ORDER : M. Satyanarayana Murthy, J. 1. The petitioners claiming to be the public spirited persons filed the writ petition in resorting to pro bono publico for issue of a Writ of mandamus declaring the inaction of the respondents' 1 and 3 to surrender the 5th respondent and repatriate him to Animal Husbandry Department as illegal, irregular, arbitrary and unjust and consequently direct the respondents 1 and 3 to forthwith surrender the 5th respondent to his parent department. 2. The 1st petitioner is the 11th Ward Councillor and the 2nd petitioner is a resident of 6th Ward of Gudivada Municipality of Krishna District. The 5th respondent is a Graduate in Veterinary Sciences and thereby he acquired proficiency in the field of Animal Husbandry. However, on account of his high level political influence he is holding in whatever party in power, he gets the posting of his choice and on deputation to some other department which is totally unconnected with his normal professional duties. He was permitted to work mostly on deputation in his service and minimum part of his service in the parent department. In terms of G.O. Rt. No. 10, Finance and Planning Department, dated 22-1-1993, he was posted to work in District Water Management Agency. The term of deputation was fixed initially and extended periodically from time to time. The Government by G.O. Rt. No. 15, Animal Husbandry, Dairy Development and Fisheries (AH.I) Department, dated 15-1-2012, extended the term from 20.1.2012 to 19-1-2013 to work as Assistant Project Director in District Water Management Agency (DWMA), West Godavari District. Thereafter, by G.O. Rt. No. 130, Animal Husbandry, Dairy Development and Fisheries (AH.I) Department, dated 30.3.2013, the 1st respondent extended his term from 20.1.2013 to 19.1.2014. Thereafter, by G.O. Rt. No. 83, Animal Husbandry, Dairy Development and Fisheries (AH.I) Department, dated 20.3.2015, his term was extended with retrospective effect from 20.1.2014 to 19.1.2016. 3. The petitioners specifically contended that no employee can be sent to foreign service from parent department for more than five years' period. But by the above Government Orders, the 5th respondent shall relieve himself after completion of the 5th year of deputation and report before the parent department for his posting in the parent department. 3. The petitioners specifically contended that no employee can be sent to foreign service from parent department for more than five years' period. But by the above Government Orders, the 5th respondent shall relieve himself after completion of the 5th year of deputation and report before the parent department for his posting in the parent department. Soon after completion of five years, the 5th respondent reported before the 4th respondent for posting, hardly worked for 19 days in Animal Husbandry Department but he could secure, again transfer on deputation from Animal, Husbandry Department to join as Additional Personal Secretary to the Minister for Social Welfare and Tribal Welfare Department vide G.O. Rt. No. 57, Animal Husbandry, Dairy Development and Fisheries (AH.I) Department, dated 1-3-2016. After working as a Personal Secretary for about 23 months, he was transferred on deputation as Municipal Commissioner, Tadepalligudem. Somehow, the Municipal Chair Person and Councillors did not accept his posting there, as such the 5th respondent was transferred as Municipal Commissioner, Gudivada and thereafter, by G.O. Rt. No. 107, Municipal Administration and urban Development (A1) Department, dated 29-1-2018, posted him as Municipal Commissioner, Gudivada, for a period of one year, which was completed on 28-1-2019. 4. While the matter stood thus, one Sana Murali Krishna of Gudivada submitted a complaint against several employees working in the Municipality, making grave and serious allegations. The 3rd respondent through proceedings Roc. No.1637153/2018/C1, dated 16-8-2018, appointed the Joint Director of Municipal Administration, Guntur, to conduct preliminary enquiry and accordingly he conducted enquiry, submitted his report through his letter dated 12-9-2018 to the 3rd respondent. While recording findings and observations in respect of three other employees, the Joint Director also recorded his finding on various allegations about the conduct and functioning of the 5th respondent. Some of the allegations are vague. Therefore, he suggested that in view of the prima facie evidence of misappropriation of Government funds to a tune of Rs.20.89 lakhs, a regular enquiry needs to be conducted. Basing on such report, the 3rd respondent by letter in Roc. No. R-1637153/2018/CK dated 1-10-2018, requested the 1st respondent to conduct common enquiry under Rule 24 of CCA Rules, 1991. Since the 5th respondent belongs to Animal Husbandry Department, the 3rd respondent requested the 1st respondent to surrender the 5th respondent to parent department and to instruct the parent department to initiate disciplinary action against him. 5. No. R-1637153/2018/CK dated 1-10-2018, requested the 1st respondent to conduct common enquiry under Rule 24 of CCA Rules, 1991. Since the 5th respondent belongs to Animal Husbandry Department, the 3rd respondent requested the 1st respondent to surrender the 5th respondent to parent department and to instruct the parent department to initiate disciplinary action against him. 5. Large scale irregularities committed by the 5th respondent are widely reported in the Newspapers. Even the Municipal Counsel also passed Resolution No. 169, dated 29-8-2018, requesting the Government to take disciplinary action against the concerned employees against whom the preliminary enquiry officer submitted a report recording fact findings but there employees were placed under suspension by proceedings dated 1-10-2018 of the 3rd respondent. On account of the commission of several irregularities, functioning of the 5th respondent as Municipal Commissioner, Gudivada, is not desirable since his continuation is not in the interest of the Municipality or the public in Gudivada Municipal area. On 20-12-2018, the 1st petitioner submitted a representation to the 1st respondent for immediate surrender of the 5th respondent to his parent department and to post a new officer as Municipal Commissioner. The 1st respondent by G.O. Rt. No. 1157, Municipal Administration and Urban Development (Vig. II.1) Department, dated 20-12-2018, initiated disciplinary proceedings against the 5th respondent and three others against whom action was proposed by the 3rd respondent. Once again, the 1st petitioner submitted representation dated 28-12-2018 to the 1st respondent requesting him to surrender the 5th respondent to parent department and not to continue him any longer as Municipal Commissioner, Gudivada. Despite the endorsement by the Minister for Animal Husbandry Department to take immediate action, no purpose was served and still, continuing the 5th respondent in the office as Municipal Commissioner is against the interest of public. 6. Since no action was taken, the 1st petitioner obtained information under the Right to Information Act, 2005, by application dated 11-2-2019 to know about the follow up action taken on the endorsement of the Minister, referred supra. But according to the information, the officer by Letter No. 530/AH-I/1/2019, dated 13-2-2019, informed that their department requested the 1st respondent to repatriate the 5th respondent and issue orders immediately. The same is pending with the 1st respondent. But no action was taken. 7. But according to the information, the officer by Letter No. 530/AH-I/1/2019, dated 13-2-2019, informed that their department requested the 1st respondent to repatriate the 5th respondent and issue orders immediately. The same is pending with the 1st respondent. But no action was taken. 7. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that the 5th respondent got scant respect to the orders of this Court in W.P.(PIL) No. 365 of 2018 and a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 18-12-2018, took serious view and directed the 5th respondent to appear before the Court on 21-12-2018 for taking further action. 8. As such, the inaction of the respondents 1 and 3 for their failure to repatriate the 5th respondent to the parent department is challenged before this Court and sought to issue a Writ of mandamus. Therefore, having no other alternative, the petitioners approached this Court for the relief prayed for. 9. The 5th respondent alone filed counter denying the material allegations made in the Affidavit, inter alia, contending that the writ petition as a public interest litigation is not maintainable since no public interest involved more particularly in employees' service matters. 