JUDGMENT : D.N. PATEL, J. 1. This writ petition has been preferred mainly for getting reservation for Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes in the selection process for appointment on the post of District Judge, for which applications have been invited vide Public Advertisement No.1/2017/Apptt.. Full Court of the High Court of Jharkhand has resolved on 29th November, 2018 not to prescribe reservation for the post of District Judges, for which the applications have been invited in pursuance of the Public Advertisement No. No.1/2017/Apptt. because selection process has already been started. 2. The petitioners have mainly prayed for issuance of writ, order or direction upon respondents alleging that non-inclusion of provision of reservation for Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes in the “Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rule, 2001 for direct appointment to the post of District Judge has made the said Rules ultra vires to Articles 16(4) and 16(4A) of the Constitution of India. 3. It is also prayed in this writ petition that non-inclusion of the provision for reservation for Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes is violative of the reservation policy of the State of Jharkhand and is violative to Letter No. 449/Appointment dated 22nd February, 2001. 4. It is further prayed in this writ petition for issuance of a direction upon Respondents to enact new rules, incorporating the reservations for Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes as per Jharkhand Government Reservation Policy and Resolution No. 3464 dated 3rd October, 2001 issued by the Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms & Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi. 5. It is further prayed in the writ petition for issuance of directions upon respondents to implement the Jharkhand State Reservation policy, which is at Annexure 2 to the memo of the writ petition. 6. It is further prayed in this writ petition to implement the recommendation of the Three Judges’ Committee of this Court. The recommendations were in pursuance of a final meeting dated 9th December, 2013. And lastly it is prayed that Full Court resolution dated 29th November, 2018 of the Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand be brought on record. Further, these petitioners are seeking direction upon respondents to extend the benefit of reservation from the date of filing of this writ petition, viz. 4th January, 2017. Arguments of the Petitioners:- 7. And lastly it is prayed that Full Court resolution dated 29th November, 2018 of the Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand be brought on record. Further, these petitioners are seeking direction upon respondents to extend the benefit of reservation from the date of filing of this writ petition, viz. 4th January, 2017. Arguments of the Petitioners:- 7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that as Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001 (Hereinafter to be referred to as “The Rules, 2001” for the sake of brevity) does not prescribe any reservation for appointment on the post of District Judge and hence, it is violative of Jharkhand State Reservation Policy (Annexure 2 to the memo of the writ petition) as well as is violative of Article 16(4) and is also violative of Article 16 (4A) of the Constitution of India. As per new policy of reservation of the State of Jharkhand, there is 50% reservation (For Scheduled Castes-14%, Scheduled Tribes-10%, for Extremely Backward Classes-14%, for Backward Classes 10% and for Women of Backward Classes-2%). 8. It is further submitted by counsel for the petitioners that for the post of Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), there is already a reservation for reserved category up to 50%(For Scheduled Castes-10%, Scheduled Tribes-26%, Extremely Backward Classes-8% and Backward Classes-6%), but, there is no reservation in the Superior Judicial Services under the Rules, 2001, hence, it is violative of Article 16(4), 16(4A) of the Constitution of India and also violative of the reservation policy of the State of Jharkhand. 9. It is further submitted by counsel for the petitioners that there is bound to be a reservation policy in the Superior Judicial Service. Reservation is the demand of the day. In the State of Bihar, there is reservation in the Superior Judicial Service. 10. Counsel appearing for the petitioners has relied upon several decisions including (i) Govt. of Bihar & Ors. Etc. Etc. –vs.- Dayanand Singh Etc. Etc. reported in 2016 (4) JBCJ 201 (SC) (ii) Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) Represented By Its Assistant General Secretary on Behalf of The Association reported in (1981) 1 SCC 246 (iii) M. Nagaraj and others vs. Union of India and others reported in (2006) 8 SCC 212 (iv) Jarnail Singh & Ors. vs. Lachhmi Narain Gupta & Ors. Etc. reported in 2016 (4) JBCJ 201 (SC) (ii) Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) Represented By Its Assistant General Secretary on Behalf of The Association reported in (1981) 1 SCC 246 (iii) M. Nagaraj and others vs. Union of India and others reported in (2006) 8 SCC 212 (iv) Jarnail Singh & Ors. vs. Lachhmi Narain Gupta & Ors. reported in 2018 (4) JBCJ 133 (SC) On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by counsel for the petitioners that there is bound to be a reservation for the candidates of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes for the appointment on the post of District Judges for which applications have been invited in pursuance of Public Advertisement No. 1/2017/Apptt. Arguments by the State:- 11. Counsel appearing for the State of Jharkhand submitted that detailed affidavit has been filed in this case. It is further submitted by the respondent State of Jharkhand that so far as reservation for the post of District Judge is concerned, it is for the High Court of Jharkhand to decide the same. If the High Court is prescribing reservation, the same will be immediately implemented, looking to the powers of High Court under Articles 233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution of India. It is further submitted by counsel for the State that it is one thing to have reservation policy of the State of Jharkhand and it is altogether another thing to apply the same to the Judiciary. Reservation cannot be imposed upon the High Court. The State of Jharkhand cannot impose reservation policy for the appointment in the Superior Judicial Service unless there is a specific resolution of the Full Court of the High Court and hence, no question, whatsoever, arises of any reservation in the Superior Judicial Service unless the High Court prescribes the same. The Rules, 2001 does not prescribe any reservation for appointment of District Judges directly from Bar. Hence, this writ petition may not be entertained by this Court. Arguments by High Court of Jharkhand :- 12. It is submitted by counsel for the High Court of Jharkhand (Respondent No.1) that looking to the prayers in this writ petition no writ of mandamus or any other writ can be issued upon the respondents to incorporate the provisions of reservation for appointment in the Superior Judicial Service in the Rules, 2001. It is submitted by counsel for the High Court of Jharkhand (Respondent No.1) that looking to the prayers in this writ petition no writ of mandamus or any other writ can be issued upon the respondents to incorporate the provisions of reservation for appointment in the Superior Judicial Service in the Rules, 2001. Counsel for Respondent No.1 has also submitted that non-inclusion of the reservation in the Rules, 2001 is never violative of Article 16(4) nor it is violative of Article 16(4A) of the Constitution of India. It is also submitted by the counsel for Respondent No.1 that reservation policy of the State of Jharkhand has no automatic application in the appointment of the District Judges. Nobody can impose reservation for appointment of District Judges. Powers of reservation is vested in the High Court under Articles 233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution of India. Neither any rule can be enacted under Article 309 of the Constitution of India nor under Articles 16(4) or 16(4 A) of the Constitution of India reservation can be prescribed by the State of Jharkhand for the appointment of judicial officers. There bound to be a consultation with the High Court before reservation is imposed for the appointment on the post of District Judges. Articles 233, 234 and 235 constitute a complete code by itself. Article 309 is subject to these Articles. Similarly, Article 16(4) and Article 16(4A) are also subject to Articles 233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution of India. Thus, as prayed, no direction can be issued upon the respondents to incorporate reservation by looking at Article 16(4) or by looking at Article 16(4A) of Constitution of India, which are subject to Article 233, Article 234 and Article 235 of Constitution of India. This is known as separation of power. This is known as independence of Judiciary. This is known as basic features of the Constitution of India, meaning