JUDGMENT : N.ANIL KUMAR, J. 1. The appellant, who is the first accused in S.C. No.881/2006 on the file of the Additional Sessions Court-VI, Kollam, challenges the conviction and sentence passed against him by judgment dated 19.12.2014 for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 498A and 304B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'the IPC'). There were altogether three accused in the above case. The learned Sessions Judge, on trial, found that the second and third accused were not guilty and the first accused was guilty of the charges levelled against him. The court below convicted and sentenced the first accused to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. The fine amount of Rs.25,000/-was ordered to be equally given to PW1 and his sister Omana under Section 357(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Cr.P.C.'). Further, the court below sentenced the first accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months more for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC. No separate sentence was awarded under Section 304B of IPC. The above substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Assailing the conviction and sentence, the first accused is before this Court. 2. The facts, shorn of unnecessary details, as unfolded by the prosecution are stated hereunder:- The appellant/first accused married the sister of PW1 on 8.9.2002 in accordance with the custom prevailing among the community. At the time of marriage, 25 sovereigns of gold ornaments and Rs.50,000/-were given to her as patrimony and was also promised an assignment of 3 cents of property within one year. However, after three days of marriage, the appellant ill-treated the victim for getting the three cents of property and dropped her at PW1's residence. Hence, PW1 was constrained to execute Ext.P1 sale deed, assigning an area of 3 cents of property on the southern side of the entire property in the name of the victim on 20.3.2003. Originally, the said property belonged to their mother and after her death, the share of both the sisters were assigned to PW1 through a release deed. Hence, PW1 was constrained to execute Ext.P1 sale deed, assigning an area of 3 cents of property on the southern side of the entire property in the name of the victim on 20.3.2003. Originally, the said property belonged to their mother and after her death, the share of both the sisters were assigned to PW1 through a release deed. Thereupon, by Ext.P1 sale deed, PW1 assigned 3 cents to the victim. The appellant/first accused demanded sale of the above 3 cents of property as well as the share of his wife from the 20 cents of property owned by his wife's mother. Second and third accused are the sisters of the first accused. In furtherance of their common intention, the accused Nos.1 to 3 harassed the victim several times for shortage of dowry. The harassment continued till 27.7.2003. The appellant forced his wife – the victim to go back and stay at her parental house. On 25.7.2003, all the accused conspired together to do away with the victim and the appellant requested the victim by phone to come back to his house. Believing the request of the appellant as genuine, the victim boarded a bus at 2.30 p.m. and reached her matrimonial home after some time on 25.7.2003. In the morning of 27.7.2003, the appellant threatened the victim with dire consequences and asked her to take a decision regarding the property he had demanded earlier, failing which he threatened that the victim would not be permitted to stay back at the matrimonial home. Confronted with the above situation, the victim decided to go back home. When she was dressing to go back home at 7 a.m. on 27.7.2003, the appellant closed the bedroom door of his house and intentionally and knowingly poured kerosene on her body from the lantern and set fire on her inside the bedroom of the house namely, Thundil Puthen Veedu, bearing No.9/70, Kunduman, Velichikala Cheril, Pallimon Village. While so, she ran out of the room and then the second and the third accused poured water and tried to extinguish the fire. The second and the third accused were present at the scene of occurrence. Consequently, the victim suffered severe burns and succumbed to the same at 19 hours on 8.8.2003. 3. Ext.P2 First Information Statement was given by the victim. The second and the third accused were present at the scene of occurrence. Consequently, the victim suffered severe burns and succumbed to the same at 19 hours on 8.8.2003. 3. Ext.P2 First Information Statement was given by the victim. On 27.7.2003, PW13, the Sub Inspector of Police, Chathannur received information from the District Hospital, Kollam that the victim was admitted after sustaining burns. Then PW13 proceeded to the hospital and recorded Ext.P2 First Information Statement of the victim. Thereupon, he registered Crime No.264/2003 against the first accused for the offence punishable under Section 498A IPC. Thereafter, on 28.7.2003, he went to the scene of occurrence and prepared Ext.P10 Scene Mahazar as identified by the second accused Devaki. While preparing Ext.P10 mahazar, PW13 recovered MO1 saree, MO2 blouse pieces, MO3 underskirt, MO4 brassiere, MO5 matchbox and MO6, portion of a lantern from the occurrence place. Pursuant thereto, PW13 filed an application before the jurisdictional Magistrate Court for recording dying declaration of the victim. Consequent to the request, PW9 the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Paravur recorded Ext.P6 dying declaration of the victim. While so, PW13 submitted Ext.P12 report before the court to proceed with the investigation incorporating Section 307 read with 34 of IPC. PW13 identified the accused 1 to 3 and filed