10. It is further contended that the petition was filed with a mala fide intention. One gulzar Chowk Mosque made an application to Gudivada Municipality on 5-8-2014 and 14-6-2017 for construction of shopping complex in their land. On this, the earlier Chief Executive Officer of A.P. State Wakf Board, Vijayawada, issued proceedings on 6-7-2017 in F. No. 13/RF/KST/2014, enumerating various conditions in the said proceedings. One gulzar Chowk Mosque made an application to Gudivada Municipality on 5-8-2014 and 14-6-2017 for construction of shopping complex in their land. On this, the earlier Chief Executive Officer of A.P. State Wakf Board, Vijayawada, issued proceedings on 6-7-2017 in F. No. 13/RF/KST/2014, enumerating various conditions in the said proceedings. Condition No. 6 of the said proceedings stipulates that the Building Construction Committee should obtain initial permission from the Municipal authorities and shall register with the Wakf Board after construction; that the President/Secretary of the Building Construction Committee shall jointly operate the bank account and they have to maintain proper accounts with appropriate vouchers and bills of expenditure; that the measurement book regarding the measurements of the construction to be produced whenever required or demanded by the Board authorities, that on the writ petition filed vide W.P. No. 5182 of 2018 before this Court that some unauthorized constructions were taken up upon the subject property and this Court was pleased to pass an order dated 19-2-2018 directing not to make construction of any shopping complex either by Wakf Board or by the Municipality but for the continuation of compound wall only. Thereafter, on 30-1-2019, the 2nd petitioner in the public interest litigation made an application to the Municipal Commissioner, Gudivada, that the Government has sanctioned Rs. 96,75,536/- for construction of Al-Habib Muslims Shadi Khana vide G.O. Rt. No. 50, requested to issue site plan and measurements. Thereafter, on 1-2-2019, the 5th respondent sent an endorsement to the 2nd petitioner in the present public interest litigation, requesting to submit the details of demolition of earlier building and sanction plan of the proposed building and also copy of the sanction of the funds granted by the A.P. Government. Thereafter, the 2nd petitioner in the public interest litigation has not at all submitted any of these details. The 5th respondent made discreet enquiries and come to know that W.P. No. 5182 of 2018 was filed before that Court and the Court was pleased to pass the order on 19-2-2018 with a specific direction not to construct any shopping complex either by Wakf Board or by Municipality in the disputed land. However, the 2nd petitioner in the public interest litigation commenced and proceeded with the construction of shopping complex illegally and unauthorisedly by violating the order passed by this Court and not even obtaining any permission from the Municipality. However, the 2nd petitioner in the public interest litigation commenced and proceeded with the construction of shopping complex illegally and unauthorisedly by violating the order passed by this Court and not even obtaining any permission from the Municipality. The 2nd petitioner was also the Councilor of Gudivada Municipality and for one of the Councillors of Gudivada Municipality viz., Shaik Sarkar, Councillor of 10th Ward and Muslim representative and others made a representation to Gudivada Municipality on 18-2-2019 stating that the Government has sanctioned AC.1.50 cts., of land to Gulzar Chowk Mosque and grave yard as per the Municipal records and only Ac. 0.75 cts. of land was remaining and also constructed 14 shops in the land, now only Ac. 0.45 cts. of land was available being used as grave yard for Muslim religion. They also informed that the construction of shopping complex was completed and only Ac. 0.25 cts. of land is remaining as grave yard, not sufficient for future requirement as grave yard and requested to stop construction activity. Hence, the 5th respondent addressed a letter to the Collector and District Magistrate, Krishna, narrating all the facts and circumstances on 20-2-2019 vide Roc. No. 571/2019/G1 and thereafter on the directions by the District Collector, the construction was stalled and the present writ petition is the outcome of such desist order passed by the 5th respondent. Therefore, there are any amount of mala fides in filing the petition to settle the personal scores and to wreak vengeance and on account of personal vendetta. 11. The 5th respondent denied the details mentioned in the report as to his posting in various departments and disclosed the details of his posting in the table hereunder: "Service particulars of Dr. A. Samuel. Municipal Commissioner, Gudivada Municipality: S.No. Posting Place Period of service 1. Veterinary Assistant Surgeon, Department of Animal Husbandry Veterinary Dispensary, Pattimpalem, TP Gudem (M), W.G. Dist. 26-2-2000 to 18-6-2002 First Posting 2. Veterinary Assistant Surgeon, Department of Animal Husbandry Veterinary Dispensary, Allampuram, Pentapadu (M), W.G. Dist. 19-6-2002 to 16-12-2003 3. Veterinary Assistant Surgeon, Department of Animal Husbandry Veterinary Dispensary, Pentapadu (M), W.G. Dist. 17-12-2003 to 19-1-2011 4. Assistant Project Director, District Water Management Agency (DWMA) District Water Management Agency (DWMA), W.G. Dist 20-1-2011 to 19-1-2016 As per G.O.No.10 and 2 Fin and Plg. Dept, (5 years) 5. Veterinary Assistant Surgeon, Department of Animal Husbandry Veterinary Dispensary, West Vipper, Pentapadu (M), W.G. Dist. 17-12-2003 to 19-1-2011 4. Assistant Project Director, District Water Management Agency (DWMA) District Water Management Agency (DWMA), W.G. Dist 20-1-2011 to 19-1-2016 As per G.O.No.10 and 2 Fin and Plg. Dept, (5 years) 5. Veterinary Assistant Surgeon, Department of Animal Husbandry Veterinary Dispensary, West Vipper, Pentapadu (M), W.G. Dist. 20-1-2016 to 7-3-2016 6. Addl. Pvt. Secretary to Minister for Social Welfare and Empowerment and Tribal Welfare and Empowerment Minister for Social Welfare and Empowerment and Tribal Welfare and Empowerment 7-3-2016 to 7-9-2016 As per G.O. Ms. No.522, GAD (OP.II) Dept., dt.27-8-2011 as OD basis 7. Veterinary Assistant Surgeon, Department of Animal Husbandry Veterinary Dispensary Devarapalli (M), W.G. Dist. 8-9-2016 to 23-3-2017 8. Pvt. Secretary to Govt. Whip A.P. Legislative Assembly, Amaravathi 24-3-2017 to 29-1-2018 As per G.O. Ms. No.522, GAD (OP.II) Dept, dt 27-8-2011 as OD basis 9. Municipal Commissioner, MA and UD Department Municipal Commissioner, Gudivada, Krishna Dist. 29-1-2018 to till date 12. The 5th respondent also further contended that the allegations made against him as to the pending departmental enquiry are false and baseless and that the enquiry is only with regard to sanction of leave, loss of pay etc., and postponing of annual increments and therefore it is not misappropriation and prayed to dismiss the writ petition against him. 13. The 5th respondent also further contended that the allegations made against him as to the pending departmental enquiry are false and baseless and that the enquiry is only with regard to sanction of leave, loss of pay etc., and postponing of annual increments and therefore it is not misappropriation and prayed to dismiss the writ petition against him. 13. During hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioners mainly contended that when the 5th respondent has completed his five years of period of deputation in total, in various departments, he is to be surrendered to the parent department by the departments who engaged the services of the 5th respondent in different capacities and the petitioners have no other alternative except to approach the Court by way of public interest litigation since the Tribunals have no jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by a third party and therefore, the Writ by way of public interest litigation is maintainable and placed reliance on a judgment of the apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 and he further contended that despite initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the 5th respondent, he cannot be continued and his continuation in Gudivada Municipality may possibly interfere with the fair enquiry and therefore the 5th respondent is to be surrendered to the parent department i.e. Animal Husbandry and Dairy Development Department since he completed his period of deputation and his continuation is against the Fundamental Rules of A.P. and requested issue direction. stated supra. 