thereby, unless the High Court resolves for reservation, State legislature has no power, jurisdiction and authority to impose reservation either for the appointment on the post of District Judges or upon the appointments in the Subordinate Judiciary. There bound to be a specific resolution by the High Court prescribing reservation. If the Rules, 2001 are silent, neither any reservation can be presumed nor can it be imposed. There bound to be a specific resolution by the High Court prescribing reservation. If the Rules, 2001 are silent, neither any reservation can be presumed nor can it be imposed. It is further submitted by the counsel for Respondent No.1 that in the facts of the present case, the Full Court of the High Court of Jharkhand has resolved on 29th November, 2018 that reservation in principle is accepted, but, as the present recruitment process has already been started, in pursuance of Public Advertisement No. 1/2017/Apptt. for the post of District Judges, there shall be no reservation for the appointments with respect to the said advertisement. It is further submitted by counsel for the Respondent No.1 that in future there shall be reservation, but, so far as finalisation of the percentage is concerned, the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court of Jharkhand shall constitute a committee. Percentage of reservation is also a delicate issue, for which a committee will be constituted for future appointments, because every aspect of the matter will be looked into with respect to the representation of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes in the Judiciary as well as to the fact that efficiency of the Judicial Services has to be maintained. This process of maintaining equilibrium by prescribing proper percentage of reservation will be done for future appointments as per the resolution of the Full Court of the High Court of Jharkhand, hence, this writ petition may not be entertained by this Court, especially for Public Advertisement No. 1/2017/Apptt., because High Court of Jharkhand has not prescribed any reservation in exercise of the powers under Articles 233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution of India. 13. Counsel for the Respondent No.1-High Court of Jharkhand has placed reliance upon the following decisions: (i) STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER -vs.- BAL MUKUND SAH AND OTHERS reported in (2000) 4 SCC 640 (ii) REGISTRAR (ADMN.), HIGH COURT OF ORISSA -vs.- SISIR KANTA SATAPATHY (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ANOTHER, reported in (1999) 7 SCC 725 On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by counsel for Respondent No.1-the High Court of Jharkhand that Article 16(4) and Article 16(4A) are mere enabling provisions and they are subject to Articles 233 and 234 and 235 of the Constitution of India. Likewise, Article 309 is also subject to Articles 233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution of India. Likewise, Article 309 is also subject to Articles 233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution of India. 14. Counsel for Respondent No.1 has also placed reliance upon the decision reported in SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION AND OTHERS vs. UNION OF INDIA, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 441 and has pointed out on the basis of the aforesaid decisions, meaning of the word ‘Consultation’. 15. Similarly, SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION AND ANOTHER –vs.- UNION OF INDIA, reported in (2016) 5 SCC 1 has also been relied upon. 16. Counsel for Respondent No.1 has also placed reliance upon INDRA SAWHNEY AND OTHERS –vs.- UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS, reported in (1992) Supplementary (3) SCC 217 and NAWAL KISHORE MISHRA AND OTHERS –vs.- HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ALLAHABAD THROUGH ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL AND OTHERS, reported in (2015) 5 SCC 479 . On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by counsel for the Respondent No.1 that reservation policy of the State of Jharkhand is not automatically applicable for the appointment on the post of District Judges, especially, when the Rules, 2001 is silent about reservation and especially, when Resolution dated 29th November, 2018 of the Full Court of the High Court of Jharkhand (Annexure A to the counter affidavit dated 16th January, 2019 of the Respondent No.1) does not prescribe for any reservation for the appointment on the post of District Judges for which applications have been invited vide Public Advertisement No. 1/2017/Apptt., hence, this writ petition may not be entertained by this Court. REASONS : 17. Having heard counsels appearing for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we see no reason to entertain this writ petition mainly for the following facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements:- (I) Vide Public Advertisement No. 1/2017/Apptt., applications have been invited for the post of District Judges. There are rules with respect to recruitment process known as Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001. (II) Recruitment process has already been started, examinations have already been conducted. Interviews have also been conducted. As per the Rules, 2001, there is no provision for reservation, hence, once the process of selection has already been started no Rule of recruitment process can be altered. It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court that once recruitment process has started, the rules of appointment cannot be altered. Interviews have also been conducted. As per the Rules, 2001, there is no provision for reservation, hence, once the process of selection has already been started no Rule of recruitment process can be altered. It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court that once recruitment process has started, the rules of appointment cannot be altered. Full Court of High Court of Jharkhand has resolved on 29th November, 2018 as under: “SL. NO. AGENDA RESOLUTIONS To consider the matter related with reservation in Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service Discussed. Considering all the aspects of the matter as well as order dated 25.01.2018 passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.1010/2018 and Constitutional mandate for making provisions for reservation in respect of candidates of backward classes in Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service, the Full Court agrees in principle that reservation in recruitment for Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service U/r 4 (a) [by way of direct recruitment] should be implemented. However, in view of the fact that reservation policy in recruitment for Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service U/r 4(a) [by way of direct recruitment] was not adopted at the time of Advertisement of current recruitment process with reference to advertisement no. 01/2017/Apptt., it will not be proper to change the rule midway, hence benefits of reservation shall not be provided in the present recruitment process with reference to advertisement no. 01/2017/Apptt. It is further, resolved that a committee be constituted by Hon’ble the Chief Justice to look into the matter of reservation in detail considering the reservation policies of other States including Jharkhand State Government as also keeping in view of demographic condition of this State.” (Emphasis supplied) (III) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Swapna reported in (2005) 4 SCC 154 in Paragraph No. 14 as under: “14. The High Court has committed an error in holding that the amended rule was operative. As has been fairly conceded by learned counsel for Respondent 1 applicant it was the unamended rule which was applicable. Once a process of selection starts, the prescribed selection criteria cannot be changed. The logic behind the same is based on fair play. The High Court has committed an error in holding that the amended rule was operative. As has been fairly conceded by learned counsel for Respondent 1 applicant it was the unamended rule which was applicable. Once a process of selection starts, the prescribed selection criteria cannot be changed. The logic behind the same is based on fair play. A person who did not apply because a certain criterion e.g. minimum percentage of marks can make a legitimate grievance, in case the same is lowered, that he could have applied because he possessed the said percentage. Rules regarding qualification for appointment if amended during continuance of the process of selection do not affect the same. That is because every statute or statutory rule is prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. Unless there are words in the statute or in the rules showing the intention to affect existing rights the rule must be held to be prospective. If the rule is expressed in a language which is fairly capable of either interpretation it ought to be considered as prospective only. (See P. Mahendran v. State of Karnataka and Gopal Krushna Rath v. M.A.A. Baig.)” (Emphasis supplied) (IV) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Mohd. Sohrab Khan v. Aligarh Muslim University, reported in (2009) 4 SCC 555 in Paragraph No.s 24, 25 as under: “24. According to us, the Selection Committee as also the University changed the rule in the midstream which was not permissible. The University can always have a person as a Lecturer in a particular discipline that it desires to have, but the same must be specifically stated in the advertisement itself, so that there is no confusion and all persons who could be intending candidates, should know as to what is the subject which the person is required to teach and what essential qualification the person must possess to be suitable for making application for filling up the said post. 25. We are not disputing the fact that in the matter of selection of candidates, opinion of the Selection Committee should be final, but at the same time, the Selection Committee cannot act arbitrarily and cannot change the criteria/qualification in the selection process during its midstream. 