Ext.P13 report before the court. The first accused was arrested on 1.8.2003 at 12 noon by Ext.P14 arrest memo. PW13 produced the first accused before the court by Ext.P15 remand application. The learned Magistrate remanded the first accused to judicial custody pending investigation. On 8.8.2003, the victim passed away. On 9.8.2003, PW13 filed a report before the learned Magistrate incorporating Section 304B IPC as well in lieu of Section 307 IPC by Ext.P16. On 11.8.2003, PW14 took over investigation in this case. It was disclosed during the investigation that the second and the third accused were also involved in the crime and hence he submitted a report incorporating them in the array of accused. PW14 questioned the witnesses and filed the charge sheet against accused Nos.1 to 3 for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B read with 34 of IPC before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Paravur. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offences under Sections 304B and 498A read with 34 of IPC and registered the case as CP No. 61 of 2004. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offences under Sections 304B and 498A read with 34 of IPC and registered the case as CP No. 61 of 2004. After completing the usual formalities, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the court of Sessions, Kollam. The learned Sessions Judge took cognizance of the offences under Sections 498A, 304B read with 34 of IPC and made over the case to the Additional Sessions Court-VI, Kollam for trial and disposal. 4. All the accused entered appearance before the Additional Sessions Court through the counsel of their choice. The learned Additional Sessions Judge framed charges under Sections 498A and 304B read with 34 IPC on 4.8.2007. On 8.10.2007, Crl.M.P. 2255/2007 was filed by the learned Public Prosecutor to add charge against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC in addition to Sections 304B and 498A read with 34 IPC. On 6.4.2010, after having heard both sides, the learned Additional Sessions Judge framed charge under Sections 302, 498A and 304B read with 34 of IPC. It is pertinent to note that the order was passed on 6.4.2010. 5. PWs.1 to 14 were examined and marked Exts.P1 to P17 and MOs.1 to 7 were identified on the side of the prosecution. On the application of the accused, PWs.1,6 and 13 were recalled and examined again. 6. After the closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused were questioned under Section 313(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Cr.P.C.') with regard to the incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence for the prosecution. Their defence is one of total denial. 7. The learned Sessions Judge, who conducted the trial, did not deem it fit and proper for recording an acquittal under Section 232 of the Cr.P.C. The accused were therefore called upon to enter on their defence and to adduce evidence that they might have in support thereof. The accused examined DWs.1 to 7 on their side and marked Exts.D1 to D4. 8. We heard Sri.Rahul.P., the learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.K.B.Udayakumar, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State. 9. The following points arise for consideration in this appeal. 1. Whether the appellant used to behave cruelly with the victim, his wife, for illegal object of getting more dowry? 2. 8. We heard Sri.Rahul.P., the learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.K.B.Udayakumar, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State. 9. The following points arise for consideration in this appeal. 1. Whether the appellant used to behave cruelly with the victim, his wife, for illegal object of getting more dowry? 2. Whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving that the victim had died as a result of sustaining burns on 8.8.2003 at 7 p.m. at the residence of the appellant as alleged? If so, was it suicidal or homicidal? 3. Whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving that the appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of the victim on account of dowry by pouring kerosene all over her body and setting her ablaze? 4. Are the conviction entered and sentence imposed against the appellant sustainable? 10. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that during the whole period of nearly 11 months, while the victim was residing along with the appellant, there was no complaint of any type of demand of dowry and also while she was admitted in the hospital, she never made any complaint that there was any demand of dowry or any type of harassment on the part of the appellant. It has been stated that after attending the victim in the hospital, PW1 was instrumental in making a statement with regard to demand of dowry much against the wish of the victim. It is his submission that the statement of victim with regard to the claim of property made by the appellant, was as desired by her relatives. It is further contended that PW9 recorded the dying declaration of the victim in consultation with PWs.1 and 6. The appellant contended that the victim committed suicide. According to him, he was not present at his residence at the time of occurrence. He stated that he went out for his morning tea at the shop of Syed Kutty at Kunduman and while so, he heard a hue and cry from the direction of his house. DW3 was examined to prove the fact that the appellant was not present at the time of occurrence at his residence. He stated that he went out for his morning tea at the shop of Syed Kutty at Kunduman and while so, he heard a hue and cry from the direction of his house. DW3 was examined to prove the fact that the appellant was not present at the time of occurrence at his residence. DW3 stated that after hearing the hue and cry, he went along with the appellant to the spot where they found the victim sitting on the open veranda of his house and the second and third accused were trying to extinguish the fire on her body. DW4 also supported the version of DW3. 11. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor submits that since the death had occurred within seven years of marriage and harassment of dowry had been established, a legal presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short 'the Evidence Act') that the appellant had caused the death of the victim, could be drawn and the trial court rightly convicted the appellant. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, Ext.P6 statement made by the victim is admissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. The learned Public Prosecutor further submits that the appellant poured kerosene on the body of the victim and put her on fire solely with an intention to do away with her. 12. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that no presumption of demand of dowry had been drawn as against the appellant as there was no demand of dowry on the part of the appellant. It is his submission that the appellant was not even present at the time of occurrence. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that there was no direct evidence regarding the cause of death or the circumstances leading to the victim's death. 13. During the investigation, the inquest report was prepared and the body was sent for postmortem report. Ext.P5 inquest report was prepared by PW12-the Tahsildar and Executive Magistrate, Kollam in the presence of PW5. In Ext.P5 inquest report, in column No.7 and 8a, PW12 noted burns on the body of the victim. Column No.11 in Ext.P5 is pertaining to the apparent cause of death. PW12 noted that the victim died as a result of burns. 14. PW11 Dr.V.Prathapan was working as District Police Surgeon and Resident Medical Officer on 9.8.2003 at the District Hospital, Kollam. Column No.11 in Ext.P5 is pertaining to the apparent cause of death. PW12 noted that the victim died as a result of burns. 14. PW11 Dr.V.Prathapan was working as District Police Surgeon and Resident Medical Officer on 9.8.2003 at the District Hospital, Kollam. On that day at 2.45 p.m., he had conducted autopsy on the body of the victim and prepared Ext.P8 postmortem certificate. PW11 noted the following injuries on the body of the deceased. The ante mortem injuries and other findings recorded in Ext.P8 are the following:- “Body was that of a moderately nourished adult female of height 141 cm. Conjunctivae congested. External genetalia normal. Hymen absent. Faecal discharge present at the anus. Other external body orifices normal. Nails blue. Rigormortis fully established and retained all over the body. Postmortem staining could not be made out due to burns. No sign of decomposition. Body was not kept in cold room. Injuries (Antemortem) Infected superficial to deep burns involving the whole of face, neck and around the trunk 17 cm above natal cleft, and 21 cm above pubic bone, whole of both upper limbs except 32x2 to 5cm at its outer aspect of the left upper limb on dissection the scalp was oedematous. Air passages contained mucoid fluid. Lungs are oaedematous. Stomach contained 100ml of viscid fluid having no unusual smell. Mucosa pale. On dissection, both kidneys showed distinct corticomedullary demarcation and was soft and pale. Spleen was friable. Urinary bladder was empty. Uterus normal in size and the cavity was empty. All other internal organs were pale otherwise normal. ” 15. PW11 stated before the trial court that the victim sustained 55% of burns and died as a result of the burns. When cross-examined before court, PW11 opined that the primary cause of death is burns. Thus, it is clear that the victim died as a result of burns on 8.8.2003 at 7p.m. 16. Considering the facts and circumstances involved in the case, we think it is appropriate to examine Ext.P2 statement recorded by PW13, immediately after the occurrence. In Ext.P2, the victim had stated that the appellant was in the habit of demanding dowry and several times, she was sent back home. She further stated that the appellant demanded dowry from her and tortured her for dowry. She further stated that the appellant poured kerosene all over her body and set her ablaze. In Ext.P2, the victim had stated that the appellant was in the habit of demanding dowry and several times, she was sent back home. She further stated that the appellant demanded dowry from her and tortured her for dowry. She further stated that the appellant poured kerosene all over her body and set her ablaze. Her second statement, which is the verbatim reproduction of Ext.P2, was recorded by PW9 V.S.Bindu Kumary, the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate on 28.7.2003. PW10 Dr.Sajeev was also present while recording Ext.P6 Dying Declaration of the victim. PW9 obtained certificate from the Doctor before and after recording the Dying Declaration touching the condition of the victim to make a declaration. PW10 opined that the victim was in a fit state of mind to make a declaration. In Ext.P6 Dying Declaration, the victim stated that her husband poured kerosene on her body and set her ablaze at his residence. She further stated that her husband alone was present at the time of occurrence and her husband was responsible for her present condition, adding that on the day before the date of occurrence, he had demanded property from her and abused her. Hence, she requested her brother to come and settle the matter. However, he did not turn up. The day before the date of occurrence, after having her breakfast, her husband directed her to leave the matrimonial home. She replied that she was not prepared to leave. Her husband further demanded a transfer of property owned by her mother as well. According to her, she had no complaints against her husband's relatives. While recording Ext.P6 dying declaration of the victim, on 27.7.2003, at the District Hospital, Kollam, PW2 Staff nurse of the hospital was also present. She stated that the victim was conscious during the first two days and that the victim's thumb impression on Ext.P6 was put in her presence. 