ORDER : The petitioner, who is the owner of a JCB bearing Registration No.KL-33/5, has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P1 order of confiscation of the 1st respondent District Collector dated 10.02.2012 and to set aside Ext.P4 judgment dated 23.01.2017 of the Sessions Court, Kottayam in Criminal Appeal No.82 of 2012. The petitioner has also sought for a declaration that all proceedings initiated against him before final publication of data-bank by the 6th respondent Municipality is illegal; and a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to release JCB bearing Registration No.KL-33/5 to the petitioner forthwith. 2. The Registry has noted defect as to whether a writ petition under Article 226 can be filed challenging Ext.P4 judgment of the Sessions Court in Criminal Appeal No.82 of 2012 and accordingly, the matter is listed before this Court as an unnumbered writ petition. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. 4. The issue that has to be decided is as to whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be filed challenging Ext.P4 judgment in an appeal filed under Section 21 of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008, against Ext.P1 order of confiscation. 5. The confiscation of the petitioner's vehicle by Ext.P1 order dated 10.01.2012 of the 1st respondent District Collector is one under Section 20 of Kerala, Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act. Section 21 of the Act deals with appeal against confiscation. As per Section 21, any person aggrieved by an order of confiscation under Section 20 may within thirty days from the date of communication to him of such order, appeal to the District Court having jurisdiction over the area in which the articles were seized and the District Judge shall, after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard issue such order either confirming, amending or annulling the order appealed against. 6. Article 226 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of the High Courts to issue certain writs. 6. Article 226 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of the High Courts to issue certain writs. Under clause (1) of Article 226 of the Constitution, notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. Going by clause (2) of Article 226, the power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. 7. On the other hand, Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. Clause (2) of Article 227 provides that, without prejudice. to the generality of the provisions under clause (1), the High Court may call for returns from such courts; make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts, Going by clause (4), nothing in Article 227 shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. 8. 8. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [ (2010) 8 SCC 329 ] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. 9. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [ (2010) 9 SCC 385 ], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well established principles of law. The High Court is vested with the powers of superintendence and/or judicial revision, even in matters where no revision or appeal lies to the High Court. The jurisdiction under this Article is, in some ways, wider than the power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is, however, well to remember the well known adage that greater the power, greater the care and caution in exercise thereof. The High Court is, therefore, expected to exercise such wide powers with great care, caution and circumspection. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. 10. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a china shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. 10. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [ (2015) 12 SCC 39 ] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. On the facts of the said case, the Apex Court held that, when the Labour Court has exercised its discretion keeping in view the facts of the case and the cases of similarly situated workmen, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the Labour Court. 11. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [ 2016 (1) KHC 1 ] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law. 12. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. 12. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a lower court or tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors of the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order or judgment of a lower court or tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. 13. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai [ (2003) 6 SCC 675 ] the Apex Court held that, Article 227 of the Constitution confers on every High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction excepting any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. The jurisdiction under Article 227 can be traced back to Section 15 of High Courts. Act, 1861 which gave a power of judicial superintendence to the High Court apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisional jurisdiction on the High Court. Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 and then Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935 were similarly worded and reproduced the predecessor provision. However, sub-section (2) was added in Section 224 which confined the jurisdiction of the High Court to such judgments of the inferior courts which were not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. That restriction has not been carried forward in Article 227 of the Constitution. 14. However, sub-section (2) was added in Section 224 which confined the jurisdiction of the High Court to such judgments of the inferior courts which were not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. That restriction has not been carried forward in Article 227 of the Constitution. 14. In Surya Dev Rails case (supra) the Apex Court held further that, proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is a intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamount to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. 