25. We are not disputing the fact that in the matter of selection of candidates, opinion of the Selection Committee should be final, but at the same time, the Selection Committee cannot act arbitrarily and cannot change the criteria/qualification in the selection process during its midstream. Merajuddin Ahmad did not possess a degree in Pure Chemistry and therefore, it was rightly held by the High Court that he did not possess the minimum qualification required for filling up the post of Lecturer in Chemistry, for Pure Chemistry and Industrial Chemistry are two different subjects.” (Emphasis supplied) (V) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Mithilesh Kumar reported in (2010) 13 SCC 467 in Paragraph No. 20 as under: “20. The decisions which have been cited on behalf of the respondent have clearly explained the law with regard to the applicability of the rules which are amended and/or altered during the selection process. They all say in one voice that the norms or rules as existing on the date when the process of selection begins will control such selection and any alteration to such norms would not affect the continuing process, unless specifically the same were given retrospective effect.” (Emphasis supplied) (VI) Much has been argued out by counsel for the petitioners that necessary direction be given to the respondents to incorporate the provisions of reservation in the Rules, 2001 and it is also argued out by the counsel for the petitioners that there is a reservation policy of the State of Jharkhand (Annexure 2 to the memo of the writ petition) which should be implemented. None of these arguments is accepted by this Court looking to Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution of India. As per these Articles, reservation can be prescribed by the State of Jharkhand only after consultation with the High Court. Full Court resolution prescribing reservation in the appointment of judicial officers is sine qua non. Independent of this consultation with the High Court, neither the Rules can be enacted nor any policy, prescribing reservation can be made applicable in the process of recruitment of judges. Independence of Judiciary is to be maintained. Neither the reservation policy of the State is automatically applicable to the process of appointment on the post of District Judges nor can there be compulsory reservation in the said recruitment process. Independence of Judiciary is to be maintained. Neither the reservation policy of the State is automatically applicable to the process of appointment on the post of District Judges nor can there be compulsory reservation in the said recruitment process. There is no right vested in these petitioners to get themselves appointed on the post of District Judges merely because they belong to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes. Article 16(4) and Article 16(4A) of the Constitution of India are mere enabling provisions. There cannot be automatic reservation under these two Articles in the process of recruitment of District Judges because these two Articles are subject to Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution of India. Similarly, State also has no power, jurisdiction and authority to impose reservation nor any rule can be enacted by the State under Article 309 of the Constitution of India imposing reservation for the appointment of District Judges. Article 309 is also subject to Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution of India. (VII) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in STATE OF BIHAR AND ANOTHER –vs.- BAL MUKUND SAH AND OTHERS reported in (2000) 4 SCC 640 in Paragraph Nos. 26, 29, 37 and 48 as under: “26. So far as recruitment to the District and Subordinate Judiciary is concerned, we have therefore, to turn to the twin articles found in Chapter VI of Part VI dealing with “subordinate courts”. The relevant two articles read as under: “233. Appointment of District Judges.—(1) Appointment of persons to be, and the posting and promotion of, District Judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. (2) A person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a District Judge if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment. * * * 234. (2) A person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a District Judge if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment. * * * 234. Recruitment of persons other than District Judges to the Judicial Service.—Appointments of persons other than District Judges to the Judicial Service of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State.” (emphasis supplied) Article 233 dealing with appointment of District Judges, on its own express terminology projects a complete scheme regarding the appointment of persons to the District Judiciary as District Judges. In the present appeals, we are concerned with direct recruitment to the cadre of District Judges and hence sub-article (2) of Article 233 becomes relevant. Apart from laying down the eligibility criterion for candidates to be appointed from the Bar as direct District Judges the said provision is further hedged by the condition that only those recommended by the High Court for such appointment could be appointed by the Governor of the State. Similarly, for recruitment of judicial officers other than District Judges to the Judicial Service at lower level, a complete scheme is provided by Article 234 wherein the Governor of the State can make such appointments in accordance with the rules framed by him after consulting with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. So far as the Public Service Commission is concerned, as seen from Article 320, the procedure for recruitment to the advertised posts to be followed by it is earmarked therein. But the role of the Public Service Commission springs into action after the posts in a cadre are required to be filled in by direct recruitment and for that purpose due intimation is given to the Commission by the State authorities. They have obviously to act in consultation with the High Court so far as recruitment to posts in the Subordinate Judiciary is concerned. They have obviously to act in consultation with the High Court so far as recruitment to posts in the Subordinate Judiciary is concerned. Of course, it will be for the High Court to decide how many vacancies in the cadre of District Judges and Subordinate Judges are required to be filled in by direct recruitment so far as the District Judiciary is concerned and necessarily only by direct recruitment so far as the Subordinate Judiciary is concerned. This prime role of the High Court becomes clearly discernible from Article 235 which deals with the control of the High Court over the Subordinate Judiciary and also of subordinate courts. The said article provides as under: “235. Control over subordinate courts.—The control over District Courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the Judicial Service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of District Judge shall be vested in the High Court, but nothing in this article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any right of appeal which he may have under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed under such law.” It is in the light of the aforesaid relevant scheme of the Constitution that we now proceed to tackle the main controversy posed for our consideration. 