17. In the light of Ext.P2 First Information Statement and Ext.P6 Dying Declaration of the victim, let us examine the statements of the other witnesses. 18. PW1 is the brother of the victim. According to him, the marriage between the victim and the appellant was conducted on 8.9.2002 in accordance with Hindu religious rites and ceremonies. He stated that 25 sovereigns of gold ornaments and Rs.50,000/-were given as dowry before the marriage. 18. PW1 is the brother of the victim. According to him, the marriage between the victim and the appellant was conducted on 8.9.2002 in accordance with Hindu religious rites and ceremonies. He stated that 25 sovereigns of gold ornaments and Rs.50,000/-were given as dowry before the marriage. However, immediately after the marriage, on several occasions, the appellant brought her back alleging that the property was not given to her as agreed. The process repeated several times. Finally, the local people had intervened and PW1 had executed Ext.P1 sale deed in favour of the victim on 20.3.2003. The matter did not end there. PW1 stated that the appellant demanded more dowry from the 20 cents of property owned by her mother at Chadayamangalam. They were not in a position to execute the document in favour of the victim for technical reasons. The property was not mutated in the name of her mother. Feeling aggrieved by the persistent demand of dowry, the victim sent an Advocate Notice to the appellant. He refused to receive it. After two months, he again prevailed upon the victim and promised her a good life. Believing the words of the appellant, the victim decided to start a new life in her matrimonial home. PW1 tried his level best to dissuade the victim from her decision. However, she stood by what she decided. After reaching her matrimonial home, she requested PW1 and others to come to her matrimonial home urgently. They promised her to reach there by following Sunday. Later, they came to know that the appellant had set her ablaze after pouring kerosene all over her body. On getting information, PW1 proceeded to the hospital on 27.7.2003 and reached the hospital by 12 noon. On being asked, the victim stated that her husband had poured kerosene all over her body and set her ablaze. 19. PW6 is the cousin brother of the victim. PW6 supported the version of PW1 in full. He was present when PW13 recorded Ext.P2 statement of the victim. In Ext.P1 document executed on 20.3.2003, PW6 was a signatory. The victim also told PW6 that the appellant poured kerosene all over her body and set her ablaze since his demands for more dowry went unheeded. 20. PW6 supported the version of PW1 in full. He was present when PW13 recorded Ext.P2 statement of the victim. In Ext.P1 document executed on 20.3.2003, PW6 was a signatory. The victim also told PW6 that the appellant poured kerosene all over her body and set her ablaze since his demands for more dowry went unheeded. 20. Coming to the question as to whether the death was accidental or homicidal, we think it is appropriate to examine Ext.P6 Dying Declaration recorded by the learned Magistrate while the victim was admitted in the hospital. It is well settled that the Dying Declaration should be pertaining to the cause of death or the circumstances surrounding the transaction that resulted in death. The circumstances must have proximate relation to the actual occurrence. 21. On a perusal of the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, it is clear that the learned Sessions Judge has mainly relied on Ext.P6 Dying Declaration, which according to the learned Sessions Judge is reliable evidence of which the appellant cannot escape. It was found that the dying declaration is trustworthy of credence. It was recorded in the presence of PW9-the learned Magistrate and that too with certificate from PW10 Dr.Sajeev, stating that the victim was in a fit state of mind to give statement, despite the fact that the victim sustained 55% burns on her body. The facts recorded by the learned Magistrate in Ext.P6 are duly supported by the oral evidence of PWs.1 and 6 stating that the victim was treated cruelly by the appellant. The court below strongly relied on the oral evidence of PWs.1 and 6, notwithstanding the fact that they are interested witnesses being close relations of the victim. To a greater extent, the testimony was supported by Ext.P1 document executed by PW1 in favour of the victim. 22. In Muthu Kutty and another v. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu [ (2005)9 SCC 113 ], the Supreme Court has held that the conviction can be maintained solely on the basis of dying declaration, if it is worthy and reliable and there is no infirmity in reinforcing the maxim 'nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire' which means that a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth. 23. In the case on hand, Ext.P6 Dying declaration is supported by the oral evidence of PW1, PW6 and Ext.P2. 23. In the case on hand, Ext.P6 Dying declaration is supported by the oral evidence of PW1, PW6 and Ext.P2. Since offences under Sections 498A and 304B of IPC are pertaining to cruelty on the part of the newly married husband, ordinary human probability leans in favour of the fact that the victim was inclined to report her sad state of affairs to her close relatives only. PWs.1 and 6 are close relatives of the victim. 