15. The decision of the Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai's case (supra) on the point that the High Court can exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 to interfere with a judicial order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction now stands overruled by the decision of a Three-Judge Bench in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath [ (2015) 5 SCC 423 ]. In Radhey Shyam's case, the Apex Court held that, judicial orders of Civil Courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226 and that the scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. In Radhey Shyam's case, the Apex Court held that, judicial orders of Civil Courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226 and that the scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. Dealing with the submission made on behalf of the respondent that the view in Surya Dev Rai's case stands approved by Larger Benches in Shall v. Manoj Kumar [ (2004) 4 SCC 785 ], Mahendra Saree Emporium (II) v. G.V. Srinivasa Murthy [ (2005) 1 SCC 481 ] and Salem Advocate Bar Association (II) v. Union of India [ (2005) 6 SCC 344 ] and on that ground correctness of the said view cannot be gone into, the Three-Judge Bench observed that, in 'Shall', though reference has been made to 'Surya Dev Rai', the same is only for the purpose of scope of power under Article 227, as is clear from paragraph 3 of the said judgment. There is no discussion on the issue of maintainability of a petition under Article 226. In 'Mahendra Saree Emporium', reference to 'Surya. Dev Rai' is made in paragraph 9 of the judgment only for the proposition that no subordinate legislation can whittle down the jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution. Similarly, in 'Salem Bar Association' in paragraph 40, reference to 'Surya Dev Rai' is for the same purpose. 16. In Radhey Shyam's case (supra) the Three-Judge Bench held that Article 227 can be invoked by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases, but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration in the larger public interest, whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievances. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline. The object of superintendence under Article 227, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline. The object of superintendence under Article 227, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. 17. The supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited, where interference qua an interlocutory order of a subordinate court or tribunal is concerned. In such matters, the High Court has to consider the question as to whether such an interlocutory order of the subordinate court or tribunal was vitiated due to want of jurisdiction or that the said court or tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction or that the order passed by it had resulted in failure of justice. This view is supported by the decision of the Apex Court in Kokkanda B. Poondacha v. K.D. Ganapathi [(2011) 12 SCC 6001 18. Therefore, the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 is administrative as well as judicial and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be exercised suo motu. It is exercised to keep the subordinate courts or tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction. It can be invoked when a subordinate court or tribunal over which the High Court have superintendence has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available has been exercised in a manner which is not permissible by law and a grave failure of justice has occasioned. 19. On the other hand, Article 226 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of the High Courts to issue certain writs. 19. On the other hand, Article 226 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of the High Courts to issue certain writs. Under clause (1) of Article 226 of the Constitution, notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. Going by clause (2) of Article 226, the power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. On the other hand, by virtue of clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. 20. By virtue of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the power under clause (1) of Article 226 to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. However, the language of Article 226 makes, it clear that the said Article does not contemplate interference by the High Court with the orders of the subordinate courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which that High Court exercises jurisdiction. 21. However, the language of Article 226 makes, it clear that the said Article does not contemplate interference by the High Court with the orders of the subordinate courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which that High Court exercises jurisdiction. 21. As already noticed, the law laid down by the Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai's case (supra) that the High Court can exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 to interfere with a judicial order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction now stands overruled by the decision of a Three-Judge Bench in Radhey Shyam's case (supra), wherein the Apex Court held that, judicial orders of Civil Courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226 and that the scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226. In Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana [ (2017) 5 SCC 533 ] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court followed the law laid down in Radhey Shyam's case (supra) while holding that, a writ petition which assails the order of a Civil Court in the High Court has to be understood, in all circumstances, to be a challenge under Article 227 of the Constitution and determination by the High Court under the said Article. 22. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Nandini J. Shah and others [ (2018) 15 SCC 356 ], the question that came up for consideration before a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court was whether the order passed by the City Civil Court, Bombay in Misc. Appeal No.121 of 2011 in exercise of the powers under Section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, as an Appellate Officer, is in the capacity of a Civil Court or persona designata. Sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the said Act reads thus; "9. Appeals. Appeal No.121 of 2011 in exercise of the powers under Section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, as an Appellate Officer, is in the capacity of a Civil Court or persona designata. Sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the said Act reads thus; "9. Appeals. - (1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the estate officer made in respect of any public premises under Section 5 or Section 5.B. or Section 5C or Section 7 to an appellate officer who shall be the district judge of the district in which the public premises are situate or such other judicial officer in that district of not less than ten years standing as the district judge may designate in this behalf." The appellant contended that, the interplay of Section 9 of the 1971 Act read with the other provisions in the said Act, such as Sections 3, 8 and 10, makes it amply clear that the jurisdiction exercised by the Appellate Officer, namely the City Civil Court Judge, in an appeal under Section 9 of the Act, is in his capacity as a Civil Court and not persona designata. If so, the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India alone could be availed in the fact situation of the present case and not under Article 226, for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari. Per contra, the respondents contended that the District Judge/Appellate Officer exercises power under Section 9 of the 1971 Act as persona designata and not as a Civil Court. The respondents contended that, when a special statute creates an Appellate Officer and where it refers to the Presiding Judge and not to the Court to be such Appellate Officer, then it can be said that the reference has been made to the Judge as persona designata. The Apex Court held that, sub-section (1) of Section 9 postulates that an appeal shall lie from every order of the Estate Officer, passed under the Act, to an Appellate Officer. As to who shall be the Appellate Officer, has also been specified in the same provision. The first part of the provision does suggest that the appeal shall lie to an Appellate Officer, however, it does not follow therefrom that the Appellate Officer is persona designata. Something more is required to hold so. As to who shall be the Appellate Officer, has also been specified in the same provision. The first part of the provision does suggest that the appeal shall lie to an Appellate Officer, however, it does not follow therefrom that the Appellate Officer is persona designata. Something more is required to hold so. Had it been a case of designating a person by name as an Appellate Officer, the concomitant would be entirely different. However, when the Appellate Officer is either the District Judge of the district or any another judicial officer in that district possessing necessary qualification who could be designated by the District Judge, the question of such investiture of power of an appellate authority in the District Judge or Designated Judge would by no standards acquire the colour or for that matter trappings of persona designata. In the first place, the power to be exercised by the Appellate Officer in terms of Section 9 is a judicial power of the State which is quite distinct from the executive power of the State. Secondly, the District Judge or designated judicial officer exercises judicial authority within his jurisdiction. Thirdly, as the Act predicates the Appellate Officer is to be a District Judge or judicial officer, it is indicative of the fact of a pre existing authority exercising judicial power of the State. Fourthly, District Judge is the creature of Section 5 of the Maharashtra Civil Courts Act, 1869, who presides over a District Court invariably consisting of more than one Judge in the concerned district. After referring to the provisions under the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948 the Apex Court held that, the District Judge or Principal Judge of the City Civil Court is the officer presiding over the Court and derives his description from the nomenclature of the Court. Even if the District Judge/Principal Judge of the City Civil Court might retire or get transferred, his successor-in-office can pick up the thread of the proceedings under Section 9 of the 1971 Act from the stage where it was left by his predecessor and can function as an appellate authority. The District Judge/Principal Judge of the City Civil Court and other judicial officers of these Courts possessing necessary qualifications constitute a class and cannot be considered as persona designata. The District Judge/Principal Judge of the City Civil Court and other judicial officers of these Courts possessing necessary qualifications constitute a class and cannot be considered as persona designata. The Appellate Officer, therefore, has to function as a Court and his decision is final in terms of Section 10 of 1971 Act. The legislative intent behind providing an appeal under Section 9 before the Appellate Officer to be the District Judge of the concerned District Court in which the public premises are situated or such other judicial officer in that district possessing necessary qualification to be designated by the District Judge for that purpose, is indicative of the fact that the power to be exercised by the Appellate Officer is not in his capacity as persona designata but as a judicial officer of the pre existing Court. The thrust of sub-section (1) of Section 9 of 1971 Act is to provide for remedy of an appeal against the order of the Estate Officer before the District Judge who, undeniably, is a pre existing authority and head of the judiciary within the district, discharging judicial power of the State including power to condone the delay in filing of the appeal and to grant interim relief during the pendency of the appeal. Though described as an Appellate Officer, the District Judge, for deciding an appeal under Section 9, can and is expected to exercise the powers of the Civil Court. In the case of Thakur Das v. State of M.P. [AIR 1978 SC 1 ], in paragraph 9, while analysing the cleavage of opinion of the High Courts, it is noticed that the expression 'judicial authority' would comprehend the Additional Sessions Judge or the Sessions Judge could transfer such appeal pending before him to Additional Sessions Judge which was a pointer to the fact that he was not a persona designata. Even in respect of the appeal under Section 9 of the 