29. The first part of Article 235 itself lays down that it is for the High Court to control the District Courts and courts subordinate thereto and in exercise of that control vesting in the High Court, regulation of posting and promotions and granting of leave to persons belonging to the Judicial Services has to be done by the High Court. It is, of course, true that in the second part of Article 235 judicial officers already appointed to the service have their statutory right of appeal and the right to be dealt with regarding other service conditions as laid down by any other law for the time being in force, expressly protected. It is, of course, true that in the second part of Article 235 judicial officers already appointed to the service have their statutory right of appeal and the right to be dealt with regarding other service conditions as laid down by any other law for the time being in force, expressly protected. But these provisions of the second part only enable the Governor under Article 309, in the absence of any statutory enactment made by the competent Legislature for regulating the conditions of service of judicial officers who are already recruited and have entered and become part and parcel of the State service, to promulgate appropriate rules on the subject. But so far as the entry points are concerned, namely, recruitment and appointment to the posts of Presiding Officers of the courts subordinate to the High Courts, only Articles 233 and 234 would govern the field. Article 234 lays down the procedure and the method of recruiting judicial officers at grass-root level being Subordinate Judges and Munsiffs as laid down by the 1955 Rules. These Rules are also framed by the Governor of Bihar in exercise of his powers under Article 234 obviously after the consultation of the High Court and the Public Service Commission. Rules regarding the procedure of selection to be followed by the State Public Service Commission as found in Rules 4 to 17 deal with the method to be adopted by the Public Service Commission while selecting candidates who offer their candidature for the posts advertised to be filled in. These Rules obviously require consultation with the Commission on the procedural aspect of selection process. But so far as the High Court is concerned, its consultation becomes pivotal and relevant by the thrust of Article 233 itself as it is the High Court which has to control the candidates, who ultimately on getting selected, have to act as Judges at the lowest level of the Judiciary and whose posting, promotion and grant of leave and other judicial control would vest only in the High Court, as per Article 235 first part, once they enter the Judicial Service at grass-root level. Thus consultation of the Governor with the High Court under Article 234 is entirely of a different type as compared to his consultation with the Public Service Commission about the procedural aspect of selection. Thus consultation of the Governor with the High Court under Article 234 is entirely of a different type as compared to his consultation with the Public Service Commission about the procedural aspect of selection. So far as direct recruitment to the posts of District Judges is concerned, Article 233 sub-article (2) leaves no room for doubt that unless the candidate is recommended by the High Court, the Governor cannot appoint him as a District Judge. Thus Articles 233 and 234, amongst them, represent a well-knit and complete scheme regulating the appointments at the apex level of the District Judiciary, namely, District Judges on the one hand and Subordinate Judges at the grass-root level of the Judiciary subordinate to the District Court. Thus the Subordinate Judiciary represents a pyramidical structure. At the base level i.e. grass-root level are the Munsiffs and Magistrates whose recruitment is governed by Article 234. That is the first level of the Judiciary. The second level represents already recruited judicial officers at grass-root level, whose working is controlled by the High Court under Article 235 first part. At the top of this pyramid are the posts of District Judges. Their recruitment to these posts is governed by Article 233. It is the third and the apex level of the Subordinate Judiciary. 37. It is, of course, true as laid down by a catena of decisions of this Court, that topics of constitution of courts and services, laying down of rules regarding the conditions of service other than those expressly placed within the jurisdiction of the High Court by Articles 233 and 235, providing for age of superannuation or other retirement benefits to judicial officers, fixing pay scales, diversification of cadres may form part of the general recruitment and conditions of services falling within the spheres of the Governor’s rule-making power under Article 309 read with the second part of Article 235 or may even be made the subject-matter of legislation by the competent Legislature in exercise of its legislative powers under Entry 41 of List II or for that matter Entry 11-A of List III of the Seventh Schedule. But save and except this permitted field, the State Legislature cannot enter upon the forbidden field expressly reserved for consultation with the High Court by the thrust of Articles 233 and 234 so far as the initial entry point of recruitment to the Judicial Service at grass-root level or at the apex level of the District Judiciary is concerned. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of A. Panduranga Rao v. State of A.P. speaking through Untwalia, J., considered the question whether anyone can be appointed by the Governor as a District Judge without being recommended by the High Court. Relying on the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Chandra Mohan case11 in para 7 of the Report, observations were made as under: (SCC p. 712) “There are two sources of recruitment, namely, (i) service of the Union or the State, and (ii) Members of the Bar. The said Judges from the first source are appointed in consultation with the High Court and those from the second source are appointed on the recommendation of the High Court.” And thereafter the following pertinent observations were made in para 8, which read as under: (SCC p. 712) “8. A candidate for direct recruitment from the Bar does not become eligible for appointment without the recommendation of the High Court. He becomes eligible only on such recommendation under clause (2) of Article 233. The High Court in the judgment under appeal felt some difficulty in appreciating the meaning of the word ‘recommended’. But the literal meaning given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary is quite simple and apposite. It means ‘suggest as fit for employment’. He becomes eligible only on such recommendation under clause (2) of Article 233. The High Court in the judgment under appeal felt some difficulty in appreciating the meaning of the word ‘recommended’. But the literal meaning given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary is quite simple and apposite. It means ‘suggest as fit for employment’. In case of appointment from the Bar it is not open to the Government to choose a candidate for appointment until and unless his name is recommended by the High Court.” It is, therefore, obvious that the State Legislature has no role to play while controlling appointments of District Judges under Article 233 or appointment of Civil Judges to the Subordinate Judiciary at grass-root level under the District Judiciary and it is only the Governor who is entrusted with the said task which he has to undertake after consultation with the High Court and by framing appropriate rules for recruitment to the Judiciary at grass-root level as enjoined by Article 234 and can only act on recommendation by the High Court for direct recruitment from the Bar for being appointed as District Judges as laid down by Article 233 sub-article (2). There is no third method or third authority which can intervene in the process or can have its say, whether legislative authority or executive authority, as the case may be, independently of the complete scheme of such recruitment as envisaged by the aforesaid two articles. It is, therefore, difficult to appreciate the contention of learned Senior Counsel for the appellant State that paramount legislative power of the State Legislature stands untouched by the scheme of the aforesaid two articles of the Constitution. 48. Dr Dhavan then invited our attention to the observations of a nine-Judge Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Indra Sawhney para 694, at p. 662, para 738, at p. 689 and para 788, at p. 720, for submitting that Article 16 sub-article (4) enables the State authorities to direct reservation in services under the State. This constitutional power, once exercised, cannot be sought to be circumscribed or curtailed by non-compliance with the procedure of Article 234 or for that matter, Article 233. This argument of his cannot be countenanced. This constitutional power, once exercised, cannot be sought to be circumscribed or curtailed by non-compliance with the procedure of Article 234 or for that matter, Article 233. This argument of his cannot be countenanced. It is obvious that for utilising the enabling power under Article 16(4), the State Legislature cannot enter the forbidden field and conflict with substantive provisions of Article 233 or the first part of Article 235. Meaning thereby, neither can it lay down a new criterion of eligibility contrary to sub-article (2) of Article 233 for appointment to the District Judiciary nor can it affect the control of the High Court in connection with the District Judiciary as vested in the High Court under the first part of Article 235. If at all any reservation policy under Article 16(4) is to be pursued, it has to be exercised in consonance with the scheme of Articles 233 and 234 and not dehors it. Dr Dhavan fairly