24. Learned counsel for the appellant Sri.Rahul.P submits that this is not a case of demand of dowry in treating the victim with cruelty, but is a case where the victim was unhappy over the conduct of her parents and close relations as they committed breach of trust in fulfilling their promise at the time of marriage. The learned counsel for the appellant further submits that frustrated by the conduct of the relatives of the victim, she had committed suicide when she was alone at her husband's residence. However, on going through the oral evidence of PWs.1 and 6 and also Exts.P2 and P6, it is clear that there was no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration of the victim, which was rightly done by the court below. There is no dispute about the fact that the victim died due to burns. Marriage between the victim and the appellant was solemnised on 8.9.2002. Thus, the occurrence took place within one year from the date of marriage. Since it is within seven years of the marriage, presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act is attracted for the offence punishable under Section 304B of IPC. 25. To invoke Section 304B of the IPC, the following ingredients are essential. 1. The death of a woman should be caused by any burn or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances. 2. Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage. 3. She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or relatives of her husband. 4. Such cruelty or harassment should be for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. 5. Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. 26. 3. She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or relatives of her husband. 4. Such cruelty or harassment should be for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. 5. Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. 26. One of the important ingredients to attract the provisions of dowry death is that the death of the bride must relate to the cruelty or harassment on account of demand for dowry. It is true that Section 304B does not define cruelty. However, under Explanation to Section 113A of the Evidence Act, it has been provided that 'cruelty' shall have the same meaning as in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. As per the requirement of clause (b) appended to Section 498A, there should be nexus between harassment and any unlawful demand for dowry. If these conditions are satisfied, the presumption under the Evidence Act and the burden of proof shifts on the appellant to prove that he is innocent. 27. A combined reading of Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B of the IPC would reveal that there must be material on record to establish that soon before her death, the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. It is the duty of the prosecution to rule out the possibility of natural death or accidental death so as to bring the death within the ambit of the term 'death' occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances. 28. In Ext.P6, the victim had given the true state of affairs of the occurrence in which she sustained burn injuries. In Ext.P6, she specifically alleged that she and her husband used to fight in connection with dowry and that her husband poured kerosene on her body and put her on fire. In view of Ext.P6 dying declaration, the question arising for consideration is as to whether the victim had made such a statement voluntarily and without any compulsion whatsoever. Ext.P6 statement was recorded by the learned Magistrate in the presence of PWs.1 and 6. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, Ext.P6 declaration was made by the victim in the presence of her relatives including PWs.1 and 6. Hence, it is contended that Ext.P6 declaration was tutored, before she made the statement, by the relatives. Ext.P6 statement was recorded by the learned Magistrate in the presence of PWs.1 and 6. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, Ext.P6 declaration was made by the victim in the presence of her relatives including PWs.1 and 6. Hence, it is contended that Ext.P6 declaration was tutored, before she made the statement, by the relatives. Secondly, it is argued that Ext.P6 was not recorded immediately before the death of the victim or under the expectation of her death. On going through the entire evidence, we are of the view that there is no evidence to show that after reaching the hospital she had occasion to meet PW1 or PW6 and they got an opportunity to tutor her. Prior to the occurrence, she had informed her relatives that she was harassed by the appellant demanding more dowry and she was not happy with her matrimonial life. Undoubtedly, death of the victim was caused by burns that had occurred other than under normal circumstances. 