1971 Act, the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court or District Judge is competent to hear the appeal himself or designate some other judicial officer within his jurisdiction possessing requisite qualification. Even in respect of the appeal under Section 9 of the 1971 Act, the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court or District Judge is competent to hear the appeal himself or designate some other judicial officer within his jurisdiction possessing requisite qualification. It is implicit in Section 9 read with the provisions of the Acts constituting the District Judiciary that the head of the district judiciary is the District Judge or Principal Judge of the City Civil Court and Section 9 of the 1971 Act makes it explicit, by investing authority in the District Judge or Principal Judge of the City Civil Court, to designate any other judicial officer within his jurisdiction possessing essential qualifications, to hear such appeals. This is a clear departure from the appointment of a District Judge as a persona designata. The Additional District Judge or Judicial Officer possessing essential qualification, therefore, is not an inferior appellate officer within the meaning of Section 9 of the 1971 Act. The Apex Court opined that, there is enough indication in Section 9 of the 1971 Act to spell out the legislative intent that the remedy of appeal before the appellate officer is not before a persona designate but a pre-existing judicial authority in the district concerned. 23. In Life Insurance Corporation of India’s case (supra) applying the principles underlying the decisions of Three-Judge Bench in Thakur Das Vs. State of M.P. [AIR 1978 SC 1 ], Asnew Drums Pvt. Ltd. V. Mahrashtra State Finance Corporation [ (1971) 3 SCC 602 ], Maharashtra State Financial Corporation V. Jaycee Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. [ (1991) 2 SCC 637 ] , Ram Chander Aggarwal V. State of U.P. [1966 Supp.SCR 393] and Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthenpurayil Aboobacker [ (1995) 5 SCC 5 ], the Apex Court concluded that the Appellate Officer referred to in Section 9 of the 1971 Act, is not a persona designata but acts as a Civil Court. The Appellate Officer while exercising power under Section 9 of the 1971 Act, does not act as a persona designata but in his capacity as a pre-existing judicial authority in the district (being a District Judge or judicial officer possessing essential qualification designated by the District Judge). The Appellate Officer while exercising power under Section 9 of the 1971 Act, does not act as a persona designata but in his capacity as a pre-existing judicial authority in the district (being a District Judge or judicial officer possessing essential qualification designated by the District Judge). Being part of the district judiciary, the Judge acts as a Court and the order passed by him will be an order of the Subordinate Court against which remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be availed on the matters delineated for exercise of such jurisdiction. In paragraph 55 of the said decision, after referring to the decision in Shyam Sunder Agarwai and Co. v. Union of India [ (1996) 2 SCC 132 ] (wherein it has been held that, even if a special statute expressly attaches finality to an appellate order passed by the Appellate Officer, who has been clothed with the jurisdiction to act as Civil Court, such provision of finality will not take away the revisional power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure) the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can certainly be availed against the decision of the Appellate Officer. Paragraphs 54 to 58 of the said decision read thus; "54. In Jinda Ram v. Union of India [ (1999) 2 MPLJ 221 ], the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court was called upon to consider the maintainability of revision application under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code against an order passed by the District Judge as an Appellate Officer under Section 9 of the 1971 Act. After considering the conflicting decisions of the same High Court on the point, the Division Bench held that an order passed by the Appellate Officer under Section 9 is amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code. The Court relied upon the exposition of this Court in the case of Mukri Gopalan [ (1995) 5 SCC 5 ] wherein it has been observed that the appellate authorities constituted under the enactment constitute a class and cannot be considered as a persona designata. Further, the appellate authority functions as a court. 55. The Court also referred to another decision of this Court in Shyam Sunder Agarwal and Co. Further, the appellate authority functions as a court. 55. The Court also referred to another decision of this Court in Shyam Sunder Agarwal and Co. v. Union of India [ (1996) 2 SCC 132 ] wherein it has been held that appellate order having been passed by a civil court, constituted under a special statute subordinate to the High Court though made final under the Act, it is amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court relied upon other decisions of this Court to buttress the conclusion that the remedy of revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was available against an order passed by the District Judge on an appeal under Section 9 of the Act. Be that as it may, we are certain that remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is availed against the decision of the Appellate Officer. 56. In the case of M.Papa Naik v. City Municipal Council [(1996) 3 Kant. II 86] the Court was called upon to examine the purport of Section 9 of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974. Even in this case the question was whether a remedy of revision or writ petition would lie against the order passed by the District Judge on an appeal preferred under Section 10 of the State Act. The Court concluded that the order passed by the District Judge as an appellate authority under Section 9 of the State Act does not cease to be a Court subordinate to the High Court and any order passed by him is amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of this conclusion, the learned Single Judge relied upon the exposition in the case of Central Talkies Ltd. v. Dwarka Prasad [ AIR 1961 SC 606 ] and Kokku Parthasaradhi Naidu Garu v. Chintaiachervu Koteswara Rao Garu [ILR 1924 (47) Mad. 369]. 