conceded that neither in the Rules of 1951 regarding appointments to the district cadre as per Article 233 nor under the Rules of 1955 for appointments in the cadre of the Subordinate Judiciary as laid down by Article 234, is there any provision for 50% reservation of posts. As already noted earlier, Article 16(4) is an enabling provision and it enables the competent authority which is entrusted with the task of recruitment and appointment to any service including the Judicial Service to exercise this enabling power and provide for appropriate reservation. In fact there is no dispute between the parties in these proceedings that with the consent of the High Court of Patna, 14% reservation for SCs and 10% reservation for STs is already accepted as permissible reservation for direct recruitment at the grass-root level and Rule 20 of the Rules of 1955 clearly points to such reservation, the percentage of which has already been agreed to between the High Court on the one hand and the Government on the other. That would be a perfectly permissible exercise under Article 16(4) read with Article 234. But beyond that, unless the rules are properly amended by following the procedure of Articles 233 and 234 read with Article 309 after consulting the High Court, the Governor on his own cannot provide for any more reservation. That would be a perfectly permissible exercise under Article 16(4) read with Article 234. But beyond that, unless the rules are properly amended by following the procedure of Articles 233 and 234 read with Article 309 after consulting the High Court, the Governor on his own cannot provide for any more reservation. Nor can, by a legislative Act, an independent provision under Article 16(4) totally bypassing the High Court be resorted to. As already seen earlier, Article 16(4) has to be read with Article 335 and maintenance of efficiency of administration in the making of appointments to services and posts would be a sine qua non before considering the claim for reservation of SCs and STs which would also include OBCs as laid down by a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Indra Sawhney case. If Article 16(4) has to be read with Article 335 as already ruled by the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court, the same authority which can have the pulse and full control of administration pertaining to the services concerned having sufficient expertise can avail of the aforesaid Article 16(4) keeping in view the mandate of Article 335. In case of Subordinate Judicial Services comprising of District Courts and courts subordinate thereto, full control vests in the High Court under Article 235 which can control the promotions and postings of such Members of the Judiciary. It is the High Court which will have full knowledge and expertise for deciding the question of adequacy of representation by way of reservation in the Judicial Service. Therefore, it is the High Court only which can give the green signal regarding the extent of such reservations at entry points as candidates entering on reserved posts in the Judicial Service of the District Judiciary both at the apex level and at the grass-root level have to act under its control. In the absence of such a green signal by the High Court there would be no occasion to invoke Article 16(4) read with Article 335. We fail to appreciate how the State Legislature by enacting Section 4 of the Act, can decide for itself that 50% reservation is required to be made in appointments to the District and Subordinate Judiciaries consistent with the maintenance of efficiency of judicial administration which is under the full control of the High Court as per Article 235. We fail to appreciate how the State Legislature by enacting Section 4 of the Act, can decide for itself that 50% reservation is required to be made in appointments to the District and Subordinate Judiciaries consistent with the maintenance of efficiency of judicial administration which is under the full control of the High Court as per Article 235. As it cannot of its own be alive to this vital aspect lacking requisite knowledge and expertise, any scheme of reservation framed by the Legislature under Article 16(4) dehors Article 335 so far as judicial appointments are concerned, must necessarily fall through. The authority giving the green signal as per Article 16(4) read with Article 335 can be only the High Court. It will be totally out of the picture so far as enactment of such straitjacket reservation provisions dehors the High Court’s consultation goes. In this view of the matter, the broad submission of Dr Dhavan that reservation in fulfilment of right to equality of opportunity under Article 16(1) read with Article 16(4) can be resorted to without reference to the High Court and therefore, the impugned Act cannot be found fault with, cannot be accepted.” (Emphasis supplied) In the light of the aforesaid decision, it is pertinent to mention here that independence of Judiciary is a basic structure of the Constitution of India. There cannot be automatic reservation in the appointment of the District Judges. The High Court’s consultation is must. High Court must resolve for application of the reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes and High Court must also prescribe the percentage of reservation based upon the data supplied by the State with respect to the representation of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes in the Judiciary. An equilibrium is to be maintained by the Judiciary between reservation and efficiency in the Judicial Services. (VIII) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Govt. of Bihar & Ors. Etc. Etc. –vs.- Dayanand Singh Etc. Etc. reported in 2016 (4) JBCJ 201 (SC) in Paragraph No.s 15 and 16 thereof as under: “15. An equilibrium is to be maintained by the Judiciary between reservation and efficiency in the Judicial Services. (VIII) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Govt. of Bihar & Ors. Etc. Etc. –vs.- Dayanand Singh Etc. Etc. reported in 2016 (4) JBCJ 201 (SC) in Paragraph No.s 15 and 16 thereof as under: “15. From the submissions made before us, it is clear from the stand of the Government of Bihar that as a matter of policy there is a need for providing appropriate reservations in favour of the various backward classes of citizens even in the JUDICIAL SERVICES of the State of Bihar. However, under the scheme of the Constitution, the Executive is not the only authority to formulate such policy or to give effect to. The Executive is under a constitutional obligation to consult the High Court both for framing and giving effect to such policy of providing reservations in the JUDICIAL SERVICES. The legal position in this regard is made clear on more than one occasion by this Court. In the context of the State of Bihar, the law is declared in Bal Mukund case (supra) 16. This Court observed in Bal Mukund case that a constitutional body like the High Court cannot be believed to be oblivious to “the need for a scheme of reservation”.- “32. ……. It is not as if that the High Courts being constitutional functionaries may be oblivious of the need for a scheme of reservation if necessary in appropriate cases by resorting to the enabling provision under Article 16(4).” The assessment of the existence of the need for providing reservation and matters incidental thereto is essentially the function of the Legislature or the Executive, as the case may be , and in the realm of policy choice. But the power to frame the policy is structured by certain constitutional imperatives and limitations. They are (i) the identification of the existence of backward classes in the State, (ii) the formation of the opinion that such classes are not adequately represented in the JUDICIAL SERVICES of the State, (iii) the determination of the question as to what would be the appropriate percentage of reservation required to be made with reference to the JUDICIAL SERVICE consistent with obligation to maintain the efficiency of the JUDICIAL SERVICES. Such assessments are required to be made on objective and rational considerations consistent with constitutional obligations of both the Executive and Judicial branches of the State.” (Emphasis supplied) (IX) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in REGISTRAR (ADMN.), HIGH COURT OF ORISSA -vs.- SISIR KANTA SATAPATHY (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ANOTHER reported in (1999) 7 SCC 725 in Paragraph 15 and 21 as under: “15. On going through the judgments of this Court right from Shyamlal v. State of U.P. down to High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal one cannot but reach one conclusion regarding the power of the High Court in the matter of ordering compulsory retirement. That conclusion is that the High Courts are vested with the disciplinary control as well as administrative control over the members of the judicial service exclusively, but that does not mean that they can also pass orders of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination from service while exercising administrative and disciplinary control over the members of the judicial service. Undoubtedly, the High Courts alone are entitled to initiate, to hold enquiry and to take a decision in respect of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination from service, but the formal order to give effect to such a decision has to be passed only by the State Governor on the recommendation of the High Court. It is well settled again by a catena of decisions of this Court that the recommendation of the High Court is binding on the State Government/Governor (vide para 18 in Inder Prakash Anand case). 