29. The second question is as to whether the quarrel between the victim and the appellant could be treated as satisfying the requirements 'soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry'. In this connection, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Najjam Faraghi @ Nijjam Faruqui v. State of West Bengal [ (1998) 2 SCC 45 ]. In the said case, kerosene was poured on the victim and she was put on fire on 30.6.1985. She lived about a month and passed away on 31.7.85. Referring to Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the victim died long after making the dying declaration, the statement does not loose its value. In paragraph 9, it has been held as follows:- “9. There is no merit in the contention that the appellant's wife died long after making the dying declarations and, therefore, those statements have no value. The contention overlooks the express provision in Section 32 of the Evidence Act. In paragraph 9, it has been held as follows:- “9. There is no merit in the contention that the appellant's wife died long after making the dying declarations and, therefore, those statements have no value. The contention overlooks the express provision in Section 32 of the Evidence Act. The second paragraph of sub-section (1) reads as follows:- "Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question". No doubt it has been pointed out that when a person is expecting his death to take place shortly he would not be indulging in falsehood. But that does not mean that such a statement loses its value if the person lives for a longer time than expected. The question has to be considered in each case on the facts and circumstances established therein. If there is nothing on record to show that the statement could not have been true or if the other evidence on record corroborates the contents of the statements, the court can certainly accept the same and act upon it. In the present case both courts have discussed the entire evidence on record and found that two dying declarations contained in Exts. 5 and 6 are acceptable.” 30. In the case at hand, as discussed above, the prosecution has succeeded in proving that there were materials to show that soon before her death, the victim was subjected to cruelty and harassment by the appellant. The prosecution has succeeded in ruling out the possibility of natural or accidental death so as to bring the case within the purview of death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances. Further, the evidence tendered in this case would show that soon before the occurrence, there was cruelty and harassment on the part of the appellant. Ext.P6 Dying Declaration inter alia would show that the alleged incident of cruelty was proximate in time and was strong enough to disturb the mental equilibrium and tranquility of the victim. 31. The injuries found on the body of the victim support the prosecution case in full. Ext.P6 Dying Declaration inter alia would show that the alleged incident of cruelty was proximate in time and was strong enough to disturb the mental equilibrium and tranquility of the victim. 31. The injuries found on the body of the victim support the prosecution case in full. Ext.P6 dying declaration made by the victim finds corroboration from the injuries on the body of the victim and the sequence of events and manner of incidents as claimed by the prosecution. 32. With reference to Section 302 of IPC is concerned, there is evidence to show that the appellant had express malice to do away with the victim on account of dowry. The nature of the acts done by the appellant would suggest that the death of the victim was occasioned by the injuries and complications arising therefrom, including 55% burns which resulted in her death. The circumstances appearing against the appellant require to be considered in the light of the evidence on record and the only logical inference, which could be drawn, is that the appellant had intention to cause the death of the victim or had the knowledge that the act of the appellant in pouring kerosene all over her body and setting her on fire would likely to cause death. The intention of the appellant in inflicting burns on the victim was for the purpose of getting more dowry. In fact, the appellant had an eye on the property belonging to the victim's mother. The requisite knowledge, in view of the circumstances that the act done by the appellant might cause death of the victim, could be attributed to him. On analysing the entire facts and circumstances of the case, particularly with reference to the predominant intention of the appellant to get more dowry from the victim, we are of the view that the appellant is liable for murder for the simple reason that the appellant had intention to cause death or knowledge that such act may cause death. The trial court, on well-founded reason, has rightly come to the conclusion that the appellant had committed an offence under Section 302 of IPC. 33. The trial court, on well-founded reason, has rightly come to the conclusion that the appellant had committed an offence under Section 302 of IPC. 33. In this case, as indicated earlier, the trial court added Section 302 IPC as per order dated 6.4.2010 taking into consideration of the facts that the materials on record clearly indicate that accused Nos.1 to 3 conspired together with an intention to murder the victim, that the appellant/ first accused invited the victim in his house over phone and on her arrival on the date of occurrence at his residence, the appellant harassed the victim demanding more dowry and when she was about to leave from his house on 27.7.2003 at 7 a.m, closed the bedroom door, and poured kerosene on her from the lantern and set her on fire. This is a clear indication that the appellant was present at the scene of occurrence on the date of occurrence. To put it shortly, the prosecution had succeeded in proving that the victim sustained burns, that the nature of injuries was fatal, that the burns were inflicted by the appellant/first accused and that the burns were not accidental or unintentional. It is further proved that the injury sustained to the victim is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. 