14. Whereas, the Government Pleader for the 3rd respondent contended that the file is under process and after completion of process, necessary orders will be issued by the Government for the surrender of 5th respondent to the parent department and in view of the pendency of the file in process, no action was taken against the 5th respondent and requested to pass appropriate orders. 15. However, the counsel for the 5th respondent Sri P.B. Suresh Kumar vehemently contended that the writ petition as a public interest litigation is not maintainable in service matters by placing reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in Girjesh Shrivastava v. State of M.P. 2010 Law Suit (SC) 748 and State of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok (2013) 5 SCC 1 . Based on the principles laid down in the said judgments, he contended that the Court cannot entertain public interest litigation in service matters. He further contended that this petition is filed only to wreak vengeance against the 5th respondent since he stopped the construction of shopping complex in Gulzar Chowk Mosque site without obtaining prior approval by the Municipality and such petition cannot be entertained and prayed for dismissal of the petition. 16. Considering rival contentions and the material available on record, the point that arises for consideration is: Whether a Writ by way of public interest litigations maintainable in service matters, if so whether continuation of the 5th respondent as Municipal Commissioner, Gudivada, caused any public injury if not whether he is liable to be surrendered to the parent department of Animal Husbandry and Dairy Development Department? In Re point:-It is an undisputed fact that the 5th respondent was appointed as Veterinary Assistant Surgeon in Animal Husbandry and Dairy Development Department. But he was deputed to various other departments including District Water Management Agency (DWMA), West Godavari District, Additional Private Secretary to Minister for Social Welfare and Empowerment and Tribunal Welfare and Empowerment, Private Secretary to Government Whip, A.P. Legislative Assembly, Amaravati and Municipal Commissioner, Gudivada Krishna District, on different dates. Therefore, he is a State Government servant and his deputation is governed by the A.P. Fundamental Rules. Rules 109 to 127 deal with deputation to foreign service i.e. deputation from parent department to other departments. In view of the said Rules, deputation shall be for a period of three years initially and that can be extended for another two years with the orders of the Government. Therefore, the total continuous period on deputation is only five years. But as seen from the details furnished by the 5th respondent, he was not continuously on deputation as Municipal Commissioner, Gudivada, for five years. Therefore, his continuation is not contrary to the A.P. Fundamental Rules. 17. The petitioners sought for surrender of the 5th respondent to his parent department i.e. Animal Husbandry Department as he was initially appointed as Veterinary Assistant Surgeon in the department having possessed a Degree in Veterinary Sciences. Such request would fall within the service matters since the request made by the petitioners is relating to directly connected to service of a Government employee or servant. Such request would fall within the service matters since the request made by the petitioners is relating to directly connected to service of a Government employee or servant. Therefore, the question before us is whether public interest litigation can be maintained in service matters. 18. The learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the judgment in L. Chandra Kumar case, (1997) 3 SCC 261 supra, wherein the apex Court held that the power of judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and hence the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and on the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The Apex Court in the said judgment, further held in paras 77 and 78 under: "77. We find that the various factors mentioned in the test evolved by Chandrachud, J. Have already been considered by decisions of various Benches of this Court that have been referred to in the course of our analysis. From their conclusions, many of which have been extracted by us in toto, it appears that this Court has always considered the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts and in this Court under Articles 226 and 32 respectively, enabling legislative action to be subjected to the scrutiny of superior courts, to be integral to our constitutional scheme. While several judgments have made specific references to this aspect [Gajendragadkar, C.J. in Keshav Singh case ( AIR 1965 SC 745 ], Beg, J. and Khanna, J. in Kesavananda Bharati case (1973) 4 SCC 225 ), Chandrachud, C.J. in Fertilizer Kamgar (1981) 1 SCC 568 ), K.N. Singh, J. in Delhi Judicial Service Assn (1991) 4 SCC 406 ), etc] the rest have made general observations highlighting the significance of this feature. 78. The legitimacy of the power of courts within constitutional democracies to review legislative action has been questioned since the time it was first conceived. The Constitution of India, being alive to such criticism, has, while conferring such power upon the higher judiciary, incorporated important safeguards. An analysis of the manner in which the Farmers of our Constitution incorporated provisions relating to the judiciary would indicate that they were very greatly concerned with securing the independence of the judiciary. The Constitution of India, being alive to such criticism, has, while conferring such power upon the higher judiciary, incorporated important safeguards. An analysis of the manner in which the Farmers of our Constitution incorporated provisions relating to the judiciary would indicate that they were very greatly concerned with securing the independence of the judiciary. These attempts were directed at ensuring that the judiciary would be capable of effectively discharging its wide powers of judicial review. While the Constitution confers the power to strike down laws upon the High Courts and the Supreme Court, it also contains elaborate provisions dealing with the tenure, salaries, allowances, retirement age of Judges as well as the mechanism for selecting Judges to the superior courts. The inclusion of such elaborate provisions appears to have been occasioned by the belief that, armed by such provisions, the superior courts would be insulated armed by such provisions, the superior courts would be insulated from any executive or legislative attempts to interfere with the making of their decisions. The Judges of the superior courts have been entrusted with the task of upholding the Constitution and to this end, have been conferred the power to interpret it. It is they who have to ensure that the balance of power envisaged by the Constitution is maintained and that the legislature and the executive do not, in the discharge of their functions, transgress constitutional limitations. It is equally their duty to oversee that the judicial decisions rendered by those who man the subordinate courts and tribunals do not fall foul of strict standards of legal correctness and judicial independence. The constitutional safeguards which ensure the independence of the Judges of the subordinate judiciary or to those who man tribunals created by ordinary legislations. Consequently, Judges of the latter category can never be considered full and effective substitutes for the superior judiciary in discharging the function of constitutional interpretation. We, therefore, hold that the power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226 and in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded." 19. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded." 19. The principle laid down in the said judgment is that in the absence of conferring jurisdiction on any other tribunal, the High Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But here, the petitioners invoked jurisdiction of this Court by public interest litigation. In Sail Sabhlok case in paras 25, 29, 44 and 84, the Supreme Court while deciding the appointment of Chairman of the Public Service Commission held that since the person lacking character as the Chairman of the Public Service Commission in the State of Punjab, when the 1st respondent brought to the notice of the High Court through the writ petition that the State Government of Punjab proposed to appoint Mr. Harish Dhanda as the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, only because of his political affiliation, the Division Bench of the High Court rightly entertained the writ petition as public interest litigation. The Division Bench of the High Court, however, found that no procedure for appointment of Chairman and Members of the Public Service Commission has been laid down in Article 316 of the Constitution and therefore posed the question of maintainability. However, the Court finally concluded that a writ petition is maintainable as public interest litigation. 