21. After the recommendation of the Full Court was received, the Government on 2-12-1991 chose not to proceed further on the plea that the matter was pending in the Supreme Court. They declined to act further on the recommendation. This, the Government could not have done. 21. After the recommendation of the Full Court was received, the Government on 2-12-1991 chose not to proceed further on the plea that the matter was pending in the Supreme Court. They declined to act further on the recommendation. This, the Government could not have done. The course open to the Government was to forward the recommendation of the High Court to the Governor who would have passed an order in accordance with the recommendation made by the High Court as has been held in Inder Prakash Anand case because the recommendation of the High Court was binding on the Government.” (Emphasis supplied) (X) In view of the aforesaid decisions, detailed meaning of the word “Consultation” has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which is also followed in the decision reported in (2016) 5 SCC Page No.1 and it has been pointed out that unless there is resolution for reservation made by the High Court, there can be no reservation in the process of selection of the District Judges. There cannot be any automatic reservation. State cannot impose any reservation policy upon the judiciary. In view of the aforesaid decisions, Article 16 (4) and Article 16(4A) of the Constitution of India are mere enabling provisions. They are subject to Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution of India. (XI) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in INDRA SAWHNEY AND OTHERS –vs.- UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in (1992) Supplementary (3) SCC 217 in Paragraph No. 417, 434, 836 and 859 as under: “417. Under Article 16(4), the reservation in the State employment is to be provided for a “class of people” which must be “backward” and “in the opinion of the State” is “not adequately represented” in the services of the State. Under Article 46, the State is required to “promote with special care” the “educational and economic interests” of the “weaker sections” of the people and “in particular”, of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and “to protect” them from “social injustice” and “all forms of exploitation”. Under Article 46, the State is required to “promote with special care” the “educational and economic interests” of the “weaker sections” of the people and “in particular”, of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and “to protect” them from “social injustice” and “all forms of exploitation”. Since in the present case, we are not concerned with the reservations in favour of the SCs/STs, it is not necessary to refer to Article 335 except to point out that, it is in terms provided there that the claims of SCs/STs in the services are to be taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration. It must, therefore, mean that the claims of other backward class of citizens and weaker sections must also be considered consistently with the maintenance of the efficiency. For, whomsoever, therefore, reservation is made, the efficiency of administration is not to be sacrificed, whatever the efficiency may mean. That is the mandate of the Constitution itself. 434. In this connection, a reference may first be made to Article 335 of the Constitution. There is no doubt that backward classes under Article 16(4) would also include SCs/STs for whose entry into services, provision is also made under Article 335. There is, however, a difference in the language of the two articles. Whereas the provision of Article 16(4) is couched in an enabling language, that of Article 335 is in a mandatory cast. It appears that it became necessary to make the additional provision of reservations for SCs/STs under Article 335 because for them the reservations in services were to be made as obligatory as reservations in the House of the People and the Legislative Assemblies under Articles 330 and 332 respectively. When we remember that Articles 330, 332 and 335 belong to the family of articles in Part XVI which makes “Special Provisions Relating to Certain Classes”, the additional and obligatory provision for SCs/STs under Article 335 becomes meaningful. It is probably because of the mandate of Article 335 and the level of backwardness of the SCs/STs — the most backward among the backward classes — that it also became necessary to caution and emphasise in the same vein, that the imperative claims of the SCs/STs shall be taken into consideration consistently with the efficiency of the administration, and not by sacrificing it. It cannot, however, be doubted that the same considerations will have to prevail while making provisions for reservation in favour of all backward classes under Article 16(4). To hold otherwise would not only be irrational but discriminatory between two classes of backward citizens. 836. We do not think it necessary to express ourselves at any length on the correctness or otherwise of the opposing points of view referred to above. (It is, however, necessary to point out that the mandate — if it can be called that — of Article 335 is to take the claims of members of SC/ST into consideration, consistent with the maintenance of efficiency of administration. It would be a misreading of the article to say that the mandate is maintenance of efficiency of administration.) Maybe, efficiency, competence and merit are not synonymous concepts; maybe, it is wrong to treat merit as synonymous with efficiency in administration and that merit is but a component of the efficiency of an administrator. Even so, the relevance and significance of merit at the stage of initial recruitment cannot be ignored. It cannot also be ignored that the very idea of reservation implies selection of a less meritorious person. At the same time, we recognise that this much cost has to be paid, if the constitutional promise of social justice is to be redeemed. We also firmly believe that given an opportunity, members of these classes are bound to overcome their initial disadvantages and would compete with — and may, in some cases, excel — members of open competition. It is undeniable that nature has endowed merit upon members of backward classes as much as it has endowed upon members of other classes and that what is required is an opportunity to prove it. It may not, therefore, be said that reservations are anti-meritarian. Merit there is even among the reserved candidates and the small difference, that may be allowed at the stage of initial recruitment is bound to disappear in course of time. These members too will compete with and improve their efficiency along with others. 859. We may summarise our answers to the various questions dealt with and answered hereinabove: (1) (a) It is not necessary that the ‘provision’ under Article 16(4) should necessarily be made by the Parliament/Legislature. Such a provision can be made by the Executive also. These members too will compete with and improve their efficiency along with others. 859. We may summarise our answers to the various questions dealt with and answered hereinabove: (1) (a) It is not necessary that the ‘provision’ under Article 16(4) should necessarily be made by the Parliament/Legislature. Such a provision can be made by the Executive also. Local bodies, Statutory Corporations and other instrumentalities of the State falling under Article 12 of the Constitution are themselves competent to make such a provision, if so advised. (Paras 735-737) (b) An executive order making a provision under Article 16(4) is enforceable the moment it is made and issued. (Paras 738-740) (2) (a) Clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to clause (1). It is an instance and an illustration of the classification inherent in clause (1). (Paras 741-742) (b) Article 16(4) is exhaustive of the subject of reservation in favour of backward class of citizens, as explained in this judgment. (Para 743) (c) Reservations can also be provided under clause (1) of Article 16. It is not confined to extending of preferences, concessions or exemptions alone. These reservations, if any, made under clause (1) have to be so adjusted and implemented as not to exceed the level of representation prescribed for ‘backward class of citizens’ — as explained in this Judgment. (Para 745) (3) (a) A caste can be and quite often is a social class in India. If it is backward socially, it would be a backward class for the purposes of Article 16(4). Among non-Hindus, there are several occupational groups, sects and denominations, which for historical reasons, are socially