34. In the case at hand, the trial court considered the above facts and added a charge under Section 302 of IPC to the one already framed against the appellant. While doing so, the trial court simply placed reliance upon Section 216 of Cr.P.C. which empowers the court to add or alter the charge at any stage. The victim's death took place at her matrimonial home within seven years of her marriage. There is a presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act for dowry death. This is a clear case of premeditated attack with intention to cause death. We are satisfied from the evidence that the victim was attacked by the appellant with an intention to murder the victim. It was not a case of suicide. The act of pouring kerosene on her body in the manner indicated in the postmortem certificate could never be termed as intending to cause bodily injury alone, and rather it was an act to cause bodily injuries with an intention to cause death. It was not a case of suicide. The act of pouring kerosene on her body in the manner indicated in the postmortem certificate could never be termed as intending to cause bodily injury alone, and rather it was an act to cause bodily injuries with an intention to cause death. Upon consideration of identical facts, the Supreme Court in Rajbir @ Raju and another v. State of Haryana [ (2010)15 SCC 116 ] issued directions on 22.11.2010 to all the trial courts in India to ordinarily add Section 302 to the charge of Section 304B, so that death sentences can be imposed in such heinous and barbaric crimes against women. Charge was altered in this case before the direction of the Apex Court in Rajbir's case (supra). The trial court recorded valid reasons to add Section 302 of IPC also against the appellant. 35. In Jasvinder Saini and Others v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) [ (2013)7 SCC 256 ], the Supreme Court interpreted the true purport of the order in Rajbir's case, holding that the direction was not meant to be followed mechanically and without due regard to the nature of the evidence available in the case as follows:- “14. Be that as it may the common thread running through both the orders is that this Court had in Rajbir's case directed the addition of a charge under Section 302 IPC to every case in which the accused are charged with Section 304-B. That was not, in our opinion, the true purport of the order passed by this Court. The direction was not meant to be followed mechanically and without due regard to the nature of the evidence available in the case. All that this Court meant to say was that in a case where a charge alleging dowry death is framed, a charge under Section 302 can also be framed if the evidence otherwise permits. No other meaning could be deduced from the order of this Court.” Section 304B of IPC and Section 302 of IPC are distinct and separate offences. The question whether it is murder punishable under Section 302 IPC or a dowry death punishable under Section 304B IPC depends upon the factual situation and evidence in the case. No other meaning could be deduced from the order of this Court.” Section 304B of IPC and Section 302 of IPC are distinct and separate offences. The question whether it is murder punishable under Section 302 IPC or a dowry death punishable under Section 304B IPC depends upon the factual situation and evidence in the case. Under Section 218 of Cr.P.C., for every distinct offence of which any person is accused, there shall be a separate charge and every such charge shall be tried separately. In the case on hand, circumstantial evidences to support the charge under Section 302 IPC are clearly brought out. The facts and circumstances of the case would indicate that the appellant poured kerosene over the body of the victim and set her on fire. Hence, the trial court added charge under Section 302 IPC in addition to the charge under Sections 304B and 498A of IPC. On a perusal of the ingredients under Sections 304B and 302 of IPC, we are satisfied that the trial court added Section 302 of IPC adverting to the materials placed on record in accordance with law. 36. We also find that Sections 302 and 304B of IPC are not mutually exclusive. If materials are brought on record, which would suggest commission of an offence under Section 302 of IPC and also commission of an offence under Section 304B of IPC, the proper course would be to frame charges under both the above sections and if the case is proved beyond doubt, then the accused can be convicted under both the sections, but no separate sentence need be awarded under Section 304B of IPC, considering the fact that sentence has been awarded for the higher offence under Section 302 of IPC. The trial court has rightly followed the above said principle while imposing sentence on the appellant. 37. In Muthu Kutty's case (supra), the Apex Court held as follows:- “20. A reading of Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B, Evidence Act together makes it clear that law authorises a presumption that the husband or any other relative of the husband has caused the death of a woman if she happens to die in circumstances not normal and that there was evidence to show that she was treated with cruelty or harassed before her death in connection with any demand for dowry. It, therefore, follows that the husband or the relative, as the case may be, need not be the actual or direct participant in the commission of the offence of death. For those that are direct participants in the commission of the offence of death there are already provisions incorporated in Sections 300, 302 and 304. The provisions contained in Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were incorporated on the anvil of the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the main object of which is to curb the evil of dowry in the society and to make it severely punitive in nature and not to extricate husbands or their relatives from the clutches of Section 302 IPC if they directly cause death. This conceptual difference was not kept