20. Taking advantage of these two judgments, the learned Senior Counsel Sri P. Veera Reddy contended that the writ petition as public interest litigation is maintainable. But the facts in Sail Sabhlok case are distinguishable for the reason that the question before the apex Court in the above judgment was with regard to qualification of Chairman of Public Service Commission of the State which is a Constitutional Post. The dispute with regard to appointment of a Chairman of the Public Service Commissioner cannot be said to be a service matter and it is an appointment to the Constitutional post. Therefore, maintainability of the writ petition with regard to service matters has not come up for consideration in the said judgment and consequently the principle laid down therein has no direct application to the present facts of the case. 21. Sri P.B. Suresh Kumar (sic. Therefore, maintainability of the writ petition with regard to service matters has not come up for consideration in the said judgment and consequently the principle laid down therein has no direct application to the present facts of the case. 21. Sri P.B. Suresh Kumar (sic. P.S.P. Suresh Kumar), Counsel for the 5th respondent, while contending that a public interest litigation is not maintainable, has placed reliance on a judgment of the apex Court in Girijesh Shrivastava case 2010 Law Suit (SC) 748 (supra), wherein the Supreme Court while placing reliance on Dr. Duryodhan Sahu v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra [ (1998) 7 SCC 273 ], Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal 2003 (8) Supreme 299 : 2004 (3) ALT 10.2 (DN SC) : 2004 (2) SBR 76 : (2004) 3 SCC 349 and various other judgments including the judgment in B. Ramanjini v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2002 (3) Supreme 617 : 2002 (3) ALT 18.1 (DN SC) : (2002) 5 SCC 533 , held that in service matters, a writ petition by way of public interest litigation is not maintainable, the same principle is supported by a long line of perspective pronouncements of the apex Court. 22. It is settled law that public interest litigation is not maintainable in service maters, including recruitment, appointment, transfers etc. An identical question came up before the Madhuri Bench of Madras High Court, wherein, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in P. Mayilrajaperumal v. The Secretary to Government W.P. (MD) No. 9088 of 2011 dated 7.9.2016, considered the question as to the maintainability of public interest litigation. 23. In the facts of the above judgment, the service conditions of the drivers and conductors from the third respondent/Tamil Nadu State Express Transport Corporation were questioned, on the ground that when the drivers or conductors should work only for eight hours, the third respondent is illegally compelling to work beyond eight hours continuously and they are directed to work for more than 13 hours continuously in one trip. Such an action of the Corporation was questioned before the Madras High Court by a practicing advocate claiming to be a social activist. In paragraph 10 of the said judgment, the Court observed that, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in various cases, no public interest litigation Writ Petition lie in respect of service matters. Such an action of the Corporation was questioned before the Madras High Court by a practicing advocate claiming to be a social activist. In paragraph 10 of the said judgment, the Court observed that, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in various cases, no public interest litigation Writ Petition lie in respect of service matters. The petitioner being a practicing Advocate is no way connected with the service of the respondent/Corporation. There are service rules for the third respondent/Corporation and as per the above said rules, employees, namely Driver-cum-Conductors are working in the third respondent/Corporation and that the information furnished by the third respondent/Corporation under Right to Information Act to the petitioner make it clear that there are 2421 drivers and 2425 conductors working in the third respondent/Corporation and totally 910 buses are running and the State Express Transport Corporation's buses are operating in 192 routes and the employees namely drivers and conductors are working 8 hours per day. The Court held that, based on such information, the petitioner being a practicing advocate who is unconcerned with the Government Department cannot question the same in the guise of public interest litigation. 24. The Madhurai Court also adverted to the judgment in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and others v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra (1998) 7 SCC 273 (supra), wherein, the Apex Court dealt with the issue to whether a Public Interest Writ Petition, at the instance of a stranger, could be entertained, by the Administrative Tribunal. After considering the decisions in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji basher Ahmed (1976) 1 SCC 671 , and the law declared in Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 (supra), the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 held as Follows: "Section 3(b) defines the word 'application' as an application made under Section 19. The latter Section refers to 'person aggrieved'. In order to bring a matter before the Tribunal, an application has to be made and the same can be made only by a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. We have already seen that the work 'order' has been defined in the explanation to sub-s. (1) of Section 19 so that all matters referred to in Section 3(q) as service matters could be brought before the Tribunal. We have already seen that the work 'order' has been defined in the explanation to sub-s. (1) of Section 19 so that all matters referred to in Section 3(q) as service matters could be brought before the Tribunal. It in that context, Sections 14 and 15 are read, there is no doubt that a total stranger to the concerned service cannot make an application before the Tribunal. If public interest litigations at the instance of strangers are allowed to be entertained by the Tribunal the very object of speedy disposal of service matters would get defeated." 25. Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal 2003 (8) Supreme 299 : 2004 (3) ALT 10.2 (DN SC) : 2004 (2) SBR 76 : (2004) 3 SCC 349 , the Apex Court at paragraphs 5 to 16, held as follows:- "5. It is necessary to take note of the meaning of the expression? Public interest litigation. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 4 (4th Edn.), "public interest" Is defined thus: Public interest.--(1) A matter of public or general interest--does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement; but that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected?" 26. In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdary 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 the Apex Court considered the scope of public interest litigation. In para 53 of the said judgment, after considering what is 'public interest', the Supreme Court held as follows: "The expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all proceedings therein initiated in a court of law with the purpose of enforcing a right or seeking a remedy. Therefore, lexically the expression 'PIL' means a legal action initiated in a court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected." Be that as it may, it is needless to emphasise that the requirement of locus standi if a party to a litigation is mandatory; because the legal capacity of the party to any litigation whether in private or public action in relation to any specific remedy sought for has to be primarily ascertained at the threshold." 27. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be allowed to be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity-oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, courts must be careful to see that a body of persons or member of public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations by masked phantoms who monitor at times from behind. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives and try to bargain for a good deal as well to enrich themselves. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busy bodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs. 28. The Court has to be satisfied about: (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; and (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike a balance between two conflicting interests: (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, Justifiable executive actions. 29. In Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab (2004) 3 SCC 363 the Apex Court decided the case on the same lines and held that PIL is not maintainable in service matters. 30. Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law from crafty invasions. 29. In Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab (2004) 3 SCC 363 the Apex Court decided the case on the same lines and held that PIL is not maintainable in service matters. 30. Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good. (vide State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu (1994) 2 SCC 481 and A.P. State Financial Corporation v. Gar Re-Rolling Mills AIR 1994 SC 2151 ). 31. No litigant has a right to unlimited draught on the court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as the wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. (vide Buddhi Kota Subba Rao (Dr) v. Parasaran (1996) 5 SCC 530 ) 32. The Apex Court also adverted to the principle laid down in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra (1998) 7 SCC 273 (supra) and Ashok Kumar Pandy v. State of West Bengal 2003 (8) Supreme 299 : 2004 (3) ALT 10.2 (DN SC) : 2004 (2) SBR 76 : (2004) 3 SCC 349 (supra) and held as follows: "It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants. Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievances go unnoticed, unrepresented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and substantial rights and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing the gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue delay in service matters? Government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of tax cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenus expecting their release from the detention orders etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the courts and having their grievances redressed, the busy bodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no real public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity, break the queue muffling their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get into the courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions of luxury litigants who have nothing to lose but trying to gain for nothing and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the courts never moves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants." 33. In the judgment referred supra, the Madras High Court reviewed the entire law and concluded that, Public Interest Litigation is not maintainable in service matters, unless the applicant had any interest in the subject matter. 34. In view of the law declared by the apex Court in the judgments referred supra, the writ petition as a public interest litigation is not maintainable since the surrender of 5th respondent to the parent department is purely a service matter since it directly relates to service continuation of 5th respondent as Municipal Commissioner of Gudivada. 35. Public interest litigation though recognized, such power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is to be exercised in various circumstances. The notion of Justice is fundamental to all organized civilisations, communities and cultures. It inheres in the attempt of communities to organize themselves as a collective and the dispensation of justice is the highest dharma. Dispensation of justice is complete, when the law that gives a right or prohibits the infringement thereof also gives a remedy. 36. Thus, the administration of justice is broadly understood as ensuring the conduct of the affairs of the State and of the community in terms of and in accordance with the scheme and principles of such codification. Dispensation of justice is complete, when the law that gives a right or prohibits the infringement thereof also gives a remedy. 36. Thus, the administration of justice is broadly understood as ensuring the conduct of the affairs of the State and of the community in terms of and in accordance with the scheme and principles of such codification. Administration of justice also means the implementation of the laws enacted in pursuance of constitutional and statutory powers and other policy measures. The Constitution has codified the powers of governance, the duties and obligations involved in governance, and the guarantee of fundamental and other constitutional rights. The regard which the State must have for individual liberty, autonomy, and freedoms is also articulated in the Constitution. The competence of the State to deal with those subjects is considered with reference to constitutional statements of rights, powers and the limits thereof. 37. Access to justice is said to be a right vested in every citizen and is a necessary complement of administration of justice. The absence of legislation or legislative silence in regard to such access will not jeopardize that right. Citizens can access courts for resolution of disputes and seek appropriate remedies for the wrongs, injuries or damage suffered by them. Besides such legal right to access the courts, citizens can access the Supreme Court for enforcement of the rights guaranteed under the Constitution or any enacted law or the High Courts for enforcement of both constitutional and other rights. 38. Certain constitutional directives provides for another important dimension of administration of Justice, viz, access to justice for the socially, economically and/or politically disadvantaged or other disabled or weaker sections of the community. Women and children are given a special place of protection. The following principles emanate from the constitutional directives:- (a) Securing social, economic and political justice to all peoples; (b) Securing the functioning of all the institutions of national life towards the above objective; (c) Ensuring that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities; Public interest litigation is understood and treated as the Citizens' invocation and use of the delivery of legal services in aid of and as a tool of administration of justice, as understood above. Therefore, the public interest litigation guarantees opportunities for securing justice and distribution of material resources of the community and to promote justice among the litigant public. 39. The jurisdiction of the Courts in the guise of public interest litigation is not unlimited but there are constitutional limitations and governance. It is not the function of the Government to keep citizens from falling into error. It is the function of citizens to keep the Government from falling into error. In the interest of and promotion of good governance, the courts review state action. Governance is not a mere political principal. It is a process defined, determined and regulated by the Constitution. Several provisions of the Constitution act as "Sign posts" and "Road maps" for governance. The Preamble to the Constitution, the Directive Principles of State Policy, and the provisions relating to local self-government etc., are such constitutional sign posts. Both fundamental rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy are claimants on the state for just and good governance. Therefore, when there is a failure of good governance, the Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to provide good governance to rectify the errors to direct the Government in this governance or to direct to do an act which is legally permissible or not to do such act which is impermissible in law. Therefore, the State action if it is not in accordance with law or rules framed for exercise of such power, the Court can exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Time and again, the Courts made it clear that the power can be exercised sparingly. Moreover, the Apex Court highlighted the circumstances under which the Court can exercise such power in State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) 3 SCC 402 and following are the guidelines: "198. In order to preserve the purity and sanctity of the PIL, it has become imperative to issue the following directions:- (1) The courts must encourage genuine and bona fide PIL and effectively discourage and curb the PIL filed for extraneous considerations. (2) Instead of every individual judge devising his own procedure for dealing with public interest litigation, it would be appropriate for each High Court to properly formulate rules for encouraging the genuine PIL and discouraging the PIL filed with