backward. They too represent backward social collectivities for the purposes of Article 16(4). (Paras 746 to 779) (b) Neither the Constitution nor the law prescribes the procedure or method of identification of backward classes. Nor is it possible or advisable for the court to lay down any such procedure or method. It must be left to the authority appointed to identify. It can adopt such method/procedure as it thinks convenient and so long as its survey covers the entire populace, no objection can be taken to it. Identification of the backward classes can certainly be done with reference to castes among, and along with, other occupational groups, classes and sections of people. One can start the process either with occupational groups or with castes or with some other groups. Identification of the backward classes can certainly be done with reference to castes among, and along with, other occupational groups, classes and sections of people. One can start the process either with occupational groups or with castes or with some other groups. Thus one can start the process with the castes, wherever they are found, apply the criteria (evolved for determining backwardness) and find out whether it satisfies the criteria. If it does — what emerges is a “backward class of citizens” within the meaning of and for the purposes of Article 16(4). Similar process can be adopted in the case of other occupational groups, communities and classes, so as to cover the entire populace. The central idea and overall objective should be to consider all available groups, sections and classes in society. Since caste represents an existing, identifiable social group/class encompassing an overwhelming minority of the country’s population, one can well begin with it and then go to other groups, sections and classes. (Paras 780 and 785). (c) It is not correct to say that the backward class of citizens contemplated in Article 16(4) is the same as the socially and educationally backward classes referred to in Article 15(4). It is much wider. The accent in Article 16(4) is on social backwardness. Of course, social, educational and economic backwardness are closely inter-twined in the Indian context. (Paras 786-789) (d) ‘Creamy layer’ can be, and must be excluded. (Paras 790-793) (e) It is not necessary for a class to be designated as a backward class that it is situated similarly to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes. (Paras 794 and 797) (f) The adequacy of representation of a particular class in the services under the State is a matter within the subjective satisfaction of the appropriate Government. The judicial scrutiny in that behalf is the same as in other matters within the subjective satisfaction of an authority. (Para 798) (4) (a) A backward class of citizens cannot be identified only and exclusively with reference to economic criteria. (Para 799) (b) It is, of course, permissible for the Government or other authority to identify a backward class of citizens on the basis of occupation-cum-income, without reference to caste, if it is so advised. (Para 800) (5) There is no constitutional bar to classify the backward classes of citizens into backward and more backward categories. (Para 799) (b) It is, of course, permissible for the Government or other authority to identify a backward class of citizens on the basis of occupation-cum-income, without reference to caste, if it is so advised. (Para 800) (5) There is no constitutional bar to classify the backward classes of citizens into backward and more backward categories. (Paras 801 to 803) (6) (a) and (b) The reservations contemplated in clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50%. While 50% shall be the rule, it is necessary not to put out of consideration certain extraordinary situations inherent in the great diversity of this country and the people. It might happen that in far-flung and remote areas the population inhabiting those areas might, on account of their being out of the mainstream of national life and in view of the conditions peculiar to end characteristic of them need to be treated in a different way, some relaxation in this strict rule may become imperative. In doing so, extreme caution is to be exercised and a special case made out. (Paras 804 to 813) (c) The rule of 50% should be applied to each year. It cannot be related to the total strength of the class, category, service or cadre, as the case may be. (Para 814) (d) Devadasan was wrongly decided and is accordingly overruled to the extent it is inconsistent with this judgment. (Paras 815 to 818) (7) Article 16(4) does not permit provision for reservations in the matter of promotion. This rule shall, however, have only prospective operation and shall not affect the promotions already made, whether made on regular basis or on any other basis. We direct that our decision on this question shall operate only prospectively and shall not affect promotions already made, whether on temporary, officiating or regular/permanent basis. It is further directed that wherever reservations are already provided in the matter of promotion — be it Central Services or State Services, or for that matter services under any Corporation, authority or body falling under the definition of ‘State’ in Article 12 — such reservations may continue in operation for a period of five years from this day. Within this period, it would be open to the appropriate authorities to revise, modify or re-issue the relevant rules to ensure the achievement of the objective of Article 16(4). Within this period, it would be open to the appropriate authorities to revise, modify or re-issue the relevant rules to ensure the achievement of the objective of Article 16(4). If any authority thinks that for ensuring adequate representation of ‘backward class of citizens’ in any service, class or category, it is necessary to provide for direct recruitment therein, it shall be open to it to do so. (Ahmadi, J expresses no opinion on this question upholding the preliminary objection of Union of India). It would not be impermissible for the State to extend concessions and relaxations to members of reserved categories in the matter of promotion without compromising the efficiency of the administration. (Paras 819 to 831) (8) While the rule of reservation cannot be called anti-meritarian, there are certain services and posts to which it may not be advisable to apply the rule of reservation. (Paras 832 to 841) (9) There is no particular or special standard of judicial scrutiny applicable to matters arising under Article 16(4). (Para 842) (10) The distinction made in the impugned Office Memorandum dated September 25, 1991 between ‘poorer sections’ and others among the backward classes is not invalid, if the classification is understood and operated as based upon relative backwardness among the several classes identified as Other Backward Classes, as explained in paras 843-844 of this Judgment. (Para 843-844) (11) The reservation of 10% of the posts in favour of ‘other economically backward sections of the people who are not covered by any of the existing schemes of the reservation’ made in the impugned Office Memorandum dated September 25, 1991 is constitutionally invalid and is accordingly struck down. (Para 845) (13) The Government of India and the State Governments have the power to, and ought to, create a permanent mechanism — in the nature of a Commission — for examining requests of inclusion and complaints of over-inclusion or non-inclusion in the list of OBCs and to advise the Government, which advice shall ordinarily be binding upon the Government. Where, however, the Government does not accept the advice, it must record its reasons therefor. (Para 847) (14) In view of the answers given by us herein and the directions issued herewith, it is not necessary to express any opinion on the correctness and adequacy of the exercise done by the Mandal Commission. Where, however, the Government does not accept the advice, it must record its reasons therefor. (Para 847) (14) In view of the answers given by us herein and the directions issued herewith, it is not necessary to express any opinion on the correctness and adequacy of the exercise done by the Mandal Commission. It is equally unnecessary to send the matters back to the Constitution Bench of five Judges. (Paras 848 to 850)” (XII) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in NAWAL KISHORE MISHRA AND OTHERS –vs.- HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ALLAHABAD THROUGH ITS REGISTRAR GENERAL AND OTHERS reported in (2015) 5 SCC 479 in Paragraph No. 20 as under: (Emphasis supplied) “20. Such principles can be culled out and stated as under: 20.1. Neither Article 233 nor Article 234 contain any provision of being subject to any enactment by the appropriate legislature as is provided in certain other articles of the Constitution. 20.2. Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution are not subject to the provisions of law made by Parliament or the legislature as no such provision is found in Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution. 