in view by the courts below. But that cannot bring any relief if the conviction is altered to Section 304 Part II. No prejudice is caused to the accused-appellants as they were originally charged for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC along with Section 304-B IPC,” 38. Judged by the above standards, we are of the view that the trial court applied its mind rightly and added a charge under Section 302 of IPC after taking into consideration of the entire materials on record and framed charge against the appellant under Sections 498A, 304B, 302 read with 34 IPC. The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 302, 304B and 498A of IPC. 39. One of the contentions taken by the appellant is that on 29.7.2003, Ext.D4 news item was published in the Mathrubhumi daily stating that a lady sustained burns. Hence it is contended that the news item was instrumental in implicating the appellant in this case. It is well settled law that newspaper report is not an evidence in accordance with the Evidence Act. Merely because a news item was published in the local daily, it could not be said that the news item was instrumental in implicating the appellant in this case. 40. Ext.P2 First Information Statement would indicate that criminal law was set in motion without any delay. Ext.D1 G.D. copy also would show that DW2, the then Sub Inspector of Police, Chathannoor received an information regarding the occurrence on 27.7.2003 at 22.30 hrs. and registered Crime No.264/2003, pursuant to the information received from the District Hospital, Kollam. 40. Ext.P2 First Information Statement would indicate that criminal law was set in motion without any delay. Ext.D1 G.D. copy also would show that DW2, the then Sub Inspector of Police, Chathannoor received an information regarding the occurrence on 27.7.2003 at 22.30 hrs. and registered Crime No.264/2003, pursuant to the information received from the District Hospital, Kollam. Hence, the contention that the first information was delayed, is without any merit. 41. The contention next raised that the appellant was not at his residence at the time of the occurrence, is not proved. According to the appellant, he was very much available in the near vicinity at the time of occurrence. When a plea of alibi is taken as a defence, the burden is on the part of the accused to prove that he is in some other place at the time when the alleged offence is committed. It is an excuse used by the accused when he is trying to avoid getting into trouble. In the above context, the plea of the appellant that he was not present in the house in question at the relevant point of time, but rather was away deserves rejection particularly when the evidence as to the plea of alibi is false and wholly worthless as rightly held by the trial court. Evidence tendered by the prosecution coupled with Ext.P6 Dying Declaration inter alia would show that the appellant accompanied the victim when she was taken to the hospital along with others. Hence, evidence tendered by the defence witnesses that the appellant was elsewhere from the scene of occurrence at the time of occurrence has no significance to decide the merits of the case. 42. Learned counsel for the appellant has strongly relied on Ext.D3 to contend that the victim committed suicide. Ext.D3 was issued to one Adv.P.R.Jayachandran by the Public Information Officer under the Right to Information Act. Ext.D3 would show that wound certificate was issued on 27.7.2003 in the name of the victim. However, the original records were not available at the Office on the date of issuance of Ext.D3. DW6 was examined to prove Ext.D3. DW6 stated that the Despatch Register summoned by the appellant was not available at the District Hospital, Kollam. According to him, records are retained in the Office for five years only. However, the original records were not available at the Office on the date of issuance of Ext.D3. DW6 was examined to prove Ext.D3. DW6 stated that the Despatch Register summoned by the appellant was not available at the District Hospital, Kollam. According to him, records are retained in the Office for five years only. DW6 stated that as per the wound certificate available at the Office, the victim attempted to commit suicide. Merely because a statement was recorded in the wound certificate that the victim attempted to commit suicide, the same could not be taken as evidence. The chance of furnishing such an information by the person, who brought the victim to the hospital, could not be ruled out especially in view of the fact that it is an admitted fact that the appellant took the victim to the hospital immediately after the occurrence. 43. We have gone through the entire evidence on record and are fully satisfied that the trial court did not commit any error in convicting the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 304B and 498A of IPC. The learned Sessions Judge, while discussing the evidence, has analysed the entire materials on record and has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant. In view of the conclusions and findings based on the prosecution evidence with regard to the appellant, we are of the view that the judgment and order of conviction passed by the trial court contained positive proof, credible evidence, sequence of events and factual proof linking the appellant with the commission of the offences under Section 498A, 304B and 302 of IPC beyond doubt. Resultantly, we uphold the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the court below for the several reasons stated supra. We do not find any merit in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed. The appellant/first accused will suffer the remaining sentence imposed by the trial court.