pendency of the execution petition and the same was denied by the family court. Aggrieved by the denial of interim custody, the petitioner preferred O.P.(FC) No.338/2014 before this Court and this Court passed an interim order granting interim custody of the child to the petitioner on the 3rd Saturday of every month between 10.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. till the disposal of the E.P. Finally the family court dismissed the E.P. on a finding that the decree is not a workable one in view of clause (vi) of the terms of the compromise agreement. Subsequently, considering the observations made by the family court in the order dismissing E.P.No.19/2014; the petitioner preferred Ex.P3 original petition before this Court. This Court also dismissed Ext.P3 original petition with a direction to the parties to abide by the terms of Ext.P3. Further the petitioner preferred an I.A.No.455/2017 before the Family Court, Attingal, seeking to review Ext.P1 decree passed in O.P.No.959/2013. According to the averments in the I.A., the terms of Ext.P1 has become unworkable due to the violation of the same by the parties. Therefore, in view of clause (vi) of Ext.P1, O.P.No.959/2013 is liable to be reopened and disposed of on merits after taking evidence. 2. The first respondent resisted the said I.A. on a finding that everything in respect of the custody of the child has been concluded by this Court in O.P.(FC) No.338/2014 and Ext.P3 judgment in O.P. (FC) No.662/2016. Therefore, there is no scope for re-opening of Ext.P1 decree. After considering the objection raised by the first respondent herein, the family court passed Ext.P6 order dismissing I.A.No.455/2017, which is under challenge in this original petition. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents. 4. It is true that this original petition has a chequered history starting from a compromise agreement and the petitioner has come up before this Court twice in O.P.(FC) Nos.338/2014 and 662/2016. It is not disputed that the petitioner has filed E.P.No.19/2014 seeking execution of Ext.P1 compromise agreement and got it dismissed by Ext.P2 order. 4. It is true that this original petition has a chequered history starting from a compromise agreement and the petitioner has come up before this Court twice in O.P.(FC) Nos.338/2014 and 662/2016. It is not disputed that the petitioner has filed E.P.No.19/2014 seeking execution of Ext.P1 compromise agreement and got it dismissed by Ext.P2 order. Though the petitioner has challenged the same before this Court, by filing O.P.(FC) No.662/2016, this Court dismissed the said original petition with a direction to the parties to abide by the orders passed by this Court in O.P.No.338/2014. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the present I.A.No.455/2017 in O.P.No.959/2013 seeking to review the compromise agreement passed earlier in O.P(G&W) No.959/2013 in view of clause (vi) of Ext.P1 decree. 5. Neither the family court nor this Court has considered the validity of clause (vi) in the compromise agreement. As per clause (vi) of the compromise agreement, if any of the parties does not obey the terms of Ext.P1 compromise decree, the decree shall be re-opened and determined afresh on merits after taking evidence. Prima facie we find that the aforesaid clause (vi) is not a lawful one. According to Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC, a suit can be decided wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise. Further as per the Explanation to Order XXIII Rule 3 an agreement or compromise, which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule. It is trite law that where a decree is passed on the basis of a compromise agreement, it can never be re-opened at the will and wish of the parties to the compromise agreement. As per clause (vi), the parties agreed to re-open the decree, if any of the parties disobeys the terms of the compromise agreement. We are of the consistent view that such a clause is per se unlawful and void. Therefore, no legal force or enforceability can be attributed with clause (vi). In other words, Ext.P1 decree can never be reopened in exercise of clause (vi) of Ext.P1. At the same time, we take notice that in the earlier round of litigation before this Court and this Court has no opportunity to consider the enforceability of clause (vi) of Ext.P1. Therefore, no legal force or enforceability can be attributed with clause (vi). In other words, Ext.P1 decree can never be reopened in exercise of clause (vi) of Ext.P1. At the same time, we take notice that in the earlier round of litigation before this Court and this Court has no opportunity to consider the enforceability of clause (vi) of Ext.P1. In the above view, we find that I.A.No.455/2017 is not maintainable and the family court is justified in dismissing the I.A., even though the dismissal was on the other findings. Where a compromise decree has been passed there is no provision for an appeal. It means that the parties to the compromise decree are bound to obey the terms of compromise decree and they cannot escape from the enforceability of the compromise decree. 6. In the above view, we find that Ext.P1 decree is enforceable under law except clause (vi). The parties are bound by the terms of Ext.P1 compromise decree, clause (ii) in respect of the custody of the child. As per clause (ii) of Ext.P1 decree, the petitioner herein was given interim custody of the child from 4.30 p.m. on every 2nd Friday till 9.30 a.m. on ensuing Monday. The said clause in Ext.P1 decree is a valid and enforceable one. Both the petitioner and the respondent are bound to obey the aforesaid clause in the compromise decree. In case of violation, the aggrieved parties is at liberty to seek execution in terms of the said clause (ii) of Ext.P1 before the family court. The O.P.(FC) is disposed of.