57. In support of this conclusion, the learned Single Judge relied upon the exposition in the case of Central Talkies Ltd. v. Dwarka Prasad [ AIR 1961 SC 606 ] and Kokku Parthasaradhi Naidu Garu v. Chintaiachervu Koteswara Rao Garu [ILR 1924 (47) Mad. 369]. 57. Even though the respondents have invited our attention to other decisions of High Courts and also of Supreme Court which have analysed the provisions of other legislations, it is unnecessary to dilate on those decisions as we intend to apply the principles underlying the decisions of three-Judge Bench of this Court in Thakur Das (supra), Asnew Drums Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Maharashtra State Financial Corporation (supra), Ram Chander Aggarwal (supra) and Mukri Gopalan (supra), in particular, to conclude that the Appellate Officer referred to in Section 9 of the 1971 Act, is not a persona designata but acts as a civil court. 58. In other words, the Appellate Officer while exercising power under Section 9 of the 1971 Act, does not act as a Persona designata but in his capacity as a pre existing judicial authority in the district (being a District Judge or judicial officer possessing essential qualification designated by the District Judge). Being part of the district judiciary, the judge acts as a Court and the order passed by him will be an order of the Subordinate Court against which remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be availed on the matters delineated for exercise of such jurisdiction." (underline supplied) 24. In Subaida v. Deputy Tahsildar (RR), Thrissur District and others [2019 (1) KHC SN 7] this Court, taking note of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India's case (supra) held that an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is appealable before this Court, under Section 173 of the said Act. Therefore, if a person is aggrieved by an award passed by the Tribunal under Section 168 of the Act, he has to challenge the same in an appeal filed under Section 173 of the Act, after complying with the statutory mandate of the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 173, subject to the time limit prescribed in the second proviso to that sub-rule. The challenge to an order passed by the Tribunal (other than an award passed under Section 168) has to be one invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The challenge to such an order of the District Judge, as the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, has to be made under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and not under Article 226. Being part of the district judiciary, the District Judge acts as a court and the order passed by him is an order of the subordinate court against which remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be availed on the matters delineated for exercise of such jurisdiction, which is supervisory in nature. Section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that, where any amount is due from any person under an award, the Claims Tribunal may, on an application made to it by the person entitled to the amount, issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. The order of the Claims Tribunal under Section 174 of the Act, to initiate revenue recovery, based on an application made by the person entitled to the amount as per the award, is also an order against which remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be availed. In an 0.P.(MAC) filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner can seek a time bound disposal of any interlocutory applications filed after the award passed by the Claims Tribunal and stay of operation of the order of the Claims Tribunal under Section 174 of the Act, and all recovery proceedings initiated pursuant to that order. For seeking such reliefs, it is for the petitioner to file an O.P.(MAC) under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, if a person against whom revenue recovery proceedings are initiated by issuing a demand notice pursuant to the order of the Claims Tribunal under Section 174 of the Act requires only time for payment of the dues in monthly instalments, he can approach this Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, with the person entitled to the amount as per the award and also the revenue officials in the party array. 25. In Valsaraj v. Rajan (order dated 06.08.2019 in WP(C) No.37048 of 2018 and connected cases), the issue raised before this Court was as to whether the judgment/order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal constituted under sub-section (2) of Section 89 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 can be challenged before this Court invoking the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or whether it should be challenged in an original petition filed under Article 227, by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction. In order to consider that issue, the question that has been considered by this Court was as to whether a Judicial Officer, not below the rank of a District Judge or who is qualified to be a Judge of the High Court, appointed in terms of the notification issued by the State Government under sub-section (2) of Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, is exercising powers in the capacity of a Civil Court or as persona designata. In the said order, this Court held that the Judicial Officer, who exercise the powers of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, exercise such powers as a persona designata, though his normal duties as District Judge is in the capacity of a Civil Court. In that view of the matter, the judgment/order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal cannot be termed as an order of a Civil Court against which remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be invoked. Such a judgment/order can only be challenged by invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Paragraphs 28 to 32 of the said order reads thus: "28. As already noticed, in exercise of the powers under sub-section (2) of Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the State Government constitute State Transport Appellate Tribunal, which consists of a Judicial Officer, not below the rank of a District Judge or who