oblique motives. (2) Instead of every individual judge devising his own procedure for dealing with public interest litigation, it would be appropriate for each High Court to properly formulate rules for encouraging the genuine PIL and discouraging the PIL filed with oblique motives. Consequently, we request that the High Courts who have not yet framed the rules, should frame the rules within three months. The Registrar General of each High Court is directed to ensure that a copy of the Rules prepared by the High Court is sent to the Secretary General of this Court immediately thereafter. (3) The courts should prima facie verify the credentials of the petitioner before entertaining a P.I.L. (4) The court should be prima facie satisfied regarding the correctness of the contents of the petition before entertaining a PIL. (5) The court should be fully satisfied that substantial public interest is involved before entertaining the petition. (6) The Court should ensure that the petition which involves larger public interest, gravity and urgency must be given priority over other petitions. (7) The courts before entertaining the PIL should ensure that the PIL is aimed at redressal of genuine public harm or public injury. The court should also ensure that there is no personal gain, private motive or oblique movie behind filing the public interest litigation. (8) The court should also ensure that the petitions filed by busy bodies for extraneous and ulterior motives must be discouraged by imposing exemplary costs or by adopting similar novel methods to curb frivolous petitions and the petitions filed for extraneous consideration". 40. The leading judgment of the apex Court guide the High Courts to exercise such power within the prescribed limitations, while exercising power of judicial review which is a public law remedy. 41. Time and again, the Apex Court expressed its disconcert about the practice of filing of PILS without any basis to create sensation in the public or popularize themselves in the public through print, electronic media by the persons themselves or at the instance of the persons behind themselves either for personal gain or for political gain. 41. Time and again, the Apex Court expressed its disconcert about the practice of filing of PILS without any basis to create sensation in the public or popularize themselves in the public through print, electronic media by the persons themselves or at the instance of the persons behind themselves either for personal gain or for political gain. Repeatedly, the Apex Court held that none has a right to approach the Court as a public interest litigant and that Court must be careful to see that member of the public, who approaches the Court in public interest, is acting bona fide and not for any personal gain or private profit or political motivation or other oblique considerations. (Vide: S.P. Gupa v. Union of India 1982 (2) SCR 365 ). Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest, an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not be publicity-oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, Court must be careful to see that a body of persons or member of the public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique considerations. The Court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations by masked phantoms who monitor at times from behind. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives, and try to bargain for a good deal as well as to enrich themselves. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busy bodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs. 42. Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent abuse of law from crafty invasions. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busy bodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs. 42. Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent abuse of law from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfering where it is against the social interest and public good. (Vide: "State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu (1994) 2 SCC 481 (supra) "Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation v. GAR Re-Rolling Mills AIR 1994 SC 2151 (supra). No litigant has a right to unlimited draught on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. (Vide:" Dr. B.K. Subbarao v. Mr. K. Parasaran 1996 CriLJ 3983"). Today people rush to Courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name of public interest. They must inspire confidence in Courts and among the public. 43. In matters relating to public interest litigation, the Supreme Court has time and again cautioned that the Court has to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike balance between two conflicting Interests; (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the Court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature. The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public spirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public spirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect, Reference can be made to the recent decision of the Apex Court in "Holioow Pictures Pvt., Ltd., v. Prem Chandra Mishra and others 2008 (1) CTC 711 ". 44. In "S.P. Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda (1996) 6 SCC 734 ", the Supreme Court held as follows: "It is of utmost importance that those who invoke this Court's jurisdiction seeking a waiver of the locus standi rule must exercise restraint in moving the Court by not plunging in areas wherein they are not well-versed. Such a litigant must not succumb to spasmodic sentiments and behave like a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of issues providing publicity. He must remember that as a person seeking to espouse a public cause, he owes it to the public as well as to the court that he does not rush to court without undertaking are search, even if he is qualified or competent to raise the issue. Besides, it must be remembered that a good cause can be lost if petitions are fled on half-baked information without proper research or by persons who are not qualified and competent to raise such issues as the rejection of such a petition may affect third party rights. Lastly, it must also be borne in mind that no one has a right to the waiver of the locus standi rule and the court should permit it only when it is satisfied that the carriage of proceedings is in the competent hands of a person who is genuinely concerned in public interest and is not moved by other extraneous considerations. So also the court must be careful to ensure that the process of the Court is not sought to be abused by a person who desires to persist with his point of view, almost carrying it to the point of obstinacy, by filling a series of petitions refusing to accept the Cut's earlier decisions as concluding the point. So also the court must be careful to ensure that the process of the Court is not sought to be abused by a person who desires to persist with his point of view, almost carrying it to the point of obstinacy, by filling a series of petitions refusing to accept the Cut's earlier decisions as concluding the point. We say this Court, he brushed them aside, without so much as showing willingness to deal with them and without giving them a second look, as having become stale and irrelevant by passage of time and challenged their correctness on the specious plea that they needed reconsideration. Except for saying that they needed reconsideration he had no answer to the correctness of the decisions. Such a casual approach to considered decisions of this Court even by a person well-versed in law would not be countenanced. Instead, as pointed out earlier, he referred to decisions having no bearing on the question, like the decisions on cow slaughter cases, freedom of speech and expression, uniform civil code, etc., we need say no more except to point out that indiscriminate of this important lever of public interest litigation would blunt the lever itself." 45. In "Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. 