20.3. Articles 233 to 235 provide a complete code for regulating recruitment and appointment to the District Judiciary and the Subordinate Judiciary and thereby it gets insulated from interference of any other outside agency. 20.4. The general sweep of Article 309 has to be read subject to the complete code regarding appointment of District Judges and Judges in the Subordinate Judiciary governed by Articles 233 and 234. 20.5. Even under Article 245, it is specifically provided that the same would be subject to other provisions of the Constitution which would include Articles 233 and 234. 20.6. As the twin articles cover entire field regarding recruitment and appointment of District Judges and Judges in the Subordinate Judiciary at base level pro tanto the otherwise paramount legislative power of the State Legislature to operate in this field clearly gets excluded by the constitutional scheme itself. 20.7. Both Articles 309 and 245 will have to be read subject to Articles 233 and 234 as provided in the former articles themselves. 20.8. 20.7. Both Articles 309 and 245 will have to be read subject to Articles 233 and 234 as provided in the former articles themselves. 20.8. Though under Article 16(4), the State is enabled to provide for reservations in services, insofar as judicial service is concerned such reservation can be made by the Government in exercise of its rule-making power only after consultation with the High Court. 20.9. The enactment of any statutory provision dehors consultation with the High Court for regulating the recruitment to the District Judiciary and the Subordinate Judiciary will clearly fly in the face of complete scheme of recruitment and appointment to the Subordinate Judiciary and the exclusive field earmarked in connection with such appointments under Articles 233 and 234. 20.10. Realising the need for a scheme of reservation in appropriate cases by resorting to the enabling provision under Article 16(4), the High Court can be consulted by the Government for framing appropriate rules regarding reservation for governing recruitment under Articles 233 and 234. But so long as it is not done, the legislature cannot by an indirect method completely bypass the High Court and by exercising its legislative power circumvent and cut across the very scheme of recruitment and appointment to the District Judiciary as envisaged by the makers of the Constitution. 20.11. Any such attempt by the legislature would be forbidden by the constitutional scheme as that was found on the concept relating to separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as well as the fundamental concept of an independent judiciary as both the concepts having been elevated to the level of basic structure of the Constitution and are the very heart of the constitutional scheme. 20.12. Having regard to Article 16(4), the High Court being a high constitutional functionary would also be alive to its social obligations and the constitutional guideline for having a scheme of reservation to ameliorate the lot of deprived reserved categories like SC, ST and OBC. But for that the Governor in consultation with the High Court should make appropriate rules and provide for a scheme of reservation for appointments at grassroots level and even at the highest level of District Judiciary. But for that the Governor in consultation with the High Court should make appropriate rules and provide for a scheme of reservation for appointments at grassroots level and even at the highest level of District Judiciary. If that was not done, the State Legislature cannot upset the entire apple cart and by bypassing the constitutional mandate of Articles 233 and 234 lay down a statutory scheme of reservation governing all State services including judiciary. 20.13. Even in that respect it is obvious that maintenance of efficiency of judicial administration is entirely within the control and jurisdiction of the High Court as laid down by Article 235. 20.14. If the proper course of formulating the scheme in the form of a rule by the High Court to provide for reservation is not made, that would deprive of the right to suggest the consultative process by way of its own expertise that for maintenance of the efficiency of administration of judicial service controlled by it 50% reservation may not be required and/or and even lesser reservation may be required or even may not be required at all. 20.15. To give Article 335 its full play for enacting a scheme of reservation, the High Court entrusted with the full control of the Subordinate Judiciary as per Article 235 of the Constitution has got to be consulted and cannot be treated to be a stranger to the said service by trying to apply the whole of the Reservation Act.” (Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decisions and provisions of Constitution, neither any writ nor any direction can be issued upon respondents to impose the provisions of reservation in Rules, 2001 nor any writ or direction can be issued upon respondents to follow reservation policy of the State of Jharkhand for appointment of the District Judges, especially when there is a resolution of the Full Court of the High Court of Jharkhand dated 29th November, 2018, which does not prescribe any reservation for recruitment of the District Judges for which applications have been invited vide Public Advertisement No.1/2017/Apptt. (XIII) Looking to the peculiar facts of the present case that (a) in the Rules, 2001, reservation has not been prescribed. (XIII) Looking to the peculiar facts of the present case that (a) in the Rules, 2001, reservation has not been prescribed. (b) in the Resolution dated 29th November, 2018 of the Full Court of the High Court of Jharkhand, reservation has not been prescribed for the present recruitment process, which has already been initiated in pursuance of Public Advertisement No. 1/2017/Apptt. (c) there is no specific resolution by the High Court of Jharkhand prescribing reservation and percentage of reservation for the appointment of the District Judges, These facts of the present case, make it different from the facts of the cases, upon which the reliance is placed upon by the counsel for the petitioners, hence, those judgments upon which reliance was placed by the counsel for the petitioners, are of no help to the petitioners. (XIV) Much has been argued by the counsel for the petitioner that the resolution passed by the Committee of Three Judges of the High Court of Jharkhand be implemented. This argument is not accepted by this Court mainly for the reason that the committee constituted by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court never overrides Articles 233, 234 of the Constitution of India. Secondly, said committee’s resolution is not a Full Court resolution of the High Court of Jharkhand Thirdly, the resolution of the Three Judges Committee is to be accepted in totality by the Full Court of the High Court of Jharkhand. In the facts of the present case, there is no such resolution of the Full Court of the High Court of Jharkhand, which accepts reservation and percentage of reservation for the recruitment of the District Judges for which applications have been invited in pursuance of the Public Advertisement No. 1/2017/Apptt. Fourthly, the committee’s resolution at the highest can be said to be a suggestion supplied by a committee of the Three Judges to Hon’ble the Chief Justice. But, in this eventuality also, resolution of the Full Court must be there with respect to the reservation and percentage of reservation for the recruitment of the District Judges, which is lacking in the present case. Fifthly, no writ or direction can be issued upon the respondents on the basis of the resolution of the Three Judges, Committee of the High Court to impose reservation. Fifthly, no writ or direction can be issued upon the respondents on the basis of the resolution of the Three Judges, Committee of the High Court to impose reservation. If this argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is accepted, there will be a gross violation of Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution of India, hence, no writ or direction or order can be issued upon the respondents to implement the resolution of the Committee of the Three Judges as prayed in the writ petition. (XV) Much has been argued out by counsel for the petitioners for implementation of the reservation policy of the State of Jharkhand in the recruitment process of the District Judges. In the light of the aforesaid decisions, there is no power, jurisdiction and authority of the State of Jharkhand to impose its reservation policy in the recruitment of the District Judges. Separation of powers of Judiciary from the Legislature and Executive is to be maintained especially, looking to Article 50, to be read with Articles 233, 234 of the Constitution of India. In fact, counsel for the State of Jharkhand has rightly submitted that unless the High Court of Jharkhand accepts the reservation, in the recruitment process of the District Judges, State do not want to impose reservation in Superior Judicial Service. 18. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, there is no substance in this writ petition and the same is, therefore, dismissed.