is qualified to be a Judge of the High our and the Tribunal shall exercise such jurisdiction within such area as may be notified by the State Government. In exercise of the powers under sub-section (2) of Section 89, the State Government is issuing notification appointing a particular Judicial Officer, who is a District Judge and Sessions Judge at Ernakulam, as the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, with effect from the date on which he assumes charge. In exercise of the powers under sub-section (2) of Section 89, the State Government is issuing notification appointing a particular Judicial Officer, who is a District Judge and Sessions Judge at Ernakulam, as the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, with effect from the date on which he assumes charge. The provisions under sub-section (2) of Section 89 make it explicitly clear that it is a case of designating a person by name as State Transport Appellate Tribunal and it is not a case in which a Judicial Officer, not below the rank of a District Judge in a district or any other Judicial. Officer in that district possessing necessary qualification, exercise the jurisdiction of that Tribunal. Therefore, the Judicial Officer, who exercise the powers of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, exercise such powers as a persona designata, though his normal duties as District and Sessions Judge is in the capacity of a civil court. In that view of the matter, the judgment/order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal cannot be termed as an order of a civil court against which remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be invoked. Such a judgment/order can only be challenged by invoking the writ jurisdiction Of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 29. In the order of this Court dated 08.01.2016 in W.P.(C) No.39020 of 2015, it was ordered that, orders other than an award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 can be assailed only in original petitions filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Similarly, orders passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal constituted under sub-section (2) of Section 89 of the Act can also be assailed in original petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 30. Similarly, orders passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal constituted under sub-section (2) of Section 89 of the Act can also be assailed in original petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 30. In the order dated 22.01.2019, in an unnumbered Writ Appeal (F.No.2820/2019) arising out of the judgment in O.P.(C)No.2707 of 2018, while considering the question as to whether a Writ Appeal under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 can be entertained against the judgment in that original petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, a Division Bench of this Court held that the directions issued in the impugned judgment can be traceable to the exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 31. A reading of the aforesaid orders would show that the question as to whether a Judicial Officer not below the rank of District Judge who is exercising the jurisdiction of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal constituted under sub-section (2) of Section 89 of the Motor Vehicle Act, is a persona designate or exercising powers in the capacity of a civil court, was not an issue raised before this Court. 32. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India's case (supra), applying the principles underlying the decisions of Three-Judge Bench in Thakur Das (supra), Asnew Drums Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Maharashtra State Financial Corporation (supra), Ram Chander Aggarwal (supra) and. Mukri Gopalan (supra), it can be concluded that a Judicial Officer exercising the powers of State Transport Appellate Tribunal, acts as a persona designata, and not in his capacity as a pre-existing Judicial authority in the district, he being a District Judge. Therefore, the judgment/order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal is not a judgment/order of a civil court against which the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be invoked, on the matters delineated for exercise of such jurisdiction. Such judgment/order has to be challenged in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India." 26. Such judgment/order has to be challenged in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India." 26. In the instant case, as already noticed, Section 21 of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act provides for an appeal against the order of confiscation, to the District Court having jurisdiction over the area in which the articles were seized and the District Judge shall, after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard issue such order either confirming, amending or annulling the order appealed against. It is not a case of designating a person by name as the Appellate Authority. An appeal under Section 21 of the said Act can be filed in the District Court having jurisdiction over the area in which the articles were seized, which can be heard either by the Principal District Judge or any other District Judge in that District. This is a clear departure from appointing a District Judge as a persona designata. The provisions under Section 21 of the Act spell out the legislative intend that the remedy of appeal is before the District Court having jurisdiction over the area in which the articles are seized and the District Judge hears the appeal in his capacity as a pre-existing judicial authority in the District (being a District Judge). Being part of the District Judiciary, the District Judge acts as a court and the order passed by him will be an order of the Subordinate Court against which remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be availed on the matters delineated for exercise of such jurisdiction. 27. In such circumstances, an order of the District Judge in an appeal filed under Section 21 of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Acts 2008 has to be challenged in an original petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, and not In a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The defect noted by the Registry is sustained.