2003 (8) Supreme 299 : 2004 (3) ALT 10.2 (DN SC) : 2004 (2) SBR 76 : (2004) 3 SCC 349 (supra), the Apex Court, after considering few decisions, on the aspect of public interest litigation, observed as follows: "When there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, said petition is to be thrown out. Before we grapple with 'the issue involved in the present case, we feel it necessary to consider the issue regarding public interest aspect. Public Interest Litigation which has now come to occupy an important filed in the administration of law should not be "publicity interest litigation" or "private interest litigation" or "politics interest litigation" or the latest trend "paise income litigation". If not properly regulated and abuse averted it becomes also a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreck vengeance, as well. There must be real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and not merely an adventure of knight errant or poke ones into for a probe. If not properly regulated and abuse averted it becomes also a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreck vengeance, as well. There must be real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and not merely an adventure of knight errant or poke ones into for a probe. It cannot also be invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. Courts of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants by resorting to the extraordinary jurisdiction. A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. These aspects were highlighted by the Court in "The Janta dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992) 4 SCC 305 (supra)" and "Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation 1994 Supp (2) SCC 116". A writ petitioner who conies to the Court for relief in public interest must come not only with clean hands like any other writ petitioner but also with a clean heart, clean mind and clean objective. [See "Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 852 " "K.R. Srinivas v. R.M. Premchand (1994) 6 SCC 620 ";. 46. In "Sachidanad Pandey v. State of W.B. (1987) 2 SCC 295 " the Apex Court held as follows: "Today public spirited litigants rush to courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name. They must inspire confidence in courts and among the public. They must be above suspicion. Public interest litigation has now come to stay. But one is led to think that it poses a threat to courts and public alike. Such cases are now fled without any rhyme or reason. It is, therefore, necessary to lay down clear guidelines and to outline the correct parameters for entertainment of such petitions. If courts do not restrict the free flow of such cases in the name of public interest litigations, the traditional litigation will suffer and the courts of law, instead of dispensing justice, will have to take upon themselves administrative and executive functions. If courts do not restrict the free flow of such cases in the name of public interest litigations, the traditional litigation will suffer and the courts of law, instead of dispensing justice, will have to take upon themselves administrative and executive functions. I will be second to none in extending help when such help is required. But this does not mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk in. it is necessary to have some self-imposed restraint on public interest litigants." 47. In "Ramsharari Autyanupratsi v. Union of India 1989 Supp (1) SCC 251", it is held that the 'public interest litigation' is an instrument of the administration of justice to be used properly in proper cases. [See also "Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161 ". 48. In "Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar (1976) 1 SCC 671 (supra)" The Apex Court held that the application of the busybody should be rejected at the threshold in the following terms. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) 'person aggrieved'; (ii) 'stranger'; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono public, thought they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spooking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busy bodies at the threshold. 49. This sacrosanct jurisdiction of Public Interest Litigation should be invoked very sparingly and in favour of vigilant litigant and not for the persons who invoke this jurisdiction for the sake of publicity or for the purpose of serving their private ends. 50. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busy bodies at the threshold. 49. This sacrosanct jurisdiction of Public Interest Litigation should be invoked very sparingly and in favour of vigilant litigant and not for the persons who invoke this jurisdiction for the sake of publicity or for the purpose of serving their private ends. 50. Public Interest Litigation is no doubt a very useful handle for redressing the grievances of the people but unfortunately lately it has been abused by some interested persons and it has brought very bad name. Courts should be very very slow in entertaining petitions involving public interest in very rare case where public at large stand to suffer. This jurisdiction is meant for the purpose of coming to the rescue of the down trodden and not for the purpose of serving private ends. It has now become common for unscrupulous people to serve their private ends and jeopardize the rights of innocent people so as to wreak vengeance for their personal ends. This has become very handy to the developers and in matters of public contracts. In order to serve their professional rivalry they utilize the service of the innocent people or organization in filing public interest litigation. The Courts are sometimes persuaded to issue certain directions without understanding implication and giving a handle in the hands of the authorities to misuse it. Therefore, the Courts should not exercise this jurisdiction lightly but should exercise in a very rare and few cases involving public interest of large number of people who cannot afford litigation and are made to suffer at the hands of the authorities. 51. It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts., innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants. 51. It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts., innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants. Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievance go unnoticed, un-represented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and substantial rights and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue delay in service matters government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of tax cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenu expecting their release from the detention orders etc. are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the Courts and having their grievances redressed, the busy bodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no real public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffing their cases by wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get into the Courts by filling vexatious and frivolous petitions of luxury litigants who have nothing to loose but trying to gain for nothing and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts and, as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the Court never moves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants. 52. In "Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v. Union of India (2008) 5 SCC 511 " the Apex Court held as follows: "59. Unfortunately, the truth is that PILs are being entertained by many courts as a routine and the result is that the dockets of most of the superior courts are flooded with PILs, most of which are frivolous or for which the judiciary has no remedy. Unfortunately, the truth is that PILs are being entertained by many courts as a routine and the result is that the dockets of most of the superior courts are flooded with PILs, most of which are frivolous or for which the judiciary has no remedy. As stated in "Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharastra AIR 2005 SC 540 " public interest litigation has nowadays largely become 'publicity interest litigation', 'private interest litigation', or', politics interest litigation' or the latest trend 'paise income litigation'. Much of P.I.L. is really blackmail. 60. Thus, Public Interest Litigation which was initially created as a useful judicial tool to help the poor and weaker section of society who could not afford to come to courts, has, in courts, has, in course of time, largely developed into an uncontrollable Frankenstein and a nuisance which is threatening to choke the dockets of the superior courts obstructing the hearing of the genuine and regular cases which have been waiting to be taken up for years together." 69. Therefore, whether to entertain the petition in the form of Public Interest Litigation either represented by public-spirited person; or private interest litigation in the guise of public interest litigation is to be examined in the facts and circumstances recited in the petition itself. I am" also of the view that if there is a buffer zone unoccupied by the legislature or executive which is detrimental to the public interest, judiciary must occupy the field to subserve public interest. Therefore, each case has to be examined on its own facts." 53. The Apex Court discussed about the scope of the public interest litigation in the context of transparency and probity in governance (vide:" Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226 " "Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India (2003) 7 SCC 532", "Rajiv Ran/an Singh "Lalan" (VIII) v. Union of India (2006) 6 SCC 613 ". "M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2007) 1 SCC 110 "). 54. These are few cases where the Supreme Court and the High Courts broadened the scope of public interest litigation and also entertained petitions to ensure that in governance of the State, there is transparency and no extraneous considerations are taken into consideration except the public interest. These cases regarding probity in governance or corruption in public interest. 54. These are few cases where the Supreme Court and the High Courts broadened the scope of public interest litigation and also entertained petitions to ensure that in governance of the State, there is transparency and no extraneous considerations are taken into consideration except the public interest. These cases regarding probity in governance or corruption in public interest. These cases regarding probity in governance or corruption in public life dealt with by the courts can be placed in the third phase of public interest litigation. One of the major contentions raised before this Court is that the petition is filed to wreak vengeance against the 5th respondent as he stopped construction of shopping complex of Gulzar Chowk Mosque and grave yard and such public interest litigation cannot be encouraged by the Courts. By applying the above principles, we hold that the present trumpery petition as PIL is only to settle the personal scores and vendetta by abusing process of the Courts. 55. Therefore, in view of the law declared by the Apex Court in the judgments (referred supra) the Court can order investigation into the cases, when serious issues were brought to the notice of the Court. 56. Before we grapple with the issue involved in the present case, we feel it necessary to consider the issue regarding public interest aspect. Public interest litigation which has now come to occupy an important field in the administration of law should not be "publicity interest litigation" or "private interest litigation" or "politics interest litigation" or the latest trend "paise income litigation". The High Court has found that the case at hand belongs to the last category. If not properly regulated and abuse averted, it becomes also a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreak vengeance, as well. There must be real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and not merely an adventure of a knight errant borne out of wishful thinking. It cannot also be invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. Courts of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants by resorting to the extraordinary jurisdiction. It cannot also be invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. Courts of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants by resorting to the extraordinary jurisdiction. A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [ (1992) 4 SCC 305 ] and Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. CDI [1994 Supp (2) SCC 116]. A writ petitioner who comes to the court for relief in public interest must come not only with clean hands like any other writ petitioner but also with a clean heart, clean mind and clean objective. (See Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India (1993 Supp (2) SCC 20] and K.R. Srinivas v. R.M. Premchand [ (1994) 6 SCC 620 ].) 57. It is necessary to take note of the meaning of the expression "public interest litigation". In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 4 (4th Edn.), "public interest" is defined thus: "Public interest:- (1) A matter of public or general interest 'does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement; but that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected'..." 58. In Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edn.), "public interest" is defined as follows: "Public interest:-Something in which the public, the community at large, has come pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, or as the interests of the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question Interest shared by citizens generally in affairs of local, State or national Government." 59. In Janata Dal case 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 (supra), the apex Court considered the scope of public interest litigation. In para 53 of the said judgment, after considering what is public interest, has laid down as follows: (SCC p. 331) "53. In Janata Dal case 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 (supra), the apex Court considered the scope of public interest litigation. In para 53 of the said judgment, after considering what is public interest, has laid down as follows: (SCC p. 331) "53. The expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all proceedings therein, initiated in a court of law with the purpose of enforcing a right or seeking a remedy. Therefore lexically the expression 'PIL' means a legal action initiated in a court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected." 60. In matters relating to public interest litigation, the Supreme Court has time and again cautioned that the Court has to be satisfied about certain guidelines to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of Indian para - 14 which are as follows: (a) The credentials of the applicant; (b) The prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; (c) The information being not vague and indefinite The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike a balance between two conflicting interests: (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the executive and the legislature. The court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with impostors and busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public-spirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono public, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. 61. The Court must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law from crafty invasions while maintaining the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere if it is against the social interest and public good. 61. The Court must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law from crafty invasions while maintaining the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere if it is against the social interest and public good. (See State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu [ (1994) 2 SCC 481 ] and A.P. State Financial Corpn. v. Prabhu [ (1994) 2 SCC 647 ]). 62. Though a writ petition is not maintainable as a public interest litigation, the way how this 5th respondent could get appointment on deputation in various departments would clearly show that he is highly influential and able to secure employment in various departments on deputation. But his continuation as a public servant i.e. the Municipal Commissioner of Gudivada Municipality on account of pendency of enquiry cannot be termed as against the interest of the institution since the allegations made against him are minor in nature i.e. granting of leave, loss of pay etc. But that continuation would not hamper the enquiry, if any, ordered against him. However, it is clear from the record that during the tenure of the 5th respondent, he served as Veterinary Assistant Surgeon, Pattimpale, Tadepalligudem Mandal, from 26-2-2000 to 18-6-2002 and later at Allampuram, Petapadu Mandal, from 19-6-2002 to 19-1-2011. Thereafter, his working in different departments on deputation i.e. from 20-1-2011 onwards till date i.e. for a period of eight years. His -service in the parent department is only for a period of eleven years, whereas in the other departments in about eight years as on date. To ensure good governance, to maintain purity in administration and with a hope that the Government will take necessary steps to repatriate the 5th respondent to its parent department, subject to desirability of continuation of 5th respondent either as a Municipal Commissioner or as Veterinary -Assistant Surgeon in Animal Husbandry and Dairy Development Department, we are of considered view that the PIL is not maintainable in service matters. 63. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no ground